McClellan, Burnside & Porter

[ErnieMac]

As George McClellan led the Army of the Potomac out of the Washington DC defenses he had assigned Ambrose Burnside the role as Right Wing commander. The Right Wing was composed of Joseph Hooker's First Corps and Burnside's own Ninth Corps, now under the temporary command of Jacob D. Cox. In addition to being the Army of the Potomac's second ranking officer, Burnside was a long time friend of McClellan. Burnside's role as wing commander would continue until September 14 when McClellan issued an order suspending it in the aftermath of the Battle of South Mountain. Burnside had performed his role creditably at South Mountain and could see no reason for the change. Jacob Cox would describe Burnside's reaction as "disturbed and grieved at the course things had taken." Burnside and others would attribute the changes to machinations by First Corps commander Joseph Hooker following the fighting at Turner's Gap.

Scott Hartwig in his book To Antietam Creek puts forward another reason. Initially missing from the Army of the Potomac lineup was Fitz John Porter's Fifth Corps which had been left at Washington at the beginning of the Maryland Campaign. McClellan considered Porter as his most capable subordinate and confidant, but Porter's reputation was under a cloud in DC, having been charged with insubordination by John Pope as a result of his actions at 2nd Bull Run. McClellan's intervention had Porter and the Fifth Corps restored to the Army. When Porter caught up to the Army in time for the Battle of South Mountain, Hartwig asserts he carried disturbing news. It seems that during the Northern Virginia Campaign Porter had sent Burnside a number of private communications that were highly critical of John Pope. Burnside forwarded these communications to President Lincoln, Secretary of War Stanton and General-in-Chief Halleck. The messages were now being used to help form court-martial charges against Porter.

According to Hartwig, Porter saw Burnside's forwarding private correspondence as a betrayal and said as much to McClellan. McClellan's coolness toward Burnside is said to have originated as a result. Burnside was never restored to his role as wing commander even though he pretended otherwise. McClellan's description of Burnside in his final report of the campaign (dated August 4, 1863) scarcely mentions his role at South Mountain and has an underlying tone of criticism for the action at Antietam and afterward. I think Hartwig's theory merits consideration. What say you all?

 

[Jimklag]

As George McClellan led the Army of the Potomac out of the Washington DC defenses he had assigned Ambrose Burnside the role as Right Wing commander. The Right Wing was composed of Joseph Hooker's First Corps and Burnside's own Ninth Corps, now under the temporary command of Jacob D. Cox. In addition to being the Army of the Potomac's second ranking officer, Burnside was a long time friend of McClellan. Burnside's role as wing commander would continue until September 14 when McClellan issued an order suspending it in the aftermath of the Battle of South Mountain. Burnside had performed his role creditably at South Mountain and could see no reason for the change. Jacob Cox would describe Burnside's reaction as "disturbed and grieved at the course things had taken." Burnside and others would attribute the changes to machinations by First Corps commander Joseph Hooker following the fighting at Turner's Gap.

Scott Hartwig in his book To Antietam Creek puts forward another reason. Initially missing from the Army of the Potomac lineup was Fitz John Porter's Fifth Corps which had been left at Washington at the beginning of the Maryland Campaign. McClellan considered Porter as his most capable subordinate and confidant, but Porter's reputation was under a cloud in DC, having been charged with insubordination by John Pope as a result of his actions at 2nd Bull Run. McClellan's intervention had Porter and the Fifth Corps restored to the Army. When Porter caught up to the Army in time for the Battle of South Mountain, Hartwig asserts he carried disturbing news. It seems that during the Northern Virginia Campaign Porter had sent Burnside a number of private communications that were highly critical of John Pope. Burnside forwarded these communications to President Lincoln, Secretary of War Stanton and General-in-Chief Halleck. The messages were now being used to help form court-martial charges against Porter.

According to Hartwig, Porter saw Burnside's forwarding private correspondence as a betrayal and said as much to McClellan. McClellan's coolness toward Burnside is said to have originated as a result. Burnside was never restored to his role as wing commander even though he pretended otherwise. McClellan's description of Burnside in his final report of the campaign (dated August 4, 1863) scarcely mentions his role at South Mountain and has an underlying tone of criticism for the action at Antietam and afterward. I think Hartwig's theory merits consideration. What say you all?

Sounds very likely to me. It also partially explains Burnside's elevation to command after McClellan was fired. His choice to command AoP is hard to explain otherwise. He certainly wasn't the logical choice.

 

[67th Tigers]

Burnside certainly returned to the role of wing commander after Antietam. He commanded the wing that crossed at Berlin in October 1862, with 1st, 6th and 9th Corps. With Sumner absent sick Porter commanded the other wing which crossed at Harper's Ferry with 2nd and 5th Corps.

To satisfy Lincoln, 12th Corps was detached to guard Harper's Ferry. 3rd and 11th Corps were at Washington and not released to McClellan.

 

[ErnieMac]

Sounds very likely to me. It also partially explains Burnside's elevation to command after McClellan was fired. His choice to command AoP is hard to explain otherwise. He certainly wasn't the logical choice.

At the time of his appointment Burnside was the senior officer in the AoP other than McClellan. He had performed well in independent command on the North Carolina coast. IMO his selection was reasonable.

 

[Jimklag]

At the time of his appointment Burnside was the senior officer in the AoP other than McClellan. He had performed well in independent command on the North Carolina coast. IMO his selection was reasonable.

He was next highest officer, no doubt, but not even in the team picture based on ability. That's what I meant.

 

[Jimklag]

At the time of his appointment Burnside was the senior officer in the AoP other than McClellan. He had performed well in independent command on the North Carolina coast. IMO his selection was reasonable.

Let's face it. Burnside would not have been the next choice if all of the following things were not true: Hooker and Mansfield were wounded; Franklin was a die-hard McClellan man which was not a good thing to be at that time; Porter was about to stand trial and Sumner was 150 years old.

 

[Bruce Vail]

Let's face it. Burnside would not have been the next choice if all of the following things were not true: Hooker and Mansfield were wounded; Franklin was a die-hard McClellan man which was not a good thing to be at that time; Porter was about to stand trial and Sumner was 150 years old.

I like this theory!

One problem. Hooker's wound was a minor one (a bullet wound to the foot if I recall correctly) so it was not the wound which disqualified him in Lincoln/Stanton's mind(s) for command of the AoP. It was something else. What?

Also: Mansfield wasn't wounded: He was dead.

 

[Jimklag]

I like this theory!

One problem. Hooker's wound was a minor one (a bullet wound to the foot if I recall correctly) so it was not the wound which disqualified him in Lincoln/Stanton's mind(s) for command of the AoP. It was something else. What?

Also: Mansfield wasn't wounded: He was dead.

Mansfield was way dead. As far as Hooker goes, why spoil the beauty of a theory with cold, hard facts. Don't know why Hooker was passed over this time.

 

[67th Tigers]

Mansfield was way dead. As far as Hooker goes, why spoil the beauty of a theory with cold, hard facts. Don't know why Hooker was passed over this time.

Seniority.

Burnside was next in seniority. Next was Sumner, but he was removed from the AoP to make way for Hooker. Franklin was after Sumner (once Porter was gone) and went when Burnside went.

Of the remaining officers, Sedgwick, Slocum, Hooker and Smith were promoted MG(V) together, when all McClellan's Peninsula division commanders were promoted as a job lot. Seniority was determined by previous seniority, and ran:

Kearny
Hooker
Couch
Richardson
Slocum
Peck
Morell
Smith
Sedgwick

Kearny was dead, and thus seniority in Burnside's army went:

Burnside
Sumner
Franklin
Hooker
then others

Mansfield was a Brigadier-General in the regular army. That meant he ranked all BG(V), but was ranked by all MG(V) as well as all regular MG and BG above him (Harney and Sumner). Every single MG(V) ranked Mansfield, and the only way to gets Mansfield up is to promote him to MG in the regular army.

Hooker was the senior officer remaining in the AoP when Burnside and Franklin were fired. He still was worried about having the same date on his Commission as Slocum etc., and got the Secy of War to backdate it to 5th May 1862 (Battle of Williamsburg).

 

[Andrew]

Burnside had performed his role creditably at South Mountain and could see no reason for the change. Jacob Cox would describe Burnside's reaction as "disturbed and grieved at the course things had taken." Burnside and others would attribute the changes to machinations by First Corps commander Joseph Hooker following the fighting at Turner's Gap.

Didn't Burnside get a late start on the morning of Sep 15th, which held up another corps trying to cross South Mountain to pursue Lee? I seem to recall McClellan being aggravated by this delay and even referenced it on the 16th or 17th in one of his communications to Burnside related to taking the bridge.

Also, the special order that removed Burnside from wing command was written on Sep 15th. At that time, McClellan was physically splitting up the wing, directing Hooker and his First Corps to the northern end of the field and Burnside and the Ninth Corps to the south end. It's not clear to me that the disbanding of the right wing was influenced by Burnside's performance at South Mountain.

As a slight aside, I am aware of an article (though I haven't been able to read it anywhere online) written by Ethan Rafuse that dismisses the idea that Burnside's demotion was a result of some conspiracy between Hooker, Porter and McClellan. It is titled "'Poor Burn?' The Antietam Conspiracy that Wasn't," Civil War History 54 (June 2008). Has anyone who has read this article shed any light?

 

[67th Tigers]

Didn't Burnside get a late start on the morning of Sep 15th, which held up another corps trying to cross South Mountain to pursue Lee? I seem to recall McClellan being aggravated by this delay and even referenced it on the 16th or 17th in one of his communications to Burnside related to taking the bridge.

Yes, Cox (who took the Corps over) gave 9th Corps a rest, and 5 hours after the receipt of McClellan urgent orders to pursue the enemy they had not budged. Sykes' division reached the gap, Sykes informed McClellan and pushed through.

Sykes was the second division to reach Antietam Creek (after Richardson, who was pushed to the front of the other gap). Hooker's 1st Corps arrived near dark. 9th Corps didn't reach the field until the afternoon of the next day (16th). This created a natural break in Burnside's command, as Hooker had been ordered to the extreme right, and the extreme left needed filling which is where Burnside was ordered to.

Sumner retained command of his wing, and 12th Corps acted as part of 2nd Corps tactically.

As a slight aside, I am aware of an article (though I haven't been able to read it anywhere online) written by Ethan Rafuse that dismisses the idea that Burnside's demotion was a result of some conspiracy between Hooker, Porter and McClellan. It is titled "'Poor Burn?' The Antietam Conspiracy that Wasn't," Civil War History 54 (June 2008). Has anyone who has read this article shed any light?

I have it. He argues McClellan because 1st and 9th Corps were on different roads (each, in theory, at the front of a column as Burnside's wing was in the advance the day before and attacked both gaps) it was simply expediency. He further argues that if 9th Corps had been on time Burnside's wing would have been reunited. To copy and paste:

"
In sum, although the Burnside conspiracy theory adds a certain layer of
drama and intrigue to one of the great military campaigns in all of American
history, there is good reason for setting it aside. The assignment of command
responsibilities, conduct of operations, and organization of the Army of the
Potomac during the campaign were dictated not by a conspiracy but by practical
military considerations. McClellan broke up the wing command structure
after South Mountain not out of malice toward an old friend, but because
the deployment of the two corps of Burnside's wing in the aftermath of the
fighting around Turner's Gap—for which Burnside himself was responsible—
necessitated it. It was under Burnside, in his capacity as wing commander, that
the Ninth Corps and First Corps were sent to separate ends of the battlefield
at Turner's Gap on September 14, with McClellan simply endorsing the decision
when he arrived at the front. As a consequence, Hooker's corps was at
Turner's Gap and the Ninth Corps as at Fox's Gap when the fighting at South
Mountain ended, and unless McClellan and Burnside wished to waste several
hours juggling units on the morning of September 15, there was no alternative
to having the two corps of Burnside's wing take separate routes in their approach
to the Antietam. This had the consequence of the Ninth Corps arriving
at Antietam in a manner that made it natural that it would deploy on the far
left of the Union line, and of Hooker's corps arriving from a direction that
made the decision to position it on the far right a natural one as well.

On top of this, in his battle plan, McClellan assigned one of the two prime
leadership roles to Burnside, suggesting that despite his frustration at the
delays at Fox's Gap and problems with the placement of the Ninth Corps
on September 16, McClellan remained confident in his old friend's ability.
And, aside from the problems with Crook's assault and delays in resuming
the drive toward Sharpsburg after the capture of the bridge—both of which
were as attributable to the fog of war as anything else—it is difficult to see
truly serious blunders that can be directly attributed to a corps commander's
troubled psyche on September 17. Finally, had McClellan wished to sabotage
his old friend, he would not have, as he confided to his wife he did when he
wrote it, downplayed what concerns he did have over Burnside's performance
at Sharpsburg in his initial report on the campaign or expressed what was
clearly sincere concern for "Poor Burn" when he handed over command of
the army to him in November.55

In closing, it is useful to ask why such a weakly supported conspiracy theory
has gained such firm traction in Civil War literature that no serious discussion
of the Battle of Antietam can fail to address it. One answer, clearly, is the
shadow Carman's monumental study, in which the theory is most extensively
developed and presented, casts over any work on the Maryland campaign.
This in turn is a reflection of the influence of Cox's writings, as Carman's
account of the Ninth Corps's operations during the Maryland campaign
draws heavily upon them, as do all modern studies of the campaign. Whether
Cox's at best weakly supported speculations regarding a conspiracy against
Burnside were motivated by his clear dislike for McClellan and Hooker or a
desire to distract attention from errors of his own, real or perceived, during
the campaign is certainly worthy of serious consideration."

 

[Andrew]

Thanks for that excerpt. I forgot about that comment McClellan made to his wife about feeling bad about having to say what he really thought about Burnside's performance. It shows a facet of McClellan that is rarely brought up.

 

[ErnieMac]

Didn't Burnside get a late start on the morning of Sep 15th, which held up another corps trying to cross South Mountain to pursue Lee? I seem to recall McClellan being aggravated by this delay and even referenced it on the 16th or 17th in one of his communications to Burnside related to taking the bridge.

Also, the special order that removed Burnside from wing command was written on Sep 15th. At that time, McClellan was physically splitting up the wing, directing Hooker and his First Corps to the northern end of the field and Burnside and the Ninth Corps to the south end. It's not clear to me that the disbanding of the right wing was influenced by Burnside's performance at South Mountain.

As a slight aside, I am aware of an article (though I haven't been able to read it anywhere online) written by Ethan Rafuse that dismisses the idea that Burnside's demotion was a result of some conspiracy between Hooker, Porter and McClellan. It is titled "'Poor Burn?' The Antietam Conspiracy that Wasn't," Civil War History 54 (June 2008). Has anyone who has read this article shed any light?

Hartwig states the decision to detach Hooker was made the night of the 14th (To Antietam Creek pg. 491) with the formal order suspending Burnside's wing command written the following day. Neither Hooker nor Burnside got off to a quick start on the 15th. Hooker finally marched about 10:00 a.m. (3 hours after Richardson's Division led the way). Burnside would not get on the road until 2:00 p.m. after repeated messages pressing him to move.

I don't think Hooker was involved in any conspiracy with McClellan and Porter, though I would not put asking to be removed from Burnside's supervision beyond him.

 

[ErnieMac]

Yes, Cox (who took the Corps over) gave 9th Corps a rest, and 5 hours after the receipt of McClellan urgent orders to pursue the enemy they had not budged. Sykes' division reached the gap, Sykes informed McClellan and pushed through.

Sykes was the second division to reach Antietam Creek (after Richardson, who was pushed to the front of the other gap). Hooker's 1st Corps arrived near dark. 9th Corps didn't reach the field until the afternoon of the next day (16th). This created a natural break in Burnside's command, as Hooker had been ordered to the extreme right, and the extreme left needed filling which is where Burnside was ordered to.

Sumner retained command of his wing, and 12th Corps acted as part of 2nd Corps tactically.



I have it. He argues McClellan because 1st and 9th Corps were on different roads (each, in theory, at the front of a column as Burnside's wing was in the advance the day before and attacked both gaps) it was simply expediency. He further argues that if 9th Corps had been on time Burnside's wing would have been reunited. To copy and paste:

"
In sum, although the Burnside conspiracy theory adds a certain layer of
drama and intrigue to one of the great military campaigns in all of American
history, there is good reason for setting it aside. The assignment of command
responsibilities, conduct of operations, and organization of the Army of the
Potomac during the campaign were dictated not by a conspiracy but by practical
military considerations. McClellan broke up the wing command structure
after South Mountain not out of malice toward an old friend, but because
the deployment of the two corps of Burnside's wing in the aftermath of the
fighting around Turner's Gap—for which Burnside himself was responsible—
necessitated it. It was under Burnside, in his capacity as wing commander, that
the Ninth Corps and First Corps were sent to separate ends of the battlefield
at Turner's Gap on September 14, with McClellan simply endorsing the decision
when he arrived at the front. As a consequence, Hooker's corps was at
Turner's Gap and the Ninth Corps as at Fox's Gap when the fighting at South
Mountain ended, and unless McClellan and Burnside wished to waste several
hours juggling units on the morning of September 15, there was no alternative
to having the two corps of Burnside's wing take separate routes in their approach
to the Antietam. This had the consequence of the Ninth Corps arriving
at Antietam in a manner that made it natural that it would deploy on the far
left of the Union line, and of Hooker's corps arriving from a direction that
made the decision to position it on the far right a natural one as well.

On top of this, in his battle plan, McClellan assigned one of the two prime
leadership roles to Burnside, suggesting that despite his frustration at the
delays at Fox's Gap and problems with the placement of the Ninth Corps
on September 16, McClellan remained confident in his old friend's ability.
And, aside from the problems with Crook's assault and delays in resuming
the drive toward Sharpsburg after the capture of the bridge—both of which
were as attributable to the fog of war as anything else—it is difficult to see
truly serious blunders that can be directly attributed to a corps commander's
troubled psyche on September 17. Finally, had McClellan wished to sabotage
his old friend, he would not have, as he confided to his wife he did when he
wrote it, downplayed what concerns he did have over Burnside's performance
at Sharpsburg in his initial report on the campaign or expressed what was
clearly sincere concern for "Poor Burn" when he handed over command of
the army to him in November.55

In closing, it is useful to ask why such a weakly supported conspiracy theory
has gained such firm traction in Civil War literature that no serious discussion
of the Battle of Antietam can fail to address it. One answer, clearly, is the
shadow Carman's monumental study, in which the theory is most extensively
developed and presented, casts over any work on the Maryland campaign.
This in turn is a reflection of the influence of Cox's writings, as Carman's
account of the Ninth Corps's operations during the Maryland campaign
draws heavily upon them, as do all modern studies of the campaign. Whether
Cox's at best weakly supported speculations regarding a conspiracy against
Burnside were motivated by his clear dislike for McClellan and Hooker or a
desire to distract attention from errors of his own, real or perceived, during
the campaign is certainly worthy of serious consideration."

I can certainly see that it would have been expedient to have the First Corps continue its advance on the National Pike with the Ninth Corps on the Old Sharpsburg Road. To say that they were on opposite ends of the South Mountain battlefield is a little misleading. There were no other Federal units between the two and were about 3/4 mile apart. Except for Richardson's Second Corps Division which had been brought up to support Hooker on the 14th, no other Federal command was near as close.

 

[Andy Cardinal]

Mansfield was way dead. As far as Hooker goes, why spoil the beauty of a theory with cold, hard facts. Don't know why Hooker was passed over this time.

I'm not sure it's fair to consider the decision to appoint Burnside on the basis of his obviously disastrous battle at Fredricksburg, which hadn't happened yet. At the time, he had a solid record, although a couple of bad days at Antietam, and more importantly he had experience with an independent command. Hooker was known as a fighter, but almost everyone (including Lincoln) doubted his ability as an administrator. That he turned out to be an excellent administrator was a surprise to all.

Also, Burnside was close enough to McClellan to be acceptable to McClellan's supporters in the army, while I believe Hooker was known to be anti-McClellan. I think that was part of the consideration as well.