Vicksburg / Tullahoma Crossover

[tony_gunter]

Grant moves south of Vicksburg, crosses the river, takes Grand Gulf. He then details his plan to Washington and sends it off into the ether.

A week later, Washington is freaking out. Lincoln wires Rosecrans to ask where the h*ll is Grant. Southern papers are reporting he's captured Jackson. Grant finally emerges on the river and reports that he's investing Vicksburg but that intel suggests large reinforcements are heading his way from Bragg and South Carolina.

In reality, only two divisions, one cavalry and one infantry, leave Bragg, the remainder of Johnston's reinforcements ride the rails from South Carolina. Johnston is demanding more reinforcements, Davis is telling him to push forward with what he's got.

Washington belatedly asks Rosecrans to do something to pin Bragg down to prevent additional reinforcements from traveling to Mississippi. Rosecrans says he will get right on that. But Rosecrans does not get right on that.

Instead, he waits a couple days and calls a council of war by proxy, sending literally all his subordinates a list of questions and for Garfield to compile the results.

The answers are perplexing. Have units been sent to Grant? Majority say no. Would pushing forward prevent additional units being sent to Mississippi. Almost unanimously, the subordinates say no. Bragg does not intend to defend middle Tennessee but will fall back upon the Tennessee if attacked, burning bridges behind him. Doing so could slow down the Federal pursuit enough to allow Bragg to take a large portion to Vicksburg.

The principal dissent comes from Garfield himself. He not only believes reinforcements have left the front en route to Vicksburg, he details which units. He believes Rosecrans should move forward, and points out that if he waits too long to do so, the shoe will be on the other foot: Vicksburg having surrendered, reinforcements will arrive to Bragg from Mississippi instead of vice versa (foreshadowing of Chickamauga?).

Questions:

1) if Bragg did not intend to defend middle Tennessee, and literally every commander knew that, why delay for so long prior to Tullahoma and how is that considered a brilliant campaign?

2) why was Garfield so correct about the operational situation and everyone else so dead wrong?

 

[DanSBHawk]

The old proverb "Councils of war never fight." I think most of them were just reflecting back to Rosecrans what they thought he wanted to hear. Even someone normally aggressive, Phil Sheridan, voted with the do-nothing side.

Garfield deserves a lot of credit for standing up against the crowd.

 

[Rhea Cole]

This completely misrepresents the command structure of the Army of the Cumberland. Like Washington in January 1777, Rosecrans commanded by consensus.

The front in Middle Tennessee was 50 miles wide.

Franklin in the west to Pilot Knob / Fort Transit ten miles east of Murfreesboro a series of massive earthworks secured the A of the C's front.

On the western horizon, as seen from the signal station atop the courthouse in Murfreesboro, 15 miles away the Works at Triune stretch for a mile on the highest point. The 10,000 man reserve corps manned 3 miles of rifle pits. A stone faced star bastion caps the highest point.

Signal stations of observation had a vast swath of territory swept by large telescopes 24/7. The HQ in Murfreesboro was the nexus of visual & telegraphic signals. Nothing moved for a thousand square miles without being seen.

Under Garfield the A of the C had a comprehensive intel gathering system in place. Nothing happened across the line that Rosecrans did not know about… with the exception of Bragg's tactical plan for responding to the A of the C's advance. General Polk, who shared the small town of Shelbyville with Bragg did not, either.

As far as we know, Bragg intended to draw Rosecrans into attacking him at Tullahoma. Mountains of supplies & miles of elaborate earthworks surrounded the small rail depot town.

A look at the roads & the railroad that stream southward from Rosecrans' right. For months a comprehensive propaganda & deception had reinforced the accepted belief in both armies that an attack in the west was inevitable.

Only Rosecrans & his senior commanders knew what the elaborate plan really was. It wasn't until a few days before the June 23rd kickoff that the last piece of the puzzle fell into place. A fully worked up Beardslee Repeating Telegraph unit & a veteran officer to become the signal officer on his staff arrived.

At the critical moment on the night of the 23rd, it was the Beardslee Telegraphs that made it possible for Rosecrans to refocus his advance to the center of Bragg's line.

Like Washington, Rosecrans' officers were encouraged to innovate & express their opinions. Like Washington, he also had the last word. Rosecrans knew things his generals did not know. He had earned their respect. Whatever he ordered at the end of the discussion was what everyone was going to do.

Rosecrans knew that it was physically impossible for Bragg to send reinforcements to Mississippi. The Army of TN's draft animals & supply wagons were in a state of total collapse. The rail line back to Bragg's base at Florence AL was beyond repair. In June 1863 the Army of TN's commissary had no meat to issue to the soldiers. Bragg's men weren't going anywhere.

A 500 year rain event (re:TVA) was all that saved Bragg from being enveloped from his right. His only option was to retreat to the far side of the Tennessee River. Upon entering the abandoned Tullahoma works, the Cumberlanders were delighted to feast on the huge stacks of rations abandoned because there was no way to transport it… just as Rosecrans knew it would be.