When was the war lost?

damYankee

Captain
Joined
Aug 12, 2011
I asked this question in another thread and thought it would be a good question for it's own OP.

When did the situation facing the South come to that point when surrender and the salvage of as much of it's national treasure, private property and blood of it's youth outweighed any hopes of defeating the North?
 
Why did Lee, as general-in-chief, lack the authority?
That´s why (in my opinion):

General Orders No.3 (Richmond, February 6, 1865)

Section 1. The Congress oft he Confederate States of America do exact, That there shall be appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consense of the Senate, an officer, who shall be known and designated as "General in Chief", who shall be ranking officer of the army, and as such, shall have command of the military forces of the Confederate States.

Sec.2 That the act providing a staff for the new General who may be assigned to duty at the seat of Government, is hereby repealed, and that the General in Chief, who may be appointed under that provision of this act, shall have a staff not less than that allowed a General in the field, to be assigned by the president, or to be appointed by him, by and with the consent of the Senate.

I´d say….

- the general-in-chief is clearly subordinated to the government (he even needs consent of the Senate to get his staff officers appointed)
- he has command of the military forces (which would eliminate the always lingering seniority and ranking-questions)
- but he is clearly not meant to to enact any authority outside of the army:

to capitulate with one of the South´s main armies is in it´s consequences a political act -
as it is the decision over the fate of the confederate government.

Of course a general may be forced to capitulate in extremis
- when there is no other viable way (but even then will have to communicate with the government to get allowance to do so)
- even more so when this capitulation in effect leads directly to the end of said government.

At least I would interpret the office and his authority that way….
(and Lee´s discussion with Wise leads me to believe that he saw it in a similar light…)
 
Thanks. I came up with that while trying to give perspective a friend. I know that that an 8 1/2" X 11" piece of paper & a stamp are the correct proportions. A file folder & stamp were at hand. There is something about the file folder's tab that makes it work visually.
...and a lot of people advised you to have a look on production sites, population charts, the railroad network, the topography and defensibility etc. as well to get the full picture….
 
That´s why (in my opinion):

General Orders No.3 (Richmond, February 6, 1865)

Section 1. The Congress oft he Confederate States of America do exact, That there shall be appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consense of the Senate, an officer, who shall be known and designated as "General in Chief", who shall be ranking officer of the army, and as such, shall have command of the military forces of the Confederate States.

Sec.2 That the act providing a staff for the new General who may be assigned to duty at the seat of Government, is hereby repealed, and that the General in Chief, who may be appointed under that provision of this act, shall have a staff not less than that allowed a General in the field, to be assigned by the president, or to be appointed by him, by and with the consent of the Senate.

I´d say….

- the general-in-chief is clearly subordinated to the government (he even needs consent of the Senate to get his staff officers appointed)
- he has command of the military forces (which would eliminate the always lingering seniority and ranking-questions)
- but he is clearly not meant to to enact any authority outside of the army:

to capitulate with one of the South´s main armies is in it´s consequences a political act -
as it is the decision over the fate of the confederate government.

Of course a general may be forced to capitulate in extremis
- when there is no other viable way (but even then will have to communicate with the government to get allowance to do so)
- even more so when this capitulation in effect leads directly to the end of said government.

At least I would interpret the office and his authority that way….
(and Lee´s discussion with Wise leads me to believe that he saw it in a similar light…)
I see it a little differently (maybe we agree). Lee had the authority to exercise military decisions. The military decision to surrender is when an army is in a situation where it faces the stark options of destruction or capture/surrender (on terms, if possible). As CO of the ANV he had the authority to make that decision on April 9, 1865. The other armies were not in that position on April 9 so that he lacked the authority to - at most - order their CO's to surrender. I also suspect that at most he would do so only after consulting with those CO's. Only his civilian C-in-C could make the decision that despite the absence of "military" circumstances dictating "surrender" those armies should lay down their arms. IMHO ...
 
I asked this question in another thread and thought it would be a good question for it's own OP.

When did the situation facing the South come to that point when surrender and the salvage of as much of it's national treasure, private property and blood of it's youth outweighed any hopes of defeating the North?

My question to you is what victory would have looked like? I have posted a link to the timeline of the Industrial Revolution. What kind of society would have existed in the Southern U.S. if chattel slavery lasted until the 20th Century?

If the demographics of South Carolina had proceeded unabated, the white population would have been (+/-) 10%, if that. Read more here.

Link:

 
I see it a little differently (maybe we agree). Lee had the authority to exercise military decisions. The military decision to surrender is when an army is in a situation where it faces the stark options of destruction or capture/surrender (on terms, if possible). As CO of the ANV he had the authority to make that decision on April 9, 1865. The other armies were not in that position on April 9 so that he lacked the authority to - at most - order their CO's to surrender. I also suspect that at most he would do so only after consulting with those CO's. Only his civilian C-in-C could make the decision that despite the absence of "military" circumstances dictating "surrender" those armies should lay down their arms. IMHO ...
I could indeed not agree more!

But I deem it relevant that (IMO) he had that authority not generally - because he was the C-in-C.
He had it only because the situation of the ANV had become hopeless on April 9.

Otherwise we all would have to be much more critical of him….
 
Regarding that controversy it is clear only Davis as commander in chief and president has the authority to surrender all forces and to negotiate peace.

He was not the president of the CSA, he had not to my knowledge communicated with Davis his plans to surrender the AoNV.
His authority was limited to military issues.


Ultimately.
Davis gave Lee, the General-in-chief of the Confederate armies, an authority negotiate a conclusion of military operations in January, 1865. Davis:

1774365207158.webp


Nothing came of that. However, within a few weeks, the armies were discussing prisoner exchange issues about Petersburg, and Gen. Longstreet suggested it was a chance for Gen. Lee to initiate a peace nation-wide by meeting with General Grant under some other ostensible object. Longstreet later said Lee would have done well to have acted instantly and of his own authority, but Lee insisted on discussing with Davis.
Davis gave Lee authority to conclude hostilities, or the war, if possible, by a military convention with the US forces, on February 28, 1865:

1774365688960.webp


It appears Davis preferred some sort of possible concessions from the USA from such a convention. In any case Lee noted to Grant he was authorized to "do whatever the result of the proposed interview" might render "necessary or advisable"...

1774313601867.webp

1774314044778.webp


General Grant sent notice to Washington of the apparent fact of a possibility of negotiating a general disbandment of CSA forces, or giving Gen. Lee an opportunity to surrender the same. President Lincoln, preparing for his second inaugural on March 3, informed Grant to not concern himself about other than a military victory against Lee's Army of Northern Virginia... and this was communicated to Gen. Grant, with War Secretary Stanton's signature:

1774314591444.webp


Grant replied to Lee on March 4:

1774313883423.webp


On the 13th Davis declared that the USA would accept no terms of any kind, from any Confederate authority. From this date, then, apparently, Gen. Lee was constrained not to discuss any but purely military issues with the US forces, by both the US forces, and his own commander-in-chief:

1774367175186.webp


After the "final issue" Lee surrendered himself and the Army of Northern Virginia to Grant at Appomattox, Grant apparently informed Assistant Secretary of War C.A. Dana that Lee informed him he had been prepared to surrender the entirety of the Confederate armies by the lately proposed military convention...

1774366611679.webp


Once Lee was defeated, and surrendered in the field, it was evident the Confederacy was over.
The balance of the Confederate armies were surrendered by Military Conventions with the US Army, etc. Davis was present in North Carolina when Johnston began discussions with Sherman. He wanted some terms, if possible, but ultimately, the surrender was unconditional.

Where it gets cloudy is in the mechanics of a confederation founded on limited central powers where theoretically the states held equal power to the central government. Would each state have to approve any surrender?
Yes, murky.
The Southern Confederacy had a rather unlimited, limited central government in some respects. The Confederate system did not see any distinction between the States and their Confederacy. Take the "State Sovereignty" theory, and combine that overwhelming idea of sovereignty, (more powerful to its enthusiasts than the Constitution or the Union of the United States) into the Confederate Government. A sort of attempted manifestation of Calhoun's 1851 theory of "a confederacy of sovereign states." Davis at the head.
General Beauregard later commented from an interview at New Orleans...

1774327515061.webp
 
My question to you is what victory would have looked like? I have posted a link to the timeline of the Industrial Revolution. What kind of society would have existed in the Southern U.S. if chattel slavery lasted until the 20th Century?

If the demographics of South Carolina had proceeded unabated, the white population would have been (+/-) 10%, if that. Read more here.

Link:

That's a good, but a much different question as it would require conjecture on my part as opposed to the question as to "when was the war lost" as there are historical landmarks/events that one can point to as a missed opportunity to bring the conflict to an end.
However, I'll give it a try, but I will do so by pointing out that "what a victory would have looked like?" would have or should have been dictated by the leadership of the CSA.
I would imagine that recognition of the CSA as a legitimate sovereignty would have been the basic goal of the CSA.
Just how to obtain that lofty goal is another matter, but would in my opinion require the forces of the CSA to seize and maintain control of something more important to the leadership of the Union than defeating the CSA. As in Washington DC and the president and congress and supreme court.
Merely defending Richmond, Virginia wasn't enough especially considering that to do so, the CSA had to sacrifice nearly all of the strategic points in nearly every member state.
Let's face it, after the Union occupation of the heart of Dixie and the failure of the South to drive the Union out, war was futile.
 
The failure to recognize that they had embarked on an enterprise that would destroy the institution of slavery either by their hands or the hands of their enemies means they had lost the war before it began in earnest. Strangely enough it was a general Ewell not a politician who did recognize this after first Bull Run. Those contrabands if freed could have been contributing to work important to the confederate war effort.
 
The failure to recognize that they had embarked on an enterprise that would destroy the institution of slavery either by their hands or the hands of their enemies means they had lost the war before it began in earnest. Strangely enough it was a general Ewell not a politician who did recognize this after first Bull Run. Those contrabands if freed could have been contributing to work important to the confederate war effort.

We have General Cleburne's proposal to thank for a clear eyed, unblinking analysis.

Essentially, it was free the slaves & independence was possible. Keep the slaves & both independence & slaves will be lost. Take your pick.
 
My question to you is what victory would have looked like? I have posted a link to the timeline of the Industrial Revolution. What kind of society would have existed in the Southern U.S. if chattel slavery lasted until the 20th Century?

If the demographics of South Carolina had proceeded unabated, the white population would have been (+/-) 10%, if that. Read more here.

Link:

Designated housing districts with nighttime curfews, conscription for all white males followed by militia service. Of course, there would be an exodus of slaves out which would ease any overpopulation problem. It's just a matter of controlling the flow out. East Germany faced this issue on one hand letting dissidents leave solves a problem, but you don't want too many people leaving to prevent damage to the economy.
So, to answer your question what of society, POLICE STATE.
 
I could indeed not agree more!

But I deem it relevant that (IMO) he had that authority not generally - because he was the C-in-C.
He had it only because the situation of the ANV had become hopeless on April 9.

Otherwise we all would have to be much more critical of him….
Agree. He had that authority regarding the ANV as its CO - as did Johnston, Smith, Pemberton, etc regarding their respective armies (the lunacy in a later war c January 1943 notwithstanding).
 
The failure to recognize that they had embarked on an enterprise that would destroy the institution of slavery either by their hands or the hands of their enemies means they had lost the war before it began in earnest. Strangely enough it was a general Ewell not a politician who did recognize this after first Bull Run. Those contrabands if freed could have been contributing to work important to the confederate war effort.

The Kaiser et al hadn't a clue that going to war in 1914 would put them out of a job. Who could possibly have thunk that?
 
Designated housing districts with nighttime curfews, conscription for all white males followed by militia service. Of course, there would be an exodus of slaves out which would ease any overpopulation problem. It's just a matter of controlling the flow out. East Germany faced this issue on one hand letting dissidents leave solves a problem, but you don't want too many people leaving to prevent damage to the economy.
So, to answer your question what of society, POLICE STATE.

What do you suppose already existed in South Carolina? There was no freedom of the press. Just writing about emancipation in a private letter could get you arrested. Penalties were draconian. Gangs of slave patrollers swarmed around the countryside. Some of them had vile reputations. Black Birding ( kidnapping for sale ) was an additional terror.

The 35,000 white men qualified to vote were jealous of their perquisites. Nothing that could remotely be interpreted as impudence was tolerated… that applied expressly to the poor whites who did not own slaves.
 
What do you suppose already existed in South Carolina? There was no freedom of the press. Just writing about emancipation in a private letter could get you arrested. Penalties were draconian. Gangs of slave patrollers swarmed around the countryside. Some of them had vile reputations. Black Birding ( kidnapping for sale ) was an additional terror.

The 35,000 white men qualified to vote were jealous of their perquisites. Nothing that could remotely be interpreted as impudence was tolerated… that applied expressly to the poor whites who did not own slaves.
As you go deep into 20th century you have more tools for population control. Advanced border infrastructure, internal passport control, CCTV and in the PRC a one child policy, all of those tools were available in the 1960s. I am aware of the controls we had in 1800s for controlling populations, South Carolina, didn't a native say it was too small to a be republic and too big to be an asylum.
 
I always thought just the same but then was puzzled to read quite optimistic letters of Southerners dating from as late as late1864.

Maybe it was decidedly harder then to get an overview over what was happening in a vast country as the South was. In addition: during the war the South continually experienced quite traumatic defeats and somehow always came back - and life conditions had become uncomfortable since 1863 - most were already used to.

Maybe there was that mixture of depressed lethargy, desperate hope and too less and mostly biased information that made a substantial number of people living just for the next day, always hoping to hear "Marse Robert" had pulled off the thing again and had delivered the Union another blow with another miraculous stunt.

The people cracking peanuts in the Confederate congess seemed strangely unaware of what was coming as late as 1865 (something one could also observe in the german and the austrian-hungarian parliaments as late as october 1918….)
I agree, few welcome the thought of their country's defeat and generally don't want to discuss it or admit it.

When discussing this particular subject, I try to differentiate the thoughts or attitudes of the so-called avg. citizen on the streets to differentiate from their lleaders.

I have viewed the confederate gov't singularly united on t issue of slavery and independence, i.e., moreso than the avg. citizen of the confederacy, their Congress and its leadership were much more committed to Slavery as the cornerstone of southern independence than even Jefferson Davis.
 
By April 11, 1861, the Confederate States had in practical terms already achieved their goal--independence. Sure, the north didn't acknowledge this independence, nor did the "international community," but so what? Those are just words. And the European nations would have eventually recognized Confederate independence, just as they had acknowledged Brazil's and Peru's and Mexico's.
A war could only end that independence. Which is why the CSA should never have fired on Fort Sumter. Why start a war when you can only gain 3 acres of ground even if you win? There's no upside to the Confederacy in a war.
 
By April 11, 1861, the Confederate States had in practical terms already achieved their goal--independence. Sure, the north didn't acknowledge this independence, nor did the "international community," but so what? Those are just words. And the European nations would have eventually recognized Confederate independence, just as they had acknowledged Brazil's and Peru's and Mexico's.
A war could only end that independence. Which is why the CSA should never have fired on Fort Sumter. Why start a war when you can only gain 3 acres of ground even if you win? There's no upside to the Confederacy in a war.
Exactly. This is why President Washington didn't go to war with the British despite the fact they refused to evacuate several military bases on American soil until 1796-13 YEARS after conceding American independence. As long as there was no shooting, the Confederates were winning.
 

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