Longstreet

[Rebforever]

The only one who criticized Longstreet prior to Lee's death was D.H. Hill who criticized Longstreet for his political positions (calling him a traitor to his people). Early, Pendleton, and the other "Lost Causers" didn't begin criticizing Longstreet until 1872 when Early made a speech that blamed Longstreet for the failure at Gettysburg (making up facts along the way) and, hence, the war. In the following years, Longstreet began to write his version, attempting to exonerate his name, not always being completely honest along the way.

Of course the "Lost Causers" were saying the same thing; they were all trying to shift blame from Lee (the Marble Man) to Longstreet.

R

General Lee didn't need the blame placed on him. He had already said it was his fault and offered his resignation.
There were quite a few of the people around Longstreet as well as Early that said the same thing. I know Longstreet
lied in his book for whatever reason and I am sure it was to counter those that blamed him for the Gettysburg loss.
His demeanor was so different at Gettysburg and acted like a spoiled brat. I don't lay the loss all on Longstreet
but his behavior interfered with Lee's orders enough better things could have happened if he was himself.

Now one can learn something from those "lost causers" if they are compared with each other for honest evaluation.
Those books all say Longstreet didn't do his job as I Corp General at Gettysburg. Something today's writers also say.

 

[FarawayFriend]

There's much to agree with here, but I think that rather than having a better understanding of the Federal position, Longstreet actually had a poorer understanding of the scouting reports than Lee had. Since the scouting reports were inaccurate, then Lee's understanding of the Federal position, was inaccurate.

Also, the idea behind the attack as it was made was to siphon off defenders from Cemetery Hill, thereby making it ripe for the picking. Had Posey and Mahone--especially Mahone--been more aggressive they had a great opportunity to capture Cemetery Hill.

Cash, once again I have to reveal my ignorance and have to ask you for more details so that I hopefully might learn a bit more.

What were the scouting reports Lee had and Longstreet did not? I always thought that Lee was complaining because he had no reports about the Federal position, the strength of the enemy etc. because JEB Stuart failed to report properly? And if he had superior knowledge over Longstreet, hadn't it been proper to share this knowledge with his second in command if it was so important? Or do you think they did share what information was brought in but interpreted it differently? Then again I think that Lee "had the poorer understanding" because his plan did not work out (and could not - given the Union position, that famous "fishhook" line, which enabled them to shift troops easily to where they were needed) whereas Longstreet doubted from the beginning that the plan could be successful.
(And btw meanwhile I have not only read "Killer Angels" ...)

 

[rpkennedy]

General Lee didn't need the blame placed on him. He had already said it was his fault and offered his resignation.
There were quite a few of the people around Longstreet as well as Early that said the same thing. I know Longstreet
lied in his book for whatever reason and I am sure it was to counter those that blamed him for the Gettysburg loss.
His demeanor was so different at Gettysburg and acted like a spoiled brat. I don't lay the loss all on Longstreet
but his behavior interfered with Lee's orders enough better things could have happened if he was himself.

Now one can learn something from those "lost causers" if they are compared with each other for honest evaluation.
Those books all say Longstreet didn't do his job as I Corp General at Gettysburg. Something today's writers also say.

Of course Lee needed to take the blame for Gettysburg. And yet, the "Lost Causers" spun their yarns in an attempt to cast blame somewhere else and Longstreet became a target with his unpopularity in much of the South.

What can one learn from the "Lost Causers"? Longstreet followed Lee's orders and did some of the best fighting of the war at Gettysburg.

R

 

[Rebforever]

Oh, really? Please check out the foot notes as they are not lost causers.

"
There was never any question that Longstreet would stay in his place at the head of the First Corps after Gettysburg--after all, he was the only experienced corps commander Lee had. Lee's "Old War Horse" would be with his chief at the surrender at Appomattox. However, Longstreet's conduct at Gettysburg would be a remain a subject of heated controversy. According to Moxley Sorrel, "There was apparent apathy in his movements. They lacked the fire and point of his usual bearing on the battlefield." Lafayette McLaws wrote that "during the engagement he was very excited giving contradictory orders to everyone, and was exceedingly overbearing. I consider him a humbug--a man of small capacity, very obstinate, not at all achivalrous, exceedingly conceited, and totally selfish." When the opportunity had presented itself, Lee had sought to win the war with one aggressive stroke. Longstreet, in the meantime, carried to Gettysburg the memory of the easy victory at Fredericksburg, and it had hardened into a psychological block: He could not execute Lee's orders with the required celerity when they ran counter to his idea of the right way to fight a battle."

http://www.rocemabra.com/~roger/tagg/generals/general41.html

 

[CSA Today]

So in defending himself from multiple dishonest attacks, Longstreet was also dishonest. Yet...only Longstreet's dishonesty gets complained about by some. How convenient.

There will always be disagreement in historical discourse, the Longstreet blame controversy is not unlike the question of whether Grant was a butcher of his own men – many say yes, others say no.

 

[rpkennedy]

Oh, really? Please check out the foot notes as they are not lost causers.

"
There was never any question that Longstreet would stay in his place at the head of the First Corps after Gettysburg--after all, he was the only experienced corps commander Lee had. Lee's "Old War Horse" would be with his chief at the surrender at Appomattox. However, Longstreet's conduct at Gettysburg would be a remain a subject of heated controversy. According to Moxley Sorrel, "There was apparent apathy in his movements. They lacked the fire and point of his usual bearing on the battlefield." Lafayette McLaws wrote that "during the engagement he was very excited giving contradictory orders to everyone, and was exceedingly overbearing. I consider him a humbug--a man of small capacity, very obstinate, not at all achivalrous, exceedingly conceited, and totally selfish." When the opportunity had presented itself, Lee had sought to win the war with one aggressive stroke. Longstreet, in the meantime, carried to Gettysburg the memory of the easy victory at Fredericksburg, and it had hardened into a psychological block: He could not execute Lee's orders with the required celerity when they ran counter to his idea of the right way to fight a battle."

http://www.rocemabra.com/~roger/tagg/generals/general41.html

Longstreet wasn't enthusiastic about the attacks, says Sorrel. That's not shocking and Longstreet made it pretty clear that he was not.

McLaws' writings have to be taken with a grain of salt because of their falling out.

And yet, with apparent apathy, Longstreet and his 2 divisions do some of the hardest fighting of the war, wrecking one corps and seriously damaging elements of 2 more (Caldwell's Division of the Second and Barnes and Ayres' Divisions of the Fifth). Not bad for someone off of his game.

After all, he got his men where they needed to be and attacked with ferocity and determination unlike some others. *cough* A.P. Hill *cough*

R

 

[Jamieva]

Longstreet wasn't enthusiastic about the attacks, says Sorrel. That's not shocking and Longstreet made it pretty clear that he was not.

McLaws' writings have to be taken with a grain of salt because of their falling out.

And yet, with apparent apathy, Longstreet and his 2 divisions do some of the hardest fighting of the war, wrecking one corps and seriously damaging elements of 2 more (Caldwell's Division of the Second and Barnes and Ayres' Divisions of the Fifth). Not bad for someone off of his game.

After all, he got his men where they needed to be and attacked with ferocity and determination unlike some others. *cough* A.P. Hill *cough*

R

That was not Hill's responsibility, Lee assigned Anderson to Longstreet for the July 2 attack. Hill was completely out of the picture.

 

[rpkennedy]

That was not Hill's responsibility, Lee assigned Anderson to Longstreet for the July 2 attack. Hill was completely out of the picture.

I'm not strictly referring to Anderson. When Pender went down as he was preparing his men to make the attack, Hill does nothing to help that situation (either personally or by delegating). Hill was an empty suit at Gettysburg.

R

 

[Jamieva]

I'm not strictly referring to Anderson. When Pender went down as he was preparing his men to make the attack, Hill does nothing to help that situation (either personally or by delegating). Hill was an empty suit at Gettysburg.

R

That was the beginning of the illnesses affecting his ability to perform his command role. iirc he was in bed basically when Lee rode up on July 1 and really had not much idea what was going on.

 

[cash]

Cash, once again I have to reveal my ignorance and have to ask you for more details so that I hopefully might learn a bit more.

What were the scouting reports Lee had and Longstreet did not? I always thought that Lee was complaining because he had no reports about the Federal position, the strength of the enemy etc. because JEB Stuart failed to report properly? And if he had superior knowledge over Longstreet, hadn't it been proper to share this knowledge with his second in command if it was so important? Or do you think they did share what information was brought in but interpreted it differently? Then again I think that Lee "had the poorer understanding" because his plan did not work out (and could not - given the Union position, that famous "fishhook" line, which enabled them to shift troops easily to where they were needed) whereas Longstreet doubted from the beginning that the plan could be successful.
(And btw meanwhile I have not only read "Killer Angels" ...)

They both had the same report from Capt. Johnston. I think Lee understood that report better than Longstreet did, but it was flawed because Johnston didn't get where he thought he got and thus he missed a lot of Union troops. Lee thought the Federal line ended 50-100 yards in front of where the Pennsylvania Memorial is today, which if it was accurate meant that sending an attack up the Emmitsburg Road the way he wanted McLaws lined up was an outstanding plan.

 

[FarawayFriend]

Thanks cash!

 

[MBuehner]

They both had the same report from Capt. Johnston. I think Lee understood that report better than Longstreet did, but it was flawed because Johnston didn't get where he thought he got and thus he missed a lot of Union troops. Lee thought the Federal line ended 50-100 yards in front of where the Pennsylvania Memorial is today, which if it was accurate meant that sending an attack up the Emmitsburg Road the way he wanted McLaws lined up was an outstanding plan.

Two things- the Pennsylvania Memorial is about a quarter mile east of the Emmitsburg Road, on Cemetery Ridge. If Lee believed there were Union forces at that place, they would have been on the flank of an attack up the Road. But your point is taken, Lee seemed to thing the Union flank was in the air along the road, perhaps stretching out to meet forces hastening up the Emmitsburg (which should have caused a bit of pause in itself, as those forces would end up in Longstreets rear following Lee's plan).

Second, the intelligence report was only part of the consideration. The topography or the ground was equally in play. Lee's plan just didnt make a ton of sense given the layout of the Emmitsburg Road. The plan was for McLaws to advance west of the road and Hood to the east. If you check the map, were you to walk straight up Emmitsburg road you would actually miss Cemetary Hill on your right. The road doesn't lead to the underbelly of the Federal position, it skirts it on the west. In other words, Hood would have slammed into the defenses, while McLaws missed them completely. He could have walked straight into Gettysburg town itself without tripping over a Unionist, while Hood would have had any Union forces south of Culps Hill and SE of Cemetery Hill (not to mention any reinforcements hastening up) directly on his flank or rear.

Either there was a good deal more to the plan that is lost to history, or Lee misread the maps, or Lee was spitballing a bit knowing well that by the time Longstreet deployed the situation on the ground would have changed regardless. Certainly the heart of the plan remained, to strike the flank and ultimately storm Cemetery Hill. But Lee didn't seem to take in that the line Meade originally laid made that plan impossible since the line was much further east and anchored on the Round Tops. There was no choice but to attack east, because that was where the enemy was. So either Longstreet really was entirely confused, or else he relied more looking at the map and the roads system than the scouts report and would have had to figure that aligning his divisions facing north would expose them to the east and south, where the danger lay.

 

[MBuehner]

That was not Hill's responsibility, Lee assigned Anderson to Longstreet for the July 2 attack. Hill was completely out of the picture.

I don't believe this is correct. 3rd Corp units were assigned to Longstreet on the 3rd, certainly, but i'm fairly certain Anderson was not placed under Longstreets command on the second. In fact both Anderson and Pender were scheduled to attack, so it wouldn't make much sense to assign one but not the other. As far as i can recall, all of the conversations between Lee and Longstreet were related to his two divisions on the field at the time.

 

[MBuehner]

Stick around, we need more who think like you around here. In all seriousness thank you for your post.

Thank you for the warm welcome! Great to find like minded folks

 

[cash]

Two things- the Pennsylvania Memorial is about a quarter mile east of the Emmitsburg Road, on Cemetery Ridge. If Lee believed there were Union forces at that place, they would have been on the flank of an attack up the Road. But your point is taken, Lee seemed to thing the Union flank was in the air along the road, perhaps stretching out to meet forces hastening up the Emmitsburg (which should have caused a bit of pause in itself, as those forces would end up in Longstreets rear following Lee's plan).

Again, about 100 yards in front of the Pennsylvania Memorial, not at the Pennsylvania Memorial, which puts an attacking force coming up the Emmitsburg Road on their flank. Remember that an attacking division would have a very broad front.

Second, the intelligence report was only part of the consideration. The topography or the ground was equally in play. Lee's plan just didnt make a ton of sense given the layout of the Emmitsburg Road. The plan was for McLaws to advance west of the road and Hood to the east. If you check the map, were you to walk straight up Emmitsburg road you would actually miss Cemetary Hill on your right. The road doesn't lead to the underbelly of the Federal position, it skirts it on the west. In other words, Hood would have slammed into the defenses, while McLaws missed them completely. He could have walked straight into Gettysburg town itself without tripping over a Unionist, while Hood would have had any Union forces south of Culps Hill and SE of Cemetery Hill (not to mention any reinforcements hastening up) directly on his flank or rear.

I've walked the ground. Lee's plan was for McLaws to follow Hood, with both on the Emmitsburg Road. The idea wasn't for Hood and McLaws to take Cemetery Hill. The idea was for them to draw defenders from that area to allow troops on the confederate left to be able to take Cemetery Hill.

Either there was a good deal more to the plan that is lost to history, or Lee misread the maps, or Lee was spitballing a bit knowing well that by the time Longstreet deployed the situation on the ground would have changed regardless. Certainly the heart of the plan remained, to strike the flank and ultimately storm Cemetery Hill. But Lee didn't seem to take in that the line Meade originally laid made that plan impossible since the line was much further east and anchored on the Round Tops. There was no choice but to attack east, because that was where the enemy was. So either Longstreet really was entirely confused, or else he relied more looking at the map and the roads system than the scouts report and would have had to figure that aligning his divisions facing north would expose them to the east and south, where the danger lay.

The problem wasn't with Lee, but rather with the reconnaissance.

This paper may help:

http://www.nps.gov/history/history/online_books/gett/gettysburg_seminars/11/essay1.pdf

 

[Jamieva]

I don't believe this is correct. 3rd Corp units were assigned to Longstreet on the 3rd, certainly, but i'm fairly certain Anderson was not placed under Longstreets command on the second. In fact both Anderson and Pender were scheduled to attack, so it wouldn't make much sense to assign one but not the other. As far as i can recall, all of the conversations between Lee and Longstreet were related to his two divisions on the field at the time.

Since Longstreet did not have Pickett for July 2, Lee gave him Anderson since Anderson was the most fresh of Hills corps. Longstreet had direct command of Anderson's division on July 2. Pender's division was in the attack on July 3.

 

[MBuehner]

Again, about 100 yards in front of the Pennsylvania Memorial, not at the Pennsylvania Memorial, which puts an attacking force coming up the Emmitsburg Road on their flank. Remember that an attacking division would have a very broad front.



I've walked the ground. Lee's plan was for McLaws to follow Hood, with both on the Emmitsburg Road. The idea wasn't for Hood and McLaws to take Cemetery Hill. The idea was for them to draw defenders from that area to allow troops on the confederate left to be able to take Cemetery Hill.

Pfanz demonstrates that McLaws was meant to attack first (McLaws wrote he received preemptory orders from Longstreet expecting him to have begun his attack before Hood even was positioned, which he argues was why McLaws division led the march and countermarch.) This would make some sense if Hood was meant to support McLaws right.

Hood being behind McLaws marching up the Emmitsburg Road makes the least sense of all. It would be akin to the disaster Sumner suffered with his stacked divisions facing the wrong way at Antietam (both divisions being struck simultaneously in full flank by Jackson).

 

[MBuehner]

Since Longstreet did not have Pickett for July 2, Lee gave him Anderson since Anderson was the most fresh of Hills corps. Longstreet had direct command of Anderson's division on July 2. Pender's division was in the attack on July 3.

Since Longstreet did not have Pickett for July 2, Lee gave him Anderson since Anderson was the most fresh of Hills corps. Longstreet had direct command of Anderson's division on July 2. Pender's division was in the attack on July 3.

from General Longstreets battle report (July 27, 1863):

Previous to his joining, I received instructions from the commanding general to move, with the portion of my command that was up, around to gain the Emmitsburg road, on the enemy's left. The enemy, having been driven back by the corps of Lieutenant-Generals Ewell and A.P. Hill the day previous, had taken a strong position, extending from the hill at the cemetery along the Emmitsburg road.

Fearing that my force was too weak to venture to make an attack, I delayed until General Law's brigade joined its division. As soon after his arrival as we could make our preparations, the movement was begun. Engineers, sent out by the commanding general and myself, guided us by a road which would have completely disclosed the move. Some delay ensued in seeking a more concealed route. McLaws' division got into position opposite the enemy's left about 4 p.m. Hood's division was moved on farther to our right, and got into position, partially enveloping the enemy's left.

The enemy's first position along the Emmitsburg road was but little better, in point of strength, than the first position taken by these two divisions. Our batteries were opened upon this position, Hood's division pressing upon his left and McLaws' upon his front. He was soon dislodged and driven back upon a commanding hill, which is so precipitous and rough as to render it difficult of ascent. Numerous stone fences about its base added greatly to its strength. The enemy, taking shelter behind these, held them, one after another, with great pertinacity. He was driven from point to point, however, until nearly night, when a strong force met the brigades of Major-General [R. H.] Anderson's division, which were co-operating upon my left,
(emphasis mine)

 

[JerseyBart]

There will always be disagreement in historical discourse, the Longstreet blame controversy is not unlike the question of whether Grant was a butcher of his own men – many say yes, others say no.

True, there will always disagreement. But if "your" lying caused "my" lying then we're both liars. People believing some liars and lies but not others is a matter convenience and want. "I" want to believe "them" even though "they" were dishonest because their lie agrees with what I've be taught or told."I" don't want to believe "him" because dishonesty doesn't agree with what I've been taught or told. In the end, they're all just being dishonest to support what they believe, and the first set of dishonesty seemed to cause the second. Heck, if someone is being dishonest about me...fire brings about more fire.

 

[MBuehner]

The problem wasn't with Lee, but rather with the reconnaissance.

This paper may help:

http://www.nps.gov/history/history/online_books/gett/gettysburg_seminars/11/essay1.pdf

Yes there was no question the reconnaissance was entirely faulty (I cant imagine a scenario where Johnston and co actually made it up LRT and returned with that report, given the large number of troops in the immediate area).

But my point is, that reconnaissance is only part of the decision making. Lee certainly knew that at best Longstreet couldn't attack before 11am or more likely Noon. In 6 hours, that report was sure to have changed.

The problem is Johnston claims he took the same route that constituted Longstreet's countermarch and crossed the Emmitsburg road directly opposite Round Top. He then recrossed even further south and made his way back on that side of the road. Which meant when he traced his path for Lee, it would have been apparent that he could not have seen any Federal line extending south from Cemetery Hill, because he essentially didnt see any Federals at all, and was in no position to see any at, near, or extending from Cemetery Hill.

Aside from this being difficult to reconcile given the presence of Bufford and Sickles at the time and places Johnston claimed to have been, it must have raised the question in Lee's mind- so where were the Federals? Clustering entirely on Cemetery and Culps Hill would defy all military logic (allowing themselves to be surrounded and pounded in mass by artillery etc).

There's a missing piece here. I suspect personally that there was a lot of missing information and discussion happening that morning that has escaped history. Johnston gives tantalizing hints by his refusal to discuss the matter after the war, which might indicate that information he provided was not exactly what history says it was.