Lost Triumph

[Stonewall1982]

Yes he did run onto them and it turned into the "East Cavalry Dield" battle, which happened in the same general time frame as Pickett's Charge.

 

[Stonewall1982]

Another thing that "LOST TRIUMPH" went into was why Stuart was missing until the afternoon of July 2. According to accepted history Stuart was censored privately by Lee for not informing him of the position of the Federal army. Other general, such as Longstreet, felt that Stuart should have been court martialed for derilition of duty. Stuart did capture around 100 supply wagons during the time that he was missing. Anyways, the book alleges that Lee did NOT censor Stuart, instead Stuart was doing exactly what Lee wanted him to do, capture supplies and horses. Lee spoke with Stuart privately and never recorded what was said. So what really happened????

Comments on the hypothesis? I don't know.

 

[prroh]

. Lee spoke with Stuart privately and never recorded what was said. So what really happened????

Comments on the hypothesis? I don't know.

Whatever was said was brief and private. I think that whatever ill feelings, if any, Lee may have had for Stuart would have been eradicated by his brillant screening of the ANV during the retreat back to the Potomac.

 

[Stonewall1982]

Yes ceratinly. Lee made no secrets that he thought of Stuart as a son, and he was his favorite cadet at West Point. Stuart was motivated by the disappointment of a father figure, and he made up for it the rest of his life. The messages of information never ceased. But what do you think of the theory in the book? I have my doubts as to that hypothesis.

 

[prroh]

But what do you think of the theory in the book? I have my doubts as to that hypothesis.

I think I have made my opinion clear. The book was awful. Full of unfounded speculation with weak to non-existant support. I was disappointed that James McPherson wrote the forward. I understand he and Carhart are friends, but my estimation of McPherson dropped by his association with such tripe.

The hypothesis that Lee destroyed all evidence of the "secret" plan and its failure in order to protect Stuart? Totally unbelievable and unproved.

 

[K Hale]

Another thing that "LOST TRIUMPH" went into was why Stuart was missing until the afternoon of July 2. According to accepted history Stuart was censored privately by Lee for not informing him of the position of the Federal army. Other general, such as Longstreet, felt that Stuart should have been court martialed for derilition of duty. Stuart did capture around 100 supply wagons during the time that he was missing. Anyways, the book alleges that Lee did NOT censor Stuart, instead Stuart was doing exactly what Lee wanted him to do, capture supplies and horses. Lee spoke with Stuart privately and never recorded what was said. So what really happened???

Longstreet is full of it. He himself advised Stuart to go the way he did. Unfortunately, as they say, life is what happens when we make other plans, and many things interfered with Stuart getting to PA in a timely manner. The plan that Stuart, Lee, and Longstreet all agreed on went wrong the first day and never got back on track. It took, I think, four days for Stuart to manage to even get out of VA, and by that time he ought to have been on Ewell's flank in PA. Instead that would take four more days.

If you read Lee's orders to Stuart, and Longstreet's endorsement, you will understand why Stuart was never court-martialed. It would have been utterly groundless. I'm sure Lee said something like "Jeez, man, where have you been all this time?" but s**t happens and Lee knows that as well as anyone.

The entire expedition (and I mean the whole army) was ill-advised and badly planned.

 

[K Hale]

Whatever was said was brief and private. I think that whatever ill feelings, if any, Lee may have had for Stuart would have been eradicated by his brillant screening of the ANV during the retreat back to the Potomac.

In my opinion, his most important, most unsung, and most difficult work of the entire war. Well-covered in McClellan's biography and the recent book One Continuous Fight.

 

[Stonewall1982]

So that I can read it, where would I find Lee's orders to Stuart and Longstreet's endorsement of it? Would it be in the O.R., or someplace else? Thanks!

 

[K Hale]

So that I can read it, where would I find Lee's orders to Stuart and Longstreet's endorsement of it? Would it be in the O.R., or someplace else? Thanks!

There actually were two orders from Lee, plus Longstreet's endorsement. I think they are in the ORs, but I am terrible at OR-searching, so here they are quoted by Eric Wittenberg:

http://www.armchairgeneral.com/forums/showpost.php?p=1421725&postcount=6

 

[dvrmte]

Longstreet is full of it. He himself advised Stuart to go the way he did. Unfortunately, as they say, life is what happens when we make other plans, and many things interfered with Stuart getting to PA in a timely manner. The plan that Stuart, Lee, and Longstreet all agreed on went wrong the first day and never got back on track. It took, I think, four days for Stuart to manage to even get out of VA, and by that time he ought to have been on Ewell's flank in PA. Instead that would take four more days.

If you read Lee's orders to Stuart, and Longstreet's endorsement, you will understand why Stuart was never court-martialed. It would have been utterly groundless. I'm sure Lee said something like "Jeez, man, where have you been all this time?" but s**t happens and Lee knows that as well as anyone.

The entire expedition (and I mean the whole army) was ill-advised and badly planned.

The bold indicates why I don't care for Longstreet. If Longstreet during the ACW was anything like he was in his later life, I don't know how Lee put up with it. Lee had to be extremely patient.

dvrmte

 

[Stonewall1982]

Thanks K Hale! That is helpful.

 

[K Hale]

I believe Longstreet was no longer in his right mind when he wrote From Manassas to Appomattox. A combination of age, years of personal attacks and difficulties, and perhaps effects of his Wilderness injuries deranged his mind a little and made him forget some things and misremember others.

He did a lot of good things, and some not so great. He's not my favorite person ever, but he's more sinned against than sinning.

 

[The Iron Duke]

The bold indicates why I don't care for Longstreet. If Longstreet during the ACW was anything like he was in his later life, I don't know how Lee put up with it. Lee had to be extremely patient.

Longstreet was not the only one who wrote self-serving memoirs. But why does he always get singled out for excoriation?

Try to put yourself in Longstreet's shoes: how would you feel when after four years of service in which you were arguably the best corps commander of the war your own people insult you and create fabrications to ruin your reputation? Jubal Early's sunrise order is a complete falsehood. Why is Longstreet is the villian?

 

[M E Wolf]

O.R.-- SERIES I--VOLUME XXVII/2 [S# 44]
JUNE 3-AUGUST 1, 1863.--The Gettysburg Campaign.
No. 426.--Reports of General Robert E. Lee, C. S. Army, commanding Army of Northern Virginia.
[excerpt]
MARCH INTO PENNSYLVANIA.
On the night of Ewell's appearance at Winchester, the enemy in front of A. P. Hill, at Fredericksburg, recrossed the Rappahannock, and the whole army of General Hooker withdrew from the north side of the river. In order to mislead him as to our intentions, and at the same time protect Hill's corps in its march up the Rappahannock, Longstreet left Culpeper Court-House on the 15th, and, advancing along the eastern side of the Blue Ridge, occupied Ashby's and Snicker's Gaps. He had been joined, while at Culpeper, by General Pickett, with three brigades of his division. General Stuart, with three brigades of cavalry, moved on Longstreet's right, and took position in front of the Gaps. Hampton's and [W. E.]Jones' brigades remained along the Rappahannock and Hazel Rivers, in front of Culpeper Court-House, with instructions to follow the main body as soon as Hill's corps had passed that point.

On the 17th, Fitz. Lee's brigade, under Colonel Munford, which was on the road to Snicker's Gap, was attacked near Aldie by the Federal cavalry. The attack was repulsed with loss, and the brigade held its ground until ordered to fall back, its right being threatened by another body, coming from Hopewell toward Middleburg. The latter force was driven from Middleburg, and pursued toward Hopewell by Robertson's brigade, which arrived about dark. Its retreat was intercepted by W. H. F. Lee's brigade, under Colonel Chambliss, jr., and the greater part of a regiment captured.

During the three succeeding days there was much skirmishing, General Stuart taking a position west of Middleburg, where he awaited the rest of his command.

General Jones arrived on the 19th, and General Hampton in the afternoon of the following day, having repulsed, on his march, a cavalry force sent to reconnoiter in the direction of Warrenton.

On the 21st, the enemy attacked with infantry and cavalry, and obliged General Stuart, after a brave resistance, to fall back to the gaps of the mountains. The enemy retired the next day, having advanced only a short distance beyond Upperville.

In these engagements, the cavalry sustained a loss of 510 killed, wounded, and missing. Among them were several valuable officers, whose names are mentioned in General Stuart's report. One piece of artillery was disabled and left on the field. The enemy's loss was heavy. About 400 prisoners were taken and several stand of colors.
[excerpt]
In the meantime, the progress of Ewell, who was already in Maryland, with Jenkins' cavalry advanced into Pennsylvania as far as Chambersburg, rendered it necessary that the rest of the army should be within supporting distance, and Hill having reached the Valley, Longstreet was withdrawn to the west side of the Shenandoah, and the two corps encamped near Berryville.

General Stuart was directed to hold the mountain passes with part of his command as long as the enemy remained south of the Potomac, and, with the remainder, to cross into Maryland, and place himself on the right of General Ewell. Upon the suggestion of the former officer that he could damage the enemy and delay his passage of the river by getting in his rear, he was authorized to do so, and it was left to his discretion whether to enter Maryland east or west of the Blue Ridge; but he was instructed to lose no time in placing his command on the right of our column as soon as he should perceive the enemy moving northward.

[excerpt]
On the 24th, Longstreet and Hill were put in motion to follow Ewell, and, on the 27th, encamped near Chambersburg.

General Imboden, under the orders before referred to, had been operating on Ewell's left while the latter was advancing into Maryland. He drove off the troops guarding the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, and destroyed all the important bridges on that route from Martinsburg to Cumberland, besides inflicting serious damage upon the Chesapeake and Ohio Canal. He was at Hancock when Longstreet and Hill reached Chambersburg, and was directed to proceed to the latter place by way of McConnellsburg, collecting supplies for the army on his route.

The cavalry force at this time with the army, consisting of Jenkins' brigade and [E. V.]White's battalion, was not greater than was required to accompany the advance of General Ewell and General Early, with whom it performed valuable service, as appears from their reports. It was expected that as soon as the Federal Army should cross the Potomac, General Stuart would give notice of its movements, and nothing having been heard from him since our entrance into Maryland, it was inferred that the enemy had not yet left Virginia. Orders were, therefore, issued to move upon Harrisburg. The expedition of General Early to York was designed in part to prepare for this undertaking by breaking the railroad between Baltimore and Harrisburg, and seizing the bridge over the Susquehanna at Wrightsville. General Early succeeded in the first object, destroying a number of bridges above and below York, but on the approach of the troops sent by him to Wrightsville, a body of militia stationed at that place fled across the river and burned the bridge in their retreat. General Early then marched to rejoin his corps.

The advance against Harrisburg was arrested by intelligence received from a scout on the night of the 28th, to the effect that the army of General Hooker had crossed the Potomac, and was approaching the South Mountain. In the absence of the cavalry, it was impossible to ascertain his intentions; but to deter him from advancing ****her west, and intercepting our communication with Virginia, it was determined to concentrate the army east of the mountains.

BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG.
Hill's corps was accordingly ordered to move toward Cashtown on the 29th, and Longstreet to follow the next day, leaving Pickett's division at Chambersburg to guard the rear until relieved by Imboden. General Ewell was recalled from Carlisle, and directed to join the army at Cashtown or Gettysburg, as circumstances might require. The advance of the enemy to the latter place was unknown, and the weather being inclement, the march was conducted with a view to the comfort of the troops. Heth's division reached Cashtown on the 29th, and the following morning Pettigrew's brigade, sent by General Heth to procure supplies at Gettysburg, found it occupied by the enemy. Being ignorant of the extent of his force, General Pettigrew was unwilling to hazard an attack with his
single brigade, and returned to Cashtown.

[excerpt]
In the meantime the enemy occupied the point which General Ewell designed to seize, but in what force could not be ascertained, owing to the darkness. An intercepted dispatch showed that another corps had halted that afternoon 4 miles from Gettysburg. Under these circumstances, it was decided not to attack until the arrival of Longstreet, two of whose divisions (those of Hood and McLaws) encamped about 4 miles in the rear during the night. Anderson's division of Hill's corps came up after the engagement.
[excerpt]

The movements of the army preceding the battle of Gettysburg had been much embarrassed by the absence of the cavalry. As soon as it was known that the enemy had crossed into Maryland, orders were sent to the brigades of [B. H.] Robertson and [William E.] Jones, which had been left to guard the passes of the Blue Ridge, to rejoin the army without delay, and it was expected that General Stuart, with the remainder of his command, would soon arrive. In the exercise of the discretion given him when Longstreet and Hill marched into Maryland, General Stuart determined to pass around the rear of the Federal Army with three brigades and cross the Potomac between it and Washington, believing that he would be able, by that route, to place himself on our right flank in time to keep us properly advised of the enemy's movements. He marched from Salem on the night of June 24, intending to pass west of Centreville, but found the enemy's forces so distributed as to render that route impracticable. Adhering to his original plan, he was forced to make a wide detour through Buckland and Brentsville, and crossed the Occoquan at Wolf Run Shoals on the morning of the 27th. Continuing his march through Fairfax Court-House and Dranesville, he arrived at the Potomac, below the mouth of Seneca Creek, in the evening.

He found the river much swollen by the recent rains, but, after great exertion, gained the Maryland shore before midnight with his whole command.
He now ascertained that the Federal Army, which he had discovered to be drawing toward the Potomac, had crossed the day before, and was moving toward Frederick, thus interposing itself between him and our forces.

He accordingly marched northward, through Rockville and Westminster, to Hanover, Pa., where he arrived on the 30th; but the enemy advanced with equal rapidity on his left, and continued to obstruct communication with our main body.

Supposing, from such information as he could obtain, that part of «21 R R--VOL XXVII, PT II» the army was at Carlisle, he left Hanover that night, and proceeded thither by way of Dover.

He reached Carlisle on July 1, where he received orders to proceed to Gettysburg. He arrived in the afternoon of the following day, and took position on General Ewell's left. His leading brigade, under General Hampton, encountered and repulsed a body of the enemy's cavalry at Hunterstown, endeavoring to reach our rear.

General Stuart had several skirmishes during his march, and at Hanover quite a severe engagement took place with a strong force of cavalry, which was finally compelled to withdraw from the town. The prisoners taken by the cavalry and paroled at various places amounted to about 800, and at Rockville a large train of wagons coming from Washington was intercepted and captured. Many of them were destroyed, but 125, with all the animals of the train, were secured.

The ranks of the cavalry were much reduced by its long and arduous march, repeated conflicts, and insufficient supplies of food and forage, but the day after its arrival at Gettysburg it engaged the enemy's cavalry with unabated spirit, and effectually protected our left.
[end of excerpt]
=============================
O.R.-- SERIES I--VOLUME XXVII/3 [S# 45]
Correspondence, Orders, And Returns Relating To Operations In North Carolina, Virginia, West Virginia, Maryland, Pennsylvania, And Department Of The East, From June 3 To August 3, 1863.
CONFEDERATE CORRESPONDENCE. ETC.--#1
HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA,
June 9, 1863.
Maj. Gen. J. E. B. STUART,
Commanding Cavalry:
GENERAL: General Lee desires me to say that he has received your dispatches by the couriers and from signal station. General Longstreet has a division looking to Stevensburg, and General Ewell on the other side looking to Brandy Station. He desires you not to expose your men too much, but to do the enemy damage when possible. As the whole thing seems to be a reconnaissance to determine our force and position, he wishes these concealed as much as possible, and the infantry not to be seen, if it is possible to avoid it.
I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
C. S. VENABLE,
Major, and Aide-de-Camp.
[P. S.]--Is your line of couriers by Ely's and Madden's cut off?
-----
O.R.-- SERIES I--VOLUME XXVII/3 [S# 45]
Correspondence, Orders, And Returns Relating To Operations In North Carolina, Virginia, West Virginia, Maryland, Pennsylvania, And Department Of The East, From June 3 To August 3, 1863.
CONFEDERATE CORRESPONDENCE. ETC.--#1
Markham, June 17, 1863--3.30 p.m.
Lieut. Gen. JAMES LONGSTREET,
Commanding Corps:
GENERAL: Your note of 10 a.m. to-day just received. I have heard nothing of the movements of General Hooker either from General Stuart or yourself, and, therefore, can form no opinion of the best move against him. If a part of our force could have operated east of the mountains, it would have served more to confuse him, but as you have turned off to the Valley, and I understand all the trains have taken that route, I hope it is for the best. At any rate, it is too late to change from any information I have. You had better, therefore, push on, relieve Ewell's division as soon as you can, and let him advance into Maryland, at least as far as Hagerstown. Give out it is against Harper's Ferry. I will send back for A. P. Hill to move by Chester Gap. I wrote to you to-day and yesterday. I shall go from here to the Valley.
Very respectfully,
R. E. LEE,
General.
-----
HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA,
Markham, June 17, 1863--3.30 p.m.
Lieutenant-General EWELL,
Commanding Corps:
GENERAL: I have just received your letter, the first from you since your dispatch announcing the fall of Winchester. I think the reports which you have of the forces in Harper's Ferry must be exaggerated. I wish you to move Rodes' division on as far as Hagerstown, and operate in the enemy's country according to the plan proposed. Give out that your movement is for the purpose of enveloping Harper's Ferry. Repress marauding. Take what is necessary for the army, and give citizens of Maryland Confederate money or certificates.(*) Do not expose yourself. Keep your own scouts.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
R. E. LEE,
General.
-----------------
continued

 

[M E Wolf]

O.R.-- SERIES I--VOLUME XXVII/3 [S# 45]
Correspondence, Orders, And Returns Relating To Operations In North Carolina, Virginia, West Virginia, Maryland, Pennsylvania, And Department Of The East, From June 3 To August 3, 1863.
CONFEDERATE CORRESPONDENCE. ETC.--#1
O.R.-- SERIES I--VOLUME XXVII/3 [S# 45]
HEADQUARTERS, June 22, 1863.
Maj. Gen. J. E. B. STUART,
Commanding Cavalry:
GENERAL: I have just received your note of 7.45 this morning to General Longstreet. I judge the efforts of the enemy yesterday were to arrest our progress and ascertain our whereabouts. Perhaps he is satisfied. Do you know where he is and what he is doing? I fear he will steal a march on us, and get across the Potomac before we are aware. If you find that he is moving northward, and that two brigades can guard the Blue Ridge and take care of your rear, you can move with the other three into Maryland, and take position on General Ewell's right, place yourself in communication with him, guard his flank, keep him informed of the enemy's movements, and collect all the supplies you can for the use of the army. One column of General Ewell's army will probably move toward the Susquehanna by the Emmitsburg route; another by Chambersburg. Accounts from him last night state that there was no enemy west of Frederick. A cavalry force (about 100) guarded the Monocacy Bridge, which was barricaded. You will, of course, take charge of [A. G.] Jenkins' brigade, and give him necessary instructions. All supplies taken in Maryland must be by authorized staff officers for their respective departments--by no one else. They will be paid for, or receipts for the same given to the owners. I will send you a general order on this subject, which I wish you to see is strictly complied with.
I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
R. E. LEE,
General.
--------------
HEADQUARTERS, June 22, 1863.
Lieut. Gen. R. S. EWELL:
GENERAL: Your letter of 6 p.m. yesterday has been received. If you are ready to move, you can do so. I think your best course will be toward the Susquehanna, taking the routes by Emmitsburg, Chambersburg, and McConnellsburg. Your trains had better be, as far as possible, kept on the center route. You must get command of your cavalry, and use it in gathering supplies, obtaining information, and protecting your flanks. If necessary, send a staff officer to remain with General Jenkins. It will depend upon the quantity of supplies obtained in that country whether the rest of the army can follow. There may be enough for your command, but none for the others. Every exertion should, therefore, be made to locate and secure them. Beef we can drive with us, but bread we cannot carry, and must secure it in the country.

I send you copies of a general order on this subject, which I think is based on rectitude and sound policy, and the spirit of which I wish you to see enforced in your command. I am much gratified at the success which has attended your movements, and feel assured, if they are conducted with the same energy and circumspection, it will continue. Your progress and direction will, of course, depend upon the development of circumstances. If Harrisburg comes within your means, capture it. General A. P. Hill arrived yesterday in the vicinity of Berryville. I shall move him on to-day, if possible. Saturday Longstreet withdrew from the Blue Ridge. Yesterday the enemy pressed our cavalry so hard with infantry and cavalry on the Upperville road that McLaws' division had to be sent back to hold Ashby's Gap. I have not yet heard from there this morning. General Stuart could not ascertain whether it was intended as a real advance toward the Valley or to ascertain our position.

The pontoons will reach Martinsburg to-day, and will be laid at the point you suggest, 4 or 5 miles below Williamsport, if found suitable. I have not countermanded your order withdrawing the cavalry from Charlestown. I will write you again if I receive information affecting your movements.Trusting in the guidance of a merciful God, and invoking His protection for your corps, I am, with great respect, your obedient servant,
R. E. LEE,
General.
-------------------------------
HEADQUARTERS, June 22, 1863--3.30 p.m.
Lieut. Gen. R. S. EWELL,
Commanding, &c. :
GENERAL: I have just received your letter of this morning from opposite Shepherdstown. Mine of to-day, authorizing you to move toward the Susquehanna, I hope has reached you ere this. After dispatching my letter, learning that the enemy had not renewed his attempts of yesterday to break through the Blue Ridge, I directed General R. H. Anderson's division to commence its march toward Shepherdstown. It will reach there to-morrow. I also directed General Stuart, should the enemy have so far retired from his front as to permit of the departure of a portion of the cavalry, to march with three brigades across the Potomac, and place himself on your right and in communication with you, keep you advised of the movements of the enemy, and assist in collecting supplies for the army. I have not heard from him since. I also directed Imboden, if opportunity offered, to cross the Potomac, and perform the same offices on your left. I shall endeavor to get General Early's regiments to him as soon as possible. I do not know what has become of the infantry of the Maryland Line. I had intended that to guard Winchester.
I am, most respectfully, yours,
R. E. LEE,
General.
-----------------------------------
HEADQUARTERS,
June 22, 1863--7.30 p.m.
General R. E. LEE,
Commanding, &c. :
GENERAL: Yours of 4 o'clock this afternoon is received. I have forwarded your letter to General Stuart, with the suggestion that he pass by the enemy's rear if he thinks that he may get through. We have nothing of the enemy to-day.
Most respectfully,
JAMES LONGSTREET,
Lieutenant-General, Commanding.
-----
continued

 

[prroh]

O.R.-- SERIES I--VOLUME XXVII/2 [S# 44]
JUNE 3-AUGUST 1, 1863.--The Gettysburg Campaign.
No. 426.--Reports of General Robert E. Lee, C. S. Army, commanding Army of Northern Virginia.
[excerpt]
MARCH INTO PENNSYLVANIA.
On the night of Ewell's appearance at Winchester, the enemy in front of A. P. Hill, at Fredericksburg, recrossed the Rappahannock, and the whole army of General Hooker withdrew from the north side of the river. In order to mislead him as to our intentions, and at the same time protect Hill's corps in its march up the Rappahannock, Longstreet left Culpeper Court-House on the 15th, and, advancing along the eastern side of the Blue Ridge, occupied Ashby's and Snicker's Gaps. He had been joined, while at Culpeper, by General Pickett, with three brigades of his division. General Stuart, with three brigades of cavalry, moved on Longstreet's right, and took position in front of the Gaps. Hampton's and [W. E.]Jones' brigades remained along the Rappahannock and Hazel Rivers, in front of Culpeper Court-House, with instructions to follow the main body as soon as Hill's corps had passed that point.

On the 17th, Fitz. Lee's brigade, under Colonel Munford, which was on the road to Snicker's Gap, was attacked near Aldie by the Federal cavalry. The attack was repulsed with loss, and the brigade held its ground until ordered to fall back, its right being threatened by another body, coming from Hopewell toward Middleburg. The latter force was driven from Middleburg, and pursued toward Hopewell by Robertson's brigade, which arrived about dark. Its retreat was intercepted by W. H. F. Lee's brigade, under Colonel Chambliss, jr., and the greater part of a regiment captured.

During the three succeeding days there was much skirmishing, General Stuart taking a position west of Middleburg, where he awaited the rest of his command.

General Jones arrived on the 19th, and General Hampton in the afternoon of the following day, having repulsed, on his march, a cavalry force sent to reconnoiter in the direction of Warrenton.

On the 21st, the enemy attacked with infantry and cavalry, and obliged General Stuart, after a brave resistance, to fall back to the gaps of the mountains. The enemy retired the next day, having advanced only a short distance beyond Upperville.

In these engagements, the cavalry sustained a loss of 510 killed, wounded, and missing. Among them were several valuable officers, whose names are mentioned in General Stuart's report. One piece of artillery was disabled and left on the field. The enemy's loss was heavy. About 400 prisoners were taken and several stand of colors.
[excerpt]
In the meantime, the progress of Ewell, who was already in Maryland, with Jenkins' cavalry advanced into Pennsylvania as far as Chambersburg, rendered it necessary that the rest of the army should be within supporting distance, and Hill having reached the Valley, Longstreet was withdrawn to the west side of the Shenandoah, and the two corps encamped near Berryville.

General Stuart was directed to hold the mountain passes with part of his command as long as the enemy remained south of the Potomac, and, with the remainder, to cross into Maryland, and place himself on the right of General Ewell. Upon the suggestion of the former officer that he could damage the enemy and delay his passage of the river by getting in his rear, he was authorized to do so, and it was left to his discretion whether to enter Maryland east or west of the Blue Ridge; but he was instructed to lose no time in placing his command on the right of our column as soon as he should perceive the enemy moving northward.

[excerpt]
On the 24th, Longstreet and Hill were put in motion to follow Ewell, and, on the 27th, encamped near Chambersburg.

General Imboden, under the orders before referred to, had been operating on Ewell's left while the latter was advancing into Maryland. He drove off the troops guarding the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, and destroyed all the important bridges on that route from Martinsburg to Cumberland, besides inflicting serious damage upon the Chesapeake and Ohio Canal. He was at Hancock when Longstreet and Hill reached Chambersburg, and was directed to proceed to the latter place by way of McConnellsburg, collecting supplies for the army on his route.

The cavalry force at this time with the army, consisting of Jenkins' brigade and [E. V.]White's battalion, was not greater than was required to accompany the advance of General Ewell and General Early, with whom it performed valuable service, as appears from their reports. It was expected that as soon as the Federal Army should cross the Potomac, General Stuart would give notice of its movements, and nothing having been heard from him since our entrance into Maryland, it was inferred that the enemy had not yet left Virginia. Orders were, therefore, issued to move upon Harrisburg. The expedition of General Early to York was designed in part to prepare for this undertaking by breaking the railroad between Baltimore and Harrisburg, and seizing the bridge over the Susquehanna at Wrightsville. General Early succeeded in the first object, destroying a number of bridges above and below York, but on the approach of the troops sent by him to Wrightsville, a body of militia stationed at that place fled across the river and burned the bridge in their retreat. General Early then marched to rejoin his corps.

The advance against Harrisburg was arrested by intelligence received from a scout on the night of the 28th, to the effect that the army of General Hooker had crossed the Potomac, and was approaching the South Mountain. In the absence of the cavalry, it was impossible to ascertain his intentions; but to deter him from advancing ****her west, and intercepting our communication with Virginia, it was determined to concentrate the army east of the mountains.

BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG.
Hill's corps was accordingly ordered to move toward Cashtown on the 29th, and Longstreet to follow the next day, leaving Pickett's division at Chambersburg to guard the rear until relieved by Imboden. General Ewell was recalled from Carlisle, and directed to join the army at Cashtown or Gettysburg, as circumstances might require. The advance of the enemy to the latter place was unknown, and the weather being inclement, the march was conducted with a view to the comfort of the troops. Heth's division reached Cashtown on the 29th, and the following morning Pettigrew's brigade, sent by General Heth to procure supplies at Gettysburg, found it occupied by the enemy. Being ignorant of the extent of his force, General Pettigrew was unwilling to hazard an attack with his
single brigade, and returned to Cashtown.

[excerpt]
In the meantime the enemy occupied the point which General Ewell designed to seize, but in what force could not be ascertained, owing to the darkness. An intercepted dispatch showed that another corps had halted that afternoon 4 miles from Gettysburg. Under these circumstances, it was decided not to attack until the arrival of Longstreet, two of whose divisions (those of Hood and McLaws) encamped about 4 miles in the rear during the night. Anderson's division of Hill's corps came up after the engagement.
[excerpt]

The movements of the army preceding the battle of Gettysburg had been much embarrassed by the absence of the cavalry. As soon as it was known that the enemy had crossed into Maryland, orders were sent to the brigades of [B. H.] Robertson and [William E.] Jones, which had been left to guard the passes of the Blue Ridge, to rejoin the army without delay, and it was expected that General Stuart, with the remainder of his command, would soon arrive. In the exercise of the discretion given him when Longstreet and Hill marched into Maryland, General Stuart determined to pass around the rear of the Federal Army with three brigades and cross the Potomac between it and Washington, believing that he would be able, by that route, to place himself on our right flank in time to keep us properly advised of the enemy's movements. He marched from Salem on the night of June 24, intending to pass west of Centreville, but found the enemy's forces so distributed as to render that route impracticable. Adhering to his original plan, he was forced to make a wide detour through Buckland and Brentsville, and crossed the Occoquan at Wolf Run Shoals on the morning of the 27th. Continuing his march through Fairfax Court-House and Dranesville, he arrived at the Potomac, below the mouth of Seneca Creek, in the evening.

He found the river much swollen by the recent rains, but, after great exertion, gained the Maryland shore before midnight with his whole command.
He now ascertained that the Federal Army, which he had discovered to be drawing toward the Potomac, had crossed the day before, and was moving toward Frederick, thus interposing itself between him and our forces.

He accordingly marched northward, through Rockville and Westminster, to Hanover, Pa., where he arrived on the 30th; but the enemy advanced with equal rapidity on his left, and continued to obstruct communication with our main body.

Supposing, from such information as he could obtain, that part of «21 R R--VOL XXVII, PT II» the army was at Carlisle, he left Hanover that night, and proceeded thither by way of Dover.

He reached Carlisle on July 1, where he received orders to proceed to Gettysburg. He arrived in the afternoon of the following day, and took position on General Ewell's left. His leading brigade, under General Hampton, encountered and repulsed a body of the enemy's cavalry at Hunterstown, endeavoring to reach our rear.

General Stuart had several skirmishes during his march, and at Hanover quite a severe engagement took place with a strong force of cavalry, which was finally compelled to withdraw from the town. The prisoners taken by the cavalry and paroled at various places amounted to about 800, and at Rockville a large train of wagons coming from Washington was intercepted and captured. Many of them were destroyed, but 125, with all the animals of the train, were secured.

The ranks of the cavalry were much reduced by its long and arduous march, repeated conflicts, and insufficient supplies of food and forage, but the day after its arrival at Gettysburg it engaged the enemy's cavalry with unabated spirit, and effectually protected our left.
[end of excerpt]
=============================
O.R.-- SERIES I--VOLUME XXVII/3 [S# 45]
Correspondence, Orders, And Returns Relating To Operations In North Carolina, Virginia, West Virginia, Maryland, Pennsylvania, And Department Of The East, From June 3 To August 3, 1863.
CONFEDERATE CORRESPONDENCE. ETC.--#1
HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA,
June 9, 1863.
Maj. Gen. J. E. B. STUART,
Commanding Cavalry:
GENERAL: General Lee desires me to say that he has received your dispatches by the couriers and from signal station. General Longstreet has a division looking to Stevensburg, and General Ewell on the other side looking to Brandy Station. He desires you not to expose your men too much, but to do the enemy damage when possible. As the whole thing seems to be a reconnaissance to determine our force and position, he wishes these concealed as much as possible, and the infantry not to be seen, if it is possible to avoid it.
I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
C. S. VENABLE,
Major, and Aide-de-Camp.
[P. S.]--Is your line of couriers by Ely's and Madden's cut off?
-----
O.R.-- SERIES I--VOLUME XXVII/3 [S# 45]
Correspondence, Orders, And Returns Relating To Operations In North Carolina, Virginia, West Virginia, Maryland, Pennsylvania, And Department Of The East, From June 3 To August 3, 1863.
CONFEDERATE CORRESPONDENCE. ETC.--#1
Markham, June 17, 1863--3.30 p.m.
Lieut. Gen. JAMES LONGSTREET,
Commanding Corps:
GENERAL: Your note of 10 a.m. to-day just received. I have heard nothing of the movements of General Hooker either from General Stuart or yourself, and, therefore, can form no opinion of the best move against him. If a part of our force could have operated east of the mountains, it would have served more to confuse him, but as you have turned off to the Valley, and I understand all the trains have taken that route, I hope it is for the best. At any rate, it is too late to change from any information I have. You had better, therefore, push on, relieve Ewell's division as soon as you can, and let him advance into Maryland, at least as far as Hagerstown. Give out it is against Harper's Ferry. I will send back for A. P. Hill to move by Chester Gap. I wrote to you to-day and yesterday. I shall go from here to the Valley.
Very respectfully,
R. E. LEE,
General.
-----
HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA,
Markham, June 17, 1863--3.30 p.m.
Lieutenant-General EWELL,
Commanding Corps:
GENERAL: I have just received your letter, the first from you since your dispatch announcing the fall of Winchester. I think the reports which you have of the forces in Harper's Ferry must be exaggerated. I wish you to move Rodes' division on as far as Hagerstown, and operate in the enemy's country according to the plan proposed. Give out that your movement is for the purpose of enveloping Harper's Ferry. Repress marauding. Take what is necessary for the army, and give citizens of Maryland Confederate money or certificates.(*) Do not expose yourself. Keep your own scouts.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
R. E. LEE,
General.
-----------------
]

Could you explain the reason for this long and off-topic cut and paste? Is there a point?

 

[M E Wolf]

O.R.-- SERIES I--VOLUME XXVII/3 [S# 45]
Correspondence, Orders, And Returns Relating To Operations In North Carolina, Virginia, West Virginia, Maryland, Pennsylvania, And Department Of The East, From June 3 To August 3, 1863.
CONFEDERATE CORRESPONDENCE. ETC.--#1
HEADQUARTERS,
Millwood, June 22, 1863--7 p.m.
Maj. Gen. J. E. B. STUART,
Commanding Cavalry:
GENERAL: General Lee has inclosed to me this letter for you,(*) to be forwarded to you, provided you can be spared from my front, and provided I think that you can move across the Potomac without disclosing our plans. He speaks of your leaving, via Hopewell Gap, and passing by the rear of the enemy. If you can get through by that route, I think that you will be less likely to indicate what our plans are than if you should cross by passing to our rear. I forward the letter of instructions with these suggestions.

Please advise me of the condition of affairs before you leave, and order General Hampton--whom I suppose you will leave here in command--to report to me at Millwood, either by letter or in person, as may be most agreeable to him.
Most respectfully,
JAMES LONGSTREET,
Lieutenant-General.
N. B.--I think that your passage of the Potomac by our rear at the present moment will, in a measure, disclose our plans. You had better not leave us, therefore, unless you can take the proposed route in rear of the enemy.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
O.R.-- SERIES I--VOLUME XXVII/3 [S# 45]
Correspondence, Orders, And Returns Relating To Operations In North Carolina, Virginia, West Virginia, Maryland, Pennsylvania, And Department Of The East, From June 3 To August 3, 1863.
CONFEDERATE CORRESPONDENCE. ETC.--#1
HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA,
June 23, 1863--5 p.m.
Maj. Gen. J. E. B. STUART,
Commanding Cavalry:
GENERAL: Your notes of 9 and 10.30 a.m. to-day have just been received. As regards the purchase of tobacco for your men, supposing that Confederate money will not be taken, I am willing for your commissaries or quartermasters to purchase this tobacco and let the men get it from them, but I can have nothing seized by the men.

If General Hooker's army remains inactive, you can leave two brigades to watch him, and withdraw with the three others, but should he not appear to be moving northward, I think you had better withdraw this side of the mountain to-morrow night, cross at Shepherdstown next day, and move over to Fredericktown.

You will, however, be able to judge whether you can pass around their army without hinderance, doing them all the damage you can, and cross the river east of the mountains. In either case, after crossing the river, you must move on and feel the right of Ewell's troops, collecting information, provisions, &c.

Give instructions to the commander of the brigades left behind, to watch the flank and rear of the army, and (in the event of the enemy leaving their front) retire from the mountains west of the Shenandoah, leaving sufficient pickets to guard the passes, and bringing everything clean along the Valley, closing upon the rear of the army.

As regards the movements of the two brigades of the enemy moving toward Warrenton, the commander of the brigades to be left in the mountains must do what he can to counteract them, but I think the sooner you cross into Maryland, after to-morrow, the better.

The movements of Ewell's corps are as stated in my former letter. Hill's first division will reach the Potomac to-day, and Longstreet will follow to-morrow.
Be watchful and circumspect in all your movements.
I am, very respectfully and truly, yours,
R. E. LEE,
General.
----------------
HDQRS. CAV. DIV., ARMY OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA,
June 24, 1863.
Brig. Gen. B. H. ROBERTSON,
Commanding Cavalry:
GENERAL: Your own and General Jones' brigades will cover the front of Ashby's and Snicker's Gaps, yourself, as senior officer, being in command.

Your object will be to watch the enemy; deceive him as to our designs, and harass his rear if you find he is retiring. Be always on the alert; let nothing escape your observation, and miss no opportunity which offers to damage the enemy.

After the enemy has moved beyond your reach, leave sufficient pickets in the mountains, withdraw to the west side of the Shenandoah, place a strong and reliable picket to watch the enemy at Harper's Ferry, cross the Potomac, and follow the army, keeping on its right and rear.

As long as the enemy remains in your front in force, unless otherwise ordered by General R. E. Lee, Lieutenant-General Longstreet, or myself, hold the Gaps with a line of pickets reaching across the Shenandoah by Charlestown to the Potomac.

If, in the contingency mentioned, you withdraw, sweep the Valley clear of what pertains to the army, and cross the Potomac at the different points crossed by it.

You will instruct General Jones from time to time as the movements progress, or events may require, and report anything of importance to Lieutenant-General Longstreet, with whose position you will communicate by relays through Charlestown.

I send instructions for General Jones, which please read. Avail yourself of every means in your power to increase the efficiency of your command, and keep it up to the highest number possible. Particular attention will be paid to shoeing horses, and to marching off of the turnpike.

In case of an advance of the enemy, you will offer such resistance as will be justifiable to check him and discover his intentions and, if possible, you will prevent him from gaining possession of the Gaps.

In case of a move by the enemy upon Warrenton, you will counteract it as much as you can, compatible with previous instructions.

You will have with the two brigades two batteries of horse artillery.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
J. E. B. STUART,
Major-General, Commanding.
[P. S.]--Do not change your present line of pickets until daylight to-morrow morning, unless compelled to do so.

--------------------------------------------------------
This is all I could find between Lee, Ewell, Longstreet and Stuart - leading up to Gettysburg--not being there for Lee. I will look in more areas for that "Indorsement" mentioned, K_Hale, ma'am.

I do not find anything that supports General Longstreet suggesting Stuart to be brought up for Court Martial; however--that doesn't mean the documents and or proof exists elsewhere, such as supplemental records of the Rebellion; diaries, etc.

That said, the only recollection I have of any mention of a desire to have General J.E.B. Stuart court-martial; was in the book "Killer Angels." The suggestion if memory serves me correctly, is brought up by "Major Marshall" on General Lee's staff, as Longstreet approached Head-Quarters.


M. E. Wolf

 

[prroh]

--------------------------------------------------------
This is all I could find between Lee, Ewell, Longstreet and Stuart - leading up to Gettysburg--not being there for Lee. I will look in more areas for that "Indorsement" mentioned, K_Hale, ma'am.

I do not find anything that supports General Longstreet suggesting Stuart to be brought up for Court Martial; however--that doesn't mean the documents and or proof exists elsewhere, such as supplemental records of the Rebellion; diaries, etc.

That said, the only recollection I have of any mention of a desire to have General J.E.B. Stuart court-martial; was in the book "Killer Angels." The suggestion if memory serves me correctly, is brought up by "Major Marshall" on General Lee's staff, as Longstreet approached Head-Quarters.


M. E. Wolf

These few lines says it all. Thanks

 

[M E Wolf]

From what I gather from General J.E.B. Stuart's Gettysburg report, he was blinded himself. General Early pops up boldly --and, had General Early have a staff member to wait for Stuart--perhaps hours would have been shaved off on his way to support General Lee.

Reference:
O.R.-- SERIES I--VOLUME XXVII/2 [S# 44]
JUNE 3-AUGUST 1, 1863.--The Gettysburg Campaign.
No. 565.--Reports of Maj. Gen. J. E. B. Stuart, C. S. Army, commanding cavalry, Army of Northern Virginia.
HDQRS. CAVALRY DIVISION, ARMY OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA,
August 20, 1863.
GENERAL: I have the honor to make the following report of the operations of the Cavalry Division, Army of Northern Virginia, from the time of crossing the Rappahannock on June 16, to July 24, when, having recrossed the Blue Ridge after the Pennsylvania campaign, our pickets were re-established on the south bank of the Rappahannock:
[excerpt]
Our wagon train was now a subject of serious embarrassment, but I thought, by making a détour to the right by Jefferson, I could save it. I therefore determined to try it, particularly as I was satisfied, from every accessible source of information, as well as from the lapse of time, that the Army of Northern Virginia must be near the Susquehanna. My numerous skirmishers had greatly diminished--almost exhausted--my supply of ammunition. I had this immense train in an enemy's country, very near a hostile army, and, besides, about 400 prisoners, which had accumulated since the paroling at Cooksville. I therefore had the train closed up in park, and Hampton, arriving in the meantime, engaged the enemy ****her to the right, and finally, with his sharpshooters, dislodged the enemy from the town, the enemy moving toward our left apparently to reunite his broken column, but pressing us with dismounted men on our left flank. General Fitz. Lee's brigade was put at the head of the column, and he was instructed to push on with the train through Jefferson for York, Pa. and communicate as soon as practicable with our forces. Hampton's brigade brought up the rear.

We were not molested in our march, which, on account of the very exposed situation of our flank and the enemy's knowledge of it, was continued during the night. The night's march over a very dark road was one of peculiar hardship, owing to loss of rest to both man and horse. After a series of exciting combats and night marches, it was a severe tax to their endurance. Whole regiments slept in the saddle, their faithful animals keeping the road unguided. In some instances they fell from their horses, overcome with physical fatigue and sleepiness.

Reaching Dover, Pa., on the morning of July 1, I was unable to find our forces. The most I could learn was that General Early had marched his division in the direction of Shippensburg, which the best information I could get seemed to indicate as the point of concentration of our troops. After as little rest as was compatible with the exhausted condition of the command, we pushed on for Carlisle, where we hoped to find a portion of the army. I arrived before that village, by way of Dillsburg, in the afternoon. Our rations were entirely out. I desired to levy a contribution on the inhabitants for rations, but was informed before reaching it that it was held by a considerable force of militia (infantry and artillery), who were concealed in the buildings, with the view to entrap me upon my entrance into the town. They were frustrated in their intention, and although very peaceable in external aspect, I soon found the information I had received was correct. I disliked to subject the town to the consequences of attack; at the same time it was essential to us to procure rations. I therefore directed General Lee to send in a flag of truce, demanding unconditional surrender or bombardment. This was refused. I placed artillery in position commanding the town, took possession of the main avenues to the place, and repeated the demand. It was again refused, and I was forced to the alternative of shelling the place.

Although the houses were used by their sharpshooters while firing on our men, not a building was fired excepting the United States cavalry barracks, which were burned by my order, the place having resisted my advance instead of peaceable surrender, as in the case of General Ewell. General Fitz. Lee's brigade was charged with the duty of investing the place, the remaining brigades following at considerable intervals from Dover. Maj. Gen. W. F. Smith was in command of the forces in Carlisle. The only obstacle to the enforcement of my threat was the scarcity of artillery ammunition.

The whereabouts of our army was still a mystery; but, during the night, I received a dispatch from General Lee (in answer to one sent by Major Venable from Dover, on Early's trail), that the army was at Gettysburg, and had been engaged on this day (July 1) with the enemy's advance. I instantly dispatched to Hampton to move 10 miles that night on the road to Gettysburg, and gave orders to the other brigades, with a view to reaching Gettysburg early the next day, and started myself that night.

My advance reached Gettysburg July 2, just in time to thwart a move of the enemy's cavalry upon our rear by way of Hunterstown, after a fierce engagement, in which Hampton's brigade performed gallant service, a series of charges compelling the enemy to leave the field and abandon his purpose. I took my position that day on the York and Heidlersburg roads, on the left wing of the Army of Northern Virginia.

On the morning of July 3,pursuant to instructions from the commanding general (the ground along our line of battle being totally impracticable for cavalry operations), I moved forward to a position to the left of General Ewell's left, and in advance of it, where a commanding ridge completely controlled a wide plain of cultivated fields stretching toward Hanover, on the left, and reaching to the base of the mountain spurs, among which the enemy held position. My command was increased by the addition of Jenkins' brigade, who here in the presence of the enemy allowed themselves to be supplied with but 10 rounds of ammunition, although armed with the most approved Enfield musket. I moved this command and W. H. F. Lee's secretly through the woods to a position, and hoped to effect a surprise upon the enemy's rear, but Hampton's and Fitz. Lee's brigades, which had been ordered to follow me, unfortunately debouched into the open ground, disclosing the movement, and causing a corresponding movement of a large force of the enemy's cavalry.

[[More bad luck for Stuart]]
Having been informed that Generals Hampton and Lee were up, I sent for them to come forward, so that I could show them the situation at a glance from the elevated ground I held, and arrange for further operations. My message was so long in finding General Hampton that he never reached me, and General Lee remained, as it was deemed inadvisable at the time the message was delivered for both to leave their commands.
[end of excerpt]
[[Stuart goes on about his Cavalry being dismounted and acting as skirmishers until his ammo was exhausted]]
==================================================
The Life And Campaigns
Of Major-General J. E. B. Stuart
Commander Of The Cavalry Of The Army Of Northern Virginia

by
H. B. McClellan, A.M.
Late Major, Assistant Adjutant-General And Chief Of Staff Of The Cavalry Corps, Army Of Northern Virginia
----------------------
The Life and Campaigns of Major-General J.E.B. Stuart
Chapter XVII.--Gettysburg.
[excerpt]
General Lee states in his report:--
Upon the suggestion of the former officer (General Stuart) that he could damage the enemy and delay his passage of the river by getting in his rear, he was authorized to do so.
And again:--
In the exercise of the discretion given him when Longstreet and Hill marched into Maryland, General Stuart determined to pass around the rear of the Federal army with three brigades, and cross the Potomac between it and Washington, believing that he would be able by that route to place himself on our right flank in time to keep us properly advised of the enemy's movements.
[excerpt]
The night of the 23d of June was most inclement. A pitiless rain poured without cessation from the clouds, and the land was drenched. Although the shelter of the old house at the Cross Roads was available, at bedtime Stuart ordered his blanket and oil-cloths to be spread under a tree in the rear of the house, and directed me to sleep on the front porch, where I could readily light my candle and read any despatches which might come during the night. I remonstrated with him upon this needless exposure, but his reply was: "No ! my men are exposed to this rain, and I will not fare any better than they." It was late in the night when a courier arrived from army headquarters, bearing a despatch marked "confidential." Under ordinary circumstances I would not have ventured to break the seal; but the rain poured down so steadily that I was unwilling to disturb the general unnecessarily, and yet it might be important that he should immediately be acquainted with the contents of the despatch. With some hesitation I opened and read it. It was a lengthy communication from General Lee, containing the directions upon which Stuart was to act. I at once carried it to the general and read it to him as he lay under the dripping tree. With a mild reproof for having opened such a document, the order was committed to my charge for the night, and Stuart was soon asleep. It is much to be regretted that a copy of this letter cannot now be produced. A diligent search has failed to find it, and as General Stuart did not forward a copy of it with his report, I presume it was destroyed during our subsequent march. But I have many times had occasion to recall its contents, and I find that my recollection of it is confirmed by several passages in General Stuart's report.

The letter discussed at considerable length the plan of passing around the enemy's rear. It informed General Stuart that General Early would move upon York, Pa., and that he was desired to place his cavalry as speedily as possible with that, the advance division of Lee's right wing. The letter suggested that, as the roads leading northward from Shepherdstown and Williamsport were already encumbered by the infantry, the artillery, and the transportation of the army, the delay which would necessarily occur in passing by these would, perhaps, be greater than would ensue if General Stuart passed around the enemy's rear. The letter further informed him that, if he chose the latter route, General Early would receive instructions to look out for him and endeavor to communicate with him; and York, Pa., was designated as the point in the vicinity of which he was to expect to hear from Early, and as the possible (if not the probable) point of concentration of the army. The whole tenor of the letter gave evidence that the commanding general approved the proposed movement, and thought that it might be productive of the best results, while the responsibility of the decision was placed upon General Stuart himself. Well may General Longstreet say: "Authority thus given a subordinate general implies an opinion on the part of the commander that something better than the drudgery of a march along our flank might be open to him, and one of General Stuart's activity and gallantry should not be expected to fail to seek it."

continued

 

[M E Wolf]

Having received his orders on the night of the 23d of June, General Stuart prepared on the 24th to execute them. The three brigades of Hampton, Fitz Lee, and W. H. F. Lee, the latter under the command of Colonel Chambliss, were ordered to rendezvous that night at Salem, and Robertson's and Jones' brigades, under command of Brigadier-General B. H. Robertson, "were left in observation of the enemy on the usual front, with full instructions as to following up the enemy in case of withdrawal, and joining our main army."(2) I do not profess to give authoritatively the reasons which led General Stuart to make this disposition of his brigades, but there are some considerations which seem to lie upon the surface. Stuart was about to undertake a hazardous movement, in which he needed not only veteran troops, but officers upon whose hearty coöperation he could confidently rely. These qualities were united in the brigades and brigade commanders which he selected to accompany him. Moreover, by this division of his brigades he left in close communication with the army a force of cavalry nearly equal to that which he carried with him, for Jones' brigade was by far the largest in the division, and when joined to Robertson's two regiments, this command must have numbered more than 3,000 men, even after deducting the losses in battle since the 9th of June. This force, added to Jenkins' brigade, which constituted Ewell's advance in Pennsylvania, and which General Stuart estimated at 3,800, (1) he was justified in considering sufficient to fulfil every duty which might be required of the cavalry by the commanding general. Another consideration doubtless had weight. I have heard General Stuart pronounce in unqualified terms that he considered General Jones "the best outpost officer" in his command; and that his watchfulness over his pickets and his skill and energy in obtaining information were worthy of all praise. General Stuart must, therefore, have considered that he was leaving in communication with the army an officer eminently qualified for the duty of observing and reporting the enemy's movements; and that the fact that his brigade constituted, perhaps, four fifths of the force employed would cause General Robertson, who commanded the two brigades, to give full weight to his suggestions and counsels.
[excerpt]
At this day we read the history of the minutest events connected with this campaign in the light of the final result. Had General Lee gained the battle of Gettysburg, as he said he would have done if Stonewall Jackson had been present, the persistency with which Stuart held on to these wagons, and the difficulties he surmounted in transporting them safely through an enemy's country during the next three days and nights of incessant marching and fighting, would have been the cause of congratulation. But Gettysburg was lost to the Confederate arms, and not through Stuart's fault; and every circumstance which might have contributed to a different result will be judged in the light of the final catastrophe. Considered from this point of view, it must be acknowledged that the capture of this train of wagons was a misfortune. The time occupied in securing it was insignificant; but the delay caused to the subsequent march was serious at a time when minutes counted almost as hours. Had Stuart been entirely unimpeded he would have probably passed Hanover, Pa., on the 30th, before the arrival of Kilpatrick's division, and would have been in communication with General Lee before nightfall on that day. That this would have altered the result of the campaign is a matter of grave doubt; but it would certainly have relieved the movement of the cavalry around the rear of Meade's army of the disapprobation to which some have given expression.
[excerpt]

When Fitz Lee reached the road leading from York to Gettysburg he learned that Early had retraced his steps, and had marched westward. The best information which Stuart could obtain seemed to indicate that the Confederate army was concentrating in the vicinity of Shippensburg. After a short rest at Dover, on the morning of the 1st of July, Stuart pressed on toward Carlisle, hoping there to obtain provisions for his troops, and definite information concerning the army. From Dover he sent Major A. R. Venable, of his staff, on the trail of Early's troops, and at a later hour of the day Captain Henry Lee, of Fitz Lee's staff, was sent toward Gettysburg on a similar errand. Stuart had reached Carlisle before either of these officers could return with a report. He found the town in the possession of the enemy. When the Confederate infantry had withdrawn from it General W. F. Smith had occupied the town with two brigades of militia, supported by artillery and a small force of cavalry. General Smith was summoned to surrender, but refused. While preparing to enforce his demand Stuart received, through Major Venable and Captain Lee, the first information of the location of the Confederate army, and orders from General Lee to move at once for Gettysburg.

[excerpt]
Stuart himself, with Fitz Lee's and Chambliss' commands, reached Gettysburg on the afternoon of the 2d, and took position on the Confederate left. For eight days and nights the troops had been marching incessantly. On the ninth night they rested within the shelter of the army, and with a grateful sense of relief which words cannot express.
[end of excerpt]
========================================================================
General Stuart was having a 'bad day.' If he didn't take so long for issuing paroles, going to a funeral, streamline the train; as well as Early leaving someone for Stuart to be re-directed; Stuart wouldn't be going in circles.

Just my opinion.

Respectfully submitted,
M. E. Wolf