Grant Grant v Lee

[67th Tigers]

That is an interesting thought. There was a BBQ for 300 people at the eternal spring a few blocks fro our house for Bell. A part of me wishes John Bell of Tennessee could have had a go at the office. By 1880, clinging to chattel slavery would have been risible... who knows what that would have looked like.

The sharecropping system, which replaced it, survived until the 1950's. Lincoln had predicted it would take a century for slavery to die out, and he wasn't far out if you take "slavery by another name" as still effectively slavery. It was the rise of farm machinery that ended this system.

The chattel slavery system would have been economically advantageous (to the owners at least) until at least the middle of the 20th Century.

 

[rbasin]

Simple "what if" for you. Give Lee the AoP in the spring of 1864 and give Grant the ANV and how do you see it playing out?

Same for those two. But I wonder about something like a Thomas vs. Longstreet, or a Sherman vs. Richard Taylor. Just spit balling here.

 

[atlantis]

Lee was unduly influenced by not only his fathers success in the war of independence but his own experience as part of a successful attacking force during the Mexican war. Time after time he over estimated the ability of subordinates to assume to know what he wanted done. He also over estimated the ability of exhausted poorly feed troops to perform. Grant won battles he forced armies to surrender, he took and kept ground, Lee did none of these things.

 

[edgeworthy]

The posts confirm my appraisal. In the US, Grant was considered a westerner and a hayseed, but not by those who knew him well. In the Napoleonic era, he would never have been accepted in the French alliance, and was nothing like a Russian aristocrat. He would have been considered Prussian or Polish, by both sides. In the Roman era, he would have been considered a half Romanized German.

Regardless of whatever titles they aquirred, and they all did, many of Napoleon's Marshals were men of humble origins. France's leading military academy is named for the son of a Tanner. Massena, arguably the best, had no formal education, Lannes little more. Men who became Kings (Bernadotte's Dynasty endures to this day) joined the army as Privates. Ney was as German as he was French. One of them was Polish. Napoleon himself was technically Italian.
Saying that had he been born into the Napoleonic era Grant could not have been accepted as one of Bonaparte's Marshals is questionable.

 

[BillO]

Same for those two. But I wonder about something like a Thomas vs. Longstreet, or a Sherman vs. Richard Taylor. Just spit balling here.

Longstreet versus Thomas would be very interesting as I see them being similar in experience and style.

 

[wausaubob]

Regardless of whatever titles they aquirred, and they all did, many of Napoleon's Marshals were men of humble origins. France's leading military academy is named for the son of a Tanner. Massena, arguably the best, had no formal education, Lannes little more. Men who became Kings (Bernadotte's Dynasty endures to this day) joined the army as Privates. Ney was as German as he was French. One of them was Polish. Napoleon himself was technically Italian.
Saying that had he been born into the Napoleonic era Grant could not have been accepted as one of Bonaparte's Marshals is questionable.

Thanks for the reply. Napoleon and France in that era would have been a particular problem for Grant. He would have been like a German who went to serve in the Russian army. His help would have been accepted, but he would always have been thought of as not quite Russian.

 

[rbasin]

Longstreet versus Thomas would be very interesting as I see them being similar in experience and style.

Both were hard hitters and smart. Neither got spooked in a fight

 

[OpnCoronet]

To me the main difference between the generalship of Grant and Lee was in their armies.

The ANV was custom built and officered to Lees specifications for the kind of war he was going to prosecute. The AoP was built to the specifications of McClellan to fight the kind of war he wanted to fight.

As in most wars the CW was determined by which side could impose their will on the other, on how their war would be bought. In Va. Little Mac failed to impose his will on Lee and thus his army was improperly trained led to effectively fight Lee on his own terms.

Grant found that political and military realities of 1864 precluded the necessary retraining and reorganization that he AoP needed. Fortunately the quality of the fighting men in the ranks of the two armies was not nearly as unequal as their leadership, i.e., Grant was able to essentially make up for the deficiencies of his senior officers and other inadequacies of the Army as long as the Army itself remained sound.

 

[wausaubob]

To me the main difference between the generalship of Grant and Lee was in their armies.

The ANV was custom built and officered to Lees specifications for the kind of war he was going to prosecute. The AoP was built to the specifications of McClellan to fight the kind of war he wanted to fight.

As in most wars the CW was determined by which side could impose their will on the other, on how their war would be bought. In Va. Little Mac failed to impose his will on Lee and thus his army was improperly trained led to effectively fight Lee on his own terms.

Grant found that political and military realities of 1864 precluded the necessary retraining and reorganization that he AoP needed. Fortunately the quality of the fighting men in the ranks of the two armies was not nearly as unequal as their leadership, i.e., Grant was able to essentially make up for the deficiencies of his senior officers and other inadequacies of the Army as long as the Army itself remained sound.

Grant most likely could never had won within the constraints of May to July 1864. But after that then US finally closed one of the two remaining blockade runners' ports. That allowed the US fleet to re-deploy to only blockade Wilmington and Charleston and then prepare for the attempt to end the blockade entirely by closing all the ports.
Then Grant severed the most direct and best RR leading into Petersberg, and Sherman severed the last remaining RR connection between Atlanta and the rest of Georgia and Alabama.
Once that happened Early had to try to remain in the Shenandoah valley to protect the harvest. He was unable to do that.
Therefore Lee's defense of Richmond/Petersberg, like A.S. Johnston's counter attack at Shiloh Church, caused huge casualties and degraded Grant's standing, but the cost was large. Mobile Bay was not adequately garrisoned, the counterattack against Warren's corp on the Weldon RR did not have weight to it to expel the US forces.
Hood was temporarily left blind in Atlanta. Not one part of Sherman's army, but all three groups made it to the Macon RR and Hood's divisions barely escaped.
Which all set the stage for Winchester III. The Confederates probably out fought the US forces at the tactical level and it did not matter.
Sheridan had a cavalry force that was going outflank the Confederates no matter what they did.
Lee was protected by Richmond and the Confederate Government. Everyone else had to pay the price for General Lee's success.

 

[67th Tigers]

Grant found that political and military realities of 1864 precluded the necessary retraining and reorganization that he AoP needed. Fortunately the quality of the fighting men in the ranks of the two armies was not nearly as unequal as their leadership, i.e., Grant was able to essentially make up for the deficiencies of his senior officers and other inadequacies of the Army as long as the Army itself remained sound.

Lee inherited his army from the forces of Johnston etc., and had to make do without the degree of artillery etc. he wanted.

McClellan's army was, again, that provided by his government. It lacked elements such as a large and efficient cavalry arm which he wanted. He made do.

You idea that Grant "made up for" his senior officers doesn't seem sound. Grant seems quite out of his depth when you look closely, and he was pretty much kept in the game by Meade, Butler and Warren.

 

[Rhea Cole]

Lee inherited his army from the forces of Johnston etc., and had to make do without the degree of artillery etc. he wanted.

McClellan's army was, again, that provided by his government. It lacked elements such as a large and efficient cavalry arm which he wanted. He made do.

You idea that Grant "made up for" his senior officers doesn't seem sound. Grant seems quite out of his depth when you look closely, and he was pretty much kept in the game by Meade, Butler and Warren.

I assume you are not aware that Grant was in command of the entire US Army. While he was busy defeating the A of NV, he was managing the March to the Sea, defeat of Hood's incursion into Tennessee & the amphibious attacks on Wilmington & Mobile. Like all the other generals in the Union Army, Meade et al did what Grant told them to do, not the other way around.

 

[67th Tigers]

I assume you are not aware that Grant was in command of the entire US Army. While he was busy defeating the A of NV, he was managing the March to the Sea, defeat of Hood's incursion into Tennessee & the amphibious attacks on Wilmington & Mobile. Like all the other generals in the Union Army, Meade et al did what Grant told them to do, not the other way around.

On paper, perhaps he was. However, the order appointing him to the office also ordered him to the field and that Halleck would exercise the powers of said office under SECWAR (the superior i/c) and GINC (the junior).

In effect, Grant commanded the combined forces of the Army of the Potomac, the Army of the James, and the sequestered Fort Fisher expeditionary force (i.e. 9th Corps). His actions beyond this are most continually asking for more reinforcements from Halleck, notably 19th Corps.

Grant was, of course, the senior officer in this army. However, to attempt to credit the achievements of Sherman, Sheridan, Thomas etc. to Grant by dint of rank seems rather disingenuous. Grant had less to do with the March to the Sea than McClellan did the attack on Fort Donelson - at least McClellan ordered Halleck to send the expedition to Dover (i.e. Fort Donelson). Grant didn't want Sherman to march to the Sea, but rather wanted him to move to Mobile, but he couldn't make Sherman do what he wanted. Hence you have the debacle of no-one knowing where Sherman is going...

 

[OpnCoronet]

Grant most likely could never had won within the constraints of May to July 1864. But after that then US finally closed one of the two remaining blockade runners' ports. That allowed the US fleet to re-deploy to only blockade Wilmington and Charleston and then prepare for the attempt to end the blockade entirely by closing all the ports.
Then Grant severed the most direct and best RR leading into Petersberg, and Sherman severed the last remaining RR connection between Atlanta and the rest of Georgia and Alabama.
Once that happened Early had to try to remain in the Shenandoah valley to protect the harvest. He was unable to do that.
Therefore Lee's defense of Richmond/Petersberg, like A.S. Johnston's counter attack at Shiloh Church, caused huge casualties and degraded Grant's standing, but the cost was large. Mobile Bay was not adequately garrisoned, the counterattack against Warren's corp on the Weldon RR did not have weight to it to expel the US forces.
Hood was temporarily left blind in Atlanta. Not one part of Sherman's army, but all three groups made it to the Macon RR and Hood's divisions barely escaped.
Which all set the stage for Winchester III. The Confederates probably out fought the US forces at the tactical level and it did not matter.
Sheridan had a cavalry force that was going outflank the Confederates no matter what they did.
Lee was protected by Richmond and the Confederate Government. Everyone else had to pay the price for General Lee's success.

All true to a certain extent, but my main point was that Grant was able to quickly gain the initiative over Lee and maintained it to the end of the War, with an army not really suited for the Job.

 

[wausaubob]

Lee was a member of the landed aristocracy, and that system went all the way back to Roman plantation system. Lee was obligated to defend Richmond/Petersberg and the Virginian center of what remained in the US of this system. By July of 1862 the ancient system had no chance to sustain itself in the 5 border regions or the far west. Still the war went on as Lee defended an ever shrinking plantation area.
Grant was neither a landed or aristocrat, nor a major capitalist. But he had seen most of the US, by 1861. He had seen the eastern cities, and like a Cossack in Kiev, he had received a nationalist education. Then he had seen Missouri and Texas. He had seen Mexico, and crossed and recrossed Panama. He had seen San Francisco and the Columbia River. He had lived in St. Louis and toured as a small businessman, ne IA, sw MN, se WI and nw IL. So he was essentially a barbarian and free. He did not have to defend anything and his decisions could be based entirely on opportunity, experience, and political expediency. Grant was therefore free to learn combined arms, water born logistics, railroad logistics and still revert to an American version of heavily armed cavalry, which was a combination of modern arms and ancient barbarian tactics.

 

[67th Tigers]

All true to a certain extent, but my main point was that Grant was able to quickly gain the initiative over Lee and maintained it to the end of the War, with an army not really suited for the Job.

Except, he didn't.

He kept trying to seize the initiative, but Lee generally outgeneralled him. Once Petersburg is reached, it is the Federals who are totally reactive, with Lee's dispatch of Early dominating the campaign. Grant doesn't make a serious offensive against Petersburg for about 8 months...

 

[wausaubob]

Colonel Lee was an important figure in the US before the Civil War. Grant was living near the western edge of civilization, but in a fast growing region which was becoming one of the main centers of Republican support. Grant was not important to the US war effort until after Vicksburg. But General Lee was essential to the Confederacy from the beginning of its existence.

 

[OpnCoronet]

Lee inherited his army from the forces of Johnston etc., and had to make do without the degree of artillery etc. he wanted.

McClellan's army was, again, that provided by his government. It lacked elements such as a large and efficient cavalry arm which he wanted. He made do.

You idea that Grant "made up for" his senior officers doesn't seem sound. Grant seems quite out of his depth when you look closely, and he was pretty much kept in the game by Meade, Butler and Warren.

In any case Grant took the same army that a succession of previous generals was unable to lead to any success in Va., in 3 Years and drove it to ultimate victory in a little less than a Year after he began his Campaign, i.e., What 4 generals could not do with the AoP in 3 Years, Grant did in a little less than 1

The AoP may not have been on a par with the ANV in every aspect, but Grant made up the difference between success and failure for the AoP, in the only aspect that counts in war, Victory.

 

[Saphroneth]

In any case Grant took the same army that a succession of previous generals was unable to lead to any success in Va., in 3 Years and drove it to ultimate victory in a little less than a Year after he began his Campaign, i.e., What 4 generals could not do with the AoP in 3 Years, Grant did in a little less than 1

He didn't really, though, because it wasn't the same army - in that it was much bigger. You simply can't separate that from Grant's success because Grant himself was the one demanding more troops, and indeed despite getting about half again as many troops as any other AotP commander ever had available Grant still wanted more.

 

[Saphroneth]

In fact, here is a hypothesis:

"Any Union commander in the east could have successfully defeated Lee, no matter the size of Lee's army, so long as they had a force of at least 160,000 PFD all told pass through their army, and they had nine months to do it in".

Now, I happen to think this is false... but you can't look at the results of any commander's operations for disproof. It's simple fact that Grant had more men to work with and was allowed to persist in offensive operations for longer; you can argue that Grant never suffered a serious enough defeat to stop him from continuing the campaign, but the same is true of (say) McClellan and the only thing preventing McClellan in 1862 from doing the same thing as Grant in 1864 was that McClellan literally did not have the necessary pontoons to bridge the James.

 

[Rhea Cole]

Except, he didn't.

He kept trying to seize the initiative, but Lee generally outgeneralled him. Once Petersburg is reached, it is the Federals who are totally reactive, with Lee's dispatch of Early dominating the campaign. Grant doesn't make a serious offensive against Petersburg for about 8 months...

I believe a bunch t of military history is in order. At the opening of Grant's campaign to destroy the A of NV, he initiated a multi faceted strategy. Sherman's March to the Sea was tasked with destroying Lee's lifeline to the Western CSA. Sherman's March north through the Carolinas was an extension of that strategy. The Capture of Wilmington & Sheridan's raid on the valley were also pieces of the strategic puzzle.

On direct contact with the A of NV, Grant ordered what modern military historians call constant contact. Whenever the A of the P made a lodgment in Lee's line, they dug inn& held the ground. At all times, no matter how hard Lees dug to secure his flank, the A of the P was dug in as close as possible. It was a bloody, ferociously violent tactic, but it glued Lee in place. The old days of the A of the P retreating back over a river & letting Lee free to take the initiative were over. As no less an authority than Gen Lee himself recognized, once Grant ordered the A of the P to maintain close contact, he had permanently lost the initiative & defeat was just a matter of time.