Grant Lee Grant v Lee

Perhaps the best way to look at the issue of numerical superiority is this.

Did Grant's numerical superiority over Lee actually help him?

Well, we can first look at Grant's attitude towards having a numerical superiority. It's plan as day to see that Grant was pulling in more and more reinforcements pretty much as fast as he could get them, including the whole of 9th Corps, much of Butler's Army of the James and tens of thousands of troops from Washington.

So Grant thought he needed those troops, and either he was right or he was wrong.


If he was right, then, well, Grant's numerical superiority over Lee was significant to how the campaign turned out. Job done.

If however, Grant was wrong and didn't need those troops, then he needlessly endangered Washington (which came close to being taken by Early, and it was only reinforcements rushed to Washington which prevented the peril).
 
He never had such a disparity in numbers against either man, though.

For example, in terms of the number of men who had been in Grant's army (including those who had become casualties by that date) in the Wilderness-Spotsylvania fighting, Grant had had 176,000 men by the end of Spotsylvania and Lee had had 66,140 (his first reinforcements arriving as he moved away from Spotsylvania). This is a disparity in the Wilderness-Spotsylvania fighting, counting the whole of both armies, of 8:3.
(Both numbers in Union regulation PFD).

Name another general who had 8:3 superiority over Lee in the same manner...
And maybe it should be regarded that the confederate cavalry was much weaker in 1864. And it should also be regarded that big portions of the South came under occupation just at the same time which led to much more soldiers going awol. Also the railroads in the South were pretty decrepit at that time.

I never understood why there was that high morale in the ANV at the beginning of the Overland Campaign - I read some letters where there was a common belief in victory depicted.

It doesn’t tarnish the abilities of Grant or the AoP to recognize that Lee did the utmost with his force in 1864....But I can also not detect any blunders of Grant, his flanking movements were cunning and the move over the James something nobody before even thought about as possible (as for some time Lee as well did not...).

There is just no need here to criticize one of them - both of them had evolved their typical “style” and formed their army into an effective instrument to support that “style”,
 
As Alfred C Young noted in his book Lee's Army During the Overland, the campaign strengths for the Overland campaign were 162,000 US versus 96,000 CS.
Dan, which of these statements do you think is incorrect:

1) The strength of the Army of the Potomac, PFD, when it crossed the Rapidan was slightly over 120,000.
2) The strength of 9th Corps, PFD, when it joined Grant's army was 20,000.
3) The number of reinforcements which joined Grant from Washington was greater than 44,000.
4) The number of reinforcements which joined Grant from Butler's army was 16,000 or greater.
5) The number of men who mustered out of Grant's army before he reached the James was less than 10,000.
 
Looks like the Lee defenders are retreating into overwhelming numbers and material arguments. That's not very original.
It's a fact of the campaign that Lee was heavily outnumbered; it's also a fact of the campaign that Lee came close to stopping Grant getting through the Wilderness. This says more about the strength of the line of the Rapidan as a defensive barrier than anything, though it's to Grant's credit that he knew this as well (his original plan not envisaging getting anywhere near the Rapidan).
 
Grant seems to also have read everything published in the US about the Crimean War.
From the start of the US Civil War he expected armored steam vessels to be a dominant weapon.
He was telegraph communicator from the start and defied even Stanton in claiming his own ciphers.
He was an early proponent of female nurses, sanitary commissions and better camp sanitation, as if he learned from the US Mexican War and the Crimean War.
And finally he employed a siege railroad with locomotives, just as the British had improvised in the Crimean War.
Grant's numerical advantage was telling in actions away from Virginia. At Atlanta, in the Shenandoah Valley and at Nashville, the US had the upper hand regardless of tactics.
But Grant was also not locked into a political struggle with Winfield Scott and was eager to complete closer of the remaining ports and no objection to a revolutionary result to the US Civil War that eliminated race based slavery.
 
It doesn’t doesn’t tarnish the abilities of Grant or the AoP to recognize that Lee did the utmost with his force in 1864....
I think the reason why looking at the numbers is important is that there's a tendency for people to assume that Grant was the only one who could have produced the victory by ignoring the extent to which Grant's force was larger than that given to other commanders. Hooker is the only one who has the same sort of force ratio at the start of the campaign, and he does mishandle it, but I have to wonder if Hooker's attitude to continuing would have been different if Hooker had had over 33,000 reinforcements close to hand.


I also think it's the case that if Grant had launched on his campaign with Lee deployed in the same positions as Lee was deployed in at the start of Chancellorsville, Grant may well have been stopped up and prevented from making contact with Fredericksburg. What this translates to is that Lee screwed up at the opening of the Wilderness compared to how he'd done in 1863!


From the start of the US Civil War he expected armored steam vessels to be a dominant weapon.
He did? Would you be so kind as to provide a citation? Understand I don't think it's implausible, I'm just interested what "from the start of the US Civil War" means in this context.
 
It's a fact of the campaign that Lee was heavily outnumbered; it's also a fact of the campaign that Lee came close to stopping Grant getting through the Wilderness. This says more about the strength of the line of the Rapidan as a defensive barrier than anything, though it's to Grant's credit that he knew this as well (his original plan not envisaging getting anywhere near the Rapidan).
Killing the Confederates was a dumb way to try to win the US Civil War. It was making both belligerents weaker and the possibility of peace was fading away as it happened. The Confederates had to be convinced to quit. It was the only way to produce a period of peace.
 
The greatest weakness of the northern armies at the start of the war was not its lack of military training and competence at the very top. It was the lack of military training and competence among the lower and middle ranks.

Every month that went on during the entire war the northern armies became more competent while the relative competence of the southern armies topped out in late '62 and probably started declining slightly due to attrition in the last year and a half of the war.
 
Looks like the Lee defenders are retreating into overwhelming numbers and material arguments. That's not very original.
How did the US achieve numerical superiority? Grant played a significant part in holding Missouri and Kentucky in the US and knocking a part of Tennessee out of the Confederacy early. But more importantly he realized that female nurses made more manpower available for fighting. The lesson of Florence Nightingale was not lost on Grant. More importantly Grant was always increasing his USCT regiments and improving their officers. He was free to take down slavery and Lee was not. Sherman was Grant's main lieutenant and Sherman also found ways to employ freedmen in garrison duty and in logistical work. Sherman also used the freedmen as pioneers.
Those were good developments. But Grant eventually convinced Lincoln and Stanton to create the massive cavalry deployments that ruined the south. Rhetorically penalizing Grant for convincing the US to use its financial advantage is a nice lawyerly trick.
There is a fascinating series of sketches written by a Sanitary Commission nurse who became an intimate personal friend of the Grants. Grant gave Mrs Livermore command (You are to treat her orders as having come directly from me.). Of a flotilla of transports that went north for vegetables to to save the Vicksburg besieges from scurvy. Both Grant & Sherman gave her credit for saving the army.
 
I think the reason why looking at the numbers is important is that there's a tendency for people to assume that Grant was the only one who could have produced the victory by ignoring the extent to which Grant's force was larger than that given to other commanders. Hooker is the only one who has the same sort of force ratio at the start of the campaign, and he does mishandle it, but I have to wonder if Hooker's attitude to continuing would have been different if Hooker had had over 33,000 reinforcements close to hand.


I also think it's the case that if Grant had launched on his campaign with Lee deployed in the same positions as Lee was deployed in at the start of Chancellorsville, Grant may well have been stopped up and prevented from making contact with Fredericksburg. What this translates to is that Lee screwed up at the opening of the Wilderness compared to how he'd done in 1863!



He did? Would you be so kind as to provide a citation? Understand I don't think it's implausible, I'm just interested what "from the start of the US Civil War" means in this context.
I read somewhere that he had to choose that unfortunate distribution of his forces before the Wilderness out of supplying and foraging problems.
It might very well be that he no longer could move that freely as he used to do earlier in the war - as eg. the landscape of NVa. (where he had to operate) was much depleted of supplies.
And weren’t there increasing problems to remount that made especially the artillery trains more cumbersome and more difficult to move?
Hence making an army of comparable size (as his of 1862 or 1863) just harder to handle?
 
Another naive idea: are the Seven Days and the Overland Campaign somehow comparable?
A superior force (in 1862 Lee’s) trying to drive the enemy with costly attacks from well-chosen positions?
 
Another naive idea: are the Seven Days and the Overland Campaign somehow comparable?
A superior force (in 1862 Lee’s) trying to drive the enemy with costly attacks from well-chosen positions?
It's an interesting idea, but I don't think it holds. This is because the basic concept of the Seven Days is a turning movement (a manoeuvre sur les derrieres) which is entirely predicated on using some of your force to hold some of the enemy's force in place to your front while the whole rest of your force comes in on the flank. Lee divides his force to seek decisive manoeuvre.

Grant in the Overland doesn't really do this. He could have done - one immediate example that springs to mind is the movement away from Spotsylvania, where he could have had two corps (5th and 9th?) in position to fix Lee while the other two move south to get at his supply lines - but he doesn't.

There are similarities in terms of the fact that frontal attacks happen, but in 1862 they're being done because there's no alternative; in 1864 there are alternatives but Grant chooses to attack first.
 
I read somewhere that he had to choose that unfortunate distribution of his forces before the Wilderness out of supplying and foraging problems.
It might very well be that he no longer could move that freely as he used to do earlier in the war - as eg. the landscape of NVa. (where he had to operate) was much depleted of supplies.
And weren’t there increasing problems to remount that made especially the artillery trains more cumbersome and more difficult to move?
Hence making an army of comparable size (as his of 1862 or 1863) just harder to handle?
The real problem to me is that all three of the corps are too far west. He certainly could have put a corps around Fredericksburg as there's a rail line there to supply from, at least as far as my understanding goes, and while he was worried about Grant making a wide turning movement west he missed the possibility of a movement east; if Grant does make a wide turning movement west Lee has more time to react to it, and the Union force has an iron need to connect to a safe line of resupply.
 
Killing the Confederates was a dumb way to try to win the US Civil War. It was making both belligerents weaker and the possibility of peace was fading away as it happened. The Confederates had to be convinced to quit. It was the only way to produce a period of peace.
...I've got no idea what your point is here, as you seem to be imputing to me a view I do not possess (certainly not in the post you quoted!)

It is interesting to notice though that the force Grant uses in the Overland is pretty close conceptually to the Strategy of Overwhelming laid out back in mid-1861 as the most certain way to produce a quick end to the Civil War...
 
...I've got no idea what your point is here, as you seem to be imputing to me a view I do not possess (certainly not in the post you quoted!)

It is interesting to notice though that the force Grant uses in the Overland is pretty close conceptually to the Strategy of Overwhelming laid out back in mid-1861 as the most certain way to produce a quick end to the Civil War...
I think Grant would have agreed with the propositon that the Overland Operation was not likely to produce peace, even if it was successful. And it would not have been peace at an acceptable price. But he was not a king or emperor, and in east especially political concerns topped military efficiency. Grant first, than Sherman, the even Sheridan began to write about the ghastly nature of these big battles and they began to seek another solution.
 
I think Grant would have agreed with the propositon that the Overland Operation was not likely to produce peace, even if it was successful. And it would not have been peace at an acceptable price. But he was not a king or emperor, and in east especially political concerns topped military efficiency. Grant first, than Sherman, the even Sheridan began to write about the ghastly nature of these big battles and they began to seek another solution.
I suspect the problem here is that you're starting with the conclusion that Grant (and his confidants) were somehow different and unusual, and then making grand sweeping statements about it.

But it should be noted by the way that military operations in reducing and destroying the active seat of a rebellion is a pretty good way of producing a state closer to peace than the one that came before, and while without reconciliation it's incomplete it's also pretty much a necessity to produce a complete peace under these circumstances. The South wasn't going to rejoin of their own accord no matter the deal.
 
No, you did not debunk anything. And people should realize that the numbers you and Sap come up with are debatable, and not written in stone. And your claims of the numbers are always skewed to elevate McClellan, and denigrate other generals.
Anything is nominally "debatable". Indeed, defending a hopeless assertion is very much a debate team staple.

However, when we analysed Young's numbers, we found he'd made too rather serious errors which reduced the nominal Federal strength by ca. 40,000:

1. He'd used a striped down figure for the strength of the Army of the Potomac which excluded men on extra-duty.
2. He asserted that 20,000 men had their term of service expire. Even if true, it would be totally inappropriate to deduct them. However, the numbers were:

2nd Corps: 1,280 discharged by an official return
5th Corps: upto 2,084 as recorded in various regimental histories, but these include men carried on rolls who were not with the army*, probably less than 1,800 actually with the army discharged
6th Corps: 998 discharged by an official return
9th Corps: 17 discharged by the regimental history of the only regiment whose term expired (79th NY)

* Specifically:

Pennsylvania Reserve Division reorganised into a brigade, discharging approximately 1,200.
The 9th Massachusetts muster list has 383 discharged, but not all will be in the field.
The 83rd NY history records that 92 were discharged in the field.
The 1st Maryland discharged 62, of whom not all were necessarily in the field.
The 14th NYSM discharged 132, ditto.
The 2nd Wisconsin had less than 100 remaining in the field on 11th May '64, and the residual non-veterans still had a month to serve. On 11th June the small number of non-veterans were sent home.

Here Young's assertion is unsupported by any evidence, and on seeing the (lack of) evidence it should be rejected.
 
Which is the issue. Young's analysis was focused almost entirely on the Confederate army, and indeed it's called Lee's Army during the Overland Campaign, not The Armies during the Overland Campaign, because that is his focus.

A similar error comes in for the Union army at Second Bull Run in Harsh's books, because his focus is the Confederate army and he uses numbers someone else provided. In this case it's less severe, but it's just that Morell's divisional effectives is given as 1.25 times the PFD instead of 0.8 times the PFD (which is the result of a maths error, someone got their factor the wrong way around). By finding the derivation of this number we can then assess whether the other numbers are correct (and they largely seem to be).

Young simply did something similar, which is use numbers where looking further at the derivation reveals them not to be quite what he presents them as (and, presumably, thought them to be).



Published sources are valuable, but we should be willing to look further into them instead of simply accepting something that happens to be printed in a source (even one which is otherwise very good). This means, yes, challenging numbers (including the ones I provide!) but then making a good-faith attempt to see if those numbers actually hold together and accepting them if they do. To dismiss numbers someone provides as "manipulated" without showing how they're manipulated is dishonest; to provide numbers without being willing to reexamine them if their citation tree turns out to be flawed is the same.
 
Dan, which of these statements do you think is incorrect:

1) The strength of the Army of the Potomac, PFD, when it crossed the Rapidan was slightly over 120,000.
2) The strength of 9th Corps, PFD, when it joined Grant's army was 20,000.
3) The number of reinforcements which joined Grant from Washington was greater than 44,000.
4) The number of reinforcements which joined Grant from Butler's army was 16,000 or greater.
5) The number of men who mustered out of Grant's army before he reached the James was less than 10,000.
I'm not going to get into yet another numbers debate. I'll go with the numbers agreed on by credible historians. That goes for the Overland Campaign, Yorktown, the Seven Days, Antietam, etc.

McClellan had opportunities where he had numerical superiority. He failed to exploit them.
 
I'm not going to get into yet another numbers debate. I'll go with the numbers agreed on by credible historians. That goes for the Overland Campaign, Yorktown, the Seven Days, Antietam, etc.

But how exactly do you decide who counts as a credible historian? "Credible" just means "believable", so on the face of it this means "I'll go with the numbers I believe", after all...

Young, by the way, gives those as (1) false (2) true (3) true (4) true (5) false. Do you agree with those assessments?
 
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