Especially if you werent concerned with the integrity of your line, as you seem to suggest.
Necessarily if you want your line to dominate the good ground south of Gettyburg, as opposed to the low ground.
Once again, lines can be curved.
Yes. Anybody looking from Seminary Ridge would see it with their eyeballs. You've been there, you know full well Emmitsburg Road is prominent and obvious.
Emmitsburg Road from Seminary Ridge
So then you have no evidence that Lee saw anything different from what he was led to believe by Capt. Johnston?
Not to mention the Union artillery was pounding away all day from Cemetery Ridge. That was probably a clue.
What's your source for the Union artillery firing from Cemetery Ridge before Longstreet began his march?
Why in gods name would anyone do that? He couldn't see them so he decided they must be on the low ground between two ridges with their flank in the air?
He had Capt. Johnston's report.
Which, besides being militarily nonsense, would also make McLaws orders to put his division "astride" Emmitsburg Road... odd to say the least. More than half his force would have nothing to shoot at. Same with Hood if he was to follow directly behind as you suggested.
Not at all. being on the reverse slope would mean that any confederates coming straight at them would be highlighted as they crossed the Emmitsburg Road. McLaws and Hood coming up the Emmitsburg Road would then hit them in the flank and be able to wrap around them. You don't think the unengaged troops would simply go straight ahead like unthinking automatons, do you?
They saw them on July 3rd and shelled them for 2 hours straight. Im curious how they possibly didnt see them in the same place at the hour of the day, the day before? Because thats where they were.
So then you have no evidence they were seen on July 2 before Longstreet left on his march?
The idea of intentionally offering your flank and rear to an enemy because you could potentially twist your formation in a knot to counter it is beneath response.
Especially since that's not what I claimed. When you're ready to discuss what I actually said, let me know.
Thats my point, he was going by the process of elimination. But there was many other possibilities... and we know that to be a fact because in reality they were at another possibility, a militarily logical possibility.
No, he was going by the information he was given. Capt. Johnston was a very capable engineering officer, and Lee had no reason to disbelieve him.
Lee based his view on what Johnston didnt see, and used it to base assumptions on what Johnston was not positioned to see one way or the other. And apparently didn't follow up on it. That is straight up negligence if true.
Once again, you would have him send another reconnaissance mission out to verify his first reconnaissance mission?
Remember all those times in the war where the Union artillery stayed under cover out of fear of Confederate artillery... instead of ripping them to shreds? Me neither.
Apparently you've never heard of counterbattery fire. You don't put your artillery batteries where they are sitting ducks.
Sure. By that definition every military commander that ever lived was a success.
Still, we're talking about the plan he made, which was a good plan based on what he knew at the time.
Within the scope of his orders he did. He still had to carry out the spirit of the orders. He couldnt, say, not attack at all. Or disengage his divisions and send them to flank the Round Tops instead of up Emmitsburg Road.
I disagree completely. Longstreet was the commander on scene and he had the authority to make any changes that were necessary based on what he saw when he got there. Of course, he couldn't lie to Lee and say that when he got there the Federals were entrenched all over the place and too strong to attack, but he had full authority to send Hood around the round tops based on the changed situation of finding the Federals there.
Uh, i'd have scouts scouring those position from dawn to dusk, as any commander would.
Not any smart commander, because the more people you have there, the greater the chance of their being seen or even captured, and Lee wanted to use the element of surprise.
I'd certainly have my staff climbing trees and reporting back positions,
Doesn't seem to have been a popular thing to do in the war for anyone.
and be reading the dispatches coming from all the generals already posted on Seminary Ridge looking across at the actual enemy.
They seem to have been busy doing other things like taking care of their troops, making sure their ammunition was ready, etc.
Which is one of the reasons I proposed there is a lot of missing information here. The alternative being Lee relied on a scounting report from 2 officers at 5am in the morning to plan an attack that couldnt have been carried out for many hours against an enemy known to be due to arrive, and visible arriving in large force. Thats not Robert E Lee.
Apparently it is the Robert E. Lee who conducted a reconnaissance of the Mexican positions and came back hours later with the route to victory for Winfield Scott.
He did. He was ordered to attack up Emmetsburg Road as part of a timing operation involving the entire ANV. That being physically impossible, and despite protests of his commanders to break orders completely, Longstreet pushed the enemy off Emmitsburg Road via an en echelon , broke them enough that the next unit in line, Anderson, was actually able to potential roll up the Union force had they had the numbers. Longstreet improvised to save Lee's poor plan and it nearly worked... thanks to Sickles. What else could Longstreet have done to comply with his orders?
He could have sent Hood around Little Round Top after he realized there were troops in the area.
The fact that Longstreet was skilled enough to potentially save his corps from probably the worst possible position a military unit could be in (engaged in its front, struck right and rear by a superior force while being dominated by artillery on open ground from 3 sides). is rather beside the point. Losing the 2 best divisions in the Conferederate army would certainly be a disaster, however you want to quantify it.
You misstate the position he would have been in. Losing parts of two divisions out of nine divisions is not a disaster.
It was a dangerous plan based on negative information, not positive reconnaissance.
It was a bold plan based on what Lee knew at the time.
Longstreet walked out of the woods face first into a strongly posted Union Corp
Strongly posted? In an area too large for the troops available with flanks in the air for two divisions? Okay, if that's what you think.
and his alternatives became crafting a plan of attack so he could cooperate with the rest of the army and obey his orders, not attack at all, or break his orders and go off on his own hook, I suppose flank marching in the face and view of the enemy out of support of the army to 'find' the rest of the Union army and fight them alone.
Well, I'm not a critic of the attack in the Peach Orchard. Longstreet did have the authority to send Hood around LRT, though.
That made it pretty much like getting to talk to Moses about his experience on the mount. He's a terrific speaker, and I learned some things I can throw in on Petersburg when I teach it....it's not my strongest battle, so this was just a wonderful opportunity. And I scored an autographed copy of the new edition of Petersburg Redeemed. 
and if a bullfrog had wings.................................!
Bringing the