I'm sorry, but I have to point out that you once again contradict yourself. You say that Dana's first report, on September 23 "was of a severe rout of the AotC", and that his second report, a few hours later, refers to the situation as "our disaster". But then just a few sentences later you say that Dana's "dispatches turn negative around Sept. 27". I think most people would consider "severe rout" and "our disaster" to be pretty negative right from the start. However, the fact that Dana could still speak highly of Rosecrans, as you quoted previously, demonstrates that he had no agenda against Rosecrans, whatever other agendas he may or may not have had. He comes across to me as somebody trying to give an honest assessment of a complicated situation.
I don't see all that much difference between what Meigs was saying and what Dana was saying. Where Dana wrote about a "severe rout" and "our disaster", Meigs wrote of "the crushing of the right and center". I also note that Meigs doesn't call the battle a victory himself, he says that "the leaders" find it difficult "to abstain from claiming a complete victory". But one could have said the same thing about Hood after the Battle of Franklin.
Nothing I posted was from Dana's Sept 27th and later telegrams.
Here is a telegram from Dana sent the same day as Meigs':
[Hon. E. M. Stanton,
Secretary of War.]
Chattanooga, September 27.
A very serious fermentation reigns in the Twentieth and Twentyfirst Army Corps, and, indeed, throughout this whole army, growing out or events connected with the battle on Sunday last.
I have already reported that the generals of those two corps left the field of battle amid the rout of the right wing, made their way here with the crowd of fugitives, and went to sleep, while one division of each corps remained fighting with the left wing to the end. The generals of division and of brigade feel deeply this desertion of their commanders, and say, as I am informed on good evidence, for only two or three have spoken to me on the subject, that they can no longer serve under such superiors, and that if it is required of them they must resign. This feeling is universal among them, including men like Major-Generals Palmer and Sheridan and Brigadier-Generals Wood, Johnson, and Hazen. What is the sentimont of Davis I do not know, but I judge from his expressions on a kindred subject that he must agree with the others.
Of course this is a matter which I cannot directly inquire into, and cannot be so fully informed about as if it were an ordinary affair. The feelingin the case of McCook is deepened by the recollection of his faults at Perryville and Murfreesborough, and of the great waste of life which they caused ; while toward Crittenden it is relieved somewhat by consideration for his excellent heart, general good sense, and charming social qualities. Against these, however, is balanced the fact, which I can testify to from my own observation, that he is constantly wanting in attention to the duties of his command, never rides his lines, or exercises any special care for the well-being and safety of his troops, and, in fact, discharges no other function than that of a medium for the transmission of orders.
The feeling of the officers I have mentioned above does not seem in the least to partake of a mutinous or disorderly character; it is rather conscientious unwillingness to risk their men and the country's cause in hands proved to be so uncertain and unsafe. No formal representation of this unwillingness has been made to Rosecrans, but he has been made aware of the state of things by private conversations wi+h several of theparties. The defects of bis character complicate the difficulty. He abounds in friendliness and approbativeness, and is greatly lacking in firmness and steadiness of will. He is a temporizing man, dreads so heavy an alternative as is now presented, and hates to break with McCook and Crittenden. Besides, there is a more serious obstacle to his acting decisively in the fact that if Crittenden and McCook fled to Chattanooga, withthe sound of artillery in their ears, from that glorious field where Thomas and Granger were saving their army and their country's honor, he fled also; and although it may be said in his excuse that, under the circumstances, it was proper for the commanding general to go to his base of operations, while the corps commanders ought to remain with their troops, still he feels that that excuse cannot entirely clear him either in his owneyes or in those of the army. In fact, it is perfectly plain that while the subordinate commanders will not resign if he is retained in the chief command, as I believe they certainly will if McCook and Crittenden are not relieved, their respect for him as a general has received an irreparable blow. And that not from his abandonment of the army alone but from his faulty management on the field, especially in leaving a gap of a whole brigade distance between the divisions of Wood and Davis, and not providing for it till after the battle had become furious, when he attempted to fill it with Van Cleve's forces as I have explained in former reports. But for this gap General Davis thinks the enemy could not have broken his lines and routed the right wing. Thus you will see that here in the face of the enemy this army is in a dangerous condition. The officers who have taken this grave resolution are among the bravest and most discreet in our service. In my judgment the removal of Crittenden and McCook is imperatively required, not merely as a matter of discipline, but to preserve the efficacy, not to say the organization, of this army.
If it be decided to change the chief commander also, I would take the liberty of suggesting that some Western general of high rank and great prestige, like Grant, for instance, would be preferable as his successor to any one who has hitherto commanded in East alone.
I should add that Bosecrans himself intends to punish Negley for having withdrawn his division from tlin battle on Sunday without orders and with his ranks undisturbed, ho having been directed to post himself behind Baird on the extreme left; and all parties feel that Van Cleve ought to be relieved on account of his age, and the utter confusion of mind and incapacity which he manifested on Saturday and Sunday both.
C. A. DANA. [Hon. E. M. Stanton,
Secretary of War.}
One can believe Dana or Meigs. I have some quotes from Johnson, Palmer and Sheridan about Rosecrans.
You should also know that in the 1880s Dana did write to Rosecrans and told him he might have been misinformed and unfair.
Bringing the