Random Thoughts on Iuka

[Nathan Towne]

One unanswered question about Iuka that keeps coming up is whether or not Rosecrans actually knew that due to his running late, the plan had been changed. Rosecrans denied he'd been told, and he claimed Dickey and Lagow merely made "suggestions." But after Lagow joined up with Rosecrans, he sent a message back to Grant informing him that "your dispatch to Genl. Rosecrans rec'd." This implies that Dickey and Lagow didn't just go to Rosecrans with a verbal message from Grant. They also carried a written dispatch from Grant. That makes it even more unlikely that Rosecrans didn't know that the plan had changed.

View attachment 520037

Yes. That is an important discussion that way. Which source regarding Lagow are you using there?

I have thoughts on that topic, as well.

 

[DanSBHawk]

Yes. That is an important discussion that way. Which source regarding Lagow are you using there?

I have thoughts on that topic, as well.

PUSG

 

[Nathan Towne]

Well, we have to recognize what is meant by "rapidly converged." The Jacinto and Fulton roads met the Tuscumbia road around 4 1/2 to 5 miles from one another and converged to within about 1 1/2 miles from one another as they neared Iuka, give or take. The Bay Springs road was quite close to the town, but the existence of which was well known before the operation was put into motion.

The fundamental problem was that it was a race against the clock, as the Army of the West could always pull back to the east via Bear Creek, especially if not substantially pressed. So, as the timetable fell behind and Grant was notified of such, it became problematic in that Grant then elected to withhold the attack and per his account, to actually alter the plan and so inform Rosecrans, or so attempt to inform him, at least to the effect that the Army of the Mississippi would open the attack. The trouble is that, first, it is very unclear that this was received or understood by Rosecrans, second it may have resulted in Price being able to respond more sufficiently to the southern threat and finally it proved to be unworkable in that Ord's forces were unable to hear the fighting as it opened, regardless and hence never moved, which would have still been the case had Rosecrans sent Hamilton's Division via the Fulton Road, as originally planned. So, if Rosecrans had moved via both roads and the fighting opened on one or on both roads, it isn't like Ord's forces would have then picked up the attack unless for some bizarre reason they would have been able to hear fighting on the Fulton road or on a different section of the Jacinto road/Bay Springs road which they were unable to hear historically in how events actually transpired.

Yet, Rosecrans couldn't stop and simply cover both roads because forces on each road could not support one another and had Price fallen on one or the other with substantial force, prior to them reaching the Bay Springs road, the consequences would have been severe indeed, but also because he had a duty to support Ord's attacks if they were to go forward and most importantly if the Army of the West was not hit hard and their ability to pull back via Bear Creek that night greatly impeded, they would simply do so, as the Confederates were fully aware at this point that they were coming, which Rosecrans would have known to be the case as they had been driving back the Confederate pickets that morning and afternoon.

At this point, you see how the situation began to snowball each way, operating with bare minimums in terms of force strength requisite for an operation like this relative to Confederate strength, with responsibilities to one another which had to upheld and honored, the extreme difficulty in effectively and quickly communicating with one another and the constant threat that the Army of the West was always liable to begin pulling back via Bear Creek, which was fundamental in the conception and articulation of the plan.

As I quoted earlier, here is Rosecrans to Grant, first regarding the conception of the plan:

"Hamilton has sent out Mizner with a regiment and all our cavalry, toward Barnett's on the Jacinto and Iuka Roads. The only thing that we can do to prevent Price's passing through the defiles of Bear Creek east is to push that division on him and follow it with all of Stanley's force while Ross makes a strong demonstration on his front. This is safe for a day or two if we can keep spies from running to Breckinridge and Van Dorn and Price and you can hold your hand against them. I can pursue with my entire force, which, including Du Bois and Danville, will be about 13,000 men of all arms."

And additionally:

"If Price's forces are at Iuka the plan I propose is to move up as close as we can tonight and conceal our movements; Ord to advance from Burnsville, commence the attack, and draw their attention that way, while I move in on the Jacinto and Fulton Roads, massing heavily on the Fulton Road, and crushing in their left and cutting off their retreat eastward. I propose to leave in ten minutes for Jacinto from whence I will dispatch you by a line of vedettes to Burnsville."

The plan was approved and was set into motion, but there wasn't enough time to ensure that all units were in appropriate positions for launching the operation. Stanley's Division was well out of position and had to first be moved to Jacinto, which took longer than had been optimistically forecast (which I have studied, as well) and again, all the while, the clock was ticking. Also, it has to be remembered, that per his plan, Rosecrans had assigned himself the brutal aspect of this (authorized, of course, by Grant). His forces were to move much further and were responsible for blocking not only the escape routes to the south, but also to make the crushing attack against the Confederate left in order to attempt to interpose themselves between the Army of the West and Bear Creek.

To be sure. I would agree with that. These last several comments have been productive that way.

The point was that covering those two roads was not seen as sufficient (and I see good reason in corroborating sources for Rosecrans formulation of the plan regarding that doing so alone would not be sufficient), as the Army of the West could fall back to the east across Bear Creek, unless heavily pressed from the south and their ability to fall back via Bear Creek was impeded to them that way. They weren't going to be pressing them from the south unless they got to the Bay Springs Road (or the connecting road which has been interpreted as being the Bay Springs Road) in the first place. So, in light of the impossibility of mutual support between the Jacinto and Fulton roads before reaching the connecting road, moving with only two Divisions, four brigades total, being behind the timetable already and needing to get there as soon as possible and with Lagow and Dickey having possibly sown some confusion regarding what Rosecrans stated he had been told about the forces from Burnsville, you can very quickly see the logic that way.

Furthermore, let's say that Rosecrans had not done so and instead had sent Hamilton's Division up the Fulton road as originally planned. First, even if successful in getting up the connecting road with both Divisions, it may have been dark before they were in action and Rosecrans can't come back and state later that he simply wasn't there when the attack from Burnsville went forward. He has a fiduciary responsibility to his brother officers. However, even more importantly, they probably would not have been to hold if hit hard, on either road, by either of the two Confederate Divisions, or by both of them, anyways, putting aside the prospect of the Army if the West pulling back via Bear Creek. Price had around 12,000 men (and U.S. estimates still had them as being bigger than that). I would have to look at the figures again, but my recollection is that Sanborn's and Sullivan's brigades (Stanley's Division) each had around 2,200 men PFD. They could have been attacked on the Fulton road, of course and that wouldn't be just a discussion to the effect that they wouldn't have been able to hold. It could be even far worse than that. Most importantly though, as stated at the top of this comment, if you don't get up into position to hit them from the south and greatly hamper their ability to fall back to the east, say that night, then it is not going to matter anyways and in order to do that, you are going to have to make it to the connecting road in the first place, anyways.

 

[DanSBHawk]

To be sure. I would agree with that. These last several comments have been productive that way.

The point was that covering those two roads was not seen as sufficient (and I see good reason in corroborating sources for Rosecrans formulation of the plan regarding that doing so alone would not be sufficient), as the Army of the West could fall back to the east across Bear Creek, unless heavily pressed from the south and their ability to fall back via Bear Creek was impeded to them that way. They weren't going to be pressing them from the south unless they got to the Bay Springs Road (or the connecting road which has been interpreted as being the Bay Springs Road) in the first place. So, in light of the impossibility of mutual support between the Jacinto and Fulton roads before reaching the connecting road, moving with only two Divisions, four brigades total, being behind the timetable already and needing to get there as soon as possible and with Lagow and Dickey having possibly sown some confusion regarding what Rosecrans stated he had been told about the forces from Burnsville, you can very quickly see the logic that way.

Furthermore, let's say that Rosecrans had not done so and instead had sent Hamilton's Division up the Fulton road as originally planned. First, even if successful in getting up the connecting road with both Divisions, it may have been dark before they were in action and Rosecrans can't come back and state later that he simply wasn't there when the attack from Burnsville went forward. He has a fiduciary responsibility to his brother officers. However, even more importantly, they probably would not have been to hold if hit hard, on either road, by either of the two Confederate Divisions, or by both of them, anyways, putting aside the prospect of the Army if the West pulling back via Bear Creek. Price had around 12,000 men (and U.S. estimates still had them as being bigger than that). I would have to look at the figures again, but my recollection is that Sanborn's and Sullivan's brigades (Stanley's Division) each had around 2,200 men PFD. They could have been attacked on the Fulton road, of course and that wouldn't be just a discussion to the effect that they wouldn't have been able to hold. It could be even far worse than that. Most importantly though, as stated at the top of this comment, if you don't get up into position to hit them from the south and greatly hamper their ability to fall back to the east, say that night, then it is not going to matter anyways and in order to do that, you are going to have to make it to the connecting road in the first place, anyways.

I disagree with all of this. Yes, if Rosecrans came up both roads as everyone expected him to, he probably would not have gotten in position before dark. The battle would have been delayed until the next morning. And Grant expected this.

From Grant's report:
"During the day General Ord returned to my
Headquarters at Iuka, and in consultation we both agreed that it
would be impossible for General Rosecrans to get his troops up
in time to make an attack that day. The General was instructed,
however, to move forward driving in the enemy's advanced
guards, but not to bring on an engagement unless he should hear
firing."

So Grant was expecting that the battle would take place the next morning.

 

[Nathan Towne]

I disagree with all of this. Yes, if Rosecrans came up both roads as everyone expected him to, he probably would not have gotten in position before dark. The battle would have been delayed until the next morning. And Grant expected this.

From Grant's report:
"During the day General Ord returned to my
Headquarters at Iuka, and in consultation we both agreed that it
would be impossible for General Rosecrans to get his troops up
in time to make an attack that day. The General was instructed,
however, to move forward driving in the enemy's advanced
guards, but not to bring on an engagement unless he should hear
firing."

So Grant was expecting that the battle would take place the next morning.

Yes, I know.

Grant was not consistent from his first report to his second and subsequently to his Memoirs on this at all. His recollection on the details did not always accord with the available record on this (nor with his other accounts on it). The historian approaches every source with responsibility and care that way.

What we know from the contemporary correspondence is that if not hit on the 19th, the whole conception of the plan recognized that the Army of the West would/could simply pull back to the east via Bear Creek. That was the whole basis upon which the plan was built, which we know from the contemporary correspondence, as has been shown above.

You have chosen to just completely ignore the contemporary record, which is not surprising based on past experiences with you, but I don't think that you will convince many people of much doing that if they have the pertinent record at their disposal. If the final conclusion is just that we are going to accept a later account from a report or from someone's Memoirs, uncritically and without respect to the available record and the other historical actors involved, then we kind of miss the entire point in terms of historical inquiry is responsibly conducted and it is just an exercise in cherry-picking information in order to support one thing or another. Not to mention that in this case, Grant's two reports and his Memoirs are not consistent on the subject from one to the other to the other, regardless, so you ultimately have to pick one doing that, anyways.

 

[DanSBHawk]

You have chosen to just completely ignore the contemporary record...

Absolutely false.

Grant and Ord expected the battle would not take place late in the afternoon of the 19th. They mistakenly thought that Rosecrans was sticking with the plan to come up both roads, and so the battle would have to be delayed until morning because there was no way that a column could reach Cartersville and then turn north on the Fulton Road and reach Iuka before dark.

The Bear Creek thing is being exaggerated here far beyond it's actual relevance. If the confederates wanted to attempt the Bear Creek route, they had all day on the 19th to get going. The Fulton road is the primary issue here. It had to be blocked for the plan to succeed.

 

[Nathan Towne]

Absolutely false.

Grant and Ord expected the battle would not take place late in the afternoon of the 19th. They mistakenly thought that Rosecrans was sticking with the plan to come up both roads, and so the battle would have to be delayed until morning because there was no way that a column could reach Cartersville and then turn north on the Fulton Road and reach Iuka before dark.

The Bear Creek thing is being exaggerated here far beyond its actual relevance. If the confederates wanted to attempt the Bear Creek route, they had all day on the 19th to get going. The Fulton road is the primary issue here. It had to be blocked for the plan to succeed.

Please refrain from misstatements like your first sentence above moving forward.

The same statement would apply to the Fulton road. It could have been utilized over the preceding days, but the Army of the West was still there, even if it wasn't going to be for much longer, as was well understood that they were a threat to pull out at any time.

You can only make the comments which you make in the last paragraph if you intentionally ignore the relevant contemporary record, as everyone can obviously see. That is not how I choose to approach history. You have to start by recognizing the relevant contemporary record and operating from there. One can attempt to argue that Rosecrans was wrong that way (which I don't think that he was on the basis of the remaining record) but one can't dispute the plan as it was conceived and must understand decision making on that basis, of course.

 

[DanSBHawk]

Please refrain from misstatements like your first sentence above moving forward.

The same statement would apply to the Fulton road. It could have been utilized over the preceding days, but the Army of the West was still there, even if it wasn't going to be for much longer, as was well understood that they were a threat to pull out at any time.

You can only make the comments which you make in the last paragraph if you intentionally ignore the relevant contemporary record, as everyone can obviously see. That is not how I choose to approach history. You have to start by recognizing the relevant contemporary record and operating from there. One can attempt to argue that Rosecrans was wrong that way (which I don't think that he was on the basis of the remaining record) but one can't dispute the plan as it was conceived and must understand decision making on that basis, of course.

If you make false accusations, I will call it what it is.

As I said, I don't agree with your characterization of the Bear Creek route as being an important part of the battle plan. I've read the contemporary evidence, and have come to a different conclusion. The Bear Creek route would become a more dangerous route simply by having federal troops in close contact with the confederate army. There was no need to block it. There was no intention to try to block it. The only road that needed to be blocked to prevent an escape east was the Fulton road, which Rosecrans recognized in the quote that you keep repeating. He was referring to blocking the Fulton Road, not the Bear Creek bottom route.

 

[Nathan Towne]

If you make false accusations, I will call it what it is.

As I said, I don't agree with your characterization of the Bear Creek route as being an important part of the battle plan. I've read the contemporary evidence, and have come to a different conclusion. The Bear Creek route would become a more dangerous route simply by having federal troops in close contact with the confederate army. There was no need to block it. There was no intention to try to block it. The only road that needed to be blocked to prevent an escape east was the Fulton road, which Rosecrans recognized in the quote that you keep repeating. He was referring to blocking the Fulton Road, not the Bear Creek bottom route.

Nothing I said was false. That would not be true. I accurately characterized things.

If you have read the contemporary correspondence and can't see that, which I am sure everyone else will be able to (and I could provide more if people want me to) then I unfortunately can't help you.

Regarding your claim, you should go read those quotes again, please. The claim that Rosecrans was not referring to a potential crossing of Bear Creek to the east is beyond ridiculous and laughable. He was. People can read Post #158 and will immediately see how preposterous and silly that assertion is. Just read what he said. I could put up additional correspondence, as well, that way, if people wanted. He wasn't going to "block" such crossings. He was trying to prevent the Army of the West from being to pull back via them, but hitting them and ultimately by turning their left between them and the creek.

 

[Lubliner]

Okay, part of this mix up is because the plan revolves around what the confederates will do. Grant does not believe their attempt to retreat along the Bear Creek passage as feasible. But he is still uncertain of the confederate choice. And ultimately Rosecrans becomes baffled because he is uncertain of what Ord is to do. My understanding is that Ord would attack first with Rosecrans support arriving later.
I can't see the idea that thinking we all read the same messages and arrive at the same conclusion as beneficial to this thread. I for one am keeping up the best I can, but to reverse gears and indulge in a conflict of judgement that will remain indeterminate at best is a waste of time. I like Grant, do not wish to backtrack. Let us move forward and remain believers that different shades of gray depend on how much black and white is mixed, and ambiguity in researching reports remains admissible, finding two rights do not make the other wrong.
Lubliner.

 

[Nathan Towne]

Okay, part of this mix up is because the plan revolves around what the confederates will do. Grant does not believe their attempt to retreat along the Bear Creek passage as feasible. But he is still uncertain of the confederate choice. And ultimately Rosecrans becomes baffled because he is uncertain of what Ord is to do. My understanding is that Ord would attack first with Rosecrans support arriving later.
I can't see the idea that thinking we all read the same messages and arrive at the same conclusion as beneficial to this thread. I for one am keeping up the best I can, but to reverse gears and indulge in a conflict of judgement that will remain indeterminate at best is a waste of time. I like Grant, do not wish to backtrack. Let us move forward and remain believers that different shades of gray depend on how much black and white is mixed, and ambiguity in researching reports remains admissible, finding two rights do not make the other wrong.
Lubliner.

That is all well and good, but if one can't read the correspondence and see that, then it is really pretty hopeless. Everyone who actually reads it, aside from maybe the above user, will see that. That isn't a matter with any gray there. Just read it.

Regarding Grant, we have what he stated in his reports and in his Memoirs. Whether his understanding was the same at the time is not clearly expressed that way to my satisfaction one way or the other, but we do know that he was obviously receiving Rosecrans correspondence and authorized the plan. That becomes a more complicated topic the deeper you delve into it.

 

[Lubliner]

we all read the same messages and arrive at the same conclusion

False.

 

[Nathan Towne]

False.

Please go back and read the correspondence which I posted in Post #158 and tell us what is being said.

 

[Lubliner]

it isn't like Ord's forces would have then picked up the attack unless for some bizarre reason they would have been able to hear fighting on the Fulton road or on a different section of the Jacinto road/Bay Springs road which they were unable to hear historically in how events actually transpired.

There was a timetable for Ord to attack, and Rosecrans to move accordingly. Regardless of what could be heard at headquarters, and what messages could be delivered on time, the full failure is due to the Fulton road being left open. Rosecrans and Grant both try to explain this lack of understanding and can't, so I find no possible way for us to either.
Lubliner.

 

[DanSBHawk]

Here is the Rosecrans post that is in dispute:
"If Price's forces are at Iuka the plan I propose is to move up as close as we can tonight and conceal our movements; Ord to advance from Burnsville, commence the attack, and draw their attention that way, while I move in on the Jacinto and Fulton Roads, massing heavily on the Fulton Road, and crushing in their left and cutting off their retreat eastward. I propose to leave in ten minutes for Jacinto from whence I will dispatch you by a line of vedettes to Burnsville."

Rosecrans is saying that by coming in heavily on the Fulton Road, he is "cutting off their retreat eastward."

Rosecrans is right. If a battle is going to happen, the best route for the confederates to retreat eastward, or southward for that matter, is the Fulton Road. He never mentions the Bear Creek route, or anything about trying to block it. He's talking about the Fulton Road.

 

[Lubliner]

"If Price's forces are at Iuka the plan I propose is to move up as close as we can tonight and conceal our movements; Ord to advance from Burnsville, commence the attack, and draw their attention that way, while I move in on the Jacinto and Fulton Roads, massing heavily on the Fulton Road, and crushing in their left and cutting off their retreat eastward. I propose to leave in ten minutes for Jacinto from whence I will dispatch you by a line of vedettes to Burnsville."

I see this as in agreement with Grant's plan as well, but in post #158, Nathan says Ord is waiting to hear the battle commence before attacking. Rosecrans tries to explain away the road left open, and Grant understands the two roads were too far enough apart to permit convergence, after the fact. This also says that Rosecrans was sending a dispatch once he started forward. He never relayed the change in plans by leaving the Fulton road open. He felt his own attack would not allow support if he covered it as he was originally designed to do.
Lubliner.

 

[Nathan Towne]

@DanSBHawk is simply not reading what is posted.

He states above that Rosecrans never mentioned the Bear Creek route or anything about preventing the Army of the West from pulling back across Bear Creek. Let's try this again. Please try again and read through carefully.

To quote again, Rosecrans stated:

"Hamilton has sent out Mizner with a regiment of cavalry, toward's Barnett's on the Jacinto and Iuka roads. The only thing that we can do to prevent Price's passing through the defiles of Bear Creek east is to push that division on him and follow it with all of Stanley's force while Ross makes a strong demonstration on his front. This is safe for a day or two if we can keep spies from running to Breckinridge and Van Dorn and Price and you can hold your hand against them. I can pursue with my entire force, which, including Dubois and Danville, will be about 13,000 men of all arms."

In his additional correspondence which I quoted, Rosecrans stated:

"If Price's forces are at Iuka the plan I propose is to move up close as we can tonight and conceal our movements; Ord to advance from Burnsville, commence the attack and draw their attention that way, while I move on the Jacinto and Fulton roads, massing heavily on the Fulton Road, and crushing in their left and cutting off their retreat eastward. I propose to leave in ten minutes for Jacinto from whence I will dispatch you by a line of vedettes."

In other words, as can be extremely plainly seen, not just to deprive them of the ability to retreat southwards on those roads, but to strike them and crush in their left in order to deprive them of the ability to retreat to the east (via the defiles in Bear Creek), which Rosecrans has highlighted. Not to move up the Fulton road to deprive them of the ability to pull out via the Fulton road, which goes without saying if you are covering that road, which was the intention, but but also to crush in their left and cut off their retreat eastward. Not to crush in their force. To crush in their left. Why? In order to deprive them of the ability to retreat eastwards. Not southwards, which is deprived to them by covering the Jacinto and Fulton roads, provided that they wouldn't break through. Eastwards. Extremely plain english and wholly consistent with the quote provided above which was intentionally neglected.

 

[Nathan Towne]

I see this as in agreement with Grant's plan as well, but in post #158, Nathan says Ord is waiting to hear the battle commence before attacking. Rosecrans tries to explain away the road left open, and Grant understands the two roads were too far enough apart to permit convergence, after the fact. This also says that Rosecrans was sending a dispatch once he started forward. He never relayed the change in plans by leaving the Fulton road open. He felt his own attack would not allow support if he covered it as he was originally designed to do.
Lubliner.

The first sentence is not what I was saying there. The rest is reconcilable for the most part.

 

[Nathan Towne]

There was a timetable for Ord to attack, and Rosecrans to move accordingly. Regardless of what could be heard at headquarters, and what messages could be delivered on time, the full failure is due to the Fulton road being left open. Rosecrans and Grant both try to explain this lack of understanding and can't, so I find no possible way for us to either.
Lubliner.

I disagree with this for reasons previously stated.

 

[DanSBHawk]

So in one dispatch, Rosecrans says the way to stop the confederates from just "passing" through the defiles of Bear Creek is to send a force directly at them to apply pressure. Okay.

In the next dispatch, Rosecrans says that the way to cut off their "retreat eastward," is to mass heavily on the Fulton road. Okay.

I agree that it's plain English. And even more importantly it's just common sense. The best route, by far, for the confederates to "retreat eastward" was the Fulton Road. Everyone who was there, whether it was Rosecrans or Grant or Price or whoever... realized this. The way to block an confederate retreat eastward was to block the Fulton Road.

Perhaps someone trying a little too hard to come up with a unique angle to the battle might misunderstand and misread the evidence. I'm going to stick with the people who were there, such as Grant.