Difference in Brigade Makeup: ANV vs. AoT

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I was looking at post on Hood and McLaws officer casualties at at Gettysburg.

There was something i hadn't noticed before. Looking at major battles in the same year, using two brigades as a quick overview, I noticed that regiment from one state would, as a generalization be placed with in the same brigade in the ANV, but not necessarily in the AoT.

As an example, McLaws division, (excluding artillery in all examples, focusing on infantry only) Kershaw had all troops from South Carolina, Barksdale had Mississippi regiments.

At Chickamauga in Cheatham's division, John Jackson's brigade had regiments from Georgia as well as Mississippi.

Wood's brigade under Cleburne, had regiments from both Alabama and Mississippi.

I noticed in those four brigades that there is a difference in their make up. Mixing up regimens with in a divisional structure, using those two brigades at Gettysburg as a cursory overview, seems to not to have been how things were done.

Using Chickamauga as a yardstick (or Meter stick for our foreign friends) things in Cheatham's divion seemed a little different.

My question is in several parts.

Was the ANV set up as it was by the military for esprit de corps and divisional unity, more or less? Or was it political, or political and military, or just "that's how it is, now get in line, shut up and quit asking so many questions."

On the flip side in the AoT, was it a matter of mixing brigades due to losses, or to mitigate the destruction of an entire generation of men from towns or counties? Or was it proximity of regiments from different states to each other?

Just as an example if there was a regiment from what is now Fort Benning, GA, and a regiment from across the river in Phenix City, AL, would they be thrown into the same brigade as a matter of proximity to each other?

Were there major differences in leadership as well as the politics between the two armies?

Or was the war more gueling in the western theater at times makung combinations on brigade level necessary to have enough men in each brigade tocarry off what needed to be done on the field at any given time?

Management style maybe? The ANV had Lee, abd was in close proximity to Richmond, so was that a factor in organisation?

The AoT shed generals like my cat does in the sun on a warm day. Always had that 'under new management' sign hanging there.

Taking into consideration the bad mouthing of Bragg at Chattanooga was it backbiting to gain position in the ranks?

Reason I ask so much about the politic ij the Western Theater is I had a relative in the AoT, 52nd Tennessee Infantry. They were combined with the 51st Tennessee Infantry. Then that combination was considered 'illegal' and i guess after some legal mumbojumbo they were recombined and that was legal. I believe part of it was keeping records and troops separate within the regiment once stuck together.

I know it's a long, involved question, but there are plenty of wiser people than myself on here. I could be taking but an example and blowing it all out of proportion. Or just even over thinking the matter entirely.
 
The order to organize brigades by States was from Richmond (June 62?), and IIRC was a pet project of Jefferson Davis. The ANV was just more successful in implementing it for various reasons.

One reason why this order was issued was because there was often political friction if you had a brigade made up of say 3 Alabama and 2 North Carolina regiments and a NC officer was made the brigadier in charge of the brigade, so the idea was to have all state brigades with brigadiers from those states. Now often West Pointers were an exception to this rule, if a brigade had poor leadership and Lee felt like none of the colonels could be successful in the role, Lee would not hesitate to put an out of state West Pointer in charge.
 
The order to organize brigades by States was from Richmond (June 62?), and IIRC was a pet project of Jefferson Davis. The ANV was just more successful in implementing it for various reasons.

One reason why this order was issued was because there was often political friction if you had a brigade made up of say 3 Alabama and 2 North Carolina regiments and a NC officer was made the brigadier in charge of the brigade, so the idea was to have all state brigades with brigadiers from those states. Now often West Pointers were an exception to this rule, if a brigade had poor leadership and Lee felt like none of the colonels could be successful in the role, Lee would not hesitate to put an out of state West Pointer in charge.
That makes sense. The AoT in some brigades wasn't like that? Nature of warfare out there or no?
 
Was the ANV set up as it was by the military for esprit de corps and divisional unity, more or less? Or was it political, or political and military, or just "that's how it is, now get in line, shut up and quit asking so many questions."

The latter mostly. Col. Edward McCrady of South Carolina gives an overview of the organization of the armies, from a handful of militia volunteer companies on up...

1765582499582.webp




The ANV was organized from the forces in Northern Virginia in the winter of 1861-62 under General J.E. Johnston. Jefferson Davis issued general orders to organize brigades by States, but this was not easily attended to while the Army was itself laboring to organize for more effective service. Gen. Johnston even resisted the orders for such reorganization after the troops had several months with their officers and brigades...


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General Beauregard too disliked the State brigades, but Jefferson Davis explained to him in October, 1862 it was a political necessity of sorts... as the brigadier generals should be appointed by State considerations so far as possible. He reiterates that the regiment is the basic unit of organization in the Confederate service, and moving regiments around among brigades should not be so big a deal as the Generals made it, etc.

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In 1862 after assuming command of the army, General Lee reiterated that he was aware of the orders to form State brigades, that they might be commanded by State generals, etc., but informed the administration at Richmond that he could only attend to such reorganizations by States when convenient (and it was rarely convenient). D.S. Freeman observed...

1765580271359.webp



On the flip side in the AoT, was it a matter of mixing brigades due to losses, or to mitigate the destruction of an entire generation of men from towns or counties? Or was it proximity of regiments from different states to each other?

Merely convenience.

By late 1862 apparently, President Davis no longer required State divisions, but his policy on State brigades remained.

1765580834627.webp


While sitting on the siege lines about Chattanooga in late 1863 General Bragg labored to reorganize the Army of Tennessee to more accommodate the standing policy, and form brigades by States. While doing so, he also broke up the Tennessee Division of Cheatham for his own purposes, etc.

After the debacle at Missionary Ridge, at Dalton, Georgia, General Johnston, with permission, restored Cheatham's Tennessee Division as prior to the late reorganization. Gen. W.H.T. Walker's Georgia Division was also organized at Dalton. But most of the Divisions of the Army remained a mix of State brigades. Cleburne's Division for example entered the Atlanta Campaign of 1864 with an Alabama, Arkansas, Texas, and a Tennessee brigade (with an Arkansas regiment or so).


As for casualties, the Confederacy suffered terribly. The whole number of deaths, for example, can never be known, but is far higher than the surviving records give account.

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Even the conscripts were generally forwarded to the Army to serve in units from their State.


Just as an example if there was a regiment from what is now Fort Benning, GA, and a regiment from across the river in Phenix City, AL, would they be thrown into the same brigade as a matter of proximity to each other?

Not unless they were organized simultaneously and formed a brigade together out of convenience.

Were there major differences in leadership as well as the politics between the two armies?

Somewhat. But J.E. Johnston commanded in Virginia in 1861-62. And during 1863 had overall command in the western Department, including Bragg's Army of Tennessee. Johnston only assumed command of the latter army personally in December, 1863, and was replaced on July 18, 1864. He was replaced in practical command of its remnants, among other forces, in North Carolina in February, 1865 to the end.

Beauregard seconded Johnston in Virginia, until sent west to second A.S. Johnston in the organization of the Army of Mississippi in 1862, which he assumed command of at Shiloh, but was replaced by Gen. Bragg during the summer.

Or was the war more gueling in the western theater at times makung combinations on brigade level necessary to have enough men in each brigade tocarry off what needed to be done on the field at any given time?

A particular difficulty was the area of operations of the Army of Mississippi/Tennessee ranged across several States, including Alabama, Mississippi, Georgia, Tennessee, Kentucky, the Carolinas, etc. See Connelly's book "Army of the Heartland" (1967) and its sequel "Autumn of Glory"... available used online, and still in print from LSU press...

1765577881175.webp
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The Army of Northern Virginia was in comparison rather static, especially in the last year of the war, when never far from Richmond.

Management style maybe? The ANV had Lee, abd was in close proximity to Richmond, so was that a factor in organisation?

1765585980248.webp


Bragg made discipline job one, and he couldn't get past letting it go...

1765586054192.webp


General Lee was noted for, in contrast, his "excessive amiability."

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And his staff officers note he found ways around the lack of "machine soldiers" in his army.

You would probably enjoy Richard D. McMurray's "Two Great Rebel Armies" (1989) which examines the distinctions between the Army of Northern Virginia and the Army of Tennessee. Used copies available on the web.

1765573879205.webp


Also still in print from the University of North Carolina Press:



The AoT shed generals like my cat does in the sun on a warm day. Always had that 'under new management' sign hanging there.

Indeed, but it was not so drastic as it might have been.

Taking into consideration the bad mouthing of Bragg at Chattanooga was it backbiting to gain position in the ranks?

Bragg held his officers responsible for the inefficiency of the troops under their command, at all levels, whether the officers were capable of reducing them or not. Made him very unpopular.

Johnston and Lee were a bit more politic about such things.

General Longstreet stated post-war that it was understood upon his being sent west in September, 1863 that he would likely assume command of the Army of Tennessee, but on arrival the Battle of Chickamauga was underway, and he attempted to second Bragg to the best of his ability (and by all accounts he did). He states that when Jeff Davis visited the Army about Chattanooga, as it was freezing in the rain and mud and practically starving, etc., and Davis labored to calm down the command situation in the army, that he offered it to Longstreet in private conversation, and he was forced to decline, as the situation had become hopeless... and only Joe Johnston might salvage the situation, which he says displeased Davis, etc.

1765586920003.webp


Bragg was retained, and relieved after the debacle at Missionary Ridge several weeks later. Hardee was offered the command of the Army but declined. Joe Johnston was so assigned before the close of the year.

Reason I ask so much about the politic ij the Western Theater is I had a relative in the AoT, 52nd Tennessee Infantry. They were combined with the 51st Tennessee Infantry. Then that combination was considered 'illegal' and i guess after some legal mumbojumbo they were recombined and that was legal. I believe part of it was keeping records and troops separate within the regiment once stuck together.

There was no law in the Confederacy to allow for the legal consolidation of understrength volunteer units for the sake of military efficiency until the last weeks of the war. This led to inefficiencies and hassles according to Lt. Col. Charles Marshall of Lee's staff...

1765575733898.webp


An advantage of legal consolidation of regiments would have discharged the supernumerary, and less efficient, officers on hand, in Bragg's view. But the official policy of the Confederacy was always to struggle to keep struggling to round up and return the absentees from the rank and file (which were always numerous) as if to restore the regiments. Also conscripts when on hand, etc.

Consequently, instead of actual legal consolidation there was the provisional "union" as Bragg called it, of the personnel of two or more regiments, which would subsequently be shown on returns as something like "1st and 3rd Florida Volunteers (Consolidated). The two regiment remained entirely separate organizations, but in such a case in reality the two formed a single battalion. Any supernumerary officers were detailed to staff or logistical functions, or just furloughed homewards, etc.

Finally in late March, 1865 an act was passed to allow for consolidation of volunteer troops into new regiments, and the Army of Tennessee indulged that necessary process about April 9-10, 1865 in North Carolina. For example the entire Florida Brigade, consisting of the remnants of six regiments, was reorganized/consolidated into a single regiment of about 400 men.

All the above just so with the regiments you mention, the 51st and 52nd Tennessee Volunteers. After Shiloh, General Bragg ordered the 52nd Regiment to be consolidated into the 51st Regiment. This was not allowed by law. So the 52nd Regiment remained distinct, but the two regiments were physically "consolidated" into a single battalion, and so served until near the close of the war, generally noted on Army returns as the "51st & 52nd Tennessee (consolidated)."

April, 1865, with the last reorganization under Joe Johnston in North Carolina, these regiments, and several others were actually consolidated into the new "2nd Tennessee regiment (consolidated)."

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Here's the order of battle of the finally consolidated units upon Surrender in North Carolina...

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I know it's a long, involved question, but there are plenty of wiser people than myself on here. I could be taking but an example and blowing it all out of proportion. Or just even over thinking the matter entirely.

Perish the thought! Fun stuff.
 
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That makes sense. The AoT in some brigades wasn't like that? Nature of warfare out there or no?

The thing about the AoT is that it's make up changes drastically over the course of the war. From the core of regiments that were with the then Army of Mississippi at Shiloh you have to add Van Dorn's Army of the West, the newly raised conscript regiments of the spring/summer of '62, the exchanged Ft. Donelson/Island No. 10 garrisons, exchanged Vicksburg troops, and troops sent from the Mobile and Charleston Garrisons.
 
Supernumerary is a word I have never heard and it sent me scrambling for my dictionary. I always like leaning a new word.

Is that based on time in the service? Or just that the pool of officers was just too large for them all to have a place

He ended up surrendering in Meridian, MS.
As to how he ended up on Meridian I have no idea. Wasn't that where a part of the remaining troops of Kirby-Smith surrendered?

My grandfather was the family historian before he passed and the torch got passed. I am quite aware of Bragg's acts with troops in Cheatham's division and Tennessee troops in general.

Don't get me started on Bragg. I could go on about him. At length.
 
Consolidated brigades/regiments are my specialty!

A lot of the colonels, lieutenant colonels, and majors made supernumerary in 1865 near the end of the war made their way into SC, GA, AL, and MS since there wasn't much else for them to do. Colonel Richard Harrison of the 43rd Mississippi, a brigade commander at Bentonville, wound up surrendering at Shreveport LA after his regiment was consolidated into the 14th Mississippi.

The thing about the AoT brigades is that the majority of them WERE made single-state brigades, but there were just not enough of some states to warrant them having their own brigade. For instance, Manigault's brigade: 3 AL and 2 SC regiments. The only way another AL brigade could be formed would be if regiments were pulled from OTHER AL brigades. And at that time, Manigault's two SC regiments were the only ones in the army. Gist's two wouldn't join until a year and a half later -- and few AoT brigades were ever just four regiments, unlike ANV brigades.
 
A lot of the colonels, lieutenant colonels, and majors made supernumerary in 1865 near the end of the war made their way into SC, GA, AL, and MS since there wasn't much else for them to do.
Begs the the question, with not much to do, what eould be the role of an officer without a unit? Some sort of Provost position or the like?
 
Begs the the question, with not much to do, what eould be the role of an officer without a unit? Some sort of Provost position or the like?

Could be employed in quartermaster, commissary, ordnance department work, or furloughed homeward. Some were detailed to the conscript bureau, etc. etc.

From Confederate Veteran magazine, a case of several hundred supernumerary officers being combined into a regiment late in the war...

1765757923838.webp
 
Begs the the question, with not much to do, what eould be the role of an officer without a unit? Some sort of Provost position or the like?
Usually they became post commanders at various Confederate-held cities and towns across the country. Some examples in 1864 are:
- Maj. Matthew S. Ward (after his battalion was broken up into its component batteries), post commander at Enterprise Miss
- Lt. Col. John T. Plattsmier (after his regiment was consolidated and he being a junior LTC), post commander at Demopolis Ala
- Capt. Richard C. Walsh (after his battery was consolidated and he being a junior CPT), post commander at Panola Miss
- Lt. Col. William E. Pinkney (after his battalion was furloughed and never returned), post commander at Clinton La
- Lt. Col. Samuel Jones (after his regiment was consolidated and he being a junior LTC), post commander at Cahaba Ala
- Col. Aaron B. Hardcastle (after his regiment became a battalion), post commander at Tuscaloosa Ala
Some examples in 1865 are:
- Brig. Gen. John K. Jackson (after his brigade was broken up), post commander at Branchville SC
- Col. Stephen D. Pool (Artillery regiment colonels had no real purpose during the war), post commander at Goldsboro NC
- Lt. Col. John C. Shields (after his artillery regiment became an infantry battalion), POW camp commander at Danville VA
- Col. Wylde L. L. Bowen (after his regiment was consolidated and he being a junior COL), on training duty at Tallahassee FL
- Lt. Col. Robert S. Bevier (after his regiment was consolidated and he being a junior LTC), on training duty at Richmond VA
- Col. William H. H. Tison (after his regiment was consolidated and he being a junior COL), on recruiting duty in Mississippi
- Cols. Alexander W. Caldwell and Egbert E. Tansil (after their regiments were consolidated and being junior COLs), on recruiting duty in Tennessee.
 

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