Tennessee/Kentucky line

[atlantis]

Was the state border between Tenn. and KY. a viable defensive line for the confederacy. My understanding is that originally A S Johnston was under orders not to enter Kentucky.

 

[Lampasas Bill]

I don't see any physical features that could have aided a defense along such an extented line.

 

[SWS]

It seems to me that Forts Henry-Heiman were by far the weakest links in the chain.

 

[gary]

Having Kentucky as a neutral buffer state was the defensive line. It's like two armies glaring at each other with Luxembourg, Poland or Switzerland in the middle. Polk didn't see it that way. I think it was only a matter of time before somebody decided to cross and it was Polk.

 

[RedRover]

Was the state border between Tenn. and KY. a viable defensive line for the confederacy. My understanding is that originally A S Johnston was under orders not to enter Kentucky.

If the State of Kentucky was in some manner, somehow, to remain a neutral zone, without the movement of the contending armies, etc., it was a defensive buffer for Confederate Tennessee. But militarily, advancing into Kentucky was the other option for the Confederates.

General Polk entered Kentucky about September 7, and occupied Columbus on the Mississippi, south of Padukah. General Grant's US forces at Cairo, IL responded by moving to Paducah. General Polk informed Governor Magoffin of Kentucky that he would withdraw his troops back to Tennessee, etc. if the Union troops also withdrew from Kentucky, and the neutrality restored.

The Kentucky legislature however, resolved demanding the CSA forces withdraw from the State, and the Governor communicated this to Polk, desiring he withdraw...

At that point, the Confederates felt the neutrality of Kentucky they had relied upon was essentially over. Jefferson Davis at Richmond ordered Polk to stay put, and await arrival of General Johnston.

The same day, Davis at Richmond informed Governor Harris of Tennessee, that the security of Tennessee required the CS troops to remain at Columbus, Kentucky for the time being...

On the 15th of September, Davis wrote General Polk approving of his operations in Kentucky, and encouraging him to hold fast, as Gen. Johnston was en route...

....

General A.S. Johnston arrived about the scene and took general charge of the affairs. Johnston's son says he talked briefly about the situation in late 1861 with his father. And observes that Kentucky's neutrality WAS the defensive line of the Confederacy along the Tennessee border. When it was no longer a buffer for the Tennessee border, Gen. Johnston pressed CSA troops to occupy Bowling Green.

...


General Johnston issued the following proclamation to the Kentuckians, etc.

Afterwards, noted the younger Johnston, even with CSA forces in Kentucky, they were at a distinct disadvantage, and numbers of Tennesseans were passing into Kentucky and many organizing with the Union Army, etc.

This map depicting the situation by February, 1862, shows the situation. The Tennessee State line from Cumberland Gap on the east, to the Mississippi River to the west, was a long border, and largely unguarded even by then. The Confederates concentrated at Columbus and Bowling Green Kentucky, and at Forts Henry and Donelson on the Cumberland and Tennessee rivers (in Tennessee, near the border) and at Cumberland Gap.

 

[atlantis]

If Polk had not advanced into Kentucky giving Johnston more time to prepare, is it not reasonable a viable defense of the Tennessee border could have been mounted.

 

[Rhea Cole]

Memphis is closer to Canada than to Bristol on the border with Virginia. There was no east / west line of communication.

The Mississippi, Tennessee & Cumberland Rivers slice through Tennessee from north to south. They create what is called the three Grand Divisions. Geographically & culturally the three divisions are distinct from one another. They were also isolated by unfordable river barriers.

Johnston had a daunting task put upon him by Davis. His commanders, Polk, Pillow & Zolicoffer were each convinced that they would be the locus of the Union invasion. Johnston, not to be left out, did too.

Gigantism was the order of the day. Columbus, Donelson & Bowling Green were enormous earthen fortresses requiring garrisons in the 25 - 30,000 numbers. Due to a complete lack of executive oversight by Johnston, Nashville's gargantuan defenses were little more than surveyor's stakes.

Leaving for another thread Polk having his pants & his wits blown away by the detonation of a cannon & Pillow's gad flying around reporting mythical hoards of Yankees just over the horizon, Johnston reverted to a lifelong coping mechanism.

When confronted with a complex problem, Johnston would fixate on a single element & ignore the rest. This is behavior typical of an incompetent manager.

As a result of his fixation on the threat Buel's force to Johnston's HQ in Bowling Green, the rest of his command was left to sort itself out.

Grant realized that Polk & Johnston could not support Fort Donelson. With a force a fraction the size of Johnston's, Grant attacked the isolated center of the Tennessee / Kentucky line.

Johnston, reacting to Grant's surprise move, personally removed to Nashville, the fortified bastion that controlled Middle Tennessee… only it didn't. While there he received Pillows' declaration of outstanding success & the surrender of Donelson.

Johnston set the good example & headed south to Corinth, Mississippi as fast as he could go. His order to the TN / KY border defenses was, essentially, "Run for your lives!"

Given these events it is possible to answer it in one way only. The only hope Davis had of defending the indefensible TN / KY border was one, appoint an entirely different chain of command. Two, he had to miraculously get Lincoln to replace Grant & Co. with the Confederate commanders. Only their collective incompetence could have prevented some form of collapse of an impossible position.

 

[Saruman]

Was the state border between Tenn. and KY. a viable defensive line for the confederacy. My understanding is that originally A S Johnston was under orders not to enter Kentucky.

Not at all. There were few defensive topographical features and the Tennessee and Cumberland rivers penetrated the line, allowing Union gunboats and troop transports easy access.

After Polk invaded Kentucky, Johnston knew that the buffer was gone and he immediately ordered Zollicoffer and Buckner to advance their troops into the state. He then tried to bluff the Union commanders into thinking that his forces were much stronger than they were in reality, and threatened Confederate offensives against the Ohio River. The illusion worked for almost six months.

 

[SWS]

Considering the sheer dearth of Confederate munitions (especially for the West) at this early stage of the War, the political necessity of keeping what troops they had on hand posted along a vast frontier instead of being concentrated for a decisive stroke, the disadvantageous (to the point of absurdity, perhaps) course of the Tennessee and Cumberland rivers and the Union's corresponding naval superiority, the fact that the site of the future Fort Heiman was during the critical summer of 1861 located in a 'neutral' territory, the complacency (if not apathy) of even the loyal Confederate populace, the reluctance of Tennessee planters to lease their slaves for absolutely essential work on fortifications (I recall Johnston basically expected the work around Nashville to be done by his soldiers, in possession of prior experience at Bowling Green, once they retired from Ky.), and the simple fact that Johnston could not be everywhere at once (Buell's large army hovering north of Bowling Green, which could be supplied and reinforced by rail from the wharves and warehouses of Louisville, was not exactly chopped liver, and Nashville, probably the most important point in the Western Department, was host to an increasingly vital depot and burgeoning manufactories), I'd say old Sidney, considering the feebleness of government and civil aid before inevitable disaster finally struck, did about as well in keeping things together for as long as could be expected as Lee when the latter was faced with the collapse of the Richmond-Petersburg line some three years later. I will also observe that the surrender of the southern force at Fort Donelson was for Johnston what finding the Union army at Jetersville was for Lee. Both instances really threw a wrench into the planning of the Confederate commanders.

If only the Union had waited until later in the spring, when a severe drought developed. Otherwise the weather appeared to favor them, from early-winter 'Indian summer' conditions to the late-winter freshets. The situation was just not favorable at all to the Confederacy beyond what trepidatious effect Johnston's prestige and stratagems could impress on the minds of the Federal commanders, and it took the resultant emergency to fully arouse the genius and will of the South for a general war. Johnston himself commanded like a pillar on the march to Mississippi and like a lion at Shiloh, but alas.

Pretty sure it was a good thing Polk took the bluffs at Columbus, Ky., when he did, as it seems likely to me that Frémont would have ordered Grant there in a short time regardless. If only they had done the same when faced with the issues on the Tennessee river. But it would probably take the same emancipation measure Frémont took in Missouri to inflame Ky. to the side of the Confederacy. And the Union seems to have been actively recruiting and organizing troops in Kentucky (at Camp Dick Robinson) all the while as well, not to mention the blatant Unionism of the Commonwealth legislature at Bowling Green and many Kentucky citizens during their so-called period of neutrality.

 

[OpnCoronet]

If the State of Kentucky was in some manner, somehow, to remain a neutral zone, without the movement of the contending armies, etc., it was a defensive buffer for Confederate Tennessee. But militarily, advancing into Kentucky was the other option for the Confederates.

General Polk entered Kentucky about September 7, and occupied Columbus on the Mississippi, south of Padukah. General Grant's US forces at Cairo, IL responded by moving to Paducah. General Polk informed Governor Magoffin of Kentucky that he would withdraw his troops back to Tennessee, etc. if the Union troops also withdrew from Kentucky, and the neutrality restored.

The Kentucky legislature however, resolved demanding the CSA forces withdraw from the State, and the Governor communicated this to Polk, desiring he withdraw...

View attachment 577734

At that point, the Confederates felt the neutrality of Kentucky they had relied upon was essentially over. Jefferson Davis at Richmond ordered Polk to stay put, and await arrival of General Johnston.

View attachment 577728

The same day, Davis at Richmond informed Governor Harris of Tennessee, that the security of Tennessee required the CS troops to remain at Columbus, Kentucky for the time being...

View attachment 577729

On the 15th of September, Davis wrote General Polk approving of his operations in Kentucky, and encouraging him to hold fast, as Gen. Johnston was en route...

View attachment 577735
....
View attachment 577736


General A.S. Johnston arrived about the scene and took general charge of the affairs. Johnston's son says he talked briefly about the situation in late 1861 with his father. And observes that Kentucky's neutrality WAS the defensive line of the Confederacy along the Tennessee border. When it was no longer a buffer for the Tennessee border, Gen. Johnston pressed CSA troops to occupy Bowling Green.

View attachment 577719
View attachment 577720
View attachment 577721
...


General Johnston issued the following proclamation to the Kentuckians, etc.

View attachment 577717
View attachment 577718



Afterwards, noted the younger Johnston, even with CSA forces in Kentucky, they were at a distinct disadvantage, and numbers of Tennesseans were passing into Kentucky and many organizing with the Union Army, etc.

View attachment 577722

This map depicting the situation by February, 1862, shows the situation. The Tennessee State line from Cumberland Gap on the east, to the Mississippi River to the west, was a long border, and largely unguarded even by then. The Confederates concentrated at Columbus and Bowling Green Kentucky, and at Forts Henry and Donelson on the Cumberland and Tennessee rivers (in Tennessee, near the border) and at Cumberland Gap.

View attachment 577737

Very true, Ky. Neutrality was a 'political' sham designed by Ky's governor to give himself time to rally pro confederate votes in the Legislature for a formal(Legal) act for Secession.

State borders a political lines drawn on a Map, with little or no reference to military or geographical importance.

In historical terms the neutrality of Ky. was condition upon which side could gain a political advantage for or against Kentucky's Secession.