I just gave a description of what I consider that it takes to be a credible historian. I'm done with the thread drift. This thread is about Lee and Grant. My point was that the numbers being presented as fact, are not. They are an interpretation, and should be taken with a grain of salt.
All right, then, here's the facts:
In the
final report of the war, the Secretary of War reported at that time the commencement of the Overland Campaign the AoP had 120,384 PFD, exclusive of 9th Corps. Humphreys, the AoP Chief-of-Staff, in his
1883 account disputed this figure and in an appendix the then adjutant-general (Drum) wrote explaining that this was the regulation strength according to the April monthly report, which was made out on 18th July 1864. Drum then wrote that the consolidated morning report for 30th April was on file, which was a document compiled at the time, not months later, and it said:
- Present for Duty: 102,869
- Present and on special, extra or daily duty: 19,095
- Sick: 4,756
- In arrest or confinement: 931
- Total Present: 127,471
This would mean the regulation PFD (which includes special/extra/daily duty, but not sick or under arrest) was
121,964, though
120,384 would also be an acceptable number.
9th Army Corps is on the final report and given at
20,780 PFD.
The forces which joined Grant from Washington etc. before he reached the James were given in
a statement enumerating
42,469 men. This may or may not be PFD, but it is a low estimate as it misses some known batteries which joined.
The force which joined Grant from Butler's army was given by Smith at the time (absent better information) as
16,000; two of the four divisions were
8,357 PFD on the 10th June monthly return.
67th has already gone into the details of the men mustered out, and how Young's statement for them cannot be correct.
This means that there is evidence suggesting that Grant had at least 120,384 + 20,780 + 42,469 + 16,000 (199,633) as part of his army at at least some point. We could also work with Aggregate Present, in which case:
AotP 127,471 (April 30)
9th Corps 21,357 (April 30)
42,469 men joined as reinforcements (assume AP here)
And Smith's divisions which joined Grant were 9,615 AP on May 31. Assuming the other two divisions were 8,000 AP, we get;
127,471 + 21,357 + 42,469 + 17,615 for 208,912.
The Army of the Potomac in March 1862 (including elements which did not go to the Peninsula) had a strength of 179,362 PFD and 191,171 AP; this return is a regulation return. The conversion factor it produces is that PFD is 93.8% of AP, producing a PFD from the above of 196,000.
Notably, converting the 127,471 AP into PFD with the above factor would give 119,600 PFD. This supports strongly the sense that the main AotP PFD upon crossing the Rapidan was more like 120,000 than 100,000.
Also note that the 42,469 number is
smaller than the number Young uses, by almost 6,000... using Young's number pulls the AotP's PFD strength up even higher.
Basically, for the 100,000 number (for regulation PFD) for Grant's AotP on crossing the Rapidan to make sense it would have to be the case that Grant took along something like 20,000 to 25,000 sick
at the start of his campaign.
What this means is that there is primary source evidence to the effect that Grant outnumbered Lee heavily, by more than 2:1 at the start of his campaign - and even using Young's numbers, as of the end of Spotsylvania Grant should have outnumbered Lee by nearly 3:1 on the field.
If this is not enough to achieve a decisive victory on the field - fine! But it means that we can't consider anyone else to not measure up to Grant unless they were tested under the same conditions.
Bringing the