Column vs. line

RedRover

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Dec 16, 2019
the civil war was fought in line... close ordered lines got nothing to do with light infantry tactics.
The only new things from Hardee's that was used was a bit faster march speed and a new manual of arms...
Yes, the battle line (close-order in two ranks) was standard, but they do have to do with light infantry tactics; and have little in common with the "Napoleonic" infantry of the 1792-1815 period beyond the close-order lines. As you mention the main difference was the speed of movement, but that evidently was considered a great distinction at the time.

The "light infantry" pre-war was not limited to skirmishing, and certainly could act in close-order where necessary, see the 1825 US infantry tactics supplement for light infantry (in the back).
Scott’s 1835 tactics deleted the specific light infantry close-order drills, requiring them to use the common infantry tactics when not skirmishing. They also required all infantry to practice the skirmish drill too.
Hardee’s tactics, adopted for ALL United States foot troops by War Department General Order No. 2, 1857, further eliminated the distinction between infantry and light infantry/riflemen; Hardee's was recognized as a “Rifle and Light Infantry” system.
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With the general adoption of Hardee’s for all foot troops, the system became essentially THE infantry tactics, and no distinction between infantry and light infantry was to be thereafter noticed. Note that the Confederate (Revised) editions of Hardee’s (Goetzel, Mobile, 1861-63) refers to it simply as “RIFLE and INFANTRY tactics.”

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In 1862 the US Army adopted a new tactics, by Gen. Silas Casey, which was entitled, "Infantry tactics" (no distinction at all between infantry/light infantry/rifle), but it require each regiment to keep and instruct its two flank companies as "light infantry" or skirmishing companies; a sort of return to the old distinction between line and light infantry from Scott's. However, this was quashed by the War Department, which immediately ordered that part of the tactics be ignored...

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General Patterson (Medal of Honor, Wilderness) in his post-war “Points on Tactics” noted the American “infantry” tactics of 1815/25/35 were copies of the French, “continued with few alterations in phraseology and details of execution in the tactics of 1815, 1825, 1835, until 1855, when Hardee's Exercises for Light Infantry were approved for the instruction of troops acting as Light Infantry…”

“In 1857 it was ordered by the War Department that all foot troops be exercised in the system of instruction for light infantry. The change from heavy to light infantry was from the more deliberate movements in common and quick time of the line manoeuvres, to the greater rapidity of movement of the light infantry system…
The company and the battalion exercises and duties of the light infantry were made the exercises and duty of all, you will remember of General Wayne's Light Division of the Continental army, and Crauford's Light Division of Wellington's army. The special duties of light infantry were those of the advanced and rear guard and skirmishers, they did what all our companies (foot) have to do now. You will find the instructions and exercises for light troops, in line and extended order, described at length in the tactics of 1825 and 1835. To fire by rank first appears in Hardee's Tactics…
Hardee's were practically the tactics of our army, and that of the Confederates also, during the Civil War, differing very little from General Casey's issue in 1863, both taken from the French Ordonnances of 1831 and 1845. The only changes of importance General Casey made, were deployments only to the front and a continuance from the system of 1815, and before and after, of the distinction between light and line infantry. This distinction was ordered by the War Department, when the tactics were issued, not to be observed, and disappears from our drill book forever after…”


Granted the close-order infantry portions of the tactics were not significantly different than the old "infantry" ones, but by most accounts the infantry lines of battle in the 1860s was not much akin to that of the Napoleonic infantry (1792-1815). First, they were quite frequently armed with rifles or rifle-muskets. Second, they moved faster, frequently at double-quick time or at a run, and finally their linear formation in battle was often similar to what James N. described above, the loose formations of the French conscript armies, or “tiralleurs en grand bandes.” (sort of a heavy skirmish line)
As General W.T. Sherman noted:

“Very few of the battles in which I have participated were fought as described in European text-books, viz., in great masses, in perfect order, manoevring by corps, divisions, and brigades. We were generally in a wooded country, and, though our lines were deployed according to tactics, the men generally fought in strong skirmish-lines, taking advantage of the shape of ground, and of every cover.” [Sherman, Memoirs, 394.]
 
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RedRover

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Dec 16, 2019
I dont think anyone would call Pickett's Charge a columnar attack, unless I am very much mistaken.

Pickett's Charge was not made in a single long line... in spite of what General Longstreet said in the 1993 movie ("spread out in a long line, perhaps a mile...") General Longstreet himself (in Manassas to Appomattox) described the attack as a column...

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With some brigades in rear of others, it was a "column of brigades."

From Gen. D.H. Hill (Confederate Military history, North Carolina):
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And it is possible not all the regiments in these "two lines" advanced deployed in line of battle... but perhaps some in battalion columns...
General Hancock described the following...

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From Carol Reardon's "Pickett's Charge..."

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Unlike the heavy infantry of the Napoleonic wars, Pickett's charge was made by the infantry moving quickly, or as General Longstreet noted;
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And others comment they carried their arms at "trail arms..."
 
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Wizard of Cozz

Private
Joined
Aug 20, 2021
Pickett's Charge was not made in a single long line... in spite of what General Longstreet said in the 1993 movie ("spread out in a long line, perhaps a mile...") General Longstreet himself (in Manassas to Appomattox) described the attack as a column...

View attachment 412888

With some brigades in rear of others, it was a "column of brigades."

From Gen. D.H. Hill (Confederate Military history, North Carolina):
View attachment 412884

And it is possible not all the regiments in these "two lines" advanced deployed in line of battle... but perhaps some in battalion columns...
General Hancock described the following...

View attachment 412890
View attachment 412891


From Carol Reardon's "Pickett's Charge..."

View attachment 412887

View attachment 412886

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Unlike the heavy infantry of the Napoleonic wars, Pickett's charge was made by the infantry moving quickly, or as General Longstreet noted;
View attachment 412889
And others comment they carried their arms at "trail arms..."
Looking at Pickett's division. There were two lines, but that was really by accident. Garnett and Kemper up front and Armistead in 2nd line. But because the unit of direction got changed as the attack led off Armistead got squeezed out. He was supposed to move up and all 3 brigades were supposed to go in abreast. Matt Atkinson has a very good youtube video as he's leading a tour of Armisteads movements. This probably actually helped Armistead as the front brigades sucked up the causalities.
 

JerryD

Private
Joined
Aug 23, 2021
Pickett's Charge was not made in a single long line... in spite of what General Longstreet said in the 1993 movie ("spread out in a long line, perhaps a mile...") General Longstreet himself (in Manassas to Appomattox) described the attack as a column...

View attachment 412888

With some brigades in rear of others, it was a "column of brigades."

From Gen. D.H. Hill (Confederate Military history, North Carolina):
View attachment 412884

And it is possible not all the regiments in these "two lines" advanced deployed in line of battle... but perhaps some in battalion columns...
General Hancock described the following...

View attachment 412890
View attachment 412891


From Carol Reardon's "Pickett's Charge..."

View attachment 412887

View attachment 412886

View attachment 412885

Unlike the heavy infantry of the Napoleonic wars, Pickett's charge was made by the infantry moving quickly, or as General Longstreet noted;
View attachment 412889
And others comment they carried their arms at "trail arms..."
Interesting. Thanks for the insight. I dont profess to be an expert on tactics, so its very illuminating that professionals like Longstreet and D.H. Hill use the term column, but I wonder if they were using it in a less technical and perhaps a more colloquial sense. It's hard to fathom that a column can be a mile wide and only a few hundred yards deep. Hancock's description of two lines with supporting columns sounds like a more a technical description. The Lt. Col of the 8th Ohio, being positioned on the northern edge of the area of attack, may have seen columns because of the supports that Hancock described.
 

RedRover

Corporal
Joined
Dec 16, 2019
Looking at Pickett's division. There were two lines, but that was really by accident. Garnett and Kemper up front and Armistead in 2nd line. But because the unit of direction got changed as the attack led off Armistead got squeezed out. He was supposed to move up and all 3 brigades were supposed to go in abreast. Matt Atkinson has a very good youtube video as he's leading a tour of Armisteads movements. This probably actually helped Armistead as the front brigades sucked up the causalities.
I do not know if the column of brigades was an accident or not, but General Longstreet seems satisfied that's what he ordered:

From his official report..

"Orders were given to Major-General Pickett to form his line under the best cover that he could get from the enemy's batteries, and so that the center of the assaulting column would arrive at the salient of the enemy's position, General Pickett's line to be the guide and to attack the line of the enemy's defenses, and General Pettigrew, in command of Heth's division, moving on the same line as General Pickett, was to assault the salient at the same moment. Pickett's division was arranged, two brigades in the front line, supported by his third brigade, and Wilcox's brigade was ordered to move in rear of his right flank, to protect it from any force that the enemy might attempt to move against it.
Heth's division, under the command of Brigadier-General Pettigrew, was arranged in two lines, and these supported by part of Major-General Pender's division, under Major-General Trimble. All of the batteries of the First and Third Corps, and some of those of the Second, were put into the best positions for effective fire upon the point of attack and the hill occupied by the enemy's left. Colonel Walton, chief of artillery of First Corps, and Colonel Alexander had posted our batteries and agreed with the artillery officers of the other corps upon the signal for the batteries to open."


And from his memoirs.

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Contrast with D'Erlon's 1st Corps column of attack at Waterloo, 1815; ca. 18,000 men in four columns, each of a brigade with its regiments in line, stacked in column one behind another (a "column of regiments") with only five paces between the regimental lines. From what I recall, it is unknown why Marshal Ney ordered this unwieldly mass forward...
 

RedRover

Corporal
Joined
Dec 16, 2019
Interesting. Thanks for the insight. I dont profess to be an expert on tactics, so its very illuminating that professionals like Longstreet and D.H. Hill use the term column, but I wonder if they were using it in a less technical and perhaps a more colloquial sense. It's hard to fathom that a column can be a mile wide and only a few hundred yards deep. Hancock's description of two lines with supporting columns sounds like a more a technical description. The Lt. Col of the 8th Ohio, being positioned on the northern edge of the area of attack, may have seen columns because of the supports that Hancock described.
Hancock does not say the frontage of Pickett's charge was a mile wide. He says it was just over the length of two of his small divisions in line (Hays and Gibbons); whatever that frontage was. Off-hand, makes sense to me, since it seems odd to have a "mile long line" converge on a single point (the angle's copse of trees!)

Also, he is describing a column ("two lines"), besides the smaller (probably battalion) columns at various points. So perhaps some regiments in line of battle, others in column; And dont forget the "strong" skirmish line in front of all.

Here's how the cyclorama artists depicted it based on their veteran's correspondences, etc.
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A general way to look at it might be to recognize that a "Column" is made up of lines, whether a column of sections (quarter companies), platoons (half-companies), companies, divisions (two companies), regiments, brigades, etc.
 
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Wizard of Cozz

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Aug 20, 2021
It also must be noted that Picketts brigades were making a series of left obliques and when these brigades were turned at right angles to make the movements they probably looked like columns to hancocks men. Back to my original point. In Napoleonic times columns of attack were more than two rows deep but picketts charge never had a depth of more than 2 rows in any division making the attack. Imagine if when armistead hit the angle there would of been another two to three rows folling up behind him. This is something longstreet did af chickamauga. 5 rows deep of brigades but only two brigades wide.
 

RedRover

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It also must be noted that Picketts brigades were making a series of left obliques and when these brigades were turned at right angles to make the movements they probably looked like columns to hancocks men. Back to my original point. In Napoleonic times columns of attack were more than two rows deep but picketts charge never had a depth of more than 2 rows in any division making the attack. Imagine if when armistead hit the angle there would of been another two to three rows folling up behind him. This is something longstreet did af chickamauga. 5 rows deep of brigades but only two brigades wide.
Here's a quote from Napoleon (from Jomini's life of Napoleon):

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Most regiments of Pickett's division in their charge, so far as known, advanced in line of battle, and were consequently spared being pummeled as they would massed into battalion columns. Maj. Peyton of the 19th VA noted:
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However Peyton notes that the division became crowded, and formed into a mass which was pummelled...

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This description of the crowding reminds me of D'Erlons' attack at Waterloo, and is evidently proved equally deadly. Elliott's map of the battlefield, and the Confederate graves, shows where this crowding took place,

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thomas aagaard

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Location
Denmark
Yes, the battle line (close-order in two ranks) was standard, but they do have to do with light infantry tactics; and have little in common with the "Napoleonic" infantry of the 1792-1815 period beyond the close-order
You are missing my point.
When moving in a close ordered line a unit is acting like heavy/line infantry.
When skirmishing it is acting as light infantry.

By 1790 units where usually specialized. It was heavy or light and a unit could often not do the other job.***
During the Napoleonic wars we start to se units that are trained to do both. (Wellingtons light division in Spain being a obvious example)
By 1850 units was now suppose to be able to do both... but was still in name, weapons and drill focused on one of the two ways of fighting. And most armies stil have specialized light infantry.
By 1860 armies have started to remove this distinction. The danish army remove it completely converting the jägercorps to infantry battalion. Others just keep the names (and uniforms) but arms and tactics are the same.

So now the question is not the type of unit, but how they are acting. And when in a closer ordered line, a unit is acting like heavy/line infantry. When out in front skirmishing its acting like light infantry.

The civil war was generally fought in close ordered lines with very little use of skirmishers compared to what we see in Europe post 1789. By 1815 it was normal for most armies to use upward of 33% of the infantry out in front as skirmishers.

In Europe the brits, Prussians and Danes have by 1860 changed to a heavy skirmishline as the main formation for fighting in their drill books... (in the field not all units/commanders followed this change)
The danish version got about 2½ times the men pr. frontage compared to the american skirmish line.

And the procedure for moving, fighting in this formation and how to reinforcing and reliving the main firing line take up a lot more of the drill books, than the pretty short chapter on skirmishing in Hardee's/Casey's.

The Austrians still love the bayonet, but 1/3 of a infantry battalion is still used as skirmishers.


We simply don't see this massive use of skirmishers during the civil war
Tactically it is closer to the 7 year war (as fought in Europe) than it is to the Napoleonic wars.

That the formations during the civil war was a bit more lose than what the drill book require was a result of poor training early on,
and later that the men realized that a more open formation was less vulnerable. (and obvious the terrain was a factor... )

So the heavy skirmish line mentioned by Sherman, is not a result of an official order from the war department and is not found in any official drill book.
It is the result of Looser discipline (Sherman did not stop it), less developed terrain and combat experience.

Also, you make it sound like there is some sort of tactical revolution between Scotts and Hardee's books... that is simply not the case. Most of Hardee's is still the same as what you can find in the earlier French drill books. (something I believe Grant also mention in his book)


*** During the american war of independence, british units did have to fight as both.
Low troop numbers and the north American terrain forced everyone to learn to fight in open order.
 
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Wizard of Cozz

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Aug 20, 2021
Here's a quote from Napoleon (from Jomini's life of Napoleon):

View attachment 412903
View attachment 412904

Most regiments of Pickett's division in their charge, so far as known, advanced in line of battle, and were consequently spared being pummeled as they would massed into battalion columns. Maj. Peyton of the 19th VA noted:
View attachment 412905

However Peyton notes that the division became crowded, and formed into a mass which was pummelled...

View attachment 412906

This description of the crowding reminds me of D'Erlons' attack at Waterloo, and is evidently proved equally deadly. Elliott's map of the battlefield, and the Confederate graves, shows where this crowding took place,

View attachment 412908
Obviously artillery played a large factor in turning back Pickett's charge, but there were two other major factors that played into the failure of the assault.

1.) The choice of brigades - Heth's division should of never made the assault. Or should never have been the front line, should have been a support line. It was in no shape to be doing so. Brockenbrough's men barely made it a few hundred yards before turning back, and in doing so allowed the rest of Pettigrew's division as well as Trimble's to be flanked by the 8th Ohio. There were other 3rd Corps brigades that would have been better choices in the assault (Mahone, Posey, and Thomas).
2.) There was no clear plan to deal with flanking attacks, or it was poorly executed. The flanking fire from the 8th Ohio & 136th NY in the North and Stannards Bde to the south, is a primary cause for the shortening of the frontage of the attack. If Lang and Wilcox had advanced with Pickett with the express purpose of protetcting the flank, more men could have hit "the angle" but instead Kemper and Armistead both detail off their two right regiments to deal with this flanking attack.

Imagine if the assault column would of been something like this:
Line 1 - Mahone and Posey
Line 2 - Armistead
Line 3 - Garnett and Kemper
Line 4 - Thomas and Lane
Line 5 - Perrin and Scales
North Flank - Pettigrew AND Rodes are tasked with moving forward long enough to protect north flank from flanking fire.
South Flank - The rest of Anderson AND Mclaws moves forward to protect the south flank from flanking fire.

Lastly, Place this assault column in the North side of Spangler wood and aim for Ziegler grove, this would have been a much shorter distance to cover for the assault column to get to main line. Your 3 freshest brigades are in Lines 2 and 3, and while Mahone and Posey will take horrendous casualties, each line afterwords will be fresher and will be bringing more of there men into the assault as they hit the Union line. I know Lee's original plan on Day 3 involved timing this in conjunction with Ewell hitting Culp's hill, so imagine if this assault is planned and prepared to time with that assault by Ewell.

I've often wondered if Longstreet didn't learn from the failure at Gettysburg, and it played a factor in how he organized his assaults and Chickamauga and the Wilderness. Compare this with Hood's assaults at Atlanta and Franklin. All of Hood's attacks involved wide frontage with no brigades behind the first line of attack.
 

RedRover

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Dec 16, 2019
That the formations during the civil war was a bit more lose than what the drill book require was a result of poor training early on,
and later that the men realized that a more open formation was less vulnerable. (and obvious the terrain was a factor... )

So the heavy skirmish line mentioned by Sherman, is not a result of an official order from the war department and is not found in any official drill boo
It is the result of Looser discipline (Sherman did not stop it), less developed terrain and combat experience.


Also, you make it sound like there is some sort of tactical revolution between Scotts and Hardee's books... that is simply not the case. Most of Hardee's is still the same as what you can find in the earlier French drill books. (something I believe Grant also mention in his book)


*** During the american war of independence, british units did have to fight as both.
Low troop numbers and the north American terrain forced everyone to learn to fight in open order.

when you mention;

"When moving in a close ordered line a unit is acting like heavy/line infantry.
When skirmishing it is acting as light infantry."


You are correct so far as a "Napoleonic" (1792-1815) model is concerned, but from 1857 all US foot troops and militia (from 1820 the US Militia by law was to employ the same tactics as the US Army) were officially to employ the "light infantry and rifle" tactics, so the distinction no longer existed essentially.

Indeed, a line of battle in "close order" (shoulder to shoulder) cannot move through wooded terrain. the files MUST open to do so... They might try to pass through by files (moving by a flank), hoping to reform in open ground, in correct order, but could not make an attack in that order under a heavy fire (they would not have been able to shoot back), and when forming line of battle in wooded terrain the files must have been somewhat loose; in what would have been considered before the 1850s a light infantry fashion... But I would not confuse this looser order with indiscipline in every case.

From Val Giles of the Texas Brigade, "Rags and Hope..."

"In a battle where the hills and gullies and unbroken woods made perfect close-order drill formations impossible, individual bravery counted for a great deal more than otherwise in modern battle. The Battle of Chickamauga was such a fight. Soldiers in pictures who stand up in unbroken lines and fire by platoons don’t represent the soldiers who fought the Battle of Chickamauga. To keep a correct alignment while going into battle was not possible at Second Manassas, where the woods were open and the plains rolling. Regiments got tangled and lapped over on the open field and, as Chickamauga was a battle in the wilderness, such battle formation was an utter impossibility." [Giles, Rags and Hope…]

Going back to 1791, the US defeat by the Indians at "St. Clair's Defeat" on the Wabash, Chief Justice John Marshall (a light infantry captain in the Revolution) commented on the bad tactics, and how troops standing up to an enemy fire in a close order did not necessarily imply bravery or tactical skill..., but could sometimes suggest the opposite.

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Hardee's tactics was somewhat revolutionary compared to Scotts. I recall many officers initially called it the "shanghai drill" because of the maneuvers at double-quick time or a run. Napoleonic (1792-1815) infantry concentrated on alignment, and close-order. They could not even have fought a battle at Chickamauga, much less a majority of American civil war battlegrounds...without doing so trained for what they would have called light infantry order.
 
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Will Carry

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The Tar Heel State.
The Union Army tried a column attack at Cold Harbor and Little Kennesaw before that. They were trying to find a way to burst through the Rebel defenses. It almost worked at Cold Harbor. They may have tried it around Petersburg. They determined that the column attack would work if you could find a week point in the defenses.
 

RedRover

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Obviously artillery played a large factor in turning back Pickett's charge, but there were two other major factors that played into the failure of the assault.
It also had to do with the Confederate's own failure.

Direct to Richmond on July 31, 1863 Lee reported:

"The enemy...had strengthened his lines with earthworks. The morning was occupied in necessary preparations, and the battle recommenced in the afternoon of the 3d, and raged with great violence until sunset. Our troops succeeded in entering the advanced works of the enemy, and getting possession of some of his batteries, but our artillery having nearly expended its ammunition, the attacking columns became exposed to the heavy fire of the numerous batteries near the summit of the ridge, and, after a most determined and gallant struggle, were compelled to relinquish their advantage, and fall back to their original positions with severe loss."

Lee says the "necessary preparations" for the success of the charge were made, so he was yet confident his plan might have worked if carried out. He declares the lack of "necessary" friendly artillery was the cause of the failure in spite of those "preparations." .

In his later January, 1864 official report of Gettysburg, General Lee states why these "necessary preparations" regarding the artillery support for the charge came to naught... a "protracted cannonade" delivered before the infantry advance...

"The troops moved steadily on, under a heavy fire of musketry and artillery, the main attack being directed against the enemy's left center. His batteries reopened as soon as they appeared. Our own [artillery] having nearly exhausted their ammunition in the protracted cannonade that preceded the advance of the infantry, were unable to reply, or render the necessary support to the attacking party. Owing to this fact, which was unknown to me when the assault took place, the enemy was enabled, to throw a strong force of infantry against our left, already wavering under a concentrated fire of artillery from the ridge in front, and from Cemetery Hill, on the left."

Notice Lee claims that he was unaware his artillery was unable to support the charge. that support being "necessary" the charge failed. He appears to be suggesting that had he known this he would not have allowed the attack to proceed.
Gen. Longstreet's official report, and his memoirs explains his rationale for advancing the infantry, knowing the artillery could not continue to support them. E. Porter Alexander wrote a great deal about this too. He says after he was out of ammo Lee rode up to his advanced position and saw for himself the guns were no longer firing as the infantry pressed forward.

Lee's aide Charles Marshall later noted;

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Also of Lee's staff, Walter Taylor later claimed Lee intended a MASSIVE infantry attack (more than a few divisions) supported by an equally large scale, necessary and critical artillery support). Col. Charles Venable of Lee's staff stated, "As they were ordered to do by General Lee, for I heard him give the orders when arranging the fight..."

For his part, General Longstreet states that he held back Hood's and McLaws' divisions, and after initially ordering forward R.H. Anderson's division, he ordered them to remain in place once he saw the attack would fail.

Lastly, Place this assault column in the North side of Spangler wood and aim for Ziegler grove, this would have been a much shorter distance to cover for the assault column to get to main line. Your 3 freshest brigades are in Lines 2 and 3, and while Mahone and Posey will take horrendous casualties, each line afterwords will be fresher and will be bringing more of there men into the assault as they hit the Union line. I know Lee's original plan on Day 3 involved timing this in conjunction with Ewell hitting Culp's hill, so imagine if this assault is planned and prepared to time with that assault by Ewell.
For what it's worth, in his memorandum notes of an April 15, 1868 interview with General Lee, Col. William Allen recorded Lee commented upon Gettysburg that:

"He found himself engaged with the Federal Army, therefore, unexpectedly, and had to fight. This being decided on, victory would have been won if he could have gotten one decided simultaneous attack on the whole line. This he tried his uttermost to effect for three days and failed. Ewell he could not get to act with decision. Rodes, Early, Johnson, attacked, and were hurt in detail. Longstreet, Hill, etc. could not be gotten to act in concert. Thus the Federal troops were enabled to be opposed to each of our corps, or even divisions in succession." [given in Charles Marshall, Aide de Camp of Lee.]

I've often wondered if Longstreet didn't learn from the failure at Gettysburg, and it played a factor in how he organized his assaults and Chickamauga and the Wilderness. Compare this with Hood's assaults at Atlanta and Franklin. All of Hood's attacks involved wide frontage with no brigades behind the first line of attack.
Yes. At Chickamauga, Williams' Battalion of Artillery was posted at the Poe House, where it enfiladed the rear of the federals' left flank, in their position on the Horseshoe Ridge, making the federal rear a shooting gallery; also Dent's and Everett's batteries on his left, pounding away at the federals' right flank while simultaneously Longstreet's infantry charged continually against the front and flanks...

Once the federals were driven, The Confederates gave a massive, earth shaking rebel yell, and Longstreet exclaimed of the enemy, "They have fought their last man... and he is running!"
 
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