Column vs. line

[JerryD]

You always read about how Civil War generals were schooled in Napoleonic tactics, but at least in the attack, its seems they did not use them. My understanding is that Napoleon favored the column in attack, but other than Spotsylvania Courthouse, invariably attacks in the Civil War were done in line. What other attacks were done by use of the column formation, and why were they not utilized more?

 

[RedRover]

You always read about how Civil War generals were schooled in Napoleonic tactics, but at least in the attack, its seems they did not use them. My understanding is that Napoleon favored the column in attack, but other than Spotsylvania Courthouse, invariably attacks in the Civil War were done in line. What other attacks were done by use of the column formation, and why were they not utilized more?

It's been a while since I read about the Napoleonic Wars, but more recent historians have described the French attacks by battalions in column as something like ambushes. the columns were intended to deploy into line of battle to fight (moving overland in column kept the men, and companies, in hand). The British in Spain, etc. would form on the reverse slopes, and as the French advanced in column up the forward slopes, they did not necessarily know WHERE the enemy line was, and consequently when exactly to deploy. The result was frequently that the British lines raked the French columns and drove them back before they could deploy, as it was considered impossible for a battalion to maneuver under a close fire... Here for example is the repulse of the Imperial Guard attack at Waterloo, advancing in column against the British...

the great difference between Europe and the USA, was that there were actual "battle fields" in Europe, with vast stretches of open ground for massive armies to maneuver. The battle fields in America were better described as battle-woods generally, and tactics were modified accordingly (Hardee's tactics is a "rifle and light infantry" system, rather than "infantry" proper). There were only several actions fought in a "napoleonic" fashion (which was rather old-fashioned by 1860), but they have dominated the public imagination versus the common modes of fighting evidently.

In some cases the Napoleonic French "columns" were simply units in line of battle, one behind another... Pickett's charge was such a "column" etc.

J.M.
Hernando, FL

 

[James N.]

You always read about how Civil War generals were schooled in Napoleonic tactics, but at least in the attack, its seems they did not use them. My understanding is that Napoleon favored the column in attack, but other than Spotsylvania Courthouse, invariably attacks in the Civil War were done in line. What other attacks were done by use of the column formation, and why were they not utilized more?

This can be a fairly complicated subject and is often described in terms of battalions, which are the Napoleonic version of Civil War regiments.

 

[Zack]

I've seen it argued that the "Napoleon" in question may in some cases have been Emperor Napoleon III, not Bonaparte. Generally speaking, battlefield practices of the Civil War had little in common with those of Bonaparte especially as regards cavalry.

I suppose that tracks with the Zouave craze of the time too.

From this site: http://johnsmilitaryhistory.com/cwarmy.html
How many Civil War historians also research and write about the Napoleonic era, the eighteenth century, or other wars of the 19th century? Almost none - but the rare ones who do give us the greatest insight into Civil War combat. How can you understand Civil War tactics without perspective, without studying what Civil War generals studied, without comparing Civil War weapons to those that came before and after? You cannot. How can you understand Civil War tactics by looking solely at the infantry? Many Civil War historians attempt just that, getting bogged down in the minutiae of battles instead of gaining perspective by researching and understanding other eras. Because of this lack of perspective, many historians don't fully understand why Civil War combat was indecisive. And because of their lack of background, when historians specializing in the Civil War have seen Civil War generals write of "Napoleonic" tactics, firstly - they may not have understood what Napoleonic tactics were - something more than men fighting shoulder to shoulder - and secondly, it didn't occur to them that "Napoleonic" might refer to another Napoleon, Napoleon III. Nineteenth century French tactics were an evolution of earlier tactics and included a faster 'gymnastic' pace of attack to reach enemy lines faster, hopefully negating the advantages of the new rifled musket. (The Bloody Crucible of Courage, Brent Nosworthy)

 

[Zack]

It's also possible that when it came to the lessons of Napoleon Bonaparte the generals of the Civil War focused more on larger strategic techniques such as concentration as opposed to specific battlefield manuevers.

https://emergingcivilwar.com/2015/0...-revisited-1815-vs-1863-part-two-of-a-series/

https://civilwarhome.com/napoleontactics.html

 

[Wizard of Cozz]

It's my understanding that line was the preferred fighting position, and column was only used for marching. Artillery had advanced much since 1815, and if you tried to move in column to a position close to the battle line before deploying you'd be ripe for being slaughtered by artillery. Having said that, while you needed to attack in line, the best way to make an attack against a battle line was to give it depth. Some of the most successful frontal attacks in the Civil War had depth. Chickamauga (5 lines - 8 brigades), Longstreet's Wilderness Counter Attack (launches Kershaw and Field's division at Hancock in Column by brigade), finally at Spotsylvania you have two examples of this (Upton's attack on May 10 and the larger attack on May 12). I'm sure there are others, but I can't think of many successful frontal attacks that lacked depth.

 

[Wizard of Cozz]

It's also possible that when it came to the lessons of Napoleon Bonaparte the generals of the Civil War focused more on larger strategic techniques such as concentration as opposed to specific battlefield manuevers.

https://emergingcivilwar.com/2015/0...-revisited-1815-vs-1863-part-two-of-a-series/

https://civilwarhome.com/napoleontactics.html

You nailed it the most when you mentioned cavalry. Napoleonic France, and Europe in general had both heavy and light cavalry. It was still effective in both Seven Weeks War and the Franco-Prussian Wars that came after the Civil War. Though less successful than at the beginning of the 19th Century. Napoleonic Combat had much higher percentage of Cavalry in their armies, when Napoleon returns from Russia after the disaster in 1812 he is able to rebuild his infantry but not his cavalry, this will come back to bite him as he is not able to follow through in his victories at Lutzen and Bautzen.

Civil War commanders never used their cavalry for much of anything more than either scouting, raiding, or as dismounted infantry. They also didn't have the equipment needed if they wanted to use it as a heavy shock weapon, as Napoleon and other European powers did. Napoleon would often use a Cavalry attack to buy him time. After the bridges broke at the battle of Aspern-Essling Napoleon launched a Cavalry Attack to cover his retreat. In the most simplest terms Napoleonic combat involved a very combined arms approach. It also had a bit a rock/paper/scissors to it. Cavalry could defeat Artillery, Unprotected artillery was easy game for Cavalry, Infantry could only stand up to Cavalry in squares, as he cavalry would get on the flanks and rear of Infantry line formations.

 

[Wizard of Cozz]

This is probably one of the best reads I've ever had comparing the evolution of Napoleonic tactics into the 19th century, and how the Civil War factored into that.

http://johnsmilitaryhistory.com/cwarmy.html

 

[James N.]

To elaborate, the twenty-year period of war 1794-1815 witnessed several periods of real problems for the French and their armies. At the beginning, France like most European countries had a relatively small but well-trained professional army; with the coming of the Revolution 1n 1789 there was a huge influx of volunteers - later replaced by essentially draftees - who were enthusiastic but untrained and incapable of making even simple battlefield maneuvers. (This was not unlike the problem Irvin McDowell faced at Bull Run in '61.) To simplify what was a complicated series of trials and decisions, French commanders decided to "bracket" the new volunteer battalions with Regular ones in a 2-1 formation called a demi-brigade. (Two volunteer plus one regular.) The intent was that the regular battalion would provide a stiffening of training while the volunteers would infuse the Regulars with necessary civisme or patriotic and morale-building energy. (As an aside I'll mention this was the first real patriotic upheaval in modern European history and gave rise to the idea of the modern nation-state with its huge armies that were the norm by WWI.)

The volunteers were incapable of performing the evolutions necessary so were usually deployed either in column OR in line but were incapable of quickly or easily forming from one into the other. Their best "tactic" evolved into a swarm that might if lucky rush forward like a mob and overwhelm their opponents. In practice this didn't work out so well: a well-trained opponent would simply blow them away before they could reach them, or even if they did, this mob was now vulnerable to a counter attack and unable to reform to receive one, scampering away instead. Again simplifying the process, this was somewhat solved by having the demi-brigades and divisions made of them formed into what was known as order mixte or "mixed order" whereby one battalion would be in line for firing; the next in column for assault; another in line; another in column; etc.; etc. This could be varied at the division commander's pleasure, say one or two battalions in line on both flanks with two or more battalions in column in the center for making an assault. This might even consist of several battalions in column one behind another for a really heavy assault. (As far as I remember, nothing this complicated was attempted during the Civil War; Hancock's dawn assault on the Mule Shoe at Spotsylvania was more like the center columns just described.) Order mixte seems to have been favored by many generals by the time of the Empire ca. 1804.

Napoleonic commanders often chose the exact nature of their attacks - the Emperor usually left the details to them, for good or ill. Marshal Macdonald famously formed his division at Wagram into a sort of hollow square two or more brigades (demi-brigades were a thing of the past by then) across in front and others in column on the flanks followed by another in line across the base of the formation. This was at least in part because he didn't trust his men in a looser formation and thought that although they would suffer horribly from Austrian artillery fire the formation would keep them together for the assault. Unfortunately it failed to achieve the object at which it was aimed but allowed the French on either flank to recover from the surprise attack that had prompted the action:

Note Macdonald's "square" in the center of the map, moving to the left - nobody on either side attempted anything as radical as this during the Civil War!

 

[Wizard of Cozz]

The other thing to consider, and has been touched upon some, is that organization, while having many of the same names (Corps, Division, Brigade, and Regiment) didn't necessarily have the meaning, or weren't used exactly the same. On top of that French Regiments were divided further into battalions.

In the french system you may see something similar to this:
Corps - 5K-20K (Usually 2-4 Divisions)
Division - 4K - 5K Men (Usually 2 or 3 Brigades)
Brigade - 1K - 2K Men (Usually 1 or 2 regments in a brigade) Not always though
Regiment - 1K Men
Battalion - 500 men

As you can see battalions were more like regiments in the civil war, while regiments and brigades both took up a level that we would describe as brigades in the civil war. Divisions were usually slightly smaller then Confederate divisions and much closer in size to Union divisions. Corps were mostly analagous in size to what you saw in the Civil War.

The fact that you have battalions in Napoleonic times gave napoleonic commanders more control. A brigade commander would have commanders on each wing of the attack (Remember the Battalions are in place of regiments during the Civil War). The situation gave for more flexibility than you saw during the Civil War.

Corps in Napoleonic times were mixed with Cavalry, Artillery, and Infantry, while the Emperor had his only personal force known as the Imperial Guard, that also included Cavalry, Artillery, and Infantry.

 

[BillWright]

On may 18th and 23rd grant used columns of four attacking Vicksburg. They were failures with much loss of life. The confederates had to call a flag of truce in order to get the union to come retrieve their dead after they laid out in the sun for 5 days

 

[Wizard of Cozz]

On may 18th and 23rd grant used columns of four attacking Vicksburg. They were failures with much loss of life. The confederates had to call a flag of truce in order to get the union to come retrieve their dead after they laid out in the sun for 5 days

I'm not as familiar with the specifics of the Vicksburg campaign, did Grant put the brigades in columns, or regiments? The best way in the civil war would be something like keeping your regiments in line formation but stacking them behind each other in intervals, OR doing that with your brigades (Like what Longstreet did at Chickamauga.

 

[James N.]

It's my understanding that line was the preferred fighting position, and column was only used for marching. Artillery had advanced much since 1815, and if you tried to move in column to a position close to the battle line before deploying you'd be ripe for being slaughtered by artillery. Having said that, while you needed to attack in line, the best way to make an attack against a battle line was to give it depth. Some of the most successful frontal attacks in the Civil War had depth. Chickamauga (5 lines - 8 brigades), Longstreet's Wilderness Counter Attack (launches Kershaw and Field's division at Hancock in Column by brigade), finally at Spotsylvania you have two examples of this (Upton's attack on May 10 and the larger attack on May 12). I'm sure there are others, but I can't think of many successful frontal attacks that lacked depth.

Of course there were different kinds of columns: a road column commonly used for marching was only four men abreast, stretching back in a long snake hundreds of men behind. One popular column much better suited for an assault was called a column of companies featuring two entire companies abreast, two men deep; in this formation a ten-company regiment would be two companies across, followed by two more, with another two behind them, another two behind them, another two behind them, and finally the last two, making a total as much as a hundred men across (assuming the companies were at full strength which is unlikely) and ten men deep!

 

[James N.]

On may 18th and 23rd grant used columns of four attacking Vicksburg. They were failures with much loss of life. The confederates had to call a flag of truce in order to get the union to come retrieve their dead after they laid out in the sun for 5 days

I'm not as familiar with the specifics of the Vicksburg campaign, did Grant put the brigades in columns, or regiments? The best way in the civil war would be something like keeping your regiments in line formation but stacking them behind each other in intervals, OR doing that with your brigades (Like what Longstreet did at Chickamauga.

The Confederates made their offer of a truce much sooner, but it took Grant that long to admit he had failed and agree to the truce. Grant left his corps and division commanders to decide on the assault formations so he didn't do any of that himself.

 

[Wizard of Cozz]

Emory Upton's attack at Spotsylvania is a great example of a column attack. Upton basically had 3 columns. His regiments were in line formation but he stacked each column with 4 regiments each. The two outer columns would peal left and right to attack down the battle line while the middle column would keep on going straight once it reached the enemy position.

 

[Wizard of Cozz]

Compare what Longstreet did at Chickamauga, and Grant and Upton at Spotsylvania, with the Gettysburg Day 3, Franklin, and Cold Harbor. The latter 3 involved a wider frontage and lacked depth to the assault.

 

[thomas aagaard]

(Hardee's tactics is a "rifle and light infantry" system, rather than "infantry" proper).

the civil war was fought in line... close ordered lines got nothing to do with light infantry tactics.
The only new things from Hardee's that was used was a bit faster march speed and a new manual of arms...

 

[jackt62]

According to Earl J. Hess in "Civil War Infantry Tactics," the use of the column formation for attack was not common in contrast to the widely used line variations.

 

[JerryD]

According to Earl J. Hess in "Civil War Infantry Tactics," the use of the column formation for attack was not common in contrast to the widely used line variations.

Yes, that was the point of my question. Invariably with few exceptions Civil War generals used line formations, but when I read accounts of Napoleon's battles you read about columnar formations that were used to quickly bring the bayonet to the fore, in that a column, apparently, could move faster and was more maneuverable than the line formation. Upton's use of the formation at Spotsylvania was such a success that I was wondering why it was not employed more often.

 

[JerryD]

In some cases the Napoleonic French "columns" were simply units in line of battle, one behind another... Pickett's charge was such a "column" etc.

J.M.
Hernando, FL

I dont think anyone would call Pickett's Charge a columnar attack, unless I am very much mistaken.