McClellan What If

[CanadianCanuck]

This essay originally from my blog. In 1864, McClellan claimed that on his dismissal he was on the eve of a great victory. But is this true?

As history tells it, on November 7th 1862, George B, McClellan, who had commanded the Army of Potomac for 16 months, was dismissed by President Lincoln. In his 1864 The Army of the Potomac, General McClellan's Report of its Operations While Under His Command McClellan relates that he was preparing to deliver a great blow to Lee with his army in November. He had moved over 120,000 men in roughly two weeks towards Lee's army in Virginia and by his own accounts was preparing to force a battle upon Lee. In his Report he relates that "I cannot doubt that the result would have been a brilliant victory for our army."[1]

Let us, for a moment, indulge McClellan and assume that, for whatever reason, Lincoln decides not to dismiss the general on November 5th, and instead allows him to continue in his tenure as commander of the Army of the Potomac. What then, might have been the result of McClellan's cool belief in victory in 1864?

McClellan's 1864 Report paints a far different picture from his personal correspondence in 1862. He told his wife on the 25th of October 1862 that he did not expect Lee to fight before Richmond[2]. He seemed to set his own objective as Culpeper Court House, and from there we have no clear idea of what he intended despite his later prediction of a great victory.

However, Longstreet beat McClellan to Culpeper comfortably, moving in half the time it took him to make the same march. Lee had nearly divined McClellan's intentions by the 6th of November[3]. He wrote that if the enemy continued to advance he would unite Longstreet and Jackson's corps through Swift Run Gap, joining at Madison through Gordonsville. From there he anticipated the ability to menace McClellan's right flank. McClellan had fears regarding his army's ability to use the Orange and Alexandria RR and viewed its capacity as overrated[4], so he would most likely then have directed his army to Fredericksburg. In his forward movement however, he abandoned Ashby and Snicker's Gap, this allowed Jackson to send men across the Blue Ridge Mountains on the 13th and harass the armies' rear columns historically.

Jackson suggested advancing his corps to threaten McClellan's flank and rear, which Lee agreed with should it be feasible. Should the enemy further advance, Lee directed him to be pulled back. In this instance, with McClellan's slow advance still pushing forward, but leaving his rear open. Jackson most likely mounts an embarrassing attack on McClellan's rear which gives him pause, and allows Jackson time to regroup with Lee. However, if McClellan's forward momentum continued positively on the 10th and 11th, Lee might recall Jackson and continue to implement his planned withdrawal to Madison. It should be noted that in his Report McClellan believed Jackson was at Chester and Thorton's Gaps, when in reality he was closer to Snickers and Ashby Gaps[5], some 18 miles north, and so his rear is actually exposed rather than covered. He had in fact, left his rear uncovered[6].

Delayed communications may allow Jackson's raid on McClellan's supplies to go forward, but this will most likely halt McClellan's advance as he turns to meet this threat. Should Jackson receive Lee's orders to withdraw on the 13th as he did historically, he would immediately make for the rendezvous with Lee. The timing of that can only be speculated, but we should not assume he tarries long, and unites with Lee at Madison.

In the face of a unified army, and an increasing supply line. McClellan's most likely option is to move his force to Fredericksburg, which will make an advance of 35 miles. This movement would take at best, four or five days, and at worst weeks. This would allow Lee to discover the change of base, and either relocate himself for a defence on the North Anna or to attack isolated portions of McClellan's command. Most likely, he does as he had done historically and moves to intercept McClellan at Fredericksburg.

McClellan is now faced with a prospect similar to that of Burnside in December of 1862. The question then is, what does McClellan decide to do? Does he cross in the face of what he believes to be superior numbers? Or does he sit and wait, planning a new campaign?

In the face of an entrenched enemy, it is likely the armies merely return to winter quarters. The upside may be that there is no disastrous Battle of Fredericksburg, as McClellan's dismissal and the obvious disposition of Lee's army make imminent action unlikely. From there though, it is anyone's guess as to how the campaign's play out in 1863. Does Burnside refuse the command and Hooker take over? None can say for sure.

In summation, I hope this lays out my reasoning behind my belief that even had McClellan been allowed to continue in his tenure of command, he would not have held it long. An extra month will not save him.

----

As a note, the letters referenced (unless otherwise specified) come from the War of the Rebellion: Official Records of the Civil War, Serial 28, available online through the Ohio State University.

[1] Report, pg. 652

[2] George McCllelan, The Young Napoleon, Stephen B. Sears, pg. 337

[3]Lee to Davis, Nov. 6th, 1862 (pg. 698): "General Jackson's corps is in the valley, his advance being at Front Royal. I do not think they will advance very far while he is in position to threaten their flank. Should they, however, continue their forward movement, General Jackson is directed to ascend the valley, and should they cross the Rappahannock, General Longstreet's corps will retire through Madison, where forage can be obtained, and the two corps unite through Swift Run Gap. No opposition has yet been offered to their advance, except the resistance of our cavalry and pickets. I have not yet been able to ascertain the strength of the enemy, but presume it is the whole of McClellan's army, as I learn that his whole force from Harper's Ferry, to Hagerstown has been withdrawn from Maryland, leaving only pickets at the fords, and but few troops at Harper's Ferry." See also, Lee to Stuart, Nov. 7th, 1862, pg. 703.

[4] George to Mary McClellan, Nov. 7th, 1862, The Civil War Papers of George B. McClellan: Selected Correspondence, 1860-1865, pg. 520
[5] Report, pg. 652

[6] Report, pg. 651. See also, Lee to Stuart Nov. 9th, 1862, pg. 706-707

 

[Andy Cardinal]

While some will say McClellan was on the verge of a great victory, I agree with you that it was not likely. One reason is that McClellan had no faith in that particular line of advance and really wanted to return to the James (a belief shared by many of his subordinates). Also, Frank O'Reilly suggests in his Fredericksburg book that McClellan intended to move toward Fredericksburg and Burnside essentially adopted this plan when he assumed command. I find this plausible, but I'm not sure how convinced I am. If so, however, the real difference is how McClellan would have acted in front of Fredericksburg (if he had retained command that long) vs. Burnside -- I doubt he would have ordered suicidal frontal assaults against Mayre's Heights.

 

[Saphroneth]

He wrote that if the enemy continued to advance he would unite Longstreet and Jackson's corps through Swift Run Gap, joining at Madison through Gordonsville.

This is a march of over 100 miles for Jackson's old division, based as it is at Winchester.

You've agreed the positions in this map are accurate, AIUI, so can we proceed on that basis?

In his forward movement however, he abandoned Ashby and Snicker's Gap, this allowed Jackson to send men across the Blue Ridge Mountains on the 13th and harass the armies' rear columns historically.

Jackson suggested advancing his corps to threaten McClellan's flank and rear, which Lee agreed with should it be feasible. Should the enemy further advance, Lee directed him to be pulled back. In this instance, with McClellan's slow advance still pushing forward, but leaving his rear open. Jackson most likely mounts an embarrassing attack on McClellan's rear which gives him pause, and allows Jackson time to regroup with Lee.

This doesn't make sense to me. Not the idea of Jackson pushing troops across the Blue Ridge to threaten Lee's rear columns (though I'd appreciate a cite on that) but that attacking McClellan's rear starting on the 13th gives Jackson time to reunite with Lee at Gordonsville as per his orders.

Historically McClellan got news of his relief on the 7th and his orders were followed for the next two days' marches. By the 13th that's another four marches McClellan could have taken, and even at the not-very-fast speed of 7 miles per day he'd have been able to get to Culpeper (which means that if Jackson's men cross the Blue Ridge through Ashby's Gap on the 13th he's about forty miles from McClellan's vanguard.)

Assuming that from the moment that Jackson crosses the Blue Ridge on the 13th to the moment he returns to the Valley that McClellan is completely paralyzed, that Jackson returns to the Valley at Front Royal rather than Ashby's Gap, and that once he's in the Valley Jackson marches straight for Gordonsville via the Swift Run Gap, then Jackson has eighty miles to go (Front Roal to Gordonsville via the Swift Run) and McClellan has thirty miles to go to get to Gordonsville.

I cannot see how Jackson can possibly beat McClellan to Gordonsville unless Jackson marches three times as fast.

Delayed communications may allow Jackson's raid on McClellan's supplies to go forward, but this will most likely halt McClellan's advance as he turns to meet this threat. Should Jackson receive Lee's orders to withdraw on the 13th as he did historically, he would immediately make for the rendezvous with Lee. The timing of that can only be speculated, but we should not assume he tarries long, and unites with Lee at Madison.

If Jackson crossed Ashby's Gap on the 13th historically, and if here he gets the instructions to withdraw on the 13th and immediately makes for Gordonsville, then Jackson instead has a march of 100 miles to reach Gordonsville - naturally, this is even further.

In the face of a unified army, and an increasing supply line. McClellan's most likely option is to move his force to Fredericksburg, which will make an advance of 35 miles.

If Lee has unified his army at Gordonsville then McClellan would most certainly not still be at Warrenton unless he's a caricature. He would have been able to advance however far his army can get while Jackson marches 80-100 miles via the Swift Run Gap, plus however far he marches before the 13th (the date you mention).
What this means is that the one thing that is very unlikely is that McClellan is marching from Warrenton to Fredericksburg as a result of a united Confederate army at Gordonsville - it takes so long for Lee to unite his army that McClellan can be south of Culpeper and be heading to Fredericksburg after having crossed the Rapidan.

This simple change to how Fredericksburg is reached alters much about the campaign. Rather than having to fight a battle to get out of Fredericksburg after crossing the river McClellan is south of the river and resupplying at Fredericksburg, which is essentially how Grant got over the Rappahanock in 1864 (cross the Rapidan and march via wagon supply to Fredericksburg).

The total distance of this movement (Warrenton via Culpeper and over the Rapidan to Fredericksburg) is eighty miles, with the section after leaving Culpeper - which is the section done after leaving a rail supply line - being about 50-55 miles. This means that the section done after leaving rail supply is roughly equal to the section marched by McClellan after getting over the Potomac, so it is within the means of his wagon supply to make the movement.

The point of closest approach on this route to Lee's concentration point at Gordonsville is Orange, which is forty miles into the route; it can be assumed that McClellan would use a force here to be a guard until the rest of his army is past, which would then become his rearguard.
Assuming that McClellan begins moving on October 10th and Jackson on October 12th (a one-day acceleration on the numbers you give) straight to Gordonsville, but that McClellan is vulnerable to attacks on his rear at Orange for two days after his head reaches Orange (to make the maths work), then what this means is that McClellan needs to cover the forty miles from Warrenton to Orange via Culpeper faster than Jackson can cover the one hundred miles from Winchester to Gordonsville via the Swift Run Gap.



Fundamentally the problem that Lee has is that for Jackson to unite with him at Gordonsville via the Swift Run gap is a very long way to march, but that until he does unite his army McClellan has enough strength to basically brush Longstreet aside. But when Jackson does come down to unite with Lee via the Swift Run Gap it means that Jackson is unable to threaten McClellan's rear at all.


This is of course assuming that Jackson is able to move swiftly at all, when his horses had a problem in early November 1862 which would naturally interfere with attempts at a force-march.



If it would interest you I could try working out the marches by location-to-location; what strategy do you recommend I should have Lee take with Jackson, and what march speed should I assume for McClellan and for Jackson? (I'll assume Longstreet can fall back to Gordonsville faster than McClellan can follow.)

 

[Saphroneth]

While some will say McClellan was on the verge of a great victory, I agree with you that it was not likely. One reason is that McClellan had no faith in that particular line of advance and really wanted to return to the James (a belief shared by many of his subordinates).

This is probably correct in general, because the James is the way to threaten Richmond - the Overland Campaign is basically a really complicated way to get to the James. On the other hand McClellan's cavalry had moved from covering the gaps further north up the Blue Ridge to seize the crossings of the Hazel, so it looks like McClellan was planning something related to Culpeper.

 

[CanadianCanuck]

While some will say McClellan was on the verge of a great victory, I agree with you that it was not likely. One reason is that McClellan had no faith in that particular line of advance and really wanted to return to the James (a belief shared by many of his subordinates). Also, Frank O'Reilly suggests in his Fredericksburg book that McClellan intended to move toward Fredericksburg and Burnside essentially adopted this plan when he assumed command. I find this plausible, but I'm not sure how convinced I am. If so, however, the real difference is how McClellan would have acted in front of Fredericksburg (if he had retained command that long) vs. Burnside -- I doubt he would have ordered suicidal frontal assaults against Mayre's Heights.

Moving to Fredericksburg is his best option. He had no faith in that line of advance (IMO correctly) and more importantly he was actually leaving himself open to being suckered by Lee. Continuing to advance to Culpeper means he is most likely becomes overextended. That he did not believe Lee would offer battle would mean he is actually unprepared to fight a major battle along that line. So when Lee does unite his army (or Jackson is in his rear) he will be completely unprepared for it.

Of course, he could also justify this to move to Fredericksburg. Which would be the safer move, but the problem is then he is basically facing Lee who is either ahead of him, or is entrenched on the North Anna. Neither of which is an especially enviable position.

The other problem of course is that any option other than forward movement without offering battle will most likely mean he is replaced. His relationship with the administration had completely deteriorated through October, unless he wins a victory somewhere he is not long for his command of the army.

 

[Saphroneth]

The interesting thing about what it looks like if McClellan goes for Gordonsville - which might be unlikely - is what it looks like if Lee hasn't united his army yet. (Which is possible given the distances involved, I could plot it out for sure if I assume Jackson starts for Gordonsville on the 12th and we have assumed advance speeds for the two of them.)
The reason is that if Lee doesn't give ground at Gordonsville then - assuming Jackson hasn't joined him yet - he's in for a fight at bad odds (a quick look at the terrain makes it look like there's no great natural defensive position), while if Lee does give ground at Gordonsville and move so that he's still able to unite with Jackson (i.e. not going east) then McClellan could actually make it to the North Anna first.

It's a pity that Lincoln would probably have seen "the enemy is falling back and the Army of the Potomac is gaining ground without having to fight for it" as "McClellan doesn't want to fight" though.

 

[CanadianCanuck]

This is a march of over 100 miles for Jackson's old division, based as it is at Winchester.

You've agreed the positions in this map are accurate, AIUI, so can we proceed on that basis?

View attachment 299440



This doesn't make sense to me. Not the idea of Jackson pushing troops across the Blue Ridge to threaten Lee's rear columns (though I'd appreciate a cite on that) but that attacking McClellan's rear starting on the 13th gives Jackson time to reunite with Lee at Gordonsville as per his orders.

Historically McClellan got news of his relief on the 7th and his orders were followed for the next two days' marches. By the 13th that's another four marches McClellan could have taken, and even at the not-very-fast speed of 7 miles per day he'd have been able to get to Culpeper (which means that if Jackson's men cross the Blue Ridge through Ashby's Gap on the 13th he's about forty miles from McClellan's vanguard.)

Assuming that from the moment that Jackson crosses the Blue Ridge on the 13th to the moment he returns to the Valley that McClellan is completely paralyzed, that Jackson returns to the Valley at Front Royal rather than Ashby's Gap, and that once he's in the Valley Jackson marches straight for Gordonsville via the Swift Run Gap, then Jackson has eighty miles to go (Front Roal to Gordonsville via the Swift Run) and McClellan has thirty miles to go to get to Gordonsville.

I cannot see how Jackson can possibly beat McClellan to Gordonsville unless Jackson marches three times as fast.




If Jackson crossed Ashby's Gap on the 13th historically, and if here he gets the instructions to withdraw on the 13th and immediately makes for Gordonsville, then Jackson instead has a march of 100 miles to reach Gordonsville - naturally, this is even further.



If Lee has unified his army at Gordonsville then McClellan would most certainly not still be at Warrenton unless he's a caricature. He would have been able to advance however far his army can get while Jackson marches 80-100 miles via the Swift Run Gap, plus however far he marches before the 13th (the date you mention).
What this means is that the one thing that is very unlikely is that McClellan is marching from Warrenton to Fredericksburg as a result of a united Confederate army at Gordonsville - it takes so long for Lee to unite his army that McClellan can be south of Culpeper and be heading to Fredericksburg after having crossed the Rapidan.

This simple change to how Fredericksburg is reached alters much about the campaign. Rather than having to fight a battle to get out of Fredericksburg after crossing the river McClellan is south of the river and resupplying at Fredericksburg, which is essentially how Grant got over the Rappahanock in 1864 (cross the Rapidan and march via wagon supply to Fredericksburg).

The total distance of this movement (Warrenton via Culpeper and over the Rapidan to Fredericksburg) is eighty miles, with the section after leaving Culpeper - which is the section done after leaving a rail supply line - being about 50-55 miles. This means that the section done after leaving rail supply is roughly equal to the section marched by McClellan after getting over the Potomac, so it is within the means of his wagon supply to make the movement.

The point of closest approach on this route to Lee's concentration point at Gordonsville is Orange, which is forty miles into the route; it can be assumed that McClellan would use a force here to be a guard until the rest of his army is past, which would then become his rearguard.
Assuming that McClellan begins moving on October 10th and Jackson on October 12th (a one-day acceleration on the numbers you give) straight to Gordonsville, but that McClellan is vulnerable to attacks on his rear at Orange for two days after his head reaches Orange (to make the maths work), then what this means is that McClellan needs to cover the forty miles from Warrenton to Orange via Culpeper faster than Jackson can cover the one hundred miles from Winchester to Gordonsville via the Swift Run Gap.



Fundamentally the problem that Lee has is that for Jackson to unite with him at Gordonsville via the Swift Run gap is a very long way to march, but that until he does unite his army McClellan has enough strength to basically brush Longstreet aside. But when Jackson does come down to unite with Lee via the Swift Run Gap it means that Jackson is unable to threaten McClellan's rear at all.


This is of course assuming that Jackson is able to move swiftly at all, when his horses had a problem in early November 1862 which would naturally interfere with attempts at a force-march.



If it would interest you I could try working out the marches by location-to-location; what strategy do you recommend I should have Lee take with Jackson, and what march speed should I assume for McClellan and for Jackson? (I'll assume Longstreet can fall back to Gordonsville faster than McClellan can follow.)

The problem for McClellan is threefold.

1) We know he has absolutely no idea his rear is exposed, and Jackson is...well Jackson. If he does as he did historically on the 13th and moves out of the Valley, then McClellan must (both politically and militarily) stop and reorganize to confront this force. However, Jackson in his rear is only one of Lee's options.

2) As noted, McClellan did not believe in the capacity of this line to support his advance. It makes it unlikely he can push his whole force forward. With that in mind, and his belief that Lee would not offer battle and his incorrect dispositions of Lee's force, we can say that if he does move forward to fine Lee's army joined and ready to offer battle at Gordonsville, he in no way has the overwhelming force necessary to engage Lee with any expectation of victory.

3) With all the above noted, then it is important to say that a 'change of base' to Fredericksburg will be the only logical outcome of this campaign. However, a 'change of base' will not be acceptable to Washington which will inevitably mean his dismissal.

Of course, we also come into the problem is that we don't see McClellan having any clear plan for the remainder of November. His is moving towards Culpeper, but what precisely will he do when he gets there? He didn't think Longstreet would offer battle (though if he ends up running into a rear guard he is then in for a rude surprise)

And Lee wrote to to Randolph on the 14th that Jackson had pushed troops through the passes (which he believed was the reason for the pause) and harassed his communications.

However, Lee seemed disposed to order Jackson to fall back rather than cross the passes and engage his rear. That is spelled out in the correspondence. The only reason it seems Jackson dawdled historically was because he sensed a potential advantage, but he was ready to move. The option for him to cross into McClellan's rear (and thus stop the army cold) is open, but the more likely scenario IMO is he moves to join Lee at Gordonsville.

If we assume Jackson moves with his usual rapidity (and we have no reason not to) then he will comfortably able to reach the army at Gordonsville before McClellan. If he is prepared for battle with a unified army, McClellan, who let us be clear, did not expect Lee to offer battle, would need to pause. He would have at most (assuming Franklin and Sigel have detachments that are now guarding his rear against Jackson's non existent threat) 58,000 - 65,000 effectives (per your map) facing Lee's force of (assuming Gordon is left behind as some sort of rearguard and accounting for straggling from a forced march) roughly 52,000 men. If McClellan pauses to bring up troops or Lee just attacks, he is in a bad way.

The only outcome I can see is defeat or a 'change of base' here. We have no evidence to believe McClellan was prepared for a decisive battle here, or that he could in any way bring overwhelming force to bear on Lee's army before it could join together.

Even with McClellan making a change of base, we know he ordered the destruction of the railroads, bridges and roads to delay McClellans army, so there is no reason to assume McClellan could comfortably beat Lee there in a change of base situation either.

 

[Saphroneth]

1) We know he has absolutely no idea his rear is exposed, and Jackson is...well Jackson. If he does as he did historically on the 13th and moves out of the Valley, then McClellan must (both politically and militarily) stop and reorganize to confront this force. However, Jackson in his rear is only one of Lee's options.

But McClellan's rear isn't exposed, because he has Franklin and Siegel such that they can block a threat to his rear. This force is dramatically larger than it would take to block the Thoroughfare Gap and could be shifted further south to protect the O&A more generally.

And Lee wrote to to Randolph on the 14th that Jackson had pushed troops through the passes (which he believed was the reason for the pause) and harassed his communications.

These sound like quite large skirmishes if over 300 prisoners are involved. Is there an equivalent Federal record of them, or is this just a rumour?

If we assume Jackson moves with his usual rapidity (and we have no reason not to) then he will comfortably able to reach the army at Gordonsville before McClellan. If he is prepared for battle with a unified army, McClellan, who let us be clear, did not expect Lee to offer battle, would need to pause. He would have at most (assuming Franklin and Sigel have detachments that are now guarding his rear against Jackson's non existent threat) 58,000 - 65,000 effectives (per your map) facing Lee's force of (assuming Gordon is left behind as some sort of rearguard and accounting for straggling from a forced march) roughly 52,000 men.

Which is a superiority, albeit a small one, and McClellan attacked under those conditions at Antietam. But there's a problem here:

How fast are you assuming Jackson to move and when are you expecting him to start to move?

If we assume that McClellan moves towards Culpeper and then Gordonsville at a speed of seven miles per day, then he will take approximately eight days as it is 51 miles by the shortest route. If he sets off on the 10th that means that McClellan reaches Gordonsville on the 17th (marches on the 10th, 11th, 12th, 13th, 14th, 15th, 16th and 17th, battle on the 17th after two miles of marching that day).
If we assume that Jackson starts from Winchester on the 13th and moves to Gordonsville by the Swift Run then to be at Gordonsville for a battle on the 17th he would need his marches on the 13th, 14th, 15th, 16th and 17th to average just over 20 miles a day each as that is 100 miles, and it means he arrives at the end of the day.
If McClellan sets off a day earlier or Jackson starts a day later there's no really physically possible way for Jackson to get to Gordonsville in time. And if Jackson's force has foot-in-mouth as was historically the case then they're marching without wagons and cannot move that fast.

Historically Jackson set off for Fredericksburg on the 22nd and arrived there on the 29th, which is eight marches (22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29) to cover 130 miles; this is a speed of about 16 miles per day. This speed means that if McClellan moves from Warrenton to Gordonsville at 7 miles per day starting on the 10th and Jackson moves from Winchester to Gordonsville at 16 miles per day starting on the 13th:

McClellan will reach Gordonsville during the day on the 17th, having covered 51 miles in seven full marches and one partial march.
Jackson's main body from Winchester will reach the Swift Run Gap at midday on the 17th, having covered 72 miles in four full marches and one half march. He will still be 28 miles (one full march and almost another full march) from Gordonsville and will not get there until the morning of the 19th.

Jackson's men are fast, but they're not fast enough. McClellan simply holds the inside line to Gordonsville by a huge margin.

 

[67th Tigers]

This essay originally from my blog. In 1864, McClellan claimed that on his dismissal he was on the eve of a great victory. But is this true?

Probably.

McClellan's 1864 Report paints a far different picture from his personal correspondence in 1862. He told his wife on the 25th of October 1862 that he did not expect Lee to fight before Richmond[2].

An exaggeration. He expected that Lee would withdraw before him to Richmond, yes. Lee indeed planned to do exactly that. He hoped he might unite his army at Gordonsville, but orders to Jackson were for him to descend to Lynchburg and entrain for Richmond if McClellan pushed over the Rappahanock, which he did.

Lee's orders to Jackson immediately dismiss any concerns we may have about Jackson somehow heading east. Not that he could have - his horses were down with hoof & mouth, and he could not move his wing at all until ca. 20th November for lack of horseflesh. That's why Jackson could obey Lee's repeated entreaties to move to Gordonsville.

You might point to Lee's early communiques suggesting Jackson strike at McClellan between the Blue Ridge and Bull Run Mountains, yes. Of course, historically he was completely unable to do so. Hence Lee ordered him south, and he couldn't do that either.

He seemed to set his own objective as Culpeper Court House, and from there we have no clear idea of what he intended despite his later prediction of a great victory.

It took the US another 18 months to get across the Rappahanock. If McClellan gets to Culpeper then he's south of the Rappahanock. Lee must scramble to halt McClellan at the North Anna. Once Fredericksburg is taken then supplies can be landed at Port Royal.

However, Longstreet beat McClellan to Culpeper comfortably, moving in half the time it took him to make the same march.

Lee ordered Longstreet to move three divisions (McLaws, Anderson and the new Pickett's division) to Culpeper on 28th October. His advance reached Front Royal on 2nd November, and a portion crossed Chester Gap on the 3rd and reached Culpeper on the 5th. On the 6th Pleasonton's Cavalry stopped the transfer of troops. It should be no surprise that it took Longstreet 3 days to march 36 miles, including a mountain crossing.

Lee had nearly divined McClellan's intentions by the 6th of November[3]. He wrote that if the enemy continued to advance he would unite Longstreet and Jackson's corps through Swift Run Gap, joining at Madison through Gordonsville. From there he anticipated the ability to menace McClellan's right flank. McClellan had fears regarding his army's ability to use the Orange and Alexandria RR and viewed its capacity as overrated[4], so he would most likely then have directed his army to Fredericksburg.

"Divined" and "if" are mutually exclusive. Lee prepared for all eventualities of course, and if McClellan advanced on him, he intended to retreat...

... and McClellan was advancing on him. On the day you mentioned his cavalry was beyond Amissville, and 9th Corps marched there, south of the Rappahanock, straight towards Longstreet.

Of course Lee hasn't "divined" anything. On the 9th he writes he believes McClellan's objective is Strasburg in the Valley for example. Until Jackson finally arrives in early December, Longstreet and Lee are gripped with fear, hence orders like this:

General Orders Headquarters First Army Corps,

No. 49. November 16, 1862.

The troops of this command will be held in readiness for
battle upon a moment's notice. Commanders will see that pro-
visions, ammunition, and transportation are at hand and in
such quantities as may be wanted to meet their necessities.
The Commanding General relies upon the valor and patriotism
of these well-tried troops to sustain them in the struggles
that they may be called upon to encounter. Officers, be cool
and take care of your men. Soldiers, remain steady in your
ranks, take good aim, and obey the orders of your officers.
Observe these injunctions, and your general will be responsi-
ble for the issue.

In his forward movement however, he abandoned Ashby and Snicker's Gap, this allowed Jackson to send men across the Blue Ridge Mountains on the 13th and harass the armies' rear columns historically.

What rear columns? What is Jackson supposed to be harassing? There is nothing of consequence between the Blue Ridge and Bull Run Mountains. How is this historical if it never happened?

Jackson suggested advancing his corps to threaten McClellan's flank and rear, which Lee agreed with should it be feasible. Should the enemy further advance, Lee directed him to be pulled back. In this instance, with McClellan's slow advance still pushing forward, but leaving his rear open. Jackson most likely mounts an embarrassing attack on McClellan's rear which gives him pause, and allows Jackson time to regroup with Lee.

What rear? Are you suggesting Jackson futilely enters the valley between the Blue Ridge and the Bull Run Mountains, impotently looks at the 11th Corps garrisoning Thoroughfare Gap and is thoroughly embarrassed?

Delayed communications may allow Jackson's raid on McClellan's supplies to go forward,

What raid? Have you looked a map? You might want to rethink this, what with McClellan's supply lines going to Washington, nearly due east. Jackson only needs to walk >50 miles, crossing 2 mountain ranges (one of which is defended) without any supply trains (which were sent down south to resupply), and through McClellan's entire army.

I think you're under the false impression he was drawing supplies from Berlin, rather than Washington.

McClellan is now faced with a prospect similar to that of Burnside in December of 1862. The question then is, what does McClellan decide to do? Does he cross in the face of what he believes to be superior numbers?

? McClellan's intelligence picture is very accurate. He knows he has caught a fraction of Lee's army, 30-40,000 men. He knows he's going to pitch into it. They know he's going to pitch into it.

In the face of an entrenched enemy,

They're not entrenched, and indeed didn't entrench at Culpeper, because (a) it's terrible defensive terrain and (b) Lee did not intend to fight there. Lee intended to retreat to Gordonsville if pushed. They want to push him back, but can't because Longstreet's 3 divisions aren't fully up until the 9th November. On the 10th they try attacking, striking Pleasonton's cavalry in front of Amissville, who retire back on Sturgis' division at Amissville and give Stuart a good smack. It's confirmed McClellan has infantry over the Rappahanock

 

[67th Tigers]

It strikes me you don't understand McClellan's supply arrangements, hence the notion of Jackson raiding McClellan's rear.

When McClellan moved into the Loudoun Valley he had no supply lines. He was operating as a flying column. That is - McClellan's army filled all their wagons and started off with just what they could carry, which was about 10 days food and forage, plus ammunition. Hence McClellan had no supply line.

He was making for the Orange & Alexandria RR, because that could deliver supplies to refill the (now empty) wagons. He then had another 10 days of range to attack Lee, or make for another supply base, such as Port Royal.

However, I should reiterate, even if Jackson could move (he couldn't because of his horse situation) he couldn't get to McClellan's supply line.

 

[Saphroneth]

I think it's worth considering at what point Franklin's force in Thoroughfare Gap is "unlocked" as it were and is able to march with the rest of the force. They're not exactly going to be left there forever.

Once McClellan's finished refilling his wagons the need to protect the O&A lessons dramatically. He doesn't actually need about 35,000 effectives to block a mountain gap anyway (in fact Franklin and Siegel are in the Thoroughfare Gap and New Baltimore area rather than just in the Gap) and the whole force is about ten miles from McClellan's HQ and has at least two non-overlapping road routes it could take.

I see no reason why McClellan couldn't leave behind a division in Thoroughfare Gap and have the rest of the force march behind him as a rearguard, screened by some of the cavalry. If Jackson comes down to try to pursue McClellan then it's the rearguard they'll hit (at about the same size as Jackson's force in Effectives this will not be an easy prospect for Jackson to overcome) and if Jackson goes for the railroad instead then the division left behind will be able to resist a cheap raid and can pull back along the railroad against anything stronger. If Jackson comes down to join Lee in Gordonsville then it just means McClellan has the rest of his troops marching a day or two behind.
Meanwhile the rest of McClellan's force can advance towards Gordonsville or turn to gain Fredericksburg.

 

[Saphroneth]

He hoped he might unite his army at Gordonsville, but orders to Jackson were for him to descend to Lynchburg and entrain for Richmond if McClellan pushed over the Rappahanock, which he did.

Continuing on my streak of counting marches and assuming for the moment that these orders are what Jackson follows, then Jackson has to march 155 miles (if using Rockfish Gap) to reach Lynchburg. It's a movement that McClellan can't block unless he gets to Richmond first, which is only possible if Jackson's transport has broken down completely; OTOH even if Jackson's able to manage his sixteen-miles-a-day average he doesn't begin entraining until ten days after he begins his march.

 

[Jamieva]

I think it's worth considering at what point Franklin's force in Thoroughfare Gap is "unlocked" as it were and is able to march with the rest of the force. They're not exactly going to be left there forever.

Once McClellan's finished refilling his wagons the need to protect the O&A lessons dramatically. He doesn't actually need about 35,000 effectives to block a mountain gap anyway (in fact Franklin and Siegel are in the Thoroughfare Gap and New Baltimore area rather than just in the Gap) and the whole force is about ten miles from McClellan's HQ and has at least two non-overlapping road routes it could take.

I see no reason why McClellan couldn't leave behind a division in Thoroughfare Gap and have the rest of the force march behind him as a rearguard, screened by some of the cavalry. If Jackson comes down to try to pursue McClellan then it's the rearguard they'll hit (at about the same size as Jackson's force in Effectives this will not be an easy prospect for Jackson to overcome) and if Jackson goes for the railroad instead then the division left behind will be able to resist a cheap raid and can pull back along the railroad against anything stronger. If Jackson comes down to join Lee in Gordonsville then it just means McClellan has the rest of his troops marching a day or two behind.
Meanwhile the rest of McClellan's force can advance towards Gordonsville or turn to gain Fredericksburg.

We know McClellan could've blocked the gap with that small of a force, but did he? What did he believe was Lee's force size at this time?

Also, from what I read in Sears book on the AotP recently (yes i know it is Sears), Mac is moving at a galacial pace once he crossed the Potomac into Virginia.

 

[Saphroneth]

Also, from what I read in Sears book on the AotP recently (yes i know it is Sears), Mac is moving at a galacial pace once he crossed the Potomac into Virginia.

It should be possible to evaluate this by looking at the marches his force made once they were over the river. @67th Tigers , do you happen to have the details?

We know McClellan could've blocked the gap with that small of a force, but did he? What did he believe was Lee's force size at this time?

I know that McClellan overestimated Lee's force somewhat at Antietam (because he didn't know that Smith wasn't present at Antietam, IIRC) but also that McClellan had a high estimate of the casualties he'd inflicted at Antietam. Theoretically the two should cancel out somewhat.
AFAICT McClellan estimated that the force at Antietam was no more than 97,000 Present (which is basically all the Confederate troops in who'd been in Virginia by his estimates) and that he'd done about 27,000 Present in casualties. This should reduce the total Confederate force to about 70,000 Present, possibly a bit more if lightly wounded have recovered. If we assume that McClellan thinks 10,000 wounded have recovered, it's up to 80,000 Present total.

This means that neither wing would be estimated at much more than 45,000 Present even if quite lopsided. The actual strength in Present of Jackson's infantry formations was pretty much 37,000, so this conjectural overestimate isn't very much of an overestimate (and I've done my best to inflate Confederate numbers back up big-time in outlining the conjectural estimate).

Thoroughfare Gap is pretty narrow, in fact there's only room for a couple of regiments deployed side-by-side (a close-order line has a width of a bit under a yard per man and it's substantially less than 300 yards, so two-deep it'd take no more than 600 men). I'd say a brigade dug in in two or three lines could hold it against anything short of a full-court divisional assault, and the rest of the division can act as reserve plus cover the closest outflanking routes as well.
This is by no means completely invulnerable and Jackson could overcome it if he committed his main body. What it does mean is that Jackon would have to commit his main body to overcome it.

Note that during the Northern Virginia campaign Ricketts was assigned to hold Thoroughfare Gap against the risk of Longstreet's entire corps coming through, and Ricketts' mistake was that he had his troops at Gainesville six miles away instead of at the Gap itself. I'd say that McClellan could be reasonably confident of a similarly sized force holding Thoroughfare Gap against a light raid on a supply line he doesn't care much about any more.



ED: Thoroughfare Gap in the flat section is about 140 yards. Cramptons Gap is both wider (by a factor of 2-3) and has shallower slopes to the side (about a 20 yard rise in 100 yards along the ground, to the south; Thoroughfare Gap has 70 yards in 100m to the south and about the same to the north).
Cramptons was held by a brigade or two for three hours of actual fighting; the more constricted terrain at Thoroughfare should allow a smaller force to hold as efficiently, so a force that's actually larger should have no worries.

 

[67th Tigers]

It should be possible to evaluate this by looking at the marches his force made once they were over the river. @67th Tigers , do you happen to have the details?

Twice during the war Federal armies marched that route. We need to separate the march and the river crossing.

McClellan's river crossing took 8 days, which is overly long. This was mostly due to the weather. The army was across on 2nd November, and on 8th November Pleasonton and the 9th Corps was over the Rappahanock at Amissville, building a new bridge at Waterloo to pass heavy equipment. The same day Bayard reached Rappahanock station and occupied the crossings. Hence the march took six days.

In Meades pursuit after Gettysburg, he reached the Potomac on 17th July, followed the same route and arrived at Amissville with his cavalry and advance forces on 30th July. It took Meade 4 days to cross the Potomac, but 10 days to reach Amissville and Rappahanock station.

In sum, McClellan and Meade took the same amount of time to move over the same ground.

Lee's army in the same general area moved at the same rate. Longstreet did not move faster, he just didn't have to cross a river.

Armies move at the speed armies move. All a commander can do is try and avoid delays.

 

[CanadianCanuck]

But McClellan's rear isn't exposed, because he has Franklin and Siegel such that they can block a threat to his rear. This force is dramatically larger than it would take to block the Thoroughfare Gap and could be shifted further south to protect the O&A more generally.]

Except we know that Franklin and Sigel have no clue where Jackson is (up to the 11th or 12th at least), and Jackson is well and truly behind them. McClellan doesn't know this, and that's quite the problem.

These sound like quite large skirmishes if over 300 prisoners are involved. Is there an equivalent Federal record of them, or is this just a rumour?]

We have the record of reports of skirmishing on the 11th, and reports of Jackson advancing on the 13th and 14th (estimated at having a force of 40,000 men) causing great alarm in the Federal rear. There are also reports of skirmishing on the 15th and of some prisoners taken, but no total agreement on numbers that I can see. The 300 I expect is exaggerated.

How fast are you assuming Jackson to move and when are you expecting him to start to move?

If we assume that McClellan moves towards Culpeper and then Gordonsville at a speed of seven miles per day, then he will take approximately eight days as it is 51 miles by the shortest route. If he sets off on the 10th that means that McClellan reaches Gordonsville on the 17th (marches on the 10th, 11th, 12th, 13th, 14th, 15th, 16th and 17th, battle on the 17th after two miles of marching that day).
If we assume that Jackson starts from Winchester on the 13th and moves to Gordonsville by the Swift Run then to be at Gordonsville for a battle on the 17th he would need his marches on the 13th, 14th, 15th, 16th and 17th to average just over 20 miles a day each as that is 100 miles, and it means he arrives at the end of the day.
If McClellan sets off a day earlier or Jackson starts a day later there's no really physically possible way for Jackson to get to Gordonsville in time. And if Jackson's force has foot-in-mouth as was historically the case then they're marching without wagons and cannot move that fast.

Historically Jackson set off for Fredericksburg on the 22nd and arrived there on the 29th, which is eight marches (22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29) to cover 130 miles; this is a speed of about 16 miles per day. This speed means that if McClellan moves from Warrenton to Gordonsville at 7 miles per day starting on the 10th and Jackson moves from Winchester to Gordonsville at 16 miles per day starting on the 13th:

McClellan will reach Gordonsville during the day on the 17th, having covered 51 miles in seven full marches and one partial march.
Jackson's main body from Winchester will reach the Swift Run Gap at midday on the 17th, having covered 72 miles in four full marches and one half march. He will still be 28 miles (one full march and almost another full march) from Gordonsville and will not get there until the morning of the 19th.

Jackson's men are fast, but they're not fast enough. McClellan simply holds the inside line to Gordonsville by a huge margin.

It's assuming McClellan moves fast enough to do this, and he doesn't react to the suggestion of Jackson's threat in his rear at all. I'm skeptical of this, and if Jackson is moving earlier than the 13th (which absent the Federal delays after the 9th seems likely, so say the 12th). If he's moving 16-18 miles a day then he would reach Gordonsville on either the night of the 17th or the morning of the 18th, or about the time when McClellan would be ready for battle.

The army was not moving with expectation of battle, and even reaching Gordonsville on the 17th and realizing Longstreet is formed before them, they will take time to maneuver into battle as McClellan realizes that the enemy is forming to meet him (and he may assume Jackson is already there since he placed Jackson further south than he actually was) and so will most likely take to the 18th to form up as the main body will still be arriving by the evening.

Even assuming a worst case scenario where Jackson is still at Winchester on the 13th and McClellan receives word of a potential movement in his rear, this will mean the army stops on the 11th or 12th as McClellan now realizes his dispositions were wrong and there might be a great force behind him. I doubt the march continues for a least a day as he tries to find out what is going on.

I just don't see a situation where McClellan is actually ready for battle before Jackson gets there.

 

[CanadianCanuck]

It took the US another 18 months to get across the Rappahanock. If McClellan gets to Culpeper then he's south of the Rappahanock. Lee must scramble to halt McClellan at the North Anna. Once Fredericksburg is taken then supplies can be landed at Port Royal.

You inform a lot of this with your own speculation. If McClellan moves down to Gordonsville and directly pursues Lee (like he is supposed to) he's unprepared for battle, and most likely loses. If he changes bases, he's dismissed. He had no room to do anything but pursue Lee and lose.

"Divined" and "if" are mutually exclusive. Lee prepared for all eventualities of course, and if McClellan advanced on him, he intended to retreat...

... and McClellan was advancing on him. On the day you mentioned his cavalry was beyond Amissville, and 9th Corps marched there, south of the Rappahanock, straight towards Longstreet.

Of course Lee hasn't "divined" anything. On the 9th he writes he believes McClellan's objective is Strasburg in the Valley for example. Until Jackson finally arrives in early December, Longstreet and Lee are gripped with fear, hence orders like this:

General Orders Headquarters First Army Corps,

No. 49. November 16, 1862.

The troops of this command will be held in readiness for
battle upon a moment's notice. Commanders will see that pro-
visions, ammunition, and transportation are at hand and in
such quantities as may be wanted to meet their necessities.
The Commanding General relies upon the valor and patriotism
of these well-tried troops to sustain them in the struggles
that they may be called upon to encounter. Officers, be cool
and take care of your men. Soldiers, remain steady in your
ranks, take good aim, and obey the orders of your officers.
Observe these injunctions, and your general will be responsi-
ble for the issue.

Patent nonsense. Lee was in no way gripped with fear by McClellan's advance, and his writings to Jackson and Davis are completely accurate in regards to McClellan's line of advance or potential line of advance.

Jackson was ready to move on the 9th and we have no reason to believe he would be unable to advance to meet Lee. Lee sees McClellan advancing, is prepared to maneuver to meet it, and once the pause is found is baffled. If McClellan advances to Culpeper, and then 'changes bases' to Fredericksburg without giving battle, his dismissal is imminent.

Quite frankly, he can't catch Lee unawares or maneuver him into a position to offer battle on unfavorable terms at all. If he goes down the route he says he intended to and manages to catch Lee's combined army at Gordonsville (in a battle he isn't expecting) then he's at a loss.

The above letter is issued on the 16th (well, well after the obvious pause of the Army of the Potomac) this shows nothing but keeping his army ready for battle. He's not scared, just competent.

The only side which shows fear is the Federal side after the 12th when they are assuming Jackson is moving to destroy the railroad with 40,000 men and they are not entirely prepared for it. It's a gross overestimation of Jackson's strength and intentions, but it causes great alarm nontheless.

? McClellan's intelligence picture is very accurate. He knows he has caught a fraction of Lee's army, 30-40,000 men. He knows he's going to pitch into it. They know he's going to pitch into it.

He says something like that in 1864, two years later. But we know he had no clue as to Jackson's dispositions, there's no expectation at the time he can catch Lee if he retreats, and he shows no preparedness for battle whatsoever. Any idea to the contrary flies in the face of all the correspondence he sent in 1862.

They're not entrenched, and indeed didn't entrench at Culpeper, because (a) it's terrible defensive terrain and (b) Lee did not intend to fight there. Lee intended to retreat to Gordonsville if pushed. They want to push him back, but can't because Longstreet's 3 divisions aren't fully up until the 9th November. On the 10th they try attacking, striking Pleasonton's cavalry in front of Amissville, who retire back on Sturgis' division at Amissville and give Stuart a good smack. It's confirmed McClellan has infantry over the Rappahanock

There's no record of attack or giving Stuart a "good smack" at all from either side, they report a giving Imboden a good smack, but nothing more. There's a reconnaissance and skirmishing, but no general engagement. And they confirm there's a 'small body' across the Rappahannock, with the intent of advancing further.

If McClellan continued advancing, and Lee pulls back declining to offer battle, then McClellan either chases him, or he 'changes bases' and is dismissed.

The non-campaign here has no recorded objective, and it's not until two years later McClellan declares he was on the eve of a great victory. Casting a critical eye at it one cannot escape the conclusion it would ultimately serve no purpose.

 

[Saphroneth]

We have the record of reports of skirmishing on the 11th,

By cavalry only, and less than a regiment (a squadron is two companies, so this is six companies of cavalry or maybe 500 effectives). Hardly a threat to an infantry division, let alone anything more.

and reports of Jackson advancing on the 13th and 14th (estimated at having a force of 40,000 men) causing great alarm in the Federal rear.

He's reported as advancing towards Cumberland, MD, and as aiming to hit the Baltimore and Ohio. That's northwest of Winchester, not east, and if McClellan believed it it would be excellent evidence he was fine (as Jackson was moving almost directly away from his army).

This means the only evidence we have of your claim that Jackson historically pushed troops through the passes and fought skirmishes on the 14th is a few cavalry skirmishing on the 11th.

Except we know that Franklin and Sigel have no clue where Jackson is (up to the 11th or 12th at least), and Jackson is well and truly behind them. McClellan doesn't know this, and that's quite the problem.

But surely you don't think that Jackson could beat 35,000 Effectives in the Thoroughfare Gap? Indeed, 5,000 effectives should be enough to block the Gap, and the rest of McClellan's force can follow because they don't really need the area blocked off at all.

It's assuming McClellan moves fast enough to do this, and he doesn't react to the suggestion of Jackson's threat in his rear at all. I'm skeptical of this, and if Jackson is moving earlier than the 13th (which absent the Federal delays after the 9th seems likely, so say the 12th). If he's moving 16-18 miles a day then he would reach Gordonsville on either the night of the 17th or the morning of the 18th, or about the time when McClellan would be ready for battle.

Hold on. You've been clear that you believe that McClellan had no idea where Jackson was, and you've claimed that Jackson was pushing troops through the passes on the 13th and/or 14th. But if you have Jackson moving on the 12th instead then there's no alarm to McClellan's rear.

Either you can have Jackson causing McClellan delay by threatening McClellan's rear (by revealing his position) or you can have Jackson set off promptly to join Lee.


This raises another question, though, which is why Jackson didn't come to join Lee historically. When did he discover McClellan had stopped moving? Is this why it is that Jackson disobeyed Lee's order to join him at Gordonsville, which historically reached him on the 13th?

The order on the 13th, by the way, is a big problem for the idea that Jackson would set off that promptly. Why didn't he obey the order and do so? (67th's model includes an explanation for this, which is that Jackson couldn't move at the time - certainly not in force.)

For now we'll assume that Jackson could move as fast as he could in late November and early December, but please realize that if Jackson's transport was as broken down as 67th has said then he is basically immobile.

As for speed, if Jackson sets off at dawn on the 12th and moves at 16 miles per day (his historical speed after his transport had recovered) he reaches Gordonsville on the morning of the 19th. OTOH, the first movement the Army of the Potomac made after the pause was from Warrenton Junction (closest point of the bivouac area) to Falmouth in no more than three marches (15th, 16th and 17th), which is 9 miles per day for the leading elements. That would mean they'd cover the 51 miles from Warrenton to Gordonsville in a total of 6 days (marches on the 10th, 11th, 12th, 13th, 14th and 15th) and deploy for a battle on the 16th; if McClellan wants to wait until Franklin's main body arrive from Thoroughfare Gap at the same speed it's 61 miles and so it's 7 marches, deploying for a battle on the 17th.

The point here is basically that there are four options, if McClellan aims for Gordonsville.

1) If Jackson is positively issuing forth into the Loudoun Valley then McClellan would have a reason to leave Franklin behind to act as a rearguard, but if Jackson is issuing forth into the Loudoun Valley then he can't be on the march to Gordonsville and so McClellan doesn't need Franklin with him to have a major advantage over Lee.

2) If Jackson is marching down to Gordonsville then McClellan (if, as you say, he has no idea where Jackson is and that he might be a threat) has no reason to need to leave Franklin behind. When the main body of McClellan's army reaches Gordonsville he has a major advantage over Lee no matter whether or not Jackson has arrived, because he has Franklin.

3) If Jackson is ordered to march to Gordonsville but he can't actually make it down there faster than McClellan (either because he has so much further to go or because he plain can't move on account of tranportation problems) then McClellan has his full force (inc Franklin) concentrated and Lee only has Longstreet. McClellan has a major advantage over Lee.

4) Jackson is assumed to get to Gordonsville faster than McClellan can, and McClellan is assumed to leave Franklin and Siegel behind (despite not having a strong reason to). In this case Lee has 73,500 Present and McClellan has 94,200 Present (with the Effectives numbers pretty much even or slightly in Lee's favour, but the Present numbers are the ones that don't require estimation for either side)
In this situation, McClellan is on the O&A and can supply from there for a time, and he can also have Franklin come down to join him; thus what results is a stalemate with both sides equal until Franklin shows up, unless McClellan is willing to attack a superior force.
(McClellan historically was willing to attack at Antietam against what he thought was a superior force.)


Of these, (4) requires:

1) Jackson's speed of marching to be at least as great as his historical speed, despite evidence his transportation was broken down.
2) Jackson to decide to set off before he got the order (despite historically having not set off even when he got it - why?)
3) McClellan to leave a large chunk of his force behind despite having no strong reason to do so.
4) McClellan to march at a speed below the speed the same force would manage the next time it did a march.


It also raises an important question, which is what Jackson was actually doing from the 10th to the 25th November historically. We have now found out that the Union thought he was moving northwest, but we also know Jackson's force was at Winchester for the whole period and as far as I can tell he didn't actually push infantry over the mountains at any point.

If it was obviously benefical no matter what the Union commander did for Jackson to come and join Longstreet at Gordonsville, why didn't he do it when he was ordered to? The danger to the Confederates is clearly much greater if they're divided, so why didn't Jackson move to unite with Lee on the 13th or on the 12th?


The answer which makes the most sense is the one which is that the horses have broken down and that Jackson cannot move rapidly.

 

[CanadianCanuck]

By cavalry only, and less than a regiment (a squadron is two companies, so this is six companies of cavalry or maybe 500 effectives). Hardly a threat to an infantry division, let alone anything more.

He's reported as advancing towards Cumberland, MD, and as aiming to hit the Baltimore and Ohio. That's northwest of Winchester, not east, and if McClellan believed it it would be excellent evidence he was fine (as Jackson was moving almost directly away from his army).

This means the only evidence we have of your claim that Jackson historically pushed troops through the passes and fought skirmishes on the 14th is a few cavalry skirmishing on the 11th.

For the record, this is not my claim. This is the correspondence with Lee and then the following Union reports detailing their opinion Jackson is moving with 40,000 men as established in the historical record. The reports very well may be garbled, but it is clear Jackson was doing something in the period of time in question or at least skirmishing with the enemy enough and moving to alarm local commanders.

But surely you don't think that Jackson could beat 35,000 Effectives in the Thoroughfare Gap? Indeed, 5,000 effectives should be enough to block the Gap, and the rest of McClellan's force can follow because they don't really need the area blocked off at all.

Not really relevant if they don't know where he is in order to intercept him is it?

Hold on. You've been clear that you believe that McClellan had no idea where Jackson was, and you've claimed that Jackson was pushing troops through the passes on the 13th and/or 14th. But if you have Jackson moving on the 12th instead then there's no alarm to McClellan's rear.

Either you can have Jackson causing McClellan delay by threatening McClellan's rear (by revealing his position) or you can have Jackson set off promptly to join Lee.

False dichotomy. Firstly, I pointed out that this was an option available to Lee and Jackson, but not the most likely. Secondly, McClellan very manifestly did not know Jackson's true position in his rear.

My belief is Jackson would be ordered to move and support Lee, but the option (as Jackson suggested) to harass the Federal rear remains open as discussed in the correspondence.

This raises another question, though, which is why Jackson didn't come to join Lee historically. When did he discover McClellan had stopped moving? Is this why it is that Jackson disobeyed Lee's order to join him at Gordonsville, which historically reached him on the 13th?

The order on the 13th, by the way, is a big problem for the idea that Jackson would set off that promptly. Why didn't he obey the order and do so? (67th's model includes an explanation for this, which is that Jackson couldn't move at the time - certainly not in force.)

For now we'll assume that Jackson could move as fast as he could in late November and early December, but please realize that if Jackson's transport was as broken down as 67th has said then he is basically immobile.

As for speed, if Jackson sets off at dawn on the 12th and moves at 16 miles per day (his historical speed after his transport had recovered) he reaches Gordonsville on the morning of the 19th. OTOH, the first movement the Army of the Potomac made after the pause was from Warrenton Junction (closest point of the bivouac area) to Falmouth in no more than three marches (15th, 16th and 17th), which is 9 miles per day for the leading elements. That would mean they'd cover the 51 miles from Warrenton to Gordonsville in a total of 6 days (marches on the 10th, 11th, 12th, 13th, 14th and 15th) and deploy for a battle on the 16th; if McClellan wants to wait until Franklin's main body arrive from Thoroughfare Gap at the same speed it's 61 miles and so it's 7 marches, deploying for a battle on the 17th.

The point here is basically that there are four options, if McClellan aims for Gordonsville.

1) If Jackson is positively issuing forth into the Loudoun Valley then McClellan would have a reason to leave Franklin behind to act as a rearguard, but if Jackson is issuing forth into the Loudoun Valley then he can't be on the march to Gordonsville and so McClellan doesn't need Franklin with him to have a major advantage over Lee.

2) If Jackson is marching down to Gordonsville then McClellan (if, as you say, he has no idea where Jackson is and that he might be a threat) has no reason to need to leave Franklin behind. When the main body of McClellan's army reaches Gordonsville he has a major advantage over Lee no matter whether or not Jackson has arrived, because he has Franklin.

3) If Jackson is ordered to march to Gordonsville but he can't actually make it down there faster than McClellan (either because he has so much further to go or because he plain can't move on account of tranportation problems) then McClellan has his full force (inc Franklin) concentrated and Lee only has Longstreet. McClellan has a major advantage over Lee.

4) Jackson is assumed to get to Gordonsville faster than McClellan can, and McClellan is assumed to leave Franklin and Siegel behind (despite not having a strong reason to). In this case Lee has 73,500 Present and McClellan has 94,200 Present (with the Effectives numbers pretty much even or slightly in Lee's favour, but the Present numbers are the ones that don't require estimation for either side)
In this situation, McClellan is on the O&A and can supply from there for a time, and he can also have Franklin come down to join him; thus what results is a stalemate with both sides equal until Franklin shows up, unless McClellan is willing to attack a superior force.
(McClellan historically was willing to attack at Antietam against what he thought was a superior force.)


Of these, (4) requires:

1) Jackson's speed of marching to be at least as great as his historical speed, despite evidence his transportation was broken down.
2) Jackson to decide to set off before he got the order (despite historically having not set off even when he got it - why?)
3) McClellan to leave a large chunk of his force behind despite having no strong reason to do so.
4) McClellan to march at a speed below the speed the same force would manage the next time it did a march.

Again, this is answered in the Correspondence. Jackson declared he was ready to march when ordered on the 9th. But the explicit order never comes, and Jackson's judgement is that with the Federal army not moving he may gain an advantage from maneuvering in their rear. This has the effect of discomforting and concerning local commanders from the 11th to the 15th.

Even if we accept the (highly unlikely) conclusion Jackson's transport is completely broken down, he is not immobile. There was forage and supply being prepared and forwarded to him from Stauton.

Then you're reasoning is strange. Three things.

1) We know McClellan does not know where Jackson is
2) We know that Franklin and Sigel are being left in McClellan's rear to protect any flanking or rear attack by Jackson (which they had already manifestly failed at)
3) We know McClellan did not expect a battle to be fought in the immediate future.

Why would McClellan return Sigel and Franklin if he believed Jackson was still a threat to his rear, or as he had later claimed, that he had effectively isolated Longstreet and Jackson from one another? He has no reason to do so unless he knows that Jackson is not a threat to his rear, since his scouting has so far completely failed him how will he be informed that Jackson is moving to unite with the army and how can he be sure Jackson is not a threat?

It is clear, in every way that counts, he has no idea what Jackson would or could be doing. Effectively, he must leave a rear guard and if he continues to march south on the present line from Warrenton to Gordonsville then his line gets longer and the men necessary to guard that line get strung out as well. He will not be approaching Longstreet with anything resembling overwhelming force. Sigel and Franklin would not be a factor in any hypothetical battle at Gordonsville unless one was left entirely to control McClellan's rear.

Unless he reaches Culpeper and then decides to move to Fredericksburg (which as established, may lead to his dismissal since he is not seeking battle) he is not in position to outmaneuver Lee. He must instead follow him, which only plays into Lee's hands and not McClellan's.

It also raises an important question, which is what Jackson was actually doing from the 10th to the 25th November historically. We have now found out that the Union thought he was moving northwest, but we also know Jackson's force was at Winchester for the whole period and as far as I can tell he didn't actually push infantry over the mountains at any point.

If it was obviously benefical no matter what the Union commander did for Jackson to come and join Longstreet at Gordonsville, why didn't he do it when he was ordered to? The danger to the Confederates is clearly much greater if they're divided, so why didn't Jackson move to unite with Lee on the 13th or on the 12th?

That is already answered in the correspondence. Jackson believed being in the enemies rear and maneuvering behind him held some advantage (and this was at a point where the Union army had been stopped for six days, which seemed to be the only thing confusing Lee). Lee trusts Jackson's judgement, but by the 13th he did not believe this to be the case that remaining separate was necessarily a good idea.

However, the, at that point, inactivity of the Federal army was the only true concern of Lee's. The sudden movement to Fredericksburg (slow as it was) allowed Lee time to maneuver and prepare.

If McCllelan keeps advancing straight on past the 7th, then Lee's contingencies will kick in through the simple expediency that the enemy army is actually moving rather than being inert for a lengthy period where he cannot guess which way they will jump.

The final point in all of this is, we don't know what McClellan was actually planning on doing. He might claim two years later (erroneously) that he was on the eve of a great victory, but this smacks of hindsight and flawed hindsight at that. Leading up to this campaign we see he had no expectation of success, and on the 30th had telegraphed Washington seeking to cover his *** by saying it would be Halleck's fault when things fell apart. (The Civil War Papers of George B. McClellan: Selected Correspondence, 1860-1865 , pg. 516)

None of this points to either any coherent plan or method to seek a decisive battle in November.[/QUOTE][/QUOTE][/QUOTE][/QUOTE]

 

[67th Tigers]

Except we know that Franklin and Sigel have no clue where Jackson is (up to the 11th or 12th at least), and Jackson is well and truly behind them. McClellan doesn't know this, and that's quite the problem.

This simply isn't true. The int reports consistently placed Jackson's Corps in the correct place. Jackson hasn't moved for over a month. His main body went into camps in a square Martinsburg-Charlestown-Berryville-Kernstown ca. 24th September, and didn't move until 21st November.

We have the record of reports of skirmishing on the 11th, and reports of Jackson advancing on the 13th and 14th (estimated at having a force of 40,000 men) causing great alarm in the Federal rear. There are also reports of skirmishing on the 15th and of some prisoners taken, but no total agreement on numbers that I can see. The 300 I expect is exaggerated.

Hardly.

On the 11th (your link is to the wrong page BTW) is simply a false report coming out of Cox in West Virginia, and has Jackson heading NW, not E or S. The 13th-14th is the same - Cox is paranoid that Jackson is heading NW. This is all wrong, and all that happened was the 12th Corps and Cox were told to be on alert. This has nothing to do with the main body, and does not support the argument you are attempting to construct.

It's assuming McClellan moves fast enough to do this, and he doesn't react to the suggestion of Jackson's threat in his rear at all. I'm skeptical of this, and if Jackson is moving earlier than the 13th (which absent the Federal delays after the 9th seems likely, so say the 12th). If he's moving 16-18 miles a day then he would reach Gordonsville on either the night of the 17th or the morning of the 18th, or about the time when McClellan would be ready for battle.

The army was not moving with expectation of battle, and even reaching Gordonsville on the 17th and realizing Longstreet is formed before them, they will take time to maneuver into battle as McClellan realizes that the enemy is forming to meet him (and he may assume Jackson is already there since he placed Jackson further south than he actually was) and so will most likely take to the 18th to form up as the main body will still be arriving by the evening.

Jackson was historically not ready to march until the 21st November. Perhaps it's best to look at the communications of Lee etc.

On 28th Lee orders Jackson to remain where he is, and Longstreet to move to Culpeper, sending Pickett's Division as rapidly as possible there.

On 2nd November, the Federal occupation of Snicker's Gap creates a panick amongst Jackson's Corps. If the Federals cross the Gap then Jackson is isolated and will have to cut his way out. Jackson of course wants to pull out, but Lee is down in Richmond and so there is no-one available to give the order.

On 5th November Lee returns from Richmond, and on the 6th tells Jackson to prepare to abandon his position and march to unite with Longstreet. On the same day Lee write to the Secy of War his assessment and plans; he has misread McClellan and wrongly believes Jackson will prevent McClellan advancing on Longstreet. However, his orders to Jackson in the event this happens are not to raid into the Loudoun Valley (which Lee understands is pointless), but rather to unite with Longstreet via Swift Run Gap. In the same event Longstreet is ordered to retreat to Madison. The next day Lee writes the Secy of War that he issued the order for Jackson to march to unite with Longstreet on the 6th. Stuart thinks McClellan might cut Jackson off, and on the 7th Lee writes that he thinks that isn't so, and he's ordered the whole army to retreat to Madison.

On the 8th Lee reiterates his order to Jackson, and on the 9th writes again, this time replying to a letter from Jackson dated the 7th. Jackson apparently reported McClellan had left Snickers and Ashby's Gaps. Lee (incorrectly) interpreted this as McClellan turning west towards the Shenandoah, and gave instructions to that effect. On the 10th Lee repeats that he wishes Jackson to descend the valley and unite with Longstreet if McClellan isn't being delayed by Lee (which he isn't), whilst Jackson is still talking to his division commanders about trying to obtain enough rations to make the march. The 11th and 12th similar, and on the 13th Lee is puzzled by why "McClellan" has stopped when he had secured the Rappahanock crossings.

On the 14th Lee has worked out that McClellan has no base of operations that Jackson could raid, and hence Jackson's presence at Winchester does nothing. He again asks Jackson to move. On the 18th Lee writes again, replying to Jackson's continued insistence that McClellan's army threatens him. Lee now quite forcefully states Jackson is doing no good and tells him to send at least some of his divisions to Longstreet. On the 18th Lee writes that Burnside's army is making for Fredericksburg, and again asks Jackson to move.

On the 21st November, Jackson starts moving. On the 23rd Lee still doesn't know that Jackson has started to move, telling him to get to Culpeper. On the 25th Lee ingenuously tells the President that it was his decision to leave Jackson there, ignoring the fact that as far as he's concerned, he gave orders on the 6th for Jackson to march to Culpeper, and has reiterated them almost daily. This is the day he received the news that Jackson is actually, finally, moving. His letters to Jackson of that day however indicate that he now believes he is in no danger - Burnside is not as threatening as McClellan was.

Even assuming a worst case scenario where Jackson is still at Winchester on the 13th and McClellan receives word of a potential movement in his rear, this will mean the army stops on the 11th or 12th as McClellan now realizes his dispositions were wrong and there might be a great force behind him. I doubt the march continues for a least a day as he tries to find out what is going on.

Historically, no order Lee gave Jackson could move him. On the 14th he realised that "McClellan" had no rear that Jackson threatened. McClellan of course knew that Jackson did not threaten him, and knew that Jackson wasn't going to march unopposed in Washington as many in the government feared.


I just don't see a situation where McClellan is actually ready for battle before Jackson gets there.[/QUOTE]