@Lubliner
@NedBaldwin
@Eric Calistri
We haven't heard from Ned or Eric, so I am not sure how much they may have amended their views on this subject and as I respect both of them, I would certainly be interested in hearing from them, but to summarize, the way I see it, based on my examination of the available record, essentially, is that it was an aggressive plan, rapidly formulated, on the basis of a potential opportunity which had been presented from Price seizing and moving into Iuka with his Army of the West and not continuing to move, despite having Bear Creek at his back, which could be crossed, but only via narrow corridors, which is what one wants to avoid having at their back, if practicable. Following Iuka having been taken, Grant began to draw in the Army of the Tennessee and once the situation was sufficiently understood, via Mower's reconnaissance against Iuka, seeing the potential opportunity, provided that they could move fast enough and following discussions with Rosecrans, Grant made the proposition that they launch a joint attack against the Army of the West via significant elements of both the Army of the Tennessee and the Army of the Mississippi while the Army of the West was still isolated. Grant, initially, proposed that the Army of the Tennessee strike via the roads through Burnsville. Ord, who had reached Corinth with John McArthur's and Thomas Davies' Divisions, would move from Corinth to Burnsville and be supplemented by Leonard Ross' Division moving from Bolivar, which was moving down to Glendale, per Grant's orders to support Mower's force which had fallen back to Burnsville following its reconnaissance against Iuka. From there, they would move against Iuka via the roads from the direction of Burnsville north of the Memphis & Charleston Railroad. It will be recalled that these Divisions were all quite
heavily depleted in strength by September of '62. Ord stated in his report that his entire force involved in the operation numbered approximately 8,000 men. (17 OR 1: 117-119) Grant estimated the size of the force in his second report at over 6,000 men, but admitted that he had not seen Ord's report at that point and so those figures could be inaccurate. (17 OR 1: 65-66) The Army's returns are available for more precise figures, but would need to be looked at again that way. Grant himself would move to Burnsville, as well. Meanwhile, Rosecrans would move with his forces via the roads leading to Iuka south of the Burnsville road.
To this, Rosecrans objected on the basis that the elements of Hamilton's Division who he would operate with were already at Jacinto (Stanley's Division had been seriously divided due to the operation against Iuka in order to discern what was being confronted on the 15th via Mower's brigade, but Mower's brigade was pulled back to Camp Clear Creek from where they moved with Fuller's brigade on the 18th), that the roads south of the railroad from Burnsville to Iuka were, in his words, "full of morasses and covered with brush, which would be difficult to operate in" and due to the ability of the Confederate Army to fall back if attacked. Rosecrans plan, very similar to what had been recommended to him by C.S. Hamilton on the night of September 17th, would be to move with Hamilton's and Stanley's Divisions via Jacinto to the roads entering Iuka from the Tuscumbia road from Barnett's Crossroads eastwards, what were the Jacinto and Fulton roads, from where they could move in from the south and with Ord opening the attack at the pre-arranged time, conduct a combined strike from both the west and from the south, pressing the enemy heavily in order to deprive them not only of the ability to move southwards, but also, fundamentally, to deprive them of the ability to pull back to the east via Bear Creek. Additionally, if possible, they would try to "crush in the enemy's left" in order to interpose between them and their ability to withdraw across Bear Creek under the cover of night and optimally to destroy them. Grant approved the plan and it was set into motion.
In order for that to actually work, they would need to:
-Move rapidly enough that they could get in on the Army of the West before they could pull out of Iuka in the interim, as one would anticipate that they would do at any time, due to the precariousness and potential vulnerability of their position, as well as the obvious understanding that there was no way that Price had moved north with the intention of fighting both the Army of the Tennessee and the Army of the Mississippi with only his small Army, meaning that the clock was ticking.
-Sufficiently prevent the Army of the West from pulling out to the south via the Jacinto and/or Fulton roads with U.S. forces which were
individually wholly insufficient to deal with a concerted attack upon either of them while isolated if covering both the Jacinto and the Fulton roads and would be very hard pressed if attacked as a conjoined force in the south, or if Ord's forces were attacked along their front from Iuka.
-Move to Iuka via coordinated movements which would result in U.S. forces launching the attacks in rapid succession for the reason of conducting the operation with only a slight numerical superiority in
total and due to the need to press the Army of the West hard enough that they would be inhibited from falling back across Bear Creek, with the attacks hopefully opening via the stronger force component operating via the Burnsville front,
if possible/practicable.
-Get into a position in which the attack from the south, supported by the attacks from the west via the Burnsville approaches, could drive in the Army of the West sufficiently, or crush in their left sufficiently, that they would not be able to pull back across Bear Creek following the culmination of fighting
except in the unlikely event that they were wholly destroyed during the day. Clearly, if pressed, it would be dramatically more difficult to pull back via any narrow corridor. The attacks would not be able to prevent such after nightfall, however, which is why this was essential.
In addition to this, Price had out pickets which would (and did) see the movements coming and once detected, it would be difficult to not press the operation to its conclusion, even if there were hold-ups, or delays, as Price could always use the cover of night to simply pull back to the east across Bear Creek. Those would be the factors driving Rosecrans' actions, logically extending from his well recorded correspondence regarding the operation with Grant.
Failure of
any of those four would
probably result in the failure of the operation, at least in terms of it being able to destroy the Army of the West.
That, I think, is what the contemporary record, supplemented via the reports and other sources, weighed against the relevant contemporary record and what else we know, tells us.
In terms of the progress of the operation as it was implemented, I provided some on it in Posts #158, #163 and #165.
Regarding that, I will just briefly
additionally state that it is
possible that Grant's understanding of the situation as it existed at the time did not accord with Rosecrans' understanding that way as far as the ability of the Confederate Army to pull back across Bear Creek was concerned. His correspondence of September 16th to Halleck, however, would seem to indicate that it was, although it could be argued that that isn't necessarily dispositive that way. However, it should also be noted that Rosecrans communications regarding the plan were with Grant, so he
would have at least known Rosecrans understanding of the situation and would have been aware of the forces of Rosecrans command which had crossed Bear Creek from the east following Price moving against Iuka. So, we
do know that he was at the mercy of his recollection on this having been a bit off certainly by the time he wrote his
Memoirs. In his second report he merely stated that with the Fulton road occupied there would have been no retreat open to the Confederate Army except to the east, with the difficult bottom of Bear Creek to cross, northeast with the Tennessee river to cross, or to break their way out. This was all true and was all that he said on that subject. It was an implied, albeit not an explicit criticism of Rosecrans that way, but he then went on to affirm that his examination of the ground after the battle confirmed the inability of units to support one another via the Jacinto and Fulton roads. Again, though, the contemporary record is quite clear on the point, regardless. This is not a criticism of him, per se, nor should it be viewed as such. That is
not something which is especially uncommon and no source,
especially written after the fact, is infallible, of course. That should, obviously, really all go without saying.
Now, at least one other thing should be noted here which is interesting that way, as well. Ord included in his report the message which he received from Ross, timestamped at 4:00 P.M. on September 19th, in which Ross stated:
"For the last twenty minutes there has been a dense smoke arising from the direction of Iuka. I conclude that the enemy are evacuating and destroying the stores."
How intricately the Division commanders of the Army of the Tennessee knew, or understood, the larger plan at the time is a debatable point, but Ord himself, at least, must have understood Rosecrans role in the larger plan, which can be gleaned from the contemporary correspondence contained in his report between himself and Grant. If Ross (and/or the other Divisional level commanders of the Army of the Tennessee) were privy to it, as well, then it would beg the question, if the Army of the Mississippi was moving up from the south via the Jacinto and Fulton roads (as Grant would always state that he had never been made aware of Rosecrans' decision at the time to move via only the Jacinto road), then where else other than across Bear Creek did Ross suppose the Confederate Army was retreating? Is just one other small thing which is worth taking note of that way. Now, of course, the smoke which they were
actually seeing may have been from the beginning of the escalation of the fighting between Rosecrans' forces and the Confederates south of Iuka, but this wasn't sufficiently understood at the time.
Now, I would say several things on all of this. First, there
is considerable evidence to support that Grant did at least
try to alter the plan and have Rosecrans attack become the opening attack and that he seemed to have believed that such had been sufficiently conveyed to Rosecrans in that Ord seemed to be aware of the supposed change in plans.
However, it is
not clear that it was understood in Ord's command at all that that would not come until the following morning, as Grant stated in an account later on and regardless of whether Rosecrans had moved via both the Jacinto and the Fulton roads, their fighting was
not heard by Ord's command
anyways. It would seem unlikely, albeit not impossible, that had Rosecrans moved via both roads and the fighting erupted with him having done so that that situation would have been much different. Second, provided that the conception of the plan as it was put forth was correct in the assessment regarding the potential of the Army of the West falling back across Bear Creek, which the evidence separately indicates that it almost certainly was, the attack coming from the west earlier would not necessarily have been sufficient, Rosecrans later frustration on this point to the contrary, because once night fell, the Confederate force could no longer be pressed, or at least it would become extremely difficult to do so. At that point, under the cover of darkness, Price could have pulled the Army back across Bear Creek (albeit
probably having to abandon his wounded and
possibly some of his wagons/and or artillery) unless the Army of the Mississippi had
also been able to attack and "crush in" the Confederate left between them and the creek, hence interposing between the Confederates and the creek and depriving them of the ability to cross, as Rosecrans had stated. There is no guarantee that they would have been able to do so even had Ord's attacks opened immediately prior to the Army of the Mississippi being prepared to attack and without the Confederates having intercepted them as they did. It
certainly doesn't seem clear that they would have been able to do so had Ord's attacks come in
after the fighting involving the Army of the Mississippi had already opened.
So, it is
obviously superficial to conclude that the operation failed because the Army of the Mississippi didn't move up the Fulton road because a concerted attack upon the National forces moving isolated on each road would have most likely broken through and regardless, the plan was formulated in recognition of the fact that the Army of the West could always pull back via Bear Creek to the east, at least if not pressed hard and possibly regardless under the cover of night unless their left was crushed in. The attack from the south which would prevent them from being able to do that (in conjunction with the attack from the west) would not be able to go forward until
after Rosecrans forces had reached the connecting road in the first place, which, of course, would permit them to
also cover the Fulton road and enable mutual support between them. Now, it is true, that at 10:30 P.M. on the night of the 19th, Rosecrans sent a message to Grant pressing him on how essential it would be that they attack at dawn, obviously hoping that the Confederate forces would still be there, but obviously they had not satisfied the conditions which would have ensured that such would have been the case.
So, properly understood, this was an aggressive and bold plan, formulated and put into effect by highly enterprising officers hoping to be able to take advantage of an opportunity which had suddenly been presented to them, via what was, probably a strategic mistake on Price's part by electing to sit in a potentially vulnerable position at Iuka for as long as he did. The National forces potentially had enough men available to capitalize on this opportunity, but not by much and it would require precision in timing and implementation and probably even a little bit of luck. It can be fairly characterized as something akin to drawing to an inside straight, but they were going to try. If you don't take shots, you will never hit one. If you don't go after the enemy, you will never catch them.
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