McClellan McClellan would excel...today!

[matthew mckeon]

McClellan is the villian of the Civil War---too slow, misreading intelligence. A patronizing "good organizer" label is all he gets. But I believe McClellan would be an outstanding general--today.

1. His corporate background--he understands the private sector.

2. His concern about building up and training his forces. Didn't Powell and Schwarzkopf taken over six months to build up a huge force to take down the Iraqis in the Gulf War?

3. His concern about casualities: a central concern for modern generals is the cost in blood.

4. Overestimating the enemy. Modern generals often overestimate the enemy because it justifies more resources and makes victory more impressive.

5. Limited war. McClellan, in his concern with preserving civilian property, especially slavery, reflects some of the concerns about causing civilian casualities modern generals have. Modern wars aren't total wars, they're limited in place and objective. McClellan was a limited war kind of guy--at a time Lincoln was deciding to radically remake America.

McClellan, physically and mentally small, a technocrat, would be successful in today's army, which fights small wars. His only flaw is his political tin ear.

 

[matthew mckeon]

Compare him with Robert E. Lee,who so dominated McClellan mentally.

Lee did have the political skills McClellan lacked: he got Davis on his side and kept him there.

Lee had a heavy casuality rate. Unacceptable to modern thinking.

Lee took long chances, which allowed for some 2nd guessing from bloggers, and opposition politicians.

Lee vision of war was radical: the southern nation would subordinate everything to the war effort in an struggle for existence. Nations struggling for independence sacrifice their best and brightest. Currently we are willing to sacrifice our noncommissioned officers.

In short, Lee was the man to fight the Civil War. McClellan was the man to fight the Gulf War.

You can probably substitute some other names for Lee.

 

[BillO]

McClellan is the villian of the Civil War---too slow, misreading intelligence. A patronizing "good organizer" label is all he gets. But I believe McClellan would be an outstanding general--today.

1. His corporate background--he understands the private sector.

2. His concern about building up and training his forces. Didn't Powell and Schwarzkopf taken over six months to build up a huge force to take down the Iraqis in the Gulf War?

3. His concern about casualities: a central concern for modern generals is the cost in blood.

4. Overestimating the enemy. Modern generals often overestimate the enemy because it justifies more resources and makes victory more impressive.

5. Limited war. McClellan, in his concern with preserving civilian property, especially slavery, reflects some of the concerns about causing civilian casualities modern generals have. Modern wars aren't total wars, they're limited in place and objective. McClellan was a limited war kind of guy--at a time Lincoln was deciding to radically remake America.

McClellan, physically and mentally small, a technocrat, would be successful in today's army, which fights small wars. His only flaw is his political tin ear.

I agree with your opinion here but I disagree with calling McClellan mentally small. His major problem wasn't being dumb it was being to smart for his own good. He was a very intelligent man with some personality flaws.

 

[kel1985]

McClellan is the villian of the Civil War---too slow, misreading intelligence. A patronizing "good organizer" label is all he gets. But I believe McClellan would be an outstanding general--today.

1. His corporate background--he understands the private sector.

2. His concern about building up and training his forces. Didn't Powell and Schwarzkopf taken over six months to build up a huge force to take down the Iraqis in the Gulf War?

3. His concern about casualities: a central concern for modern generals is the cost in blood.

4. Overestimating the enemy. Modern generals often overestimate the enemy because it justifies more resources and makes victory more impressive.

5. Limited war. McClellan, in his concern with preserving civilian property, especially slavery, reflects some of the concerns about causing civilian casualities modern generals have. Modern wars aren't total wars, they're limited in place and objective. McClellan was a limited war kind of guy--at a time Lincoln was deciding to radically remake America.

McClellan, physically and mentally small, a technocrat, would be successful in today's army, which fights small wars. His only flaw is his political tin ear.

While I agree that he would be a good modern general, I think that calling him the villian of the ACW is a little harsh. There were worse generals out there (Sickels comes to mind).
But your assessment about his strengths for a modern general are darned near hit the nail on the head.
He was politically savvy though...he managed to out manuver Scott and take his job out from under him, and ran against Lincoln in '64.
My biggest complaint about McClellan was his incredible ego...

 

[kel1985]

McClellan is the villian of the Civil War---too slow, misreading intelligence. A patronizing "good organizer" label is all he gets. But I believe McClellan would be an outstanding general--today.

1. His corporate background--he understands the private sector.

2. His concern about building up and training his forces. Didn't Powell and Schwarzkopf taken over six months to build up a huge force to take down the Iraqis in the Gulf War?

3. His concern about casualities: a central concern for modern generals is the cost in blood.

4. Overestimating the enemy. Modern generals often overestimate the enemy because it justifies more resources and makes victory more impressive.

5. Limited war. McClellan, in his concern with preserving civilian property, especially slavery, reflects some of the concerns about causing civilian casualities modern generals have. Modern wars aren't total wars, they're limited in place and objective. McClellan was a limited war kind of guy--at a time Lincoln was deciding to radically remake America.

McClellan, physically and mentally small, a technocrat, would be successful in today's army, which fights small wars. His only flaw is his political tin ear.

While I agree that he would be a good modern general, I think that calling him the villian of the ACW is a little harsh. There were worse generals out there (Sickels comes to mind).
But your assessment about his strengths for a modern general are darned near hit the nail on the head.
He was politically savvy though...he managed to out manuver Scott and take his job out from under him, and ran against Lincoln in '64.
My biggest complaint about McClellan was his incredible ego...

 

[matthew mckeon]

The scope of his mind was smaller than Lincoln's. Or Lee for that matter. I would agree he was very intelligent. Politically he could not keep Lincoln and Stanton in his corner, as Lee was able to keep Davis. His ego trumped his perception.

 

[whitworth]

McClellan was an excellent peacetime and war preparation officer and general. He was not a good general to close with the enemy.
Some generals make better peacetime generals and get those promotions. Some few generals only make good wartime generals. The good planning general holds onto them for war.

R.E. Lee was good in peacetime and war. If he had faults,l and he did, he never knew when to end a war and a fight. He fought nearly to the end of his soldiers. In defeat, Lee made sure his surviving soldiers ever sought war again.

 

[cash]

I'm in the midst of reassessing my opinion of McClellan. I have been finding bits and pieces in several different places that he may have been much better than I had previously credited him with being. In reading his letters and dispatches, I'm struck by how he veers back and forth between euphoria and depression, between thinking the worst of Lincoln and thinking Lincoln is his true friend. I wonder if anyone's ever looked at him from the standpoint of bipolar disorder.

 

[leftyhunter]

McCellan was admitted to West Point at 15 and graduated 2nd in his class. Keeping in mind West Point class's were much smaller they would star with approx 100 cadets and graduate maybe 45 or so if memory serves me. Lee thought well of his junior officer back in the Mexican American war and he McClellan was very brave. Lincoln thought in Aug 1864 he would losse the election and but for Sherman's taking of Atlanta he may of been right.

I agree with everything else Mckeon concludes McCllean was born in the wrong century. McCllean would of been a great general for logistics or training. My dream team of the AOP would of been Gen.Geo Thomas in charge and McCllean in charge of training and logistics but it was not to be.

Leftyhunter

 

[cash]

McCellan was admitted to West Point at 15 and graduated 2nd in his class. Keeping in mind West Point class's were much smaller they would star with approx 100 cadets and graduate maybe 45 or so if memory serves me. Lee thought well of his junior officer back in the Mexican American war and he McClellan was very brave. Lincoln thought in Aug 1864 he would losse the election and but for Sherman's taking of Atlanta he may of been right.

I agree with everything else Mckeon concludes McCllean was born in the wrong century. McCllean would of been a great general for logistics or training. My dream team of the AOP would of been Gen.Geo Thomas in charge and McCllean in charge of training and logistics but it was not to be.

Leftyhunter

Old Slow Trot in charge? How would that have been better than "the Virginia Creeper?"

 

[Sid J.]

I agree with most of the OP, but one area that I think would play worse for Mac today is his involvement in politics. For Mac there was little difference between a polical campaign and a military campaign. Also, he says some pretty indiscreet things in his correspondence, I'll bet he'd find himself in some hot water in today's media.

 

[matthew mckeon]

Cash,
I think there is a general reassessment of McClellan in the offing. I hesitate about applying mental health labels to historical figures, so I have no opinion about the bipolar thing. Of course "Slow Trot" Thomas has his advocates, not just as a great general, but the greatest general!

 

[Georgia Sixth]

McClellan is the villian of the Civil War---too slow, misreading intelligence. A patronizing "good organizer" label is all he gets. But I believe McClellan would be an outstanding general--today.

1. His corporate background--he understands the private sector.

2. His concern about building up and training his forces. Didn't Powell and Schwarzkopf taken over six months to build up a huge force to take down the Iraqis in the Gulf War?

3. His concern about casualities: a central concern for modern generals is the cost in blood.

4. Overestimating the enemy. Modern generals often overestimate the enemy because it justifies more resources and makes victory more impressive.

5. Limited war. McClellan, in his concern with preserving civilian property, especially slavery, reflects some of the concerns about causing civilian casualities modern generals have. Modern wars aren't total wars, they're limited in place and objective. McClellan was a limited war kind of guy--at a time Lincoln was deciding to radically remake America.

McClellan, physically and mentally small, a technocrat, would be successful in today's army, which fights small wars. His only flaw is his political tin ear.

Very interesting post. Little Mac was a complex man, one that I don't think gets his due. His main problems were his ego and, related to that, his utter lack of respect for his President. Ego need not cripple a commander (see Gen. Patton in WWII) but disrespect for your commander will in time seed all sorts of problems. Yet in 1862, he was the only general that came close to winning the war and then saved the war in the same year. His concept for moving his entire army by sea to the Peninsula was simply brilliant -- it negated all the natural lines of defense created by the rivers in Virginia. This move also resulted in the evacuation of Norfolk, which I believe is an under-appreciated blow the South -- it wiped out any hope of a genuine navy or blockade-busting squadron. Had not an random bullet felled Joe Johnston, I believe McClellan would have marched into Richmond that summer. Later, at Antietam, he did what he needed to do which was stop Lee's advance cold; anything less might have tilted Britain to intervention.

His aversion to casualties put him way ahead of his contemporaries in this matter. And I'm really glad you mention his philosophy of Limited War. It was a dark day for our nation when the Hard War school took the lead. Not only was McClellan's approach far more humanitarian, but it did not create new reasons for the southern yeomen to resist the North. There is ample source material that reveals a deeper spirit of resistance in the wake of depredations on civilians. Mac's approach might have meant a shorter war.

 

[cash]

Cash,
I think there is a general reassessment of McClellan in the offing. I hesitate about applying mental health labels to historical figures, so I have no opinion about the bipolar thing. Of course "Slow Trot" Thomas has his advocates, not just as a great general, but the greatest general!

I also hesitate on the mental health aspects, but the swings were so pronounced and so abrupt that I wondered if someone with expertise had taken a look at Mac from that aspect.

Those who advocate Pap as the greatest general are, in my perhaps not-so-humble opinion, mistaken.

 

[cash]

His aversion to casualties put him way ahead of his contemporaries in this matter. And I'm really glad you mention his philosophy of Limited War. It was a dark day for our nation when the Hard War school took the lead. Not only was McClellan's approach far more humanitarian, but it did not create new reasons for the southern yeomen to resist the North. There is ample source material that reveals a deeper spirit of resistance in the wake of depredations on civilians. Mac's approach might have meant a shorter war.

There was certainly a very deep spirit of resistance under the previous conciliatory policy McClellan favored. That policy very clearly had failed.

 

[Mark F. Jenkins]

I've mentioned this in another thread, so I'm repeating myself, but I'm struck by a number of similarities between McClellan and Sherman. I believe there's at least a possibility that many of McClellan's faults might have been remedied by serving under a more-aggressive senior officer for a period of time; as it was, he went right from the minor leagues to the top of the majors, with no apprenticeship or working-up period. It both went to his head and left him short of real-world command experience (though he appears to have been strong on the theoretical and organizational end of things).

 

[matthew mckeon]

Very interesting post. Little Mac was a complex man, one that I don't think gets his due. His main problems were his ego and, related to that, his utter lack of respect for his President. Ego need not cripple a commander (see Gen. Patton in WWII) but disrespect for your commander will in time seed all sorts of problems. Yet in 1862, he was the only general that came close to winning the war and then saved the war in the same year. His concept for moving his entire army by sea to the Peninsula was simply brilliant -- it negated all the natural lines of defense created by the rivers in Virginia. This move also resulted in the evacuation of Norfolk, which I believe is an under-appreciated blow the South -- it wiped out any hope of a genuine navy or blockade-busting squadron. Had not an random bullet felled Joe Johnston, I believe McClellan would have marched into Richmond that summer. Later, at Antietam, he did what he needed to do which was stop Lee's advance cold; anything less might have tilted Britain to intervention.

His aversion to casualties put him way ahead of his contemporaries in this matter. And I'm really glad you mention his philosophy of Limited War. It was a dark day for our nation when the Hard War school took the lead. Not only was McClellan's approach far more humanitarian, but it did not create new reasons for the southern yeomen to resist the North. There is ample source material that reveals a deeper spirit of resistance in the wake of depredations on civilians. Mac's approach might have meant a shorter war.

I agree with you about him moving the chessboard 90 degrees and turning those barrier rivers into highways for fire support, movement and supply. Its a good use of a Union advantage. But battles take place in time as well as space, and McClellan didn't quite get that.

The "limited war" Mac wanted to wage wasn't about not destroying property--it was about not emancipating slaves.

 

[cash]

I agree with you about him moving the chessboard 90 degrees and turning those barrier rivers into highways for fire support, movement and supply. Its a good use of a Union advantage. But battles take place in time as well as space, and McClellan didn't quite get that.

The "limited war" Mac wanted to wage wasn't about not destroying property--it was about not emancipating slaves.

True to an extent, but look at what he wrote in the Harrison's Landing Letter:

http://americancivilwar.com/documents/mcclellan_lincoln.html

He was not averse to emancipating slaves, just as long as it was done with compensation to the owners. I think it was more about respecting property rights, and that would include destroying property. After the Second Confiscation Act became law, Mac published an order that he said, to his wife, would forbid all pillaging & stealing & take the highest Christian ground for the conduct of the war." [quoted in Stephen Sears, George B. McClellan: The Young Napoleon, p. 244]

 

[Dugger]

Very interesting post. Little Mac was a complex man, one that I don't think gets his due. His main problems were his ego and, related to that, his utter lack of respect for his President. Ego need not cripple a commander (see Gen. Patton in WWII) but disrespect for your commander will in time seed all sorts of problems. Yet in 1862, he was the only general that came close to winning the war and then saved the war in the same year. His concept for moving his entire army by sea to the Peninsula was simply brilliant -- it negated all the natural lines of defense created by the rivers in Virginia. This move also resulted in the evacuation of Norfolk, which I believe is an under-appreciated blow the South -- it wiped out any hope of a genuine navy or blockade-busting squadron. Had not an random bullet felled Joe Johnston, I believe McClellan would have marched into Richmond that summer. Later, at Antietam, he did what he needed to do which was stop Lee's advance cold; anything less might have tilted Britain to intervention.

His aversion to casualties put him way ahead of his contemporaries in this matter. And I'm really glad you mention his philosophy of Limited War. It was a dark day for our nation when the Hard War school took the lead. Not only was McClellan's approach far more humanitarian, but it did not create new reasons for the southern yeomen to resist the North. There is ample source material that reveals a deeper spirit of resistance in the wake of depredations on civilians. Mac's approach might have meant a shorter war.

Yes his approach may have been more humanitarian but it was not going to win the war for the North. The South had no intention of rejoining the Union if they were not allowed to retain slavery and after Antietam there was not going to be any concessions to slavery by the Lincoln administration. Ending the war with the South still a slave holding section would have solved absolutly nothing....simply back to square one. It seems you are saying the humanitarian approach would have led to a shorter war with the Union reunited and the South perhaps agreeing to end slavery. Maybe you are implying this but I do not wish to put words in your mouth. They would not have agreed to end slavery and never did propose to.... since that is what the Southern leadership was fighting to preserve. Never agreed to that as a condition for re-unification. Hard war came because there was no other way to re-unite the nation without slavery dead and gone. Unfortunate but true. You can blame Lincoln, Grant, Sherman, etc. but the Southern leadership was so inflexable on the issue of slavery that the thing got very ugly. Blame them also.

Anyway Mac was not the solution once the Northern position/goals were in full place after Antietam. Lincoln saw that and relieved him...just as Harry Truman realized MacArthur was not in sync with his policy of a limited war in Korea and avoiding a general Asian war. He got fired also.

 

[Georgia Sixth]

But battles take place in time as well as space, and McClellan didn't quite get that.

Well put.