Stonewall1982
First Sergeant
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A lot of people had a "Bad Day" those three days. Thanks for the info M. E. Wolf.
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Lost Triumph
- Thread starter Historicaly Correct
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I meant the June 22 order from Longstreet at the top of post 37. Endorsement may not be the right word.
Marshall really did make some kind of speech many years later where he opined the Stuart ought to have been shot. I'm not sure for exactly what, since Marshall is the one who wrote out the orders which Stuart followed to the letter. You would think he'd know what they said.
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M.E. Wolf, thanks for all your diligent research. It is much appreciated.
Lee
Lee
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I cannot comment on the book. I did not read it.
My first clue about its value was in the subtitle. When ever a book touts itself as "the real story" (or "the true story", etc.) about a well documented event, I tend to be skeptical. In this case ""real plan" applies. Then there were several sources which I respect which found fault(s) with the book. so I decided against it.
However, I must comment about some of the posts on this thread as regards Longstreet.
The guns had not yet cooled before Longstreet began to be blamed for the defeat at Gettysburg, hence to the defeat of the entire Confederacy.
While it is reasonable to believe that Longstreet disagreed with some of Gen. Lee's decisions at Gettysburg, and may have been reluctant to do just what his commander had ordered, there is no specific evidence that I know of that he disobeyed any of Lee's orders.
Nevertheless, the main gripe has long been that Longstreet was responsible for the defeat because he disagreed with Robert E. Lee.
Now I find in this thread, that Longstreet is to be blamed for endorsing the orders of Robert E. Lee.
I find this at the height of absurdity.
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My first clue about its value was in the subtitle. When ever a book touts itself as "the real story" (or "the true story", etc.) about a well documented event, I tend to be skeptical. In this case ""real plan" applies. Then there were several sources which I respect which found fault(s) with the book. so I decided against it.
However, I must comment about some of the posts on this thread as regards Longstreet.
The guns had not yet cooled before Longstreet began to be blamed for the defeat at Gettysburg, hence to the defeat of the entire Confederacy.
While it is reasonable to believe that Longstreet disagreed with some of Gen. Lee's decisions at Gettysburg, and may have been reluctant to do just what his commander had ordered, there is no specific evidence that I know of that he disobeyed any of Lee's orders.
Nevertheless, the main gripe has long been that Longstreet was responsible for the defeat because he disagreed with Robert E. Lee.
Now I find in this thread, that Longstreet is to be blamed for endorsing the orders of Robert E. Lee.
I find this at the height of absurdity.
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The Iron Duke
First Sergeant
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- Location
- Georgia
I think this print by Keith Rocco adequately conveys what Longstreet was feeling when he later referred to July 3rd as one of the saddest days in his life.
Expired Image Removed
Expired Image Removed
A very nice summary, thanx. Early could hear firing from Hanover and knew that Stuart was somewhere in the area but sent nobody to check out what was going on. Ewell ordered Early to make contact with Stuart when they were pulling out towards Cashtown/Gettysburg and tell Stuart of the change of plans.
A lot of ink has gone into speculation about Stuart's ride and the disservice he did to the Lee and the ANV, whilst Early , arguably the villian of the piece draws hardly a peep. Mosby, with his safe route to the Potomac that turned out to be far from it and cost Stuart almost two days, also gets a free ride at Stuart's expense. As the old saying goes. "Blame enough to go around."
Kind of the same red light goes on when you see longtime household products whith labels of "New " or "improved". usually that applies to the price of the product.
Do you happen to know the source for that? This is what Stuart wrote in his report but I always kind of felt it was hindsight on his part. Early claimed he could hear firing but could not tell what direction it was coming from, and that nobody ever told him to leave someone to contact Stuart at York.
To Mosby's credit, he sure took off the gloves when it came to defending Stuart after the war.
Oh, and that Rocco painting is gorgeous.
dvrmte
Major
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- Location
- South Carolina
I'm not calling him the villian. His politics and opinions caused the southern people to see him as a "turncoat."
Turncoat defined:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Turncoat
A turncoat is a person who shifts allegiance from one loyalty or ideal to another, betraying or deserting an original cause by switching to the opposing side or party. In political and social history, this is distinct from being a traitor, as the switch mostly takes place under the following circumstances:
In groups, often driven by one or more leaders.
When the former cause driving and benefitting the person becomes inviable or too fraught with danger.
Aftermath of a turncoat:
As time goes by, along with the embracing of life under the new circumstances comes a need of burying and rewriting the past by concealing evidence. The fear of the past coming to upset the newly-found stability is always present in the mind of the turncoat. The past is rewritten and whitewashed to cover former deeds. When successful, this activity results in the distortion and falsification of historical events.
Even after the death of a turncoat his family and friends may wish to keep uncomfortable secrets from the past out of the light. There is a fear of loss of prestige as well as a wish to honor the memory of a family member from the part of those who have experienced the positive side of the person.
I really don't care what Longstreet or any of the so called "turncoats" did after the war. My concern is what they did during it. It seems most all post war writers were trying to whitewash their war careers and resultingly created the historical confusion.
Mosby wrote this long after the war while defending Stuart:
http://www.gdg.org/Research/SHSP/shmosby.html
General Longstreet, having acted a great part as a soldier, now appears as the historian of the war. His book will soon be buried in the dust of oblivion, but, fortunately for him, his fame does not rest upon what he has written, but what he has done. No doubt he has had to endure much, as he says, for the sake of his opinions, as every man must who goes in advance of his age, and he has had strong provocation to speak with bitterness of some of his contemporaries, if he spoke of them at all. But his better angel would have told him that much that he has written about his brothers-in-arms would injure his own reputation more than theirs, and that if he had suffered injustice in defending the right, he had the consolation of knowing that
"Only those are crowned and sainted,
Who with grief have been acquainted."
He will not be able to persuade anyone but himself that he was ever the rival of General Lee and Stonewall Jackson, or that Jackson's fame is factitious and due to his being a Virginian. It is not because he was a Virginian that his monument stands on the bank of the "father of waters," and that a great people beyond the sea gave his statue, in bronze, to the State that will cherish his fame as a possession forever.
Sincerely,
dvrmte
- Joined
- Aug 20, 2008
- Location
- Indiana
Awesome print. Don't think I've seen that one before. Obviously Longstreet and Pickett are discussing the momentous events about to take place. Thanks for the post.
Lee
I wanted to look at General Early's reports leading up to Gettysburg. It was mentioned by McClellan, that Early was to have met Stuart, while Ewell marched onward for General Lee.
O.R.-- SERIES I--VOLUME XXVII/2 [S# 44]
JUNE 3-AUGUST 1, 1863.--The Gettysburg Campaign.
No. 470.--Report of Maj. Gen. Jubal A. Early, C. S. Army, commanding division.
[excerpt]
MARCH FROM WINCHESTER INTO MARYLAND AND PENNSYLVANIA, TO THE DATE OF THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG.
While in command at Winchester, I detached the Fifty-fourth North Carolina Regiment, of Hoke's brigade, and the Fifty-eighth Virginia Regiment, of Smith's brigade, to Staunton, in charge of prisoners, and, leaving the Thirteenth Virginia Regiment, of Smith's brigade, on duty in Winchester, I left that place on the afternoon of the 18th, and proceeded, with the residue of Hoke's brigade and Jones' battalion of artillery, to Shepherdstown on the next day. Gordon's, Hays', and Smith's brigades having preceded me to that place.
On the 22d, I crossed the Potomac at Shepherdstown, and moved through Sharpsburg and Boonsborough, encamping on the road toward Hagerstown, about 3 miles from Boonsborough. The Seventeenth Virginia Cavalry, under Col. William H. French, of Jenkins' brigade, reported to me on this day, by order of General Ewell, and remained with me until the battle of Gettysburg.
On the 23d, I moved through Cavetown, Smithsburg, and Ringgold (or Ridgeville, as it is called), to Waynesborough, in Pennsylvania.
On the 24th, I moved through Quincy and Altodale to Greenwood, on the turnpike from Chambersburg to Gettysburg.
At this point, my division remained in camp on the 25th, and I visited General Ewell at Chambersburg, and received from him instructions to cross the South Mountain to Gettysburg, and then proceed to York, and cut the Northern Central Railroad, running from Baltimore to Harrisburg, and also destroy the bridge across the Susquehanna at Wrightsville and Columbia, on the branch road from York toward Philadelphia, if I could, and rejoin him at Carlisle by the way of Dillsburg.
[excerpt]
I then rode to Gettysburg, and found Gordon just entering the town, his command having marched more rapidly than the other brigades, because it moved on a macadamized road. The militia regiment which had been encountered by White's cavalry was the Twenty-sixth Pennsylvania Militia, consisting of 800 or 900 men, and had arrived in Gettysburg the night before, and moved that morning a short distance out on the road toward Cashtown, but had fled on the first approach of White's cavalry, taking across the fields between Mummasburg and Gettysburg, and going toward Hunterstown. Of this force, 175 prisoners in all were captured and subsequently paroled. Hays brigade was halted, and encamped about a mile from Gettysburg, and two regiments were sent to aid French in the pursuit of the fugitive militia, but could not get up with it.
[excerpt]
On the evening of the 29th, I received, through Capt. Elliott Johnston, rode to General Ewell, a copy of a note from General Lee, and also verbal instructions, which required me to move back, so as to rejoin the rest of the corps on the western side of the South Mountain; and accordingly, at daylight on the morning of the 30th, I put my whole command in motion, moving by Weigelstown and East Berlin in the direction of Heidlersburg, from which I could move either to Shippensburg or to Greenwood by the way of Arendtsville, as circumstances might require. At the same time, I sent Colonel White's cavalry on the pike from York toward Gettysburg, to ascertain if any force of the enemy was on that road.
[[No mention of looking/waiting for General J. E. B. Stuart ]]
At East Berlin, a small squad of the enemy's cavalry was seen and pursued by my cavalry advance, and I received information at this point from Colonel White that a cavalry and infantry force had been on the York road, at Abbott's Ford, but had moved south toward Hanover. A courier from General Ewell met me here with a dispatch, informing me of the fact that he was moving with Rodes' division by the way of Petersburg to Heidlersburg, and directing me to march in that direction.
I encamped about 3 miles from Heidlersburg, and rode to see General Ewell at that point, and was informed by him that the object was to concentrate the corps at or near Cashtown, and received directions to move next day to that point. I was informed that Rodes would move by the way of Middletown and Arendtsville, but it was arranged that I should go by the way of Hunterstown and Mummasburg.
BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG.
Having ascertained that the road from my camp to Hunterstown was a very rough and circuitous one, I determined next morning (July 1) to march by the way of Heidlersburg, and then from that point to the Mummasburg road. After passing Heidlersburg a short distance, I received a note from you, written by order of General Ewell, informing me that General Hill was moving from Cashtown toward Gettysburg, and that General Rodes had turned off at Middletown, and was moving toward the same place, and directing me to move also to that point. I therefore continued to move on the road I was then on toward Gettysburg, and, on arriving in sight of that place, on the direct road from Heidlersburg, I discovered that General Rodes' division was engaged with the enemy to the right of me, the enemy occupying a position in front of Gettysburg, and the troops constituting his right being engaged in an effort to drive back the left of General Rodes' line.
[excerpt - details of battle with General Barlow (Union) with General Gordon; Cemetery Hill, etc.]
Having been informed that a large portion of the rest of our army would come up during the night, and that the enemy's position would be attacked on the right and the left flanks very early next morning, I gave orders to General Hays to move his brigade under cover of night from the town into the field in front of the left of the town, to a place where he would not be exposed to the enemy's fire, and would be in position to advance upon Cemetery Hill when a favorable opportunity should occur. This movement was made, and Hays formed his brigade on the right of Avery and just behind the extension of the low ridge on which the town is located. The attack did not begin in the morning, as was expected, and in the course of the morning I rode with General Ewell to examine a position for the artillery on the left.
Having been subsequently informed that the attack would begin at 4 p.m., I directed General Gordon to move his brigade to the railroad in rear of Hays and Avery, Smith being left, under General J. E. B. Stuart, to guard the York road. The fire from the artillery having opened on the right and left at 4 o'clock, and continued for some time, I was ordered by General Ewell to advance upon Cemetery Hill with my two brigades that were in position as soon as General Johnson's division, which was on my left, should become engaged at the wooded hill on the left, which it was about to attack, information being given me that the advance would be general, and made also by Rodes' division and Hill's divisions on my right.
Accordingly, as soon as Johnson became Warmly engaged, which was a little before dusk, I ordered Hays and Avery to advance and carry the works on the heights in front. These troops advanced in gallant style to the attack, passing over the ridge in front of them under a heavy artillery fire, and then crossing a hollow between that and Cemetery Hill, and moving up this hill in the face of at least two lines of infantry posted behind stone and plank fences; but these they drove back, and, passing over all obstacles, they reached the crest of the hill, and entered the enemy's breastworks crowning it, getting possession of one or two batteries. But no attack was made on the immediate right, as was expected, and not meeting with support from that quarter, these brigades could not hold the position they had attained, because a very heavy force of the enemy was turned against them from that part of the line which the divisions on the right were to have attacked, and these two brigades had, therefore, to fall back, which they did with comparatively slight loss, considering the nature of the ground over which they had to pass and the immense odds opposed to them, and Hays' brigade brought off four stand of captured colors.
At the same time these brigades advanced, Gordon's brigade was ordered forward to support them, and did advance to the position from which they had moved, but was halted here because it was ascertained that no advance was made on the right, and it was evident that the crest of the hill could not be held by my two brigades supported by this one without any other assistance, and that the attempt would be attended with a useless sacrifice of life. Hays' and Hoke's brigades were reformed on the line previously occupied by them, and on the right and left of Gordon, respectively.
In this attack, Colonel Avery, of the Sixth North Carolina Regiment, commanding Hoke's brigade, was mortally wounded. With this affair' the fighting on July 2 terminated.
After night, I was ordered by General Ewell to send Smith's brigade to report to General Johnson, on the left, by daylight, and General Smith was ordered to do so, and did report to General Johnson, and his three regiments were engaged on the 3d on the extreme left, under General Johnson's directions.
As the operations of this brigade on this day were under the immediate order's of General Johnson, I will merely refer to the report of Colonel [John S.] Hoffman, the present brigade commander, herewith forwarded.
Before light on the morning of the 3d, I ordered Hays' and Hoke's brigades (the latter now under the command of Colonel [A. C.] Godwin, of the Fifty-seventh North Carolina Regiment) to the rear, and subsequently formed them in line in the town on the same street formerly occupied by Hays. Gordon being left to occupy the position which was occupied by these brigades on the previous day. In these positions these three brigades remained during the day, and did not again participate in the attack, but they were exposed during the time to the fire of sharpshooters and an occasional fire from the enemy's artillery on the hills.
At 2 o'clock on the morning of the 4th, my brigades were quietly withdrawn from their positions, and moved back on the Cashtown road, and formed in line on both sides of that road, in rear of Rodes' and Johnson's divisions, which occupied the front line, running along the crest of the ridge on the west of the town.
[[I find it 'odd' that General Early's report doesn't make any mention of ordering someone to wait for General Stuart. Early withdrew forces, on his judgment not wishing loss of life; and seeing there was no advance in one group, it wasn't a coordinated attack. This can be just another failure, that adds to the pile in support of the Confederate defeat at Gettysburg. And, for Early's non-participating on the 3rd, in any attacks--very opinionated on the surrounding events of "Pickett's Charge."
Respectfully submitted for consideration,
M. E. Wolf ]]
O.R.-- SERIES I--VOLUME XXVII/2 [S# 44]
JUNE 3-AUGUST 1, 1863.--The Gettysburg Campaign.
No. 470.--Report of Maj. Gen. Jubal A. Early, C. S. Army, commanding division.
[excerpt]
MARCH FROM WINCHESTER INTO MARYLAND AND PENNSYLVANIA, TO THE DATE OF THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG.
While in command at Winchester, I detached the Fifty-fourth North Carolina Regiment, of Hoke's brigade, and the Fifty-eighth Virginia Regiment, of Smith's brigade, to Staunton, in charge of prisoners, and, leaving the Thirteenth Virginia Regiment, of Smith's brigade, on duty in Winchester, I left that place on the afternoon of the 18th, and proceeded, with the residue of Hoke's brigade and Jones' battalion of artillery, to Shepherdstown on the next day. Gordon's, Hays', and Smith's brigades having preceded me to that place.
On the 22d, I crossed the Potomac at Shepherdstown, and moved through Sharpsburg and Boonsborough, encamping on the road toward Hagerstown, about 3 miles from Boonsborough. The Seventeenth Virginia Cavalry, under Col. William H. French, of Jenkins' brigade, reported to me on this day, by order of General Ewell, and remained with me until the battle of Gettysburg.
On the 23d, I moved through Cavetown, Smithsburg, and Ringgold (or Ridgeville, as it is called), to Waynesborough, in Pennsylvania.
On the 24th, I moved through Quincy and Altodale to Greenwood, on the turnpike from Chambersburg to Gettysburg.
At this point, my division remained in camp on the 25th, and I visited General Ewell at Chambersburg, and received from him instructions to cross the South Mountain to Gettysburg, and then proceed to York, and cut the Northern Central Railroad, running from Baltimore to Harrisburg, and also destroy the bridge across the Susquehanna at Wrightsville and Columbia, on the branch road from York toward Philadelphia, if I could, and rejoin him at Carlisle by the way of Dillsburg.
[excerpt]
I then rode to Gettysburg, and found Gordon just entering the town, his command having marched more rapidly than the other brigades, because it moved on a macadamized road. The militia regiment which had been encountered by White's cavalry was the Twenty-sixth Pennsylvania Militia, consisting of 800 or 900 men, and had arrived in Gettysburg the night before, and moved that morning a short distance out on the road toward Cashtown, but had fled on the first approach of White's cavalry, taking across the fields between Mummasburg and Gettysburg, and going toward Hunterstown. Of this force, 175 prisoners in all were captured and subsequently paroled. Hays brigade was halted, and encamped about a mile from Gettysburg, and two regiments were sent to aid French in the pursuit of the fugitive militia, but could not get up with it.
[excerpt]
On the evening of the 29th, I received, through Capt. Elliott Johnston, rode to General Ewell, a copy of a note from General Lee, and also verbal instructions, which required me to move back, so as to rejoin the rest of the corps on the western side of the South Mountain; and accordingly, at daylight on the morning of the 30th, I put my whole command in motion, moving by Weigelstown and East Berlin in the direction of Heidlersburg, from which I could move either to Shippensburg or to Greenwood by the way of Arendtsville, as circumstances might require. At the same time, I sent Colonel White's cavalry on the pike from York toward Gettysburg, to ascertain if any force of the enemy was on that road.
[[No mention of looking/waiting for General J. E. B. Stuart ]]
At East Berlin, a small squad of the enemy's cavalry was seen and pursued by my cavalry advance, and I received information at this point from Colonel White that a cavalry and infantry force had been on the York road, at Abbott's Ford, but had moved south toward Hanover. A courier from General Ewell met me here with a dispatch, informing me of the fact that he was moving with Rodes' division by the way of Petersburg to Heidlersburg, and directing me to march in that direction.
I encamped about 3 miles from Heidlersburg, and rode to see General Ewell at that point, and was informed by him that the object was to concentrate the corps at or near Cashtown, and received directions to move next day to that point. I was informed that Rodes would move by the way of Middletown and Arendtsville, but it was arranged that I should go by the way of Hunterstown and Mummasburg.
BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG.
Having ascertained that the road from my camp to Hunterstown was a very rough and circuitous one, I determined next morning (July 1) to march by the way of Heidlersburg, and then from that point to the Mummasburg road. After passing Heidlersburg a short distance, I received a note from you, written by order of General Ewell, informing me that General Hill was moving from Cashtown toward Gettysburg, and that General Rodes had turned off at Middletown, and was moving toward the same place, and directing me to move also to that point. I therefore continued to move on the road I was then on toward Gettysburg, and, on arriving in sight of that place, on the direct road from Heidlersburg, I discovered that General Rodes' division was engaged with the enemy to the right of me, the enemy occupying a position in front of Gettysburg, and the troops constituting his right being engaged in an effort to drive back the left of General Rodes' line.
[excerpt - details of battle with General Barlow (Union) with General Gordon; Cemetery Hill, etc.]
Having been informed that a large portion of the rest of our army would come up during the night, and that the enemy's position would be attacked on the right and the left flanks very early next morning, I gave orders to General Hays to move his brigade under cover of night from the town into the field in front of the left of the town, to a place where he would not be exposed to the enemy's fire, and would be in position to advance upon Cemetery Hill when a favorable opportunity should occur. This movement was made, and Hays formed his brigade on the right of Avery and just behind the extension of the low ridge on which the town is located. The attack did not begin in the morning, as was expected, and in the course of the morning I rode with General Ewell to examine a position for the artillery on the left.
Having been subsequently informed that the attack would begin at 4 p.m., I directed General Gordon to move his brigade to the railroad in rear of Hays and Avery, Smith being left, under General J. E. B. Stuart, to guard the York road. The fire from the artillery having opened on the right and left at 4 o'clock, and continued for some time, I was ordered by General Ewell to advance upon Cemetery Hill with my two brigades that were in position as soon as General Johnson's division, which was on my left, should become engaged at the wooded hill on the left, which it was about to attack, information being given me that the advance would be general, and made also by Rodes' division and Hill's divisions on my right.
Accordingly, as soon as Johnson became Warmly engaged, which was a little before dusk, I ordered Hays and Avery to advance and carry the works on the heights in front. These troops advanced in gallant style to the attack, passing over the ridge in front of them under a heavy artillery fire, and then crossing a hollow between that and Cemetery Hill, and moving up this hill in the face of at least two lines of infantry posted behind stone and plank fences; but these they drove back, and, passing over all obstacles, they reached the crest of the hill, and entered the enemy's breastworks crowning it, getting possession of one or two batteries. But no attack was made on the immediate right, as was expected, and not meeting with support from that quarter, these brigades could not hold the position they had attained, because a very heavy force of the enemy was turned against them from that part of the line which the divisions on the right were to have attacked, and these two brigades had, therefore, to fall back, which they did with comparatively slight loss, considering the nature of the ground over which they had to pass and the immense odds opposed to them, and Hays' brigade brought off four stand of captured colors.
At the same time these brigades advanced, Gordon's brigade was ordered forward to support them, and did advance to the position from which they had moved, but was halted here because it was ascertained that no advance was made on the right, and it was evident that the crest of the hill could not be held by my two brigades supported by this one without any other assistance, and that the attempt would be attended with a useless sacrifice of life. Hays' and Hoke's brigades were reformed on the line previously occupied by them, and on the right and left of Gordon, respectively.
In this attack, Colonel Avery, of the Sixth North Carolina Regiment, commanding Hoke's brigade, was mortally wounded. With this affair' the fighting on July 2 terminated.
After night, I was ordered by General Ewell to send Smith's brigade to report to General Johnson, on the left, by daylight, and General Smith was ordered to do so, and did report to General Johnson, and his three regiments were engaged on the 3d on the extreme left, under General Johnson's directions.
As the operations of this brigade on this day were under the immediate order's of General Johnson, I will merely refer to the report of Colonel [John S.] Hoffman, the present brigade commander, herewith forwarded.
Before light on the morning of the 3d, I ordered Hays' and Hoke's brigades (the latter now under the command of Colonel [A. C.] Godwin, of the Fifty-seventh North Carolina Regiment) to the rear, and subsequently formed them in line in the town on the same street formerly occupied by Hays. Gordon being left to occupy the position which was occupied by these brigades on the previous day. In these positions these three brigades remained during the day, and did not again participate in the attack, but they were exposed during the time to the fire of sharpshooters and an occasional fire from the enemy's artillery on the hills.
At 2 o'clock on the morning of the 4th, my brigades were quietly withdrawn from their positions, and moved back on the Cashtown road, and formed in line on both sides of that road, in rear of Rodes' and Johnson's divisions, which occupied the front line, running along the crest of the ridge on the west of the town.
[[I find it 'odd' that General Early's report doesn't make any mention of ordering someone to wait for General Stuart. Early withdrew forces, on his judgment not wishing loss of life; and seeing there was no advance in one group, it wasn't a coordinated attack. This can be just another failure, that adds to the pile in support of the Confederate defeat at Gettysburg. And, for Early's non-participating on the 3rd, in any attacks--very opinionated on the surrounding events of "Pickett's Charge."
Respectfully submitted for consideration,
M. E. Wolf ]]
The Iron Duke
First Sergeant
- Joined
- May 22, 2009
- Location
- Georgia
What struck me the most about the Rocco print was the bluish tint of Pickett's uniform.
Mosby was a wise man.
Doesn't make it any less true.
Stonewall1982
First Sergeant
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- Location
- The Bluegrass State
Iron Duke, that was a beautiful painting you posted! I went to the artist's website to find the name of the portrait but I couldn't find it. Do you know what the name is? I would love to find a print for my office.
Thank you sir.
Thank you sir.
The Iron Duke
First Sergeant
- Joined
- May 22, 2009
- Location
- Georgia
It's called The Burden of Command by Keith Rocco. You will probably need to check secondary markets for a copy.
Stonewall1982
First Sergeant
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- Location
- The Bluegrass State
Thank you sir, I will do that.
Stonewall1982
First Sergeant
- Joined
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- Location
- The Bluegrass State
I now remember exactly what I was refering to when I made this statement. I read John Gordon's "Reminiscences of the Civil War" last fall. In chapter 11 "Gettysburg" page 160 paragraph 2 and footnotes 1 and 2 Gordon does refer to Longstreet as one of the greatest American soldiers but acknowledged the controversies that surrounded him.
In footnote 1: "That General Lee distinctly ordered Longsrteet to attack early the morning of the second day, and if he had done so, two of the largest corps of Meade's army would not have been in the fight; but Longsreet delayed the attack until four o'clock in the afternoon, and thus his oppurtunity of occupying Little Round Top, the key to position, which he might have done in the morning without firing a shot or losing a man."
Footnote 2: "That General Lee ordered Longstreet to attack at daybreak on the morning of the third day, and that he did not attack until two or three o'clock in the afternoon, the artillery opening at one."
This was what I was refering too.
Thank you
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