Bragg replaced in March 1863?

[OldReliable1862]

On 31 December 1862, Braxton Bragg had sent word to Richmond that he had won a great victory at Murfreesboro. The message was premature, as after two more days of fighting the Army of the Cumberland did not retreat, and the battle ended with Bragg eventually withdrawing to Tullahoma.

These events brought the simmering ill will between Bragg and his chief subordinates to a head, and department commander Joseph E. Johnston was summoned to meet with Bragg and determine whether he should be relieved. Johnston hardly seemed eager to take Bragg's place, and approved of all his recent decisions.

However, Davis would still order Johnston to take Bragg's place, and summon Bragg to Richmond for a conference. However, Johnston was already on his way to Mississippi, and Bragg's wife Elise was ill. In the end, Bragg would remain commander for another nine months.

However, what if Johnston became commander of the Army of Tennessee before the Tullahoma campaign? Part of the poor performance of the AoT in that campaign can be explained by the lack of confidence Polk and Hardee had in their commander - a problem which should not exist here.

Another problem was the death of Van Dorn in May, leaving Wheeler to take command of the AoT's cavalry arm. If Van Dorn's death is butterflied and he is in command, I hardly think the cavalry will do any worse than they did historically.

What becomes of Bragg after this is uncertain, but I don't consider it implausible he could take command of the forces in Mississippi instead of Johnston.

 

[Gavrilo Sartorys]

If replaced, Gen. Braxton Bragg would certainly be transferred to the Eastern theater, probably assuming command of the Department of North Carolina & Southern Virginia. He would be close to Davis, would have less recusant subordinates and his administrative skills would be useful there.

Then, about Gen. Joe Johnston, an upgrade of the military situation during spring 1863 seems hard to imagine. While he is one of my favorite generals, Johnston may be tempted to "over-maneuvering" instead of fixing his troops in a well-chosen defensive position in the Tullahoma area. He still be a better commander than Bragg.

Of course, Maj. Gen. Ear Van Dorn being alive would bring a new "military-intelligence factor" during the campaign, as Van Dorn can assume command of the whole cavalry forces in Tennessee :

Army of Tennessee : GEN Joe Johnston
- - - - - J.K. Jackson's Independent Bde (District of the Tennessee)

- Polk's (1st) Corps : LTG Leonidas Polk
- - - Cheatham's Div. : MG Frank Cheatham = 4 Bdes
- - - Withers' Div. : MG Jones Withers = 4 Bdes

- Hardee's (2nd) Corps : LTG William Hardee
- - - McCown's Div. : MG John McCown = 3 Bdes
- - - Breckinridge's Div. : MG John Breckinridge = 4 Bdes
- - - Cleburne's Div. : MG Pat Cleburne = 4 Bdes

- Van Dorn's Cavalry Corps : MG Buck Van Dorn = 4 Bdes

- Wheeler's Cavalry Corps : MG Joseph Wheeler = 4 Bdes

 

[John Wolf Smith]

Who would take over the forces at Jackson Mississippi from Johnston. I would put Hardee or Beauregard in command there.

 

[Josh The Lighthouse Guy]

Who would take over the forces at Jackson Mississippi from Johnston. I would put Hardee or Beauregard in command there.

Probably a good use of Beauregard. Even swapping Bragg and Johnston would play to both men's strengths while getting Bragg away from the toxic AOT upper command situation.

 

[danny]

Who would take over the forces at Jackson Mississippi from Johnston. I would put Hardee or Beauregard in command there.

Good suggestions; however that would create critical vacancies. The Army of Tennessee would lose a capable and experienced Corp commander in Hardee. The Dept of Georgia, South Carolina & Florida would lose Beauregard.

 

[John Wolf Smith]

Good suggestions; however that would create critical vacancies. The Army of Tennessee would lose a capable and experienced Corp commander in Hardee. The Dept of Georgia, South Carolina & Florida would lose Beauregard.

I would put Hardee in command of Beauregard's old department and have D.H. Hill get Hardee's old Corps and Bragg would get the command of North Carolina. I would also organize a 3rd division for Polk's Corps under Alexander P. Stewart and have Daniel S. Donelson return to get Withers' Division due to Withers' bad health. Buckner would then replace Donelson in East Tennessee.

I belive that if Bragg was in command of North Carolina then Lee may have gotten more troops for the invasion of Pennsylvania like Cooke's and M. Ransom of Robert Ransom's division, Colquitt's brigade and the two brigades of Pickett's Division.

 

[Josh The Lighthouse Guy]

The Dept of Georgia, South Carolina & Florida would lose Beauregard.

Beauregard's practical duties were almost entirely regarding the defense of Charleston which I think could have been adequately handled by many other generals. The Union forces operating against Charleston never really seemed to have a real clue how to crack that nut. Local geography made it a tough nut to crack.

 

[John Wolf Smith]

I would have Cleburne's (Polk, Liddell and Adams) and McCown's Divisions (Ector, McNair and Vance) moved to Jackson to join in march or april so that if Pemberton needed reinforcements then there would be some. I would also removed S.A.M. Wood from his brigade and replace him with Col Samuel Adams of the 33rd Alabama. Also, I would have the department of Eastern Tennessee attached to the army and organized into two divisions.

 

[Josh The Lighthouse Guy]

Also, I would have the department of Eastern Tennessee attached to the army and organized into two divisions.

This makes a lot of sense. The Confederates had a safe and reliable railroad connecting Knoxville and Tullahoma so the AOT could shuttle units between the two points as needed.

 

[Nathan Stuart]

On 31 December 1862, Braxton Bragg had sent word to Richmond that he had won a great victory at Murfreesboro. The message was premature, as after two more days of fighting the Army of the Cumberland did not retreat, and the battle ended with Bragg eventually withdrawing to Tullahoma.

These events brought the simmering ill will between Bragg and his chief subordinates to a head, and department commander Joseph E. Johnston was summoned to meet with Bragg and determine whether he should be relieved. Johnston hardly seemed eager to take Bragg's place, and approved of all his recent decisions.

However, Davis would still order Johnston to take Bragg's place, and summon Bragg to Richmond for a conference. However, Johnston was already on his way to Mississippi, and Bragg's wife Elise was ill. In the end, Bragg would remain commander for another nine months.

However, what if Johnston became commander of the Army of Tennessee before the Tullahoma campaign? Part of the poor performance of the AoT in that campaign can be explained by the lack of confidence Polk and Hardee had in their commander - a problem which should not exist here.

Another problem was the death of Van Dorn in May, leaving Wheeler to take command of the AoT's cavalry arm. If Van Dorn's death is butterflied and he is in command, I hardly think the cavalry will do any worse than they did historically.

What becomes of Bragg after this is uncertain, but I don't consider it implausible he could take command of the forces in Mississippi instead of Johnston.

That's an interesting 'what if' question raised about Johnston and the Army of Tennessee, and consequential possibilities for Bragg, in the period between Murfreesboro and the Tullahoma campaign.

Broadly speaking. As commander of the Army of Tennessee, Johnston might have devised an effective defensive strategy in middle Tennessee to delay the offensive actions of Union forces gathering there. It's likely Johnston would have reverted to the same kind of skilful defensive maneuverings (losing ground with temporary delaying actions on ground of his choice) that he employed during the 1864 Atlanta campaign. As a theater commander, Johnston was against defending multiple areas simultaneously and he advocated ceding ground as part of any long-term strategy. However, these tactics and mindsets applied in direct Army leadership were likely to have inevitably incurred the displeasure and possible direct interference of Davis.

In relation to Bragg's possible redeployment. Johnston would not have accepted the Army leadership, if Bragg remained in the command structure. During the first half of 1863, Bragg was physically and mentally breaking down, was engaged in a power struggle with some of his Generals and was as irascible and disagreeable as ever. He was also devoid of strategies during this time. In my view, he was probably unsuited to enduring the vigors and pressures of another frontline combat command position. On the event of Johnston's accession to Army leadership during this period, it would probably have been an opportune time to transfer Bragg (due to his organizational abilities) to a senior administrative role at Richmond.

 

[John Wolf Smith]

That's a good 'what if' question raised about Johnston and the Army of Tennessee, and consequential possibilities for Bragg, in the period between Murfreesboro and the Tullahoma campaign.

Broadly speaking. As commander of the Army of Tennessee, Johnston might have devised an effective defensive strategy in middle Tennessee to delay the offensive actions of Union forces gathering there. It's likely Johnston would have reverted to the same kind of skilful defensive maneuverings (losing ground with temporary delaying actions on ground of his choice) that he employed during the 1864 Atlanta campaign. As a theater commander, Johnston was against defending multiple areas simultaneously and he advocated ceding ground as part of any long-term strategy. However, these tactics and mindsets applied in direct Army leadership were likely to have inevitably incurred the displeasure and possible direct interference of Davis.

In relation to Bragg's possible redeployment. Johnston would not have accepted the Army leadership, if Bragg remained in the command structure. During the first half of 1863, Bragg was physically and mentally breaking down, was engaged in a power struggle with some of his Generals and was as irascible and disagreeable as ever. He was also devoid of strategies during this time. In my view, he was probably unsuited to enduring the vigors and pressures of another frontline combat command position. On the event of Johnston's accession to Army leadership during this period, it would probably have been an opportune time to transfer Bragg (due to his organizational abilities) to a senior administrative role at Richmond.

I would personally belive that Bragg would get the command of North Carolina and would replace D.H. Hill who would get some of Robert E. Lee's brigades from not joining him for the invasion of Pennsylvania. Bragg would as I stated in a post above would get Lee the troops he would need because he did the same thing for Albert S. Johnston for the Shiloh Campaign. Also Joseph Johntson would have to deal with Grant in Mississippi and if he would send troops to help Pemberton and union forces near Knoxville.

 

[OldReliable1862]

Bragg could go to Mississippi, depending on how his health holds up. Beauregard is possible, but Davis won't like having two major armies commanded by men he dislikes. Hardee also seems to be an acceptable option.

 

[John Wolf Smith]

Bragg could go to Mississippi, depending on how his health holds up. Beauregard is possible, but Davis won't like having two major armies commanded by men he dislikes. Hardee also seems to be an acceptable option.

I would have Bragg take over North Carolina, Beauregard could stay in Georgia and Hardee should got to Mississippi but if needed I would have Beauregard ready to go to Mississippi if Hardee is not up to the command.

 

[Nathan Stuart]

I would personally belive that Bragg would get the command of North Carolina and would replace D.H. Hill who would get some of Robert E. Lee's brigades from not joining him for the invasion of Pennsylvania. Bragg would as I stated in a post above would get Lee the troops he would need because he did the same thing for Albert S. Johnston for the Shiloh Campaign. Also Joseph Johntson would have to deal with Grant in Mississippi and if he would send troops to help Pemberton and union forces near Knoxville.

I agree, as a less strenuous and interpersonally demanding situation, that's a possible option for Bragg.

As a theater commander, I don't think Johnston favored having undermanned commands scattered over four departments. He preferred concentrating his available resources over chosen areas. I also don't think he would commit troops to defend Vicksburg. The prospect of being hemmed in didn't appeal to him – he opted for mobile defensive maneuverings in the field.

 

[OldReliable1862]

I agree, as a less strenuous and interpersonally demanding situation, that's a possible option for Bragg.

As a theater commander, I don't think Johnston favored having undermanned commands scattered over four departments. He preferred concentrating his available resources over chosen areas. I also don't think he would commit troops to defend Vicksburg. The prospect of being hemmed in didn't appeal to him – he opted for mobile defensive maneuverings in the field.

Can Johnston just abandon Vicksburg without making some kind of effort against Grant?

 

[John Wolf Smith]

Johnston can't abandon Vicksburg as that could lead to a fight on two fronts and that would mean abandoning Port Hudson and Jackson Mississippi and could lead to the fall of Mobile.

 

[Nathan Stuart]

Can Johnston just abandon Vicksburg without making some kind of effort against Grant?

That's another interesting question.

To begin, I believe that Vicksburg was of key strategic significance to the Confederacy. The South could not afford to lose this vital transportation hub. In my opinion, its loss was the turning point of the war.

But the question raised here is about Johnston and his intentions.

As previously mentioned, one can get some indication by looking at Johnston's mindset beforehand as theater commander. He did not favor deployments of scattered undermanned commands, instead opting for troop concentrations to fight defensively. His defensive tactics also preferred fighting by skilful maneuverings (his references to a willingness to giving up ground for longer-term gains, implies his preference for defensive mobility).

A further guide as to his possible intentions in the situation can perhaps be found by examining his conduct in actual combat command. In May, 1863, while at Jackson, Johnston (as theater commander) urged Pemberton to combine with him, to attack Sherman's Divisions around Clinton, about 15 miles northwest of Jackson (Johnston, however, did not seriously intend to join up with Pemberton at Vicksburg). When this plan failed to materialize, Johnston and his gathered small force withdrew to Canton, northeast of Jackson.

Similarly, as further guidance of his possible intentions, one only has to look at how he later applied his defensive strategy of skilful maneuverings during the 1864 Atlanta campaign. Richmond came to believe that he would readily give up Atlanta in the pursuit of his own notions of a mobilized defensive strategy, without necessarily committing to securing long-term a fixed position, like Atlanta.

My bottom line opinion. Johnston would not reinforce Vicksburg because it was a fixed position and he saw there a real risk of entrapment. He would also not engage Grant outside of Vicksburg because he could not concentrate enough troops (commands were too dispersed) in the vicinity, during this period. I think if he was appointed to Army command, he would have implemented a more effective defensive strategy than Bragg in middle-Tennessee by the time of the Tullahoma campaign.

 

[John Wolf Smith]

That's another interesting question.

To begin, I believe that Vicksburg was of key strategic significance to the Confederacy. The South could not afford to lose this vital transportation hub. In my opinion, its loss was the turning point of the war.

But the question raised here is about Johnston and his intentions.

As previously mentioned, one can get some indication by looking at Johnston's mindset beforehand as theater commander. He did not favor deployments of scattered undermanned commands, instead opting for troop concentrations to fight defensively. His defensive tactics also preferred fighting by skilful maneuverings (his references to a willingness to giving up ground for longer-term gains, implies his preference for defensive mobility).

A further guide as to his possible intentions in the situation can perhaps be found by examining his conduct in actual combat command. In May, 1863, while at Jackson, Johnston (as theater commander) urged Pemberton to combine with him, to attack Sherman's Divisions around Clinton, about 15 miles northwest of Jackson (Johnston, however, did not seriously intend to join up with Pemberton at Vicksburg). When this plan failed to materialize, Johnston and his gathered small force withdrew to Canton, northeast of Jackson.

Similarly, as further guidance of his possible intentions, one only has to look at how he later applied his defensive strategy of skilful maneuverings during the 1864 Atlanta campaign. Richmond came to believe that he would readily give up Atlanta in the pursuit of his own notions of a mobilized defensive strategy, without necessarily committing to securing long-term a fixed position, like Atlanta.

My bottom line opinion. Johnston would not reinforce Vicksburg because it was a fixed position and he saw there a real risk of entrapment. He would also not engage Grant outside of Vicksburg because he could not concentrate enough troops (commands were too dispersed) in the vicinity, during this period. I think if he was appointed to Army command, he would have implemented a more effective defensive strategy than Bragg in middle-Tennessee by the time of the Tullahoma campaign.

I belive that there were enough troops in the area that could be able to help Vicksburg. Also if Richard Taylor had gotten troops then he could have helped protect Port Hudson. Plus I have a way for Johnston to kept the Army of Tennessee in good shape while sending two divisions when needed to help Vicksburg. That way is have the army rebuilt into two Corps under Polk and D.H. Hill with four divisions under each corps and three indepedent brigades at Chattanooga and the department of Eastern Tennessee would be regrouped into the army as well.

Army of Tennessee: General Joseph E. Johnston

Polk's Corps: LtG Leonidas Polk

Cheatham's Division: MG Benjamin F. Cheatham
(1st, 6th, 9th, 27th, 34th and 24th Tennessee Battalion) Maney's Brigade: BG George E. Maney
(12th, 13th, 29th, 47th and 154th Tennessee) Smith's Brigade: BG Preston Smith
(4th, 5th, 19th, 24th, 31st, 33rd and 63rd Tennessee) Strahl's Brigade: BG Otho F. Strahl

Donelson's Division: MG Daniel S. Donelson
(8th, 16th, 38th, 51st, 52nd, 81st and 22nd Tennessee Battalion) Savage's Brigade: BG John Houston Savage
(18th, 32nd, 36th, 38th and 58th Alabama) Clayton's Brigade: BG Henry D. Clayton
(1st Confederate, 37th, 47th, 55th, 65th and 4th Georgia Sharpshooters) Stovall's Brigade: BG Marcellus A. Stovall

Anderson's Division: MG J. Patton Anderson
(19th, 22nd, 25th, 39th, 50th and 17th Alabama Battalion) Deas' Brigade: BG Zachrich C. Deas
(7th, 9th, 10th, 41st, 44th and 9th Mississippi Battalion) Chalmers' Brigade: BG James R. Chalmers
(24th, 27th, 29th, 30th and 34th Mississippi) Walthall's Brigade: BG Edward C. Walthall

Cleburne's Division: MG Patrick R. Cleburne
(2nd, 35th and 48th Tennessee, 1st, 9th, 13th, 15th, 19th and 24th Arkansas) Polk's Brigade: BG Lucius E. Polk
(2nd, 5th, 6th, 7th, 8th and 18th Arkansas) Liddell's Brigade: BG St. John R. Liddell
(16th, 33rd, 41st, 45th and 18th Alabama Battalion) Adams' Brigade: BG Samuel Adams

Hill's Corps: LtG Daniel H. Hill

Breckinridge's Division: MG John C. Breckinridge
(1st, 13th, 16th, 20th, 25th and 14th Louisiana Sharpshooters) Adams' Brigade: BG Daniel W. Adams
(1st Florida Cavalry, 1st, 3rd, 4th, 6th and 7th Florida) Davis' Brigade: BG William George Mackey Davis
(2nd, 4th, 5th, 6th and 9th Kentucky) Trabue's Brigade: BG Robert P. Trabue

Buckner's Division: MG Simon B. Buckner, Sr.
(43rd, 59th, 60th and 23rd Alabama Sharpshooters) Gracie's Brigade: BG Archibald Gracie, Jr.
(1st Regulars, 5th, 32nd and 2nd Georgia Sharpshooters) Jackson's Brigade: BG John K. Jackson
(6th and 10th Texas, 15th, 17th, 18th, 24th and 25th Texas Cavalry) Deshler's Brigade: BG James Deshler
(10th and 19th South Carolina, 24th, 28th, and 34th Alabama) Slaughter's Brigade: BG James E. Slaughter

Stewart's Division: MG Alexander P. Stewart
(2nd, 17th, 21st, 23rd, 25th and 44th Tennessee) Johnson's Brigade: BG Bushrod R. Johnson
(18th, 26th, 28th, 45th and 23rd Tennessee Battalion) Brown's Brigade: BG John C. Brown
(11th, 15th, 20th, 32nd and 37th Tennessee) Bate's Brigade: BG William B. Bate

McCown's Division: MG John P. McCown
(9th Texas, 10th, 14th and 32nd Texas Cavalry) Ector's Brigade: BG Mathew D. Ector
(1st and 2nd Arkansas Rifles, 4th, 25th, 31st and 4th Arkansas Battalion) McNair's Brigade: BG Evander McNair
(29th, 39th, 58th and 60th North Carolina) Vance's Brigade: BG Robert Brank Vance

(1st, 54th, 57th, 63rd and 64th Georgia) Mercer's Independent Brigade: BG Hugh W. Mercer
(5th, 8th, 32nd, 45th 15th Mississippi Sharpshooters) Wood's Independent Brigade: BG Sterling A.M. Wood
(62nd and 64th North Carolina, 54th, 63rd and 64th Virginia) Preston's Independent Brigade: BG William Preston

 

[leftyhunter]

On 31 December 1862, Braxton Bragg had sent word to Richmond that he had won a great victory at Murfreesboro. The message was premature, as after two more days of fighting the Army of the Cumberland did not retreat, and the battle ended with Bragg eventually withdrawing to Tullahoma.

These events brought the simmering ill will between Bragg and his chief subordinates to a head, and department commander Joseph E. Johnston was summoned to meet with Bragg and determine whether he should be relieved. Johnston hardly seemed eager to take Bragg's place, and approved of all his recent decisions.

However, Davis would still order Johnston to take Bragg's place, and summon Bragg to Richmond for a conference. However, Johnston was already on his way to Mississippi, and Bragg's wife Elise was ill. In the end, Bragg would remain commander for another nine months.

However, what if Johnston became commander of the Army of Tennessee before the Tullahoma campaign? Part of the poor performance of the AoT in that campaign can be explained by the lack of confidence Polk and Hardee had in their commander - a problem which should not exist here.

Another problem was the death of Van Dorn in May, leaving Wheeler to take command of the AoT's cavalry arm. If Van Dorn's death is butterflied and he is in command, I hardly think the cavalry will do any worse than they did historically.

What becomes of Bragg after this is uncertain, but I don't consider it implausible he could take command of the forces in Mississippi instead of Johnston.

Maybe

On 31 December 1862, Braxton Bragg had sent word to Richmond that he had won a great victory at Murfreesboro. The message was premature, as after two more days of fighting the Army of the Cumberland did not retreat, and the battle ended with Bragg eventually withdrawing to Tullahoma.

These events brought the simmering ill will between Bragg and his chief subordinates to a head, and department commander Joseph E. Johnston was summoned to meet with Bragg and determine whether he should be relieved. Johnston hardly seemed eager to take Bragg's place, and approved of all his recent decisions.

However, Davis would still order Johnston to take Bragg's place, and summon Bragg to Richmond for a conference. However, Johnston was already on his way to Mississippi, and Bragg's wife Elise was ill. In the end, Bragg would remain commander for another nine months.

However, what if Johnston became commander of the Army of Tennessee before the Tullahoma campaign? Part of the poor performance of the AoT in that campaign can be explained by the lack of confidence Polk and Hardee had in their commander - a problem which should not exist here.

Another problem was the death of Van Dorn in May, leaving Wheeler to take command of the AoT's cavalry arm. If Van Dorn's death is butterflied and he is in command, I hardly think the cavalry will do any worse than they did historically.

What becomes of Bragg after this is uncertain, but I don't consider it implausible he could take command of the forces in Mississippi instead of Johnston.

It ultimately doesn't matter which general Davis appoints to the West. As Lt.General Omar Bradley said " Amateurs study strategy professionals study logistics". The Union could and did build railroads and effectively guard them from insurgents. The Union Navy not the Confederate Navy could control navigation on the major Western rivers.
The Union Army didn't suffer as many desertions and soldiers defecting to the Confederate Army vs the Confederate Army did.
The Union Army didn't depend on slave labor to produce and transport food the Confederate Army did and slaves ran away if given the chance.
General Bragg won the greatest Confederate victory in the West at Chickaumungua 8n September 1863. By November 1863 the victory was erased by Union reinforcements and superior logistics that broke the siege and now the Union Army could enter Georgia. Brilliant leadership doesn't win conventional wars that's just one component. The Confederacy didn't loose because it didn't have good military leadership it list because it was not united and it was outnumbered 1.86 to one on the battlefield by a better supplied enemy.
Leftyhunter

 

[Nathan Towne]

Maybe

It ultimately doesn't matter which general Davis appoints to the West. As Lt.General Omar Bradley said " Amateurs study strategy professionals study logistics". The Union could and did build railroads and effectively guard them from insurgents. The Union Navy not the Confederate Navy could control navigation on the major Western rivers.
The Union Army didn't suffer as many desertions and soldiers defecting to the Confederate Army vs the Confederate Army did.
The Union Army didn't depend on slave labor to produce and transport food the Confederate Army did and slaves ran away if given the chance.
General Bragg won the greatest Confederate victory in the West at Chickaumungua 8n September 1863. By November 1863 the victory was erased by Union reinforcements and superior logistics that broke the siege and now the Union Army could enter Georgia. Brilliant leadership doesn't win conventional wars that's just one component. The Confederacy didn't loose because it didn't have good military leadership it list because it was not united and it was outnumbered 1.86 to one on the battlefield by a better supplied enemy.
Leftyhunter

I don't know about the 1.86 to 1 statistic specifically, but I wholeheartedly endorse the thrust of this.

You have to remember, when we are talking about Army Commanders, for the most part we are talking about the elite. Only the best rose to that level (as a general rule) and despite Bragg's very real faults in communication/team building, e.t.c. (which I don't intend to diminish), he was a top-notch, elite, soldier. However, he was not a miracle worker and the Confederacy needed miracle workers.