Grant Grant v Lee

[OpnCoronet]

He didn't really, though, because it wasn't the same army - in that it was much bigger. You simply can't separate that from Grant's success because Grant himself was the one demanding more troops, and indeed despite getting about half again as many troops as any other AotP commander ever had available Grant still wanted more.

Apparently I have more confidence in Lee than you do. I have no confidence at all that Meade, or Hooker or McClllan, would have survived the first weeks battles in the Wilderness.

Superior numbers meant little to Lee or he would have surrendered during the Seven Days when the ANV lost every battle but one.

 

[67th Tigers]

In any case Grant took the same army that a succession of previous generals was unable to lead to any success in Va., in 3 Years and drove it to ultimate victory in a little less than a Year after he began his Campaign, i.e., What 4 generals could not do with the AoP in 3 Years, Grant did in a little less than 1

The AoP may not have been on a par with the ANV in every aspect, but Grant made up the difference between success and failure for the AoP, in the only aspect that counts in war, Victory.

However, the conditions are not the same.

Grant was lavished with manpower. If you count all the men he used in the first two months of the Overland through early Petersburg campaigns it is close to 250,000. If you count all the men McClellan got to use April-June '62 it is around 120,000. In short, for every man McClellan got, Grant got two.

Similarly, the enemy army they were facing was smaller. If you count all the forces Lee used in May-June '64, including the Bermuda Hundred forces, it's around 100,000. The same figure for 1862 is around 125,000.

In short, for the campaign, Grant had a 2.5:1 manpower advantage, whereas McClellan was around 0.8:1, and actually outnumbered.

 

[wausaubob]

Grant appreciated the real lessons of the Napoleonic era, and reached the same conclusions as Carl von Clausewitz.
British naval superiority trapped Napoleon on the European continent. The French did not have enough logistical power to stay in Russia for long. And then Russian and Cossack cavalry shredded the French army that was able to escape from Russia back across the border.
In order for those lessons to apply to the US Civil War the last two blockade runners' ports had to be closed. The US railroad power had to be fully applied while the Confederate economy was dismantled. Finally large and very mobile cavalry expeditions cut off the Confederate retreat from Richmond and destroyed the last remaining industrial towns of the Confederacy.
Grant forced a full and final surrender. There was no need for a final follow up campaign in the summer of 1865 and there was no American facsimile of Waterloo. Had the US Civil War not ended with the complete destruction of the Confederate economy, and the final surrender of each Confederate army, its likely there would have been a second separatist rebellion.

 

[OpnCoronet]

Except, he didn't.

He kept trying to seize the initiative, but Lee generally outgeneralled him. Once Petersburg is reached, it is the Federals who are totally reactive, with Lee's dispatch of Early dominating the campaign. Grant doesn't make a serious offensive against Petersburg for about 8 months...

Not really, Lee was continually responding to the AoP advances all the way to Appomattox.

 

[67th Tigers]

I believe a bunch t of military history is in order. At the opening of Grant's campaign to destroy the A of NV, he initiated a multi faceted strategy. Sherman's March to the Sea was tasked with destroying Lee's lifeline to the Western CSA. Sherman's March north through the Carolinas was an extension of that strategy. The Capture of Wilmington & Sheridan's raid on the valley were also pieces of the strategic puzzle.

On direct contact with the A of NV, Grant ordered what modern military historians call constant contact. Whenever the A of the P made a lodgment in Lee's line, they dug inn& held the ground. At all times, no matter how hard Lees dug to secure his flank, the A of the P was dug in as close as possible. It was a bloody, ferociously violent tactic, but it glued Lee in place. The old days of the A of the P retreating back over a river & letting Lee free to take the initiative were over. As no less an authority than Gen Lee himself recognized, once Grant ordered the A of the P to maintain close contact, he had permanently lost the initiative & defeat was just a matter of time.

None of this is really true.

Grant did not want Sherman to march to the sea, but was simply unable to stop him. He wanted Sherman to send a portion of his forces to Mobile, and send the rest to reinforce Grant's own force. Sherman took 4 of his 6 Corps on his march, which prevented Grant from stripping the remainder. Indeed, the main reason he wanted Hood dealt with was so he could get his hands on 23rd Corps (who were ordered to Grant before Thomas had finished pursuit ISTR).

Grant's operational methods in the Overland Campaign were not what you suggest.

Grant had spelt out his plans; he would fight one battle in North Virginia to satisfy Washington, and then march to the James to link up with Butler and lay siege to Richmond via the Bermuda Hundred. The problem was Lee kept seizing the initiative by interposing his army. Whenever Grant tried to get round Lee to march to the James, Lee intercepted. Of course, eventually he did make it there, about a month after his timetabled arrival...

 

[Rhea Cole]

None of this is really true.

Grant did not want Sherman to march to the sea, but was simply unable to stop him. He wanted Sherman to send a portion of his forces to Mobile, and send the rest to reinforce Grant's own force. Sherman took 4 of his 6 Corps on his march, which prevented Grant from stripping the remainder. Indeed, the main reason he wanted Hood dealt with was so he could get his hands on 23rd Corps (who were ordered to Grant before Thomas had finished pursuit ISTR).

Grant's operational methods in the Overland Campaign were not what you suggest.

Grant had spelt out his plans; he would fight one battle in North Virginia to satisfy Washington, and then march to the James to link up with Butler and lay siege to Richmond via the Bermuda Hundred. The problem was Lee kept seizing the initiative by interposing his army. Whenever Grant tried to get round Lee to march to the James, Lee intercepted. Of course, eventually he did make it there, about a month after his timetabled arrival...

The correspondence between Grant & Sherman is a public record. The military definition of initiative & the one you are using are very different. "Lee intercepted..." is the definition of responding to an initiative, not taking the initiative. Grant was forcing Lee to respond to his moves not the other way around.

 

[OpnCoronet]

However, the conditions are not the same.

Grant was lavished with manpower. If you count all the men he used in the first two months of the Overland through early Petersburg campaigns it is close to 250,000. If you count all the men McClellan got to use April-June '62 it is around 120,000. In short, for every man McClellan got, Grant got two.

Similarly, the enemy army they were facing was smaller. If you count all the forces Lee used in May-June '64, including the Bermuda Hundred forces, it's around 100,000. The same figure for 1862 is around 125,000.

In short, for the campaign, Grant had a 2.5:1 manpower advantage, whereas McClellan was around 0.8:1, and actually outnumbered.

Lee had little problems from little mac or hooker with similar disparities in numbers.

As I have noted before, the AoP was an imperfect instrument for Union victory over the ANV, but with Grant in command it sufficed.

 

[Piedone]

I think you've hit on the reason that some of our European friends admire the more elite aristocratic generals like Lee and McClellan. They are more the European type.

Grant was quintessentially American.

I don't think that this may be the motivation especially as aristocracy isn't really an idea that is currently very much en vogue in Europe. In many regions it also never has been really popular.
Only monarchies could flourish after 1800 somehow when monarchs acted like presidents of state and displayed virtues of the middle class.
But the aristocracy with all it's fuss fought already in the Great War a loosing battle especially when it became clear that they no longer could compete in the military against military professionals.

I don't think that the Lost Cause-picture of Lee as an aristocratic chieftain is still relevant.

Both he and Grant were disciples of West Point and displayed a very similar, more scientifical (or at least intellectual) approach to warfare.
It might be just a question of personal likes or dislikes....or the old tag-team approach?

 

[jcaesar]

Only monarchies could flourish after 1800 somehow when monarchs acted like presidents of state and displayed virtues of the middle class.
But the aristocracy with all it's fuss fought already in the Great War a loosing battle especially when it became clear that they no longer could compete in the military against military professionals.

I don't think that the Lost Cause-picture of Lee as an aristocratic chieftain is still relevant.

Both he and Grant were disciples of West Point and displayed a very similar, more scientifical (or at least intellectual) approach to warfare.
It might be just a question of personal likes or dislikes....or the old tag-team approach?

Lee was born of the aristocracy, but he took to the Virginia middle class of the near backwoods variety fairly well to the extent he lived his last years among them. General Jackson would be case and point of that kind of middle class Virginian.

I don't know how well Lee would have taken to the real frontiersmen like General Forrest. I doubt it would have gone well. When it came to him and Jackson they could connect using biblical history, military history, historical battlefields (he went to some of them in Europe).

 

[DanSBHawk]

However, the conditions are not the same.

Grant was lavished with manpower. If you count all the men he used in the first two months of the Overland through early Petersburg campaigns it is close to 250,000. If you count all the men McClellan got to use April-June '62 it is around 120,000. In short, for every man McClellan got, Grant got two.

Similarly, the enemy army they were facing was smaller. If you count all the forces Lee used in May-June '64, including the Bermuda Hundred forces, it's around 100,000. The same figure for 1862 is around 125,000.

In short, for the campaign, Grant had a 2.5:1 manpower advantage, whereas McClellan was around 0.8:1, and actually outnumbered.

As discussed in other threads, these numbers are arguable. And McClellan definitely enjoyed clear numerical superiority on occasion. Yorktown and Antietam, for example.

 

[67th Tigers]

Lee had little problems from little mac or hooker with similar disparities in numbers.

As I have noted before, the AoP was an imperfect instrument for Union victory over the ANV, but with Grant in command it sufficed.

Except he generally didn't.

The largest armies the Federals gathered to operate against Lee pre-April '64 was Burnside's 122,009 PFD (10th December) which faced off against Lee's 78,513 effectives, and Hooker's 138,378 PFD vs ca. 61,397 effectives (rebel figures from March return) Burnside was roughly 1.5:1 and Hooker 2.3:1 (because Lee had sent Longstreet to Suffolk).

In fact, the only time the Federals really were outnumbered in the war was before Richmond in 1862.

As discussed in other threads, these numbers are arguable. And McClellan definitely enjoyed clear numerical superiority on occasion. Yorktown and Antietam, for example.

As discussed on other threads, you tend to exaggerate the numbers, for example by not counting reinforcements that arrived at Yorktown.

 

[DanSBHawk]

As discussed on other threads, you tend to exaggerate the numbers, for example by not counting reinforcements that arrived at Yorktown.

Pot, meet kettle.

 

[Saphroneth]

Apparently I have more confidence in Lee than you do. I have no confidence at all that Meade, or Hooker or McClllan, would have survived the first weeks battles in the Wilderness.

Superior numbers meant little to Lee or he would have surrendered during the Seven Days when the ANV lost every battle but one.

Eh? Lee did have superior numbers at the Seven Days...

And it doesn't work that way. You can't just handwave away that the general you think was better had a numerical superiority.

 

[Irishtom29]

Lee had little problems from little mac or hooker with similar disparities in numbers.

As I have noted before, the AoP was an imperfect instrument for Union victory over the ANV, but with Grant in command it sufficed.

Illinois man that I am I must still admit that at the end of the rebellion the Armies of the James and Potomac, with all new infantry corps commanders since May of 64 (Parke, Humphreys, Wright, Griffin, Gibbon and Weitzel) and Ord commanding the Army of the James, were perhaps the best armies of the war. Add to that their aggressive cavalry and Sheridan as a general *** kicker and kampfgruppe commander. At the end those armies were hard hitting, responsive and fast.

 

[Saphroneth]

Lee had little problems from little mac or hooker with similar disparities in numbers.

He never had such a disparity in numbers against either man, though.

For example, in terms of the number of men who had been in Grant's army (including those who had become casualties by that date) in the Wilderness-Spotsylvania fighting, Grant had had 176,000 men by the end of Spotsylvania and Lee had had 66,140 (his first reinforcements arriving as he moved away from Spotsylvania). This is a disparity in the Wilderness-Spotsylvania fighting, counting the whole of both armies, of 8:3.
(Both numbers in Union regulation PFD).

Name another general who had 8:3 superiority over Lee in the same manner...

 

[DanSBHawk]

As Alfred C Young noted in his book Lee's Army During the Overland, the campaign strengths for the Overland campaign were 162,000 US versus 96,000 CS.

 

[67th Tigers]

As Alfred C Young noted in his book Lee's Army During the Overland, the campaign strengths for the Overland campaign were 162,000 US versus 96,000 CS.

Yeah, and we had a long discussion debunking Young's Federal numbers. If you remember, you chose to ignore the fact that Young made several errors because you didn't like the result.

 

[DanSBHawk]

Yeah, and we had a long discussion debunking Young's Federal numbers. If you remember, you chose to ignore the fact that Young made several errors because you didn't like the result.

No, you did not debunk anything. And people should realize that the numbers you and Sap come up with are debatable, and not written in stone. And your claims of the numbers are always skewed to elevate McClellan, and denigrate other generals.

 

[Piedone]

Might it be that - above all estimations of tactics or strategy - it's simply the fact that Lee fared very well with restricted means in often uphill battles that gives him much credit?
Maybe there is just less glory in superiority?
And hence more people are willed to praise Grant's campaign in the West where the forces were somehow more equal in size?
Or is that approach too simple?

 

[wausaubob]

Looks like the Lee defenders are retreating into overwhelming numbers and material arguments. That's not very original.
How did the US achieve numerical superiority? Grant played a significant part in holding Missouri and Kentucky in the US and knocking a part of Tennessee out of the Confederacy early. But more importantly he realized that female nurses made more manpower available for fighting. The lesson of Florence Nightingale was not lost on Grant. More importantly Grant was always increasing his USCT regiments and improving their officers. He was free to take down slavery and Lee was not. Sherman was Grant's main lieutenant and Sherman also found ways to employ freedmen in garrison duty and in logistical work. Sherman also used the freedmen as pioneers.
Those were good developments. But Grant eventually convinced Lincoln and Stanton to create the massive cavalry deployments that ruined the south. Rhetorically penalizing Grant for convincing the US to use its financial advantage is a nice lawyerly trick.