1SGDan
Major
- Joined
- Dec 13, 2009
- Location
- New Hampshire
Mac was told to move forward and did not. His failure to do so left the administration no alternative but to recall him. It was not intervention but prevention.
Mac was told to move forward and did not. His failure to do so left the administration no alternative but to recall him. It was not intervention but prevention.
You may also be right. That's the beauty of it. Educated people can disagree on the interpretation of historical events. I've always believed that Lee intended to go into PA. That's why McClellan's maneuver on the 16th has more significance to me than just positioning 1st corps for the 17th. Different strokes for different folks. Maybe @67th Tigers or @Saphroneth can add to the discussion.
Who said it was an order?When? In what way? Please provide the order.
Who said it was an order?
After a July 8th visit from Lincoln at Harrison's Landing, the president returned to Washington and dispatched General in Chief Henry Halleck to Mac's Headquarters. In discussions with Mac Halleck made it clear that the only viable alternatives under the circumstances at that time was an advance on Richmond or departure from the peninsula. By July 30th Mac had still not moved forward and was ordered back.
Who said it was an order?
After a July 8th visit from Lincoln at Harrison's Landing, the president returned to Washington and dispatched General in Chief Henry Halleck to Mac's Headquarters. In discussions with Mac Halleck made it clear that the only viable alternatives under the circumstances at that time was an advance on Richmond or departure from the peninsula. By July 30th Mac had still not moved forward and was ordered back.
Interestingly the troops he wanted were the troops which had been collecting at Fort Monroe, earmarked for McClellan but not permitted to join him, for some weeks. They were much less than the number Lincoln had originally promised him in reinforcements.Mac was talking about swinging across the James and goig after Petersburg, but wanted more troops before he moved. He and Halleck came to heads at that point and Lincoln and Halleck ordered them withdrawn
In what way is it inaccurate.The visits are well documented as were the topics of discussion. In the end Mac refused to act on the directive given to him by is superior. An implied order carries weight.That is irrelevant to the question, and in some ways quite inaccurate.
In what way is it inaccurate.The visits are well documented as were the topics of discussion. In the end Mac refused to act on the directive given to him by is superior. An implied order carries weight.
What order did he disobey here?
If the conversation ends with an understanding from McClellan that he will advance when he has recieved a small number of reinforcements but not an outright order from Halleck to advance before he's recieved the reinforcements, then McClellan is not disobeying orders by not advancing until he gets the promised reinforcements.This is simple enough for even you to understand. He was told move forward or be recalled. He didn't and was.
If the conversation ends with an understanding from McClellan that he will advance when he has recieved a small number of reinforcements but not an outright order from Halleck to advance before he's recieved the reinforcements, then McClellan is not disobeying orders by not advancing until he gets the promised reinforcements.
You will presumably not have trouble producing the order to advance immediately, as opposed to an understanding to advance upon reinforcement.
This is the thing about an order. It is an order, not an understanding; it states clearly what has to be done, it is not a suggestion. An example of an order would be something like:
"Attack the enemy within three days".
The reason why this matters is that under other circumstances (i.e. when dealing with an "understanding") a general can use their judgement; an order means accepting responsibility on the part of the man giving the order in the event that the order is misguided.
For example, take Pickett's Charge. Pickett was ordered to attack, and as such the blame for how badly it went does not fall on him - it falls on the commander who launched the attack. If Pickett had been led to understand that he should attack when reinforcements arrived, and reinforcements did not arrive, Pickett would not be expected to attack if he thought it was unlikely to work; if he then attacked anyway and things went badly the responsibility would accrue to him.
If one examines the history of the Peninsular campaign with an eye to finding orders one will find them, and one will also find that McClellan did his best to fulfil them promptly; the order to operate against the railroads north of Richmond is one, while the order to fix the supply base on the Pamunkey is another. These state what McClellan is to do in simple language and leave no conditionals; where is the simple order to advance in late July and early August?
This is simple enough for even you to understand. He was told move forward or be recalled. He didn't and was.
If your superior and you come to an understanding to advance when reinforced, then surely you have to wait until you're reinforced? Otherwise you'd be going against that understanding.You can disagree with your superiors decision all you want but you still have to carry it out. What Mac wanr=ted was irrelevant to what he was being told to do.
Yeah. I guess Bragg would have been the oppositeIt seems like the sort of decision which could go either way; if he'd refused to grant clemency I wouldn't be surprised, but nor am I surprised he was open to grant it.
The logic was presumably that the primary aim is to build a functioning army, and that knowing someone could have been executed but was shown clemency would probably result in a better overall esprit de corps than knowing someone was executed.
I wouldn't want to assume, actually. It's possible, but by no means certain.Yeah. I guess Bragg would have been the opposite