Lee General RE Lee, CSA

[brass napoleon]

I don't know if it was too bad a defeat in the sense of "too many good men", but the damage he did to the enemy didn't make up for the damage he suffered.

In absence of any clear cut accomplishment of any of his objectives, that's definitely a loss. Maybe not a disaster, but underdogs have to be able to do more with less - and he didn't quite make it, even if we count Harper's Ferry for "the campaign's results".

Actually, he did accomplish one of his most important objectives. He kept his enemy out of Virginia during the important harvest season.

 

[ole]

Actually, he did accomplish one of his most important objectives. He kept his enemy out of Virginia during the important harvest season.

First, I wouldn't call the relief of Virginia farmers one of his most important objectives. There were still plenty of Federals in Virginia to "collect" the harvest.

Really hard to tell what was on his mind when he elected to invade Pennsylvania. He posited several reasons which is very like coming up with too many reasons for it. When there are too many rationales, I generally reject all of them as a cover-up for the real reason.

It might be that simple, or it might not. But I wouldn't call relief of the Virginia farmer the primary reason.

 

[brass napoleon]

First, I wouldn't call the relief of Virginia farmers one of his most important objectives...

Well, no, me neither. But he had an army to feed, and I'd call THAT one of his most important objectives. Certainly not the only objective, and probably not the MOST important, but important nonetheless.

 

[ole]

As long as I'm at it, he might have been luring the AotP to fight on the ground of his choosing. He might have done the invasion to avoid sending troops West to save Vicksburg. He might have been striking at the B&O and coal country. Or he might have been doing all of the above.

Lee always sought to have the initiative and force the other side on the defensive. Maybe this was a followup to the victory at Chancellorsville.

Whatever. Lee was audacious with a capital A. He just, kinda, exceeded his plans when he ran into Meade at the wrong place and the wrong time.

A plus for him: The AoNV, however diminished after G'burg, remained a formidable force.

 

[Elennsar]

Actually, he did accomplish one of his most important objectives. He kept his enemy out of Virginia during the important harvest season.

Just to be clear, are we talking about harvests in September (Maryland campaign) or harvests in June and July (Gettysburg campaign)?

I think Lee's "feed my army and keep the heat off the farmers" worked better in the latter than the former.

 

[brass napoleon]

Just to be clear, are we talking about harvests in September (Maryland campaign) or harvests in June and July (Gettysburg campaign)?

I think Lee's "feed my army and keep the heat off the farmers" worked better in the latter than the former.

I was talking about the September, 1862 campaign. I agree that the harvest was less of an objective in the July, 1863 campaign.

 

[ole]

Just to be clear, are we talking about harvests in September (Maryland campaign) or harvests in June and July (Gettysburg campaign)?

I think Lee's "feed my army and keep the heat off the farmers" worked better in the latter than the former.

Good observation, Elennsar. Harvest would have been late July around there. Just a guess. Further west, it was more like August. Which has always given me a "say what" about that giving Virginians a chance to harvest.

We might note that I'm not a Virginian and have no idea of when they could plant and when they could harvest, but it remains that an early July campaign to relieve Virginia harvests is more than a bit specious. I can't imagine a harvest before July.

The Gettysburg Wheatfield contends that the wheat was close to harvest. That might well have been winter wheat. I am not versed in that kind of agriculture.

But the whole idea of relieving Virginia farmers just doesn't quite fit.

 

[Elennsar]

I was talking about the September, 1862 campaign. I agree that the harvest was less of an objective in the July, 1863 campaign.

Gotcha. Lee seems to have had farmers and crops on the brain in both cases.

I think in the September one, I'm not sure how much Lee achieved that. I mean, if Lee hadn't pushed north, his supply line has been busted up (I think Trice covered this in some thread somewhere), but I'm not sure that it necessarily relieved Union pressure on Virginia farmers very much to campaign north of the Potomac for a couple weeks.

But it took his army away from overburdening said farmers and fed 'em on someone else's for a while to allow for dealing with issues with supplies and harvesting back home. I suppose that's a something.

I stand by him not inflicting enough damage to make up for the amount his own army suffered. All the Harper's Ferry units whose enlistments aren't soon to expire returned to service - hardly a long term gain when four of those regiments are out to avenge their shame in blood at Gettysburg.

Ole: I have something of a sense of reading (though not where) for that season, the idea was about the other end of the harvest for the Gettysburg campaign - putting in a good crop. But isn't that also usually done pre-June/July? Where's a Virginia farmer when we need one?

 

[KeyserSoze]

Actually, he did accomplish one of his most important objectives. He kept his enemy out of Virginia during the important harvest season.

Lee's Maryland campaign lasted just over two weeks - September 4 through September 20. Not a whole lot of relief time.

 

[John Winn]

Don't want to drift but since the Pennsylvania invasion has been brought up already I'll just say that to me it was a big mistake on Lee's part. Now I don't make any claims to be a scholar of the war and I also know most of y'all know Gettysburg minute by minute but to me I just don't see how Lee could have accomplished that much. He had to take the army on the road without any real supply lines and to gain what ? Maybe the capital of Pennsylvania ? And so what - he couldn't have kept it. He might have caused some Union demoralization but he couldn't have kept it up for long and would have had to retreat eventually. I don't think the Union would have folded even if Lee had won Gettysburg nor do I think the English would have suddenly decided to break the blockade as a result of one more Confederate victory. As to selecting his ground, I would think some place closer to home base would have been a better idea.

So, whip me now but I really do see the second invasion (but not the first) as a mistake.

 

[diane]

I don't think the farmers or even taking the heat off Virginia was the prime objective - I think it was more political. If Lee could score a Chancellorsville in Pennsylvania, it would very likely result in some sort of foreign support for the Confederacy and perhaps unseat the war president Lincoln. He was going for a psychological blow, too, against the North - my army can enter your territory and yours be run out of ours. And, he thought he was dealing with Hooker.

 

[rebelatsea]

That's the reason that the usual list of Great Captains includes such divergent figures as Alexander the Great, Genghis Khan, Napoleon, Wellington, and Rommel ( and usually Lee and Jackson and often Grant as well ) - they're considered by their achievements like the aforementioned Second Manassas and Chancellorsville and not political, social, or moral aspects of their careers. Alexander in particular appears to have been a psychopath I wouldn't want to have been anywhere near, but he conquered the known world!

They also possessed the attribute of attracting total loyalty from their men ( in Napoleon's case the country too). but then so did Adolf Hitler.

 

[rebelatsea]

As long as I'm at it, he might have been luring the AotP to fight on the ground of his choosing. He might have done the invasion to avoid sending troops West to save Vicksburg. He might have been striking at the B&O and coal country. Or he might have been doing all of the above.

Lee always sought to have the initiative and force the other side on the defensive. Maybe this was a followup to the victory at Chancellorsville.

Whatever. Lee was audacious with a capital A. He just, kinda, exceeded his plans when he ran into Meade at the wrong place and the wrong time.

A plus for him: The AoNV, however diminished after G'burg, remained a formidable force.

I'm not an expert on the land warfare, but is it true that the armies basically blundered into each other, and had to do the best with the battlefield they were given?

 

[diane]

I'm not an expert on the land warfare, but is it true that the armies basically blundered into each other, and had to do the best with the battlefield they were given?

I've been kind of surprised at the number of big fights that began accidentally. Seemed as soon as a general said DO NOT bring on a general engagement - kapow!

 

[Rebforever]

I was talking about the September, 1862 campaign. I agree that the harvest was less of an objective in the July, 1863 campaign.

As a reminder there is the last cutting of hay and the cutting of corn for grain and fodder during those months.
Orchard production.

 

[cash]

I don't think the farmers or even taking the heat off Virginia was the prime objective - I think it was more political. If Lee could score a Chancellorsville in Pennsylvania, it would very likely result in some sort of foreign support for the Confederacy and perhaps unseat the war president Lincoln. He was going for a psychological blow, too, against the North - my army can enter your territory and yours be run out of ours. And, he thought he was dealing with Hooker.

Right. Lee realized from the start that the confederacy couldn't win in a protracted war. The longer the war went on, the more the Union's superiority in numbers and manufacturing capacity would play into the war. He realized that in order for the confederacy to win, the Union's populace had to be convinced that they couldn't win. A victory in Pennsylvania, showing the population that no Northern state was safe, would have tremendous political ramifications. Key elections in Northern states were about to take place in 1863. Replace those Republican governors with Peace Democrats who didn't support the war and that's a blow against the Union war effort. Then in 1864 we could get not only a new President but also a Congress that was dominated by Peace Democrats who would, upon entering office, immediately start to negotiate a peace.

 

[cash]

I'm not an expert on the land warfare, but is it true that the armies basically blundered into each other, and had to do the best with the battlefield they were given?

Not quite. Gettysburg was the center of a major road network. There's no simple blundering as to why the confederates were there or why Buford was there. While true the two armies didn't plan to fight there, it was a very strategic place to hold.

 

[KeyserSoze]

Don't want to drift but since the Pennsylvania invasion has been brought up already I'll just say that to me it was a big mistake on Lee's part. Now I don't make any claims to be a scholar of the war and I also know most of y'all know Gettysburg minute by minute but to me I just don't see how Lee could have accomplished that much. He had to take the army on the road without any real supply lines and to gain what ? Maybe the capital of Pennsylvania ? And so what - he couldn't have kept it. He might have caused some Union demoralization but he couldn't have kept it up for long and would have had to retreat eventually. I don't think the Union would have folded even if Lee had won Gettysburg nor do I think the English would have suddenly decided to break the blockade as a result of one more Confederate victory. As to selecting his ground, I would think some place closer to home base would have been a better idea.

So, whip me now but I really do see the second invasion (but not the first) as a mistake.

I think Lee had several reaons for his Pennsylvania campaign. First and foremost, he wanted to get outta Dodge with his army before Jeff Davis forced him to send a corps or two out west in a vain attempt to save Vicksburg. Second, he knew that his army had just about milked the local Virginia populace dry in terms food and supplies. So third, he figured he'd take his army where all the good stuff was - Pennsylvania. Lee's plan was to campaign up there and live off the land while at the same time gathering anything of any use to the army. If you read the reports from the campaign, Lee's subordinate commanders were delivering daily reports of what they had looted and in what quantities. Ideally after a month or two he would return to Virginia with enough material and supplies to satisfy his army's needs for some time. He was not looking for a fight necessarily, though he wouldn't have avoided one if the circumstances were in his favor. But he also knew that any fight meant the end of his campaign so he certainly wanted to avoid it as long as possible.

 

[KeyserSoze]

I'm not an expert on the land warfare, but is it true that the armies basically blundered into each other, and had to do the best with the battlefield they were given?

I'm not sure if 'blundered' is the right word. Lee did not make the best use of the cavarly that Stuart had left with him so his knowledge of the Union army's position wasn't the best.

 

[John Winn]

I think Lee had several reaons for his Pennsylvania campaign. First and foremost, he wanted to get outta Dodge with his army before Jeff Davis forced him to send a corps or two out west in a vain attempt to save Vicksburg. Second, he knew that his army had just about milked the local Virginia populace dry in terms food and supplies. So third, he figured he'd take his army where all the good stuff was - Pennsylvania. Lee's plan was to campaign up there and live off the land while at the same time gathering anything of any use to the army. If you read the reports from the campaign, Lee's subordinate commanders were delivering daily reports of what they had looted and in what quantities. Ideally after a month or two he would return to Virginia with enough material and supplies to satisfy his army's needs for some time. He was not looking for a fight necessarily, though he wouldn't have avoided one if the circumstances were in his favor. But he also knew that any fight meant the end of his campaign so he certainly wanted to avoid it as long as possible.

Thanks for that perspective KS. I can see such a short foray to replenish and to relieve the strain on the Virginia folks. It's just that I so often see it postulated that Lee invaded for political reasons and those just don't seem to have been a very safe gamble to me. That's sort of going all in on a relatively low pair IMO. Seems to me he could have demoralized the Union just as much by fighting on his own turf and continually defeating or stalemating the northern armies. I really don't think the English were coming to the rescue, either, and that is often mentioned as a reason to invade too.