Communications Question

The lack of timely and accurate communications was probably one of the biggest obstacles to bedevil successful and effective coordinated operations at the corps and army level and perhaps even division level. While the tighter knit movements at the brigade and regiment levels could be more or less controlled by unit commanders dispatching couriers, leading by personal example, or relying on color guards, drum rolls and file closers, any type of large-scale coordination at the larger organizational levels were almost impossible to carry out with any great reliance.
 
Courier lines were the most common in the field. If a brigade commander needed to get messages to one of his regimental commanders, he would send a mounted courier with that message and require the courier to wait there until the message was answered and then bring it back. Typically, regarding greater distances to be covered in the field, a courier line was established being comprised of several riders placed about a mile apart from each other, and the message would be passed from courier to courier until the message was delivered. Part of the duty of scouts was to intercept enemy couriers and take their communications, where that information could be used as intelligence in upcoming movements, skirmishes or battles. Most headquarters were serviced by wire (cable), that being the telegraph with operators on duty to send, receive and decipher the messages.
 
This is a good question I have thought about as well, particularly the telegraph situation. My impression is that during battles the HQ was stationary, and the Corps commanders locations were connected to the HQ location via telegraph lines. Then, orders to down to Division and Regimental commanders were distributed via mounted couriers.

As a former communicator in the service this is a subject that interests me quite a bit. I often think that there were areas where a "communicators" job during the Civil War era would be just as hard or harder than my old job. But also, that there would be be areas that would be easier.
 
The lack of timely and accurate communications was probably one of the biggest obstacles to bedevil successful and effective coordinated operations at the corps and army level and perhaps even division level. While the tighter knit movements at the brigade and regiment levels could be more or less controlled by unit commanders dispatching couriers, leading by personal example, or relying on color guards, drum rolls and file closers, any type of large-scale coordination at the larger organizational levels were almost impossible to carry out with any great reliance.
My thoughts exactly, it must have been extremely difficult at times to communicate during the heat of battle. By the time a courier reached the correct commanders, (if he made it at all), the situation on the field may have changed drastically. It makes me wonder how much of an effect it had on the outcome of a battle. The Sunken road/Bloody Lane immediately comes to mind. Thank You for the reply!!!!
 
This is a good question I have thought about as well, particularly the telegraph situation. My impression is that during battles the HQ was stationary, and the Corps commanders locations were connected to the HQ location via telegraph lines. Then, orders to down to Division and Regimental commanders were distributed via mounted couriers.

As a former communicator in the service this is a subject that interests me quite a bit. I often think that there were areas where a "communicators" job during the Civil War era would be just as hard or harder than my old job. But also, that there would be be areas that would be easier.
I do relize that the telegraph was used by Lincoln to his Generals. But the guys on the front lines during the actual fight I can see where that would be a major issue. I can't even imagine how difficult it must have been. I always wonder if and how it would have effected the final outcome of a particular battle. Especially when some of these battle lines covered miles of area like Gettysburg. Thank You for your reply and your service!
 
Courier lines were the most common in the field. If a brigade commander needed to get messages to one of his regimental commanders, he would send a mounted courier with that message and require the courier to wait there until the message was answered and then bring it back. Typically, regarding greater distances to be covered in the field, a courier line was established being comprised of several riders placed about a mile apart from each other, and the message would be passed from courier to courier until the message was delivered. Part of the duty of scouts was to intercept enemy couriers and take their communications, where that information could be used as intelligence in upcoming movements, skirmishes or battles. Most headquarters were serviced by wire (cable), that being the telegraph with operators on duty to send, receive and decipher the messages.
That all makes perfect sense to me yes. Were they able to set up those telegraph lines quickly? I assume when there was not time to set them up they would use couriers. I can see where that could have broken down very quickly however. Thank You for the reply!
 
Could you imagine if they'd had walkie-talkies back in the day?
As I recall, in Harry Turtledove's alternate history book The Guns of the South, the people from the future brought the Confederates AK-47s but didn't share walkie-talkies with them. When the Confederates found out about this technology and the lack of sharing, they were, to put it mildly, ticked off and irritated.

For those interested in the military telegraph system, here is a book you might like. The author, William Plum, was a military telegrapher during the Civil War. He moved to my area after the war. Helen Plum Library in Lombard is named for his wife. Upon the death of the Plums, their home became Lombard's library and wasn't replaced until the 1960s. He also became an authority on lilacs; thus, Lombard is the Lilac Village.


I'll go back under my rock now. :D
 
That all makes perfect sense to me yes. Were they able to set up those telegraph lines quickly? I assume when there was not time to set them up they would use couriers. I can see where that could have broken down very quickly however. Thank You for the reply!
Yes, on both the brigade and regimental levels, couriers were assigned for this specific duty. In their service records they are typically shown as being detached as couriers and on the courier line for an indefinite amount of time. Regarding the telegraph, wherever HQ was located, an operator was assigned to be on duty so that wires could be sent and received. There were people dedicated to stringing the cables or connect to existing cables so that the operator could do his duty.
 
During the heat of battle, one certainly couldn't afford the luxury of using, supposedly as Napoleon used, the method of revising his written dispatches to his Corps commanders until they could be understood and repeated in his own words, by a special "slow" aide on Napoleon's staff.
I think a good example of what you describe is Rosecrans' well known but misleading order that led General Wood to pull his division out of line at Chickamauga. In that case, the order was I believe actually written by one of Rosecrans' lesser aides at the behest of Rosecrans.
 
This is a good question I have thought about as well, particularly the telegraph situation. My impression is that during battles the HQ was stationary, and the Corps commanders locations were connected to the HQ location via telegraph lines. Then, orders to down to Division and Regimental commanders were distributed via mounted couriers.

As a former communicator in the service this is a subject that interests me quite a bit. I often think that there were areas where a "communicators" job during the Civil War era would be just as hard or harder than my old job. But also, that there would be be areas that would be easier.
I could be wrong here- but I don't believe it was common for corps commanders to be linked (via telegraph) to HQ during ACW battles. I'm thinking the most common communication during combat was still carried by mounted riders.

Western battlefields such as Shiloh were a bit off the grid?

Anyone can correct me…
 
I could be wrong here- but I don't believe it was common for corps commanders to be linked (via telegraph) to HQ during ACW battles. I'm thinking the most common communication during combat was still carried by mounted riders.

Western battlefields such as Shiloh were a bit off the grid?

Anyone can correct me…
The telegraph was not hard to move and reconnect to the main lines. It was a box that could be disconnected and taken with HQ as it was forced to move from location to location by Mobile telegraph wagons. This way the Corps commander could keep in communication with his field commanders, or with those higher up in the rank structure, being his superiors. Often the "telegraph" would travel with the operator, and he had men assigned to him (telegraph corps) who would connect the telegraph to the main lines (when accessible), or repair lines which had been damaged or cut, as well as string new lines if necessary. Sometimes the Corps commander would leave an operator and the telegraph behind, temporarily, so that messages could be sent to a previous location from the field commanders and the messages then sent by wire to the new location. Below is an example of this during the Meridian Campaign, where Lt. General Leonidas Polk (Corps Commander) was communicating with one of his brigade commanders, Brig. General Samuel W. Ferguson. He wrote the following in a wire:

"NEWTON, February 10, 1864 - 12 p.m.

General FERGUSON:

General Polk requests me to acknowledge the receipt of your dispatch from Moore`s plantation, and to say to you that he desires that you will press forward, so as to develop the enemy's position and strength and keep him fully informed of any movement. The telegraph wires and an operator will be left here, so that you can communicate with him at Meridian, for which point he leaves tomorrow morning. He wishes you to leave a force to protect this point, so as to secure prompt communication with him at Meridian. The operator from Lake brings information that 12 cavalrymen came into that place after dark tonight dressed as Confederates, but their questions and manner and appearance showed that they were Federals; they left, coming in this direction by a by-road. It has been suggested that by picketing the road near Dr. Conner's, this side of Leaf River bridge, these men might be intercepted. He wishes the force left to protect this point to picket the approaches very carefully, and to be warned of the practice of the Yankees to disguise themselves as Confederates. A dispatch was received from Mrs. Ferguson and Mrs. Holt from Meridian inquiring after you. The general will see that your communications to Mrs. Ferguson shall reach her promptly, and will forward her letters by every opportunity.

I am, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
HENRY C. YEATMAN, Aide-de-Camp."
 
Speaking of couriers, and their odds of actually delivering a critical message or not in the heat of combat, the below is a snippet of a story from "Campfires of the Confederacy," an article called "Davis' Mississippi Brigade at the Battle of the Wilderness" by a Member of the Brigade (so, actual author is unknown). The narrative picks up on May 6th, when all but Davis' Brigade, now under the command of its senior colonel, John Marshall Stone of the 2nd Mississippi, is the only intact brigade still left of Heth's Division, the rest having been swept away by Hancock's early morning assault. His brigade was comprised of his four Mississippi regiments - the 2nd, 11th, 26th, and 42nd Mississippi, the 55th North Carolina, and the 1st Confederate Battalion:

"General Heth, seeing all his division melt away except Davis' Brigade, and believing the situation hopeless, sent a staff officer to Colonel Stone with an order to retire from the field as best he could. The advance of the enemy was perceptibly checked by the continuous fire from Davis' Brigade, and Colonel Stone rode along the line directing his men to retire slowly in line of battle, all the time keeping up a lively fire. He had retired some two hundred yards with the four Mississippi regiments on the right of the road [Orange Plank Road], and the Fifty-fifth North Carolina and First Confederate on the left, when the head of General Longstreet's column came in sight marching rapidly up the plank road. The undergrowth on the left of the road being very thick, the Fifty-fifth North Carolina and the First Confederate Battalion were cut off from the rest of the brigade by General Longstreet's column, and were not afterward engaged during the day.

The four Mississippi regiments, still holding their ground, joined the advance with Longstreet's command, and in a short time were fighting on the identical ground upon which the brigade had fought the day before, the dead of the previous day's battle still remaining upon the field unburied. The enemy on that part of the line were soon out of reach, and the firing ceased, but farther to the left a terrific fire continued, and in a short time the lines were broken a short distance to the right of General Harris' Brigade, the brigade on his right having given way, Colonel Stone quickly changed his front into line of battle facing nearly west, charged up the hill, drove the enemy back in great disorder, and re-established the lines.

That part of the line occupied by Davis' Brigade, when compelled to move to the left to re-establish the broken lines, was still open, and the enemy seemed to be making a determined effort to turn the right of Davis' Brigade and get in rear of it. In this dilemma Colonel Stone had made every effort to obtain support for his right without success. Finally, the Assistant Adjutant General of the brigade, Captain T. C. Holliday, of Aberdeen, Miss., who fully realized the gravity of the situation, was sent to the rear to find troops to fill up the gap on the right of the brigade. He had gone but a short distance when he fell, mortally wounded, in rear of the Sixteenth Mississippi Regiment, of Harris' Mississippi Brigade. Partially raising himself, and waving his hand in the proper direction, he uttered the words: " Re-enforce the right," and expired..
."

The sketch below from the book is captioned: "Death of Captain T. C. Holliday"

courier death wilderness_resized.jpg
 
The Federal Army at Chancellorsville ran telegraph wire down to division level. If you think of a brigade as really the smallest practical maneuver element, a command was connected to commuication only one level higher. That´s a huge step forward. In a fluid situation, communication was by mounted courrier; that´s why generals had so many aides. Each one was potentially another message going and coming. Elements could also communicate by wig-wagging. When everything was humming right along, intelligence could almost be developed in real time. Look at how often Lincoln and Grant were communicating during the Appomattox campaign.
 

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