Given some of the recent McClellan discussions, wanted to start a new thread and get opinions on the following quote from Catton:
"On July 26, long after Jackson had been detached, McClellan told Halleck that reinforcements were "pouring into Richmond" and suggested that he should have Burnside's and Hunter's men plus 20,000 fresh troops from the west so that he could renew his campaign. Two days later he reported that this story about Confederate reinforcements had been confirmed. Lee's plans would never be interrupted by a general whose grip on reality was that infirm, and when McClellan finally realized what was happening and (on August 12) asked permission to advance on Richmond it was too late."
So a couple of questions for discussion.
1) Should a decent army commander at this point in the war have been able to discern the size of the force he was up against? And reasonably be expected to detect a weakening in front of him versus a buildup of more reinforcements? I know its been argued that Mac did not have much superiority during the Peninsula Campaign, but what about in the early days of the Second Manassas campaign? Is this a legitimate criticism/failing that he did not detect this and act? Thoughts on Catton's editorializing in the underlined note?
2) Question 1 aside, it sounds like Mac finally did figure it out but had already been ordered up to join Pope. Does the fault here actually lie with Halleck and Lincoln? To realize strategically Pope had enough to cover Washington and Mac could smash a depleted force to his front and perhaps capture Richmond or get close enough to besiege it?
Mike
"On July 26, long after Jackson had been detached, McClellan told Halleck that reinforcements were "pouring into Richmond" and suggested that he should have Burnside's and Hunter's men plus 20,000 fresh troops from the west so that he could renew his campaign. Two days later he reported that this story about Confederate reinforcements had been confirmed. Lee's plans would never be interrupted by a general whose grip on reality was that infirm, and when McClellan finally realized what was happening and (on August 12) asked permission to advance on Richmond it was too late."
So a couple of questions for discussion.
1) Should a decent army commander at this point in the war have been able to discern the size of the force he was up against? And reasonably be expected to detect a weakening in front of him versus a buildup of more reinforcements? I know its been argued that Mac did not have much superiority during the Peninsula Campaign, but what about in the early days of the Second Manassas campaign? Is this a legitimate criticism/failing that he did not detect this and act? Thoughts on Catton's editorializing in the underlined note?
2) Question 1 aside, it sounds like Mac finally did figure it out but had already been ordered up to join Pope. Does the fault here actually lie with Halleck and Lincoln? To realize strategically Pope had enough to cover Washington and Mac could smash a depleted force to his front and perhaps capture Richmond or get close enough to besiege it?
Mike
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