Longstreet

[CSA Today]

True, there will always disagreement. But if "your" lying caused "my" lying then we're both liars. People believing some liars and lies but not others is a matter convenience and want. "I" want to believe "them" even though "they" were dishonest because their lie agrees with what I've be taught or told."I" don't want to believe "him" because dishonesty doesn't agree with what I've been taught or told. In the end, they're all just being dishonest to support what they believe, and the first set of dishonesty seemed to cause the second. Heck, if someone is being dishonest about me...fire brings about more fire.

I agree --I think.

 

[JerseyBart]

I agree --I think.

Haha.

 

[War Horse]

True, there will always disagreement. But if "your" lying caused "my" lying then we're both liars. People believing some liars and lies but not others is a matter convenience and want. "I" want to believe "them" even though "they" were dishonest because their lie agrees with what I've be taught or told."I" don't want to believe "him" because dishonesty doesn't agree with what I've been taught or told. In the end, they're all just being dishonest to support what they believe, and the first set of dishonesty seemed to cause the second. Heck, if someone is being dishonest about me...fire brings about more fire.

That's very true if you read most of what Longstreet was accused of lying about are statements he made that are defensive or boastful.

 

[JerseyBart]

That's very true if you read most of what Longstreet was accused of lying about are statements he made that are defensive or boastful.

Absolutely...lie about me and I'm going to defend the heck out of myself and make everything I accomplished sound so much better than it was, even if it was already a great success.

 

[War Horse]

Absolutely...lie about me and I'm going to defend the heck out of myself and make everything I accomplished sound so much better than it was, even if it was already a great success.

And great successes they were!

 

[JerseyBart]

And great successes they were!

For a foot dragging, turncoat, traitor against the south.

 

[War Horse]

For a foot dragging, turncoat, traitor against the south.

Who Cheered him at the Confederate reunion, (the soldiers) Who hugged him on stage at the confederate reunion ( Jefferson Davis). The lost cause boys didn't see that coming. Longstreet was his own worst enemy, if he had died after his wound in the Wilderness his legend would have been as great or greater than Jackson. He was a proud and stubborn man not to mention fearless in all arena's. Moving to New Orleans and proclaiming himself a republican during that time might not have been the smartest thing in the world to do but history shows both he and Lee were right. Put it behind us and lets heal as a nation. At the time sadly just not wise.

 

[JerseyBart]

Who Cheered him at the Confederate reunion, (the soldiers) Who hugged him on stage at the confederate reunion ( Jefferson Davis). The lost cause boys didn't see that coming. Longstreet was his own worst enemy, if he had died after his wound in the Wilderness his legend would have been as great or greater than Jackson. He was a proud and stubborn man not to mention fearless in all arena's. Moving to New Orleans and proclaiming himself a republican during that time might not have been the smartest thing in the world to do but history shows both he and Lee were right. Put it behind us and lets heal as a nation. At the time sadly just not wise.

I was kidding.

 

[War Horse]

I was kidding.

I know, just saw an opportunity to jump on my soapbox. Lol

 

[JerseyBart]

I know, just saw an opportunity to jump on my soapbox. Lol

A Longstreet soapbox is a good soapbox to be on.

 

[cash]

Pfanz demonstrates that McLaws was meant to attack first (McLaws wrote he received preemptory orders from Longstreet expecting him to have begun his attack before Hood even was positioned, which he argues was why McLaws division led the march and countermarch.) This would make some sense if Hood was meant to support McLaws right.

Hood being behind McLaws marching up the Emmitsburg Road makes the least sense of all. It would be akin to the disaster Sumner suffered with his stacked divisions facing the wrong way at Antietam (both divisions being struck simultaneously in full flank by Jackson).

And yet Longstreet positioned Hood in front once they got the attack going.

 

[War Horse]

I can't help but wonder if Lee had broken the center what would have resulted? The union army was very heavily positioned on both flanks. After sustaining such heavy losses what could they have done? Two mistakes were made at Gettysburg.(actually many) One was Lee not redeploying after day one. (yes they should have redeployed and forced the union to pursue) The second was Meade not pursuing after day three.

 

[War Horse]

Yes I know I am putting myself up to be shot down, but I happen to think Longstreet got a lot of bad press.
"Defense, Defense, Defense" Yet the man knew what future warfare would bring, trench warfare. I can't believe that his politics was the sole reason for his fall out with Lee, rather his truthfulness in what Lee should have done at Gettysburg. I am sure to be corrected but I hope we can have a Longstreet thread.

Klongstreet be very proud this is a great Thread. Thank you!

 

[cash]

Yes there was no question the reconnaissance was entirely faulty (I cant imagine a scenario where Johnston and co actually made it up LRT and returned with that report, given the large number of troops in the immediate area).

But my point is, that reconnaissance is only part of the decision making. Lee certainly knew that at best Longstreet couldn't attack before 11am or more likely Noon. In 6 hours, that report was sure to have changed.

The problem is Johnston claims he took the same route that constituted Longstreet's countermarch and crossed the Emmitsburg road directly opposite Round Top. He then recrossed even further south and made his way back on that side of the road. Which meant when he traced his path for Lee, it would have been apparent that he could not have seen any Federal line extending south from Cemetery Hill, because he essentially didnt see any Federals at all, and was in no position to see any at, near, or extending from Cemetery Hill.

Aside from this being difficult to reconcile given the presence of Bufford and Sickles at the time and places Johnston claimed to have been, it must have raised the question in Lee's mind- so where were the Federals? Clustering entirely on Cemetery and Culps Hill would defy all military logic (allowing themselves to be surrounded and pounded in mass by artillery etc).

There's a missing piece here. I suspect personally that there was a lot of missing information and discussion happening that morning that has escaped history. Johnston gives tantalizing hints by his refusal to discuss the matter after the war, which might indicate that information he provided was not exactly what history says it was.

Johnston wasn't where he thought he was. He was most probably further south than he thought.

 

[MBuehner]

Johnston wasn't where he thought he was. He was most probably further south than he thought.

Yeah I agree. If you read it one way, Lee and Longstreet seemed surprised Johnston had gotten to the roundtops without seeing any union troops (As they should have been surprised). Theyd seen elements of the 2nd corp arrive and go into camp on the round tops the previous night. They also so troops hastening up Emmitsburg Road all morning, likely they could have seen some from Seminary Hill or certainly Warfield Ridge the very moment they were meeting with Johnston. Even if by some freak his party slipped through between heavy forces of infantry leaving and more arriving, he should still have seen and heard plenty.

That was a great link btw, but the author (in my humble opinion) made two mistakes.
1) The Union line is flat out wrong, and anybody could have seen that from Seminary Ridge after daylight. His figure 9 diagram shows the line below cemetery hill extending southwest with the road. While there were skirmishers out there, and even across the road some ways, the actual line resembled this -Expired Image Removed Coster's Coster's brigade had been entrenching there since the middle of July 1st- notice his line runs almost south-east! Not south-west. The line continued as per my second image almost due south and by early July 2nd anchored at LRT. Lee couldn't see the entire extent of the line, but it should have been clear that it didnt extend in force down the road. And that although he couldnt see the 5 union corp, they were certainly on or behind Cemetery Ridge and not in front of it.
In reality, the line looked like this (my interpretation of Lee's orders):

So Hewitt said: "Longstreet was sized to hit the flank of one corps". Which is well and good, but he wouldnt be hitting any flank. My point is that there is no flank to hit and never was on July 2nd anywhere north of the Round Tops until Sickles moved his line up. There was a salient at the top, certainly, but neither Pender nor Rhodes was put into any kind of position to strike cemetery hill when Longstreet would have struck it from the Southwest. Lee may have expected to draw forces to Longstreet, but why would Meade march off his snug position dug into high ground to meet Longstreet in defense of the Emmitsburg Road that had no value to him? At best Longstreet would have hit approximately where Picket struck the following day, which is a solid line and not a flank.
Hewitt further says "and if counter attacked by a single reserve corps, easily defeat it as well." A rather flip answer for two division struck in the flank as Hewitt acknowledges was likely (see the map above), particularly since he alots Longstreet a paltry 20 minutes to emerge from the woods, change the facing of both divisions under fire, dress ranks and march a mile up the road with cannon afflicting his front and right flank. But the problem is, it would certainly be more than 1 corps. Elements of the II corps, the entire III corps, and the newly arrived V corps would be available to smash McLaws and Hood's right and probably rear.

This plan ONLY works if the federals, for some reason, decided to leave their left where it didnt need to be, and undefended. And Lee must have discovered by mid-morning that that flank simply wasnt where his plan needed it to be. I submit that some key information is missing in the Lee-Longstreet planning of July 2nd.

 

[War Horse]

Yeah I agree. If you read it one way, Lee and Longstreet seemed surprised Johnston had gotten to the roundtops without seeing any union troops (As they should have been surprised). Theyd seen elements of the 2nd corp arrive and go into camp on the round tops the previous night. They also so troops hastening up Emmitsburg Road all morning, likely they could have seen some from Seminary Hill or certainly Warfield Ridge the very moment they were meeting with Johnston. Even if by some freak his party slipped through between heavy forces of infantry leaving and more arriving, he should still have seen and heard plenty.

That was a great link btw, but the author (in my humble opinion) made two mistakes.
1) The Union line is flat out wrong, and anybody could have seen that from Seminary Ridge after daylight. His figure 9 diagram shows the line below cemetery hill extending southwest with the road. While there were skirmishers out there, and even across the road some ways, the actual line resembled this -Expired Image Removed Coster's Coster's brigade had been entrenching there since the middle of July 1st- notice his line runs almost south-east! Not south-west. The line continued as per my second image almost due south and by early July 2nd anchored at LRT. Lee couldn't see the entire extent of the line, but it should have been clear that it didnt extend in force down the road. And that although he couldnt see the 5 union corp, they were certainly on or behind Cemetery Ridge and not in front of it.
In reality, the line looked like this (my interpretation of Lee's orders):

So Hewitt said: "Longstreet was sized to hit the flank of one corps". Which is well and good, but he wouldnt be hitting any flank. My point is that there is no flank to hit and never was on July 2nd anywhere north of the Round Tops until Sickles moved his line up. There was a salient at the top, certainly, but neither Pender nor Rhodes was put into any kind of position to strike cemetery hill when Longstreet would have struck it from the Southwest. Lee may have expected to draw forces to Longstreet, but why would Meade march off his snug position dug into high ground to meet Longstreet in defense of the Emmitsburg Road that had no value to him? At best Longstreet would have hit approximately where Picket struck the following day, which is a solid line and not a flank.
Hewitt further says "and if counter attacked by a single reserve corps, easily defeat it as well." A rather flip answer for two division struck in the flank as Hewitt acknowledges was likely (see the map above), particularly since he alots Longstreet a paltry 20 minutes to emerge from the woods, change the facing of both divisions under fire, dress ranks and march a mile up the road with cannon afflicting his front and right flank. But the problem is, it would certainly be more than 1 corps. Elements of the II corps, the entire III corps, and the newly arrived V corps would be available to smash McLaws and Hood's right and probably rear.

This plan ONLY works if the federals, for some reason, decided to leave their left where it didnt need to be, and undefended. And Lee must have discovered by mid-morning that that flank simply wasnt where his plan needed it to be. I submit that some key information is missing in the Lee-Longstreet planning of July 2nd.

MBuehner, Thank you very through and a very good read!

 

[cash]

Yeah I agree. If you read it one way, Lee and Longstreet seemed surprised Johnston had gotten to the roundtops without seeing any union troops (As they should have been surprised). Theyd seen elements of the 2nd corp arrive and go into camp on the round tops the previous night. They also so troops hastening up Emmitsburg Road all morning, likely they could have seen some from Seminary Hill or certainly Warfield Ridge the very moment they were meeting with Johnston. Even if by some freak his party slipped through between heavy forces of infantry leaving and more arriving, he should still have seen and heard plenty.

That was a great link btw, but the author (in my humble opinion) made two mistakes.
1) The Union line is flat out wrong, and anybody could have seen that from Seminary Ridge after daylight. His figure 9 diagram shows the line below cemetery hill extending southwest with the road. While there were skirmishers out there, and even across the road some ways, the actual line resembled this -Expired Image Removed

You're looking at Cemetery Hill, not Cemetery Ridge. Longstreet started his flank march shortly after Capt. Johnston made his report. Apparently, Lee couldn't visually confirm what Johnston reported from where they were meeting. The sight lines do change along the ridge.

Coster's Coster's brigade had been entrenching there since the middle of July 1st- notice his line runs almost south-east! Not south-west.

Coster was on Cemetery Hill, not Cemetery Ridge.

The line continued as per my second image almost due south and by early July 2nd anchored at LRT. Lee couldn't see the entire extent of the line, but it should have been clear that it didnt extend in force down the road. And that although he couldnt see the 5 union corp, they were certainly on or behind Cemetery Ridge and not in front of it.

Quite obviously, Lee didn't believe that. You're going with information Lee didn't have at the time.

In reality, the line looked like this (my interpretation of Lee's orders):

That's not the information Lee had, and not the information on which he based his plan.

So Hewitt said: "Longstreet was sized to hit the flank of one corps". Which is well and good, but he wouldnt be hitting any flank.

He would if the Union line conformed to what he thought it was.

My point is that there is no flank to hit and never was on July 2nd anywhere north of the Round Tops until Sickles moved his line up.

Had the Union line been what Lee believed it was, there would have been a flank to hit.

There was a salient at the top, certainly, but neither Pender nor Rhodes was put into any kind of position to strike cemetery hill when Longstreet would have struck it from the Southwest.

Rodes' job was to demonstrate to hold defenders in place.

Pender was placed to the left of Anderson's division. Anderson had the best opportunity to take Cemetery Hill had Mahone and Posey been more aggressive.

Lee may have expected to draw forces to Longstreet, but why would Meade march off his snug position dug into high ground to meet Longstreet in defense of the Emmitsburg Road that had no value to him?

That's the beauty of an en echelon attack. You start the attack on one side. Those troops call for help. That means transfer troops to help them. Then you attack the next part of the line. Those troops scream for help. That draws more troops. Then you attack the next part of the line, and so on.

You transfer troops in order to prevent a breakthrough at the point that is being attacked.

By the time the attack gets to the opposite side of the line, the defenders are a mere shadow of what they had been.

Hewitt further says "and if counter attacked by a single reserve corps, easily defeat it as well." A rather flip answer for two division struck in the flank as Hewitt acknowledges was likely (see the map above), particularly since he alots Longstreet a paltry 20 minutes to emerge from the woods, change the facing of both divisions under fire, dress ranks and march a mile up the road with cannon afflicting his front and right flank. But the problem is, it would certainly be more than 1 corps. Elements of the II corps, the entire III corps, and the newly arrived V corps would be available to smash McLaws and Hood's right and probably rear.

Again, you're using information that was unavailable to Lee at the time.

This plan ONLY works if the federals, for some reason, decided to leave their left where it didnt need to be, and undefended. And Lee must have discovered by mid-morning that that flank simply wasnt where his plan needed it to be. I submit that some key information is missing in the Lee-Longstreet planning of July 2nd.

What you think Lee must have done is different from what Lee actually did.

Once again, the key information that was missing was the actual position of the Union line.

By the way, Bill Hewitt is a ranger at Gettysburg and has been over the ground thousands of times. He also used to teach ground tactics at the Army Command and General Staff College. He knows this stuff cold, and you can take it to the bank.

 

[MBuehner]

You're looking at Cemetery Hill, not Cemetery Ridge. Longstreet started his flank march shortly after Capt. Johnston made his report. Apparently, Lee couldn't visually confirm what Johnston reported from where they were meeting. The sight lines do change along the ridge.

I understand that- but how the lines laid out on Cemetery Hill would be dictated by how they were to extend south- either Southwest in which case they would mirror or the Emmitsburg Road, or sharply south if they were to continue down Cemetery Ridge. This is far from trivial as the former creates a straighter line and the latter creates a very sharp salient. Moreover there wouldnt be a flank to attack from the south.

Coster was on Cemetery Hill, not Cemetery Ridge.

Yes but it dictates how the rest of the line would be laid out.

Quite obviously, Lee didn't believe that. You're going with information Lee didn't have at the time.

Lee may not have had that at 7am, but he surely did by Noon (surely earlier when the morning fog cleared). You are correct that the sight lines change along the ridge, but the Emmitsburg is higher than the ground directly behind it (from Lee's point of view) everywhere. There were skirmishers at and across the road, but no heavy lines of infantry digging in, no artillery positions. The alternative would be that the union placed their guns behind the road where they would shoot into the ground, which doesnt seem likely. On the other hand the 2nd and 3rd Corp should have become quite visible digging in where they actually were on Cemetery Ridge.
Regardless, they had to be somewhere, and if they werent adjacent to the Emmitsburg Roads, they were going to be somewhere dangerous for a force attacking up that road.

That's not the information Lee had, and not the information on which he based his plan.

Lee didnt have any information regarding troops on the Emmitsburg Road, aside from the skirmishers that had been in place since the previous evening. Johnstons party were far to the south and didnt seem to see any Federals anywhere.

That being the case, Lee clearly made a wrong assumption (that it was wrong is demonstrable, that it was an assumption, well there isnt any other information on why Lee though the line was somewhere it wasnt).

My point was that Lee was reading the road network a certain way instead of the ground. On the 1st, they had watched essentially all the Union infantry march up the Emmetsburg Road all day. Without any info from Stuart, Lee had no way of knowing the Federals were spread out in a Napoleonic 'bataillon-carré' march to cover Washington and Baltimore, and hence would be converging on all different roads. It would be easy to believe the entire AotP would march together trying to mirror Lee and should be approaching from the same direction. Hence the Emmitsburg Road should be the key and the Federal line of communication. It would then make sense for the Federals to extend from their position from Cemetery Hill to try to keep the road open and link up with reinforcements. Thats a logical reading of the situation, but it should have quickly failed the eye test when no infantry was strongly posted on the Road.

He would if the Union line conformed to what he thought it was.

My point is, and has been this entire time, that Lee was wrong about the Union flank, and in being wrong seriously endangered the 1st Corps. Misreading the Federal line was one thing- but Lee never corrected himself throughout the day. As late as 4pm, Longstreets orders to attack 'up the Emmitsburg Road' had not changed, to Longstreets growing consternation.

Had the Union line been what Lee believed it was, there would have been a flank to hit.

True, but we dont tend to judge commanders on if their plan would have worked had things been the way they thought versus the way they were. It was Lee's responsibility to confirm his scouts reports. It was Lee's responsibility to consider the implications of his assumptions being wrong.

The bottom line is that if Sickles had not moved his line up, Longstreet would have attacked as ordered, found no flank, and had the Union 3 and 5 Corps attack his flank and rear, probably with disastrous consequences. Had that been the case, the argument that Lee wrecked his army based on a single report by a 20-something year old Captain from his staff would be cold comfort.

 

[cash]

I understand that- but how the lines laid out on Cemetery Hill would be dictated by how they were to extend south- either Southwest in which case they would mirror or the Emmitsburg Road, or sharply south if they were to continue down Cemetery Ridge. This is far from trivial as the former creates a straighter line and the latter creates a very sharp salient. Moreover there wouldnt be a flank to attack from the south.

Not necessarily, as lines can be curved.

Yes but it dictates how the rest of the line would be laid out.

Again, not necessarily.

Lee may not have had that at 7am, but he surely did by Noon (surely earlier when the morning fog cleared).

Surely? Do you have any evidence that he did?

You are correct that the sight lines change along the ridge, but the Emmitsburg is higher than the ground directly behind it (from Lee's point of view) everywhere. There were skirmishers at and across the road, but no heavy lines of infantry digging in, no artillery positions.

Once again, he didn't think the Federals were along the Emmitsburg Road. He thought they were between the Emmitsburg Road and Cemetery Ridge, which would put them behind the slight ridge that has the Emmitsburg Road on it.

The alternative would be that the union placed their guns behind the road where they would shoot into the ground, which doesnt seem likely.

Or that they would place them where Lee actually did think they were, between the Emmitsburg Road and Cemetery Ridge.

On the other hand the 2nd and 3rd Corp should have become quite visible digging in where they actually were on Cemetery Ridge.

Again with the should. Do you have evidence they were seen?

Regardless, they had to be somewhere, and if they werent adjacent to the Emmitsburg Roads, they were going to be somewhere dangerous for a force attacking up that road.

No. Remember that a division has a very wide front. Attacking up the road allows them to engage the force in its flank and then wrap around it.

Lee didnt have any information regarding troops on the Emmitsburg Road, aside from the skirmishers that had been in place since the previous evening. Johnstons party were far to the south and didnt seem to see any Federals anywhere.

Lee was going based on what Johnston told him. He knew the Federals were up there, and by Johnston's information they weren't in the vicinity of the round tops.

That being the case, Lee clearly made a wrong assumption (that it was wrong is demonstrable, that it was an assumption, well there isnt any other information on why Lee though the line was somewhere it wasnt).

Lee based his view on what Johnston reported.

My point was that Lee was reading the road network a certain way instead of the ground. On the 1st, they had watched essentially all the Union infantry march up the Emmetsburg Road all day. Without any info from Stuart, Lee had no way of knowing the Federals were spread out in a Napoleonic 'bataillon-carré' march to cover Washington and Baltimore, and hence would be converging on all different roads. It would be easy to believe the entire AotP would march together trying to mirror Lee and should be approaching from the same direction. Hence the Emmitsburg Road should be the key and the Federal line of communication. It would then make sense for the Federals to extend from their position from Cemetery Hill to try to keep the road open and link up with reinforcements. Thats a logical reading of the situation, but it should have quickly failed the eye test when no infantry was strongly posted on the Road.

You mean when no infantry was posted where they would be easy targets for confederate artillery on Seminary Ridge, which is why it makes sense they would be posted between Emmitsburg Road and Cemetery Ridge where they could easily react toward Emmitsburg Road yet be concealed from artillery on Seminary Ridge.

My point is, and has been this entire time, that Lee was wrong about the Union flank, and in being wrong seriously endangered the 1st Corps. Misreading the Federal line was one thing- but Lee never corrected himself throughout the day. As late as 4pm, Longstreets orders to attack 'up the Emmitsburg Road' had not changed, to Longstreets growing consternation.

Yes, he was wrong due to the faulty information. But had the information been correct, he would have been right.

Longstreet had the authority to change his attack if he got into position and things were different. He didn't do so, though.

True, but we dont tend to judge commanders on if their plan would have worked had things been the way they thought versus the way they were. It was Lee's responsibility to confirm his scouts reports. It was Lee's responsibility to consider the implications of his assumptions being wrong.

Would you have Lee send a second scouting party to confirm what the first one said?

Lee made his plan based on the information at hand and sent Longstreet soon afterward. Longstreet, as the commander on the scene, had full authority to adjust the plan based on actual conditions once he got there. He didn't do so, though.

The bottom line is that if Sickles had not moved his line up, Longstreet would have attacked as ordered, found no flank, and had the Union 3 and 5 Corps attack his flank and rear, probably with disastrous consequences. Had that been the case, the argument that Lee wrecked his army based on a single report by a 20-something year old Captain from his staff would be cold comfort.

Possibly with disastrous consequences, or possibly not, depending on how Longstreet reacted at the time. Whatever the result, Lee wouldn't have wrecked his army, as he would still have had two corps plus Pickett's division and whoever survived from Longstreet's corps available to him.

The point is that Lee made his plans based on the information he had available at the time, they were good plans provided that information was correct, and Longstreet had full authority to alter them if he got into position and found things had changed.

 

[MBuehner]

Not necessarily, as lines can be curved.

Especially if you werent concerned with the integrity of your line, as you seem to suggest.

Again, not necessarily.

Necessarily if you want your line to dominate the good ground south of Gettyburg, as opposed to the low ground.

Surely? Do you have any evidence that he did?

Yes. Anybody looking from Seminary Ridge would see it with their eyeballs. You've been there, you know full well Emmitsburg Road is prominent and obvious.

Emmitsburg Road from Seminary Ridge

Not to mention the Union artillery was pounding away all day from Cemetery Ridge. That was probably a clue.

Once again, he didn't think the Federals were along the Emmitsburg Road. He thought they were between the Emmitsburg Road and Cemetery Ridge, which would put them behind the slight ridge that has the Emmitsburg Road on it.

Why in gods name would anyone do that? He couldn't see them so he decided they must be on the low ground between two ridges with their flank in the air?

Or that they would place them where Lee actually did think they were, between the Emmitsburg Road and Cemetery Ridge.

Which, besides being militarily nonsense, would also make McLaws orders to put his division "astride" Emmitsburg Road... odd to say the least. More than half his force would have nothing to shoot at. Same with Hood if he was to follow directly behind as you suggested.

Again with the should. Do you have evidence they were seen?

They saw them on July 3rd and shelled them for 2 hours straight. Im curious how they possibly didnt see them in the same place at the hour of the day, the day before? Because thats where they were.

No. Remember that a division has a very wide front. Attacking up the road allows them to engage the force in its flank and then wrap around it.

The idea of intentionally offering your flank and rear to an enemy because you could potentially twist your formation in a knot to counter it is beneath response.

Lee was going based on what Johnston told him. He knew the Federals were up there, and by Johnston's information they weren't in the vicinity of the round tops.

Thats my point, he was going by the process of elimination. But there was many other possibilities... and we know that to be a fact because in reality they were at another possibility, a militarily logical possibility.

Lee based his view on what Johnston reported.

Lee based his view on what Johnston didnt see, and used it to base assumptions on what Johnston was not positioned to see one way or the other. And apparently didn't follow up on it. That is straight up negligence if true.

You mean when no infantry was posted where they would be easy targets for confederate artillery on Seminary Ridge, which is why it makes sense they would be posted between Emmitsburg Road and Cemetery Ridge where they could easily react toward Emmitsburg Road yet be concealed from artillery on Seminary Ridge.

Remember all those times in the war where the Union artillery stayed under cover out of fear of Confederate artillery... instead of ripping them to shreds? Me neither.

Yes, he was wrong due to the faulty information. But had the information been correct, he would have been right.

Sure. By that definition every military commander that ever lived was a success.

Longstreet had the authority to change his attack if he got into position and things were different. He didn't do so, though.

Within the scope of his orders he did. He still had to carry out the spirit of the orders. He couldnt, say, not attack at all. Or disengage his divisions and send them to flank the Round Tops instead of up Emmitsburg Road.

Would you have Lee send a second scouting party to confirm what the first one said?

Uh, i'd have scouts scouring those position from dawn to dusk, as any commander would. I'd certainly have my staff climbing trees and reporting back positions, and be reading the dispatches coming from all the generals already posted on Seminary Ridge looking across at the actual enemy. Which is one of the reasons I proposed there is a lot of missing information here. The alternative being Lee relied on a scounting report from 2 officers at 5am in the morning to plan an attack that couldnt have been carried out for many hours against an enemy known to be due to arrive, and visible arriving in large force. Thats not Robert E Lee.

Lee made his plan based on the information at hand and sent Longstreet soon afterward. Longstreet, as the commander on the scene, had full authority to adjust the plan based on actual conditions once he got there. He didn't do so, though.

He did. He was ordered to attack up Emmetsburg Road as part of a timing operation involving the entire ANV. That being physically impossible, and despite protests of his commanders to break orders completely, Longstreet pushed the enemy off Emmitsburg Road via an en echelon , broke them enough that the next unit in line, Anderson, was actually able to potential roll up the Union force had they had the numbers. Longstreet improvised to save Lee's poor plan and it nearly worked... thanks to Sickles. What else could Longstreet have done to comply with his orders?

Possibly with disastrous consequences, or possibly not, depending on how Longstreet reacted at the time. Whatever the result, Lee wouldn't have wrecked his army, as he would still have had two corps plus Pickett's division and whoever survived from Longstreet's corps available to him.

The fact that Longstreet was skilled enough to potentially save his corps from probably the worst possible position a military unit could be in (engaged in its front, struck right and rear by a superior force while being dominated by artillery on open ground from 3 sides). is rather beside the point. Losing the 2 best divisions in the Conferederate army would certainly be a disaster, however you want to quantify it.

The point is that Lee made his plans based on the information he had available at the time, they were good plans provided that information was correct, and Longstreet had full authority to alter them if he got into position and found things had changed.

It was a dangerous plan based on negative information, not positive reconnaissance.
Longstreet walked out of the woods face first into a strongly posted Union Corp and his alternatives became crafting a plan of attack so he could cooperate with the rest of the army and obey his orders, not attack at all, or break his orders and go off on his own hook, I suppose flank marching in the face and view of the enemy out of support of the army to 'find' the rest of the Union army and fight them alone.