A prolonged Civil War?

[SWS]

I think Hood actually did checkmate Sherman in Georgia by establishing the army at Palmetto Station. Nestled in the hills and tributaries of the Chattahoochee (Utoy Creek was still very much in living memory), he effectively blocked a direct Federal advance on West Point, Columbus, the Alabama Valley, and Mobile and threatened a descent on the Federal communications and rear should they attempt to advance upon and invest Macon, Augusta, or Savannah, although Hood did fear a raid down the Flint Valley. In addition, the position also offered the prospect of an offensive movement toward the Chattanooga road and Tennessee line by turning Atlanta on the Federal right, which was the option preemptively pursued in October 1864. He could also rely pretty handily on the railroads to move troops relatively quickly to threatened points and on Selma (where Dick Taylor was shortly to assume command) to furnish much-needed supplies, although these supplies needed to be transported by steamboat to Montgomery and hauled by wagon from Newnan.

How much foraging did Sherman do in North Georgia?

I recall they did forage the Chattooga Valley in October while chasing Hood into Alabama after he had temporarily broken the Chattanooga railroad. I assume they did the same all the way to Gaylesville.

 

[Rhea Cole]

I think Hood actually did checkmate Sherman in Georgia by establishing the army at Palmetto Station. Nestled in the hills and tributaries of the Chattahoochee (Utoy Creek was still very much in living memory), he effectively blocked a direct Federal advance on West Point, Columbus, the Alabama Valley, and Mobile and threatened a descent on the Federal communications and rear should they attempt to advance upon and invest Macon, Augusta, or Savannah, although Hood did fear a raid down the Flint Valley. In addition, the position also offered the prospect of an offensive movement toward the Chattanooga road and Tennessee line by turning Atlanta on the Federal right, which was the option preemptively pursued in October 1864. He could also rely pretty handily on the railroads to move troops relatively quickly to threatened points and on Selma (where Dick Taylor was shortly to assume command) to furnish much-needed supplies, although these supplies needed to be transported by steamboat to Montgomery and hauled by wagon from Newnan.

I recall they did forage the Chattooga Valley in October while chasing Hood into Alabama after he had temporarily broken the Chattanooga railroad. I assume they did the same all the way to Gaylesville.

That is the first time I have ever heard running for your life as a "checkmate."

 

[wausaubob]

An obsessive-compulsive guy like William Sherman definitely would have the census returns for those areas between Atlanta and his multiple options for reaching the coast.

 

[wausaubob]

Sherman's raid through Georgia had the same purpose at Sheridan's cavalry taking or destroying everything near a railroad in the Shenandoah Valley. The third prong of the pitchfork of starvation was the capture of Fort Fisher and the closing of Wilmington as a blockade runners port of entry. Along the way Grant was permitted to relieve Benjamin Butler and the trading of food for cotton in Virginia ended.

 

[Rhea Cole]

An obsessive-compulsive guy like William Sherman definitely would have the census returns for those areas between Atlanta and his multiple options for reaching the coast.

Sherman did not have to speculate on the route he was going to take. This is the eastern half of the unique map produced using 1860 Census data. He knew where everything was grown & everything was manufactured.

Frankly, I am baffled that anybody who has any interest in The March to the Sea could not know how Sherman planned & executed the movement. The key data on this map is one that I never hear theorists consider.

A convoy of wagons left Atlanta with weeks of rations for Sherman's army group onboard… why? It was because Sherman knew that as his army group entered the pine barrens along the coast that the "bummers" were going to come back empty. Even as they marched through the appropriately named "barrens" his men had full rations.

This is an excellent article about the map & its utilization that made the March to the Sea a triumph.

Link:

Sherman's Maps

How the general used a surprisingly sophisticated set of data to plan his famous march across Georgia.

archive.nytimes.com

 

[wausaubob]

Very true. From early in the union advance, or raids into rebel territory there was often a policy of taking any mobile assets and burning what couldn't be easily moved as well as burning out settlements near any guerrilla resistance so likely they could have doubled up on such measures if significant numbers of rebels refused to give up when their political leaders did.

The war of destruction was accelerated after van Dorn's force captured Holly Springs and destroyed the US depot there in 1862. Grant also observed farmers in occupied territory sending their crops south to sustain Confederate armies. Both events were motivation for =enforcing a policy of commissary shortages= starvation.

 

[33RDNCK]

I think Hood actually did checkmate Sherman in Georgia by establishing the army at Palmetto Station. Nestled in the hills and tributaries of the Chattahoochee (Utoy Creek was still very much in living memory), he effectively blocked a direct Federal advance on West Point, Columbus, the Alabama Valley, and Mobile and threatened a descent on the Federal communications and rear should they attempt to advance upon and invest Macon, Augusta, or Savannah, although Hood did fear a raid down the Flint Valley. In addition, the position also offered the prospect of an offensive movement toward the Chattanooga road and Tennessee line by turning Atlanta on the Federal right, which was the option preemptively pursued in October 1864. He could also rely pretty handily on the railroads to move troops relatively quickly to threatened points and on Selma (where Dick Taylor was shortly to assume command) to furnish much-needed supplies, although these supplies needed to be transported by steamboat to Montgomery and hauled by wagon from Newnan.

I recall they did forage the Chattooga Valley in October while chasing Hood into Alabama after he had temporarily broken the Chattanooga railroad. I assume they did the same all the way to Gaylesville.

It begs the question as to what Sherman would have done, if Hood simply sat there at Palmetto. It would have been foolhardy for Sherman to attempt his march to the sea, if Hood remained there. The march was only made possible by the virtual absence of enemy forces, except of course Wheeler's cavalry and the militia.

 

[steve59p]

The war of destruction was accelerated after van Dorn's force captured Holly Springs and destroyed the US depot there in 1862. Grant also observed farmers in occupied territory sending their crops south to sustain Confederate armies. Both events were motivation for =enforcing a policy of commissary shortages= starvation.

To a degree but there's a difference between destroying a military depot containing materials reserved for the army and general removal/destruction of privately owned goods. Similarly the union was also taking such actions before and throughout the war continued a vigorous campaign against salt production facilities because of their importance as the only practical way of preserving port, the primary meat in the south. This was important for food supplies to the military but also for the general population.

Similarly were those farmers sending their crops south specifically to aid the south's military or simply to save it from being looted by the union?

 

[wausaubob]

To a degree but there's a difference between destroying a military depot containing materials reserved for the army and general removal/destruction of privately owned goods. Similarly the union was also taking such actions before and throughout the war continued a vigorous campaign against salt production facilities because of their importance as the only practical way of preserving port, the primary meat in the south. This was important for food supplies to the military but also for the general population.

Similarly were those farmers sending their crops south specifically to aid the south's military or simply to save it from being looted by the union?

After the depot at Holly Springs was destroyed Grant's army resorted to confiscating all the food in the area. His response to the farmers was simple: You don't expect men with guns in their hands to starve. I think he also told the people, we brought our own commissary supplies, but the people you support destroyed them.

 

[SWS]

It begs the question as to what Sherman would have done, if Hood simply sat there at Palmetto. It would have been foolhardy for Sherman to attempt his march to the sea, if Hood remained there. The march was only made possible by the virtual absence of enemy forces, except of course Wheeler's cavalry and the militia.

I'm not sure if a campaign on the West Point Railroad would achieve all that much other than keeping the armies occupied with each other, as Lee would continue receiving shipments of corn from Albany and powder from Augusta without breaking the railroads to the south and east. And Hood would be drawing supply from Selma all the while. And the country on the south and east bank of the Chattahoochee is more defensible than most writers give it credit for, containing many hills, steep valleys, and ridges. The Army of Tennessee, although plagued by deserters' conspiracies, has become very efficient in such an environment, a fact not fully appreciated by Hood. It certainly isn't the indefensible piney 'flat-woods' Davis and Hood would have you believe only existed between Marietta and the coast, a view stressed to discredit Joe Johnston and justify the Tennessee campaign more than anything.

An insulated Union raid between the Flint and Ocmulgee Rivers might achieve something, but it would probably spit Sherman out on the Gulf rather than the Atlantic, unless he chooses to follow the Thomasville-Savannah railway through the sterile longleaf pine woods once having collected sufficient forage in the corn belt of Southwest Ga. Hood could attempt to oppose him at the Saltilla (Tebeauville) or Altamaha (Doctortown) perhaps, although Sherman could easily establish a base at Brunswick in the latter scenario. But the fog of war might prevail in Sherman's favor, unless Wheeler can easily reconnoiter in the pines.

 

[33RDNCK]

If Hood had stayed at Palmetto, I tend to think that Sherman would have sent (or been directed to send) forces to Virginia, or the NC coast, in which case they would have gone back north via rail. The Union didn't really need to assault Ft. Fisher/Wilmington; they could use occupied New Bern to build an army that would take Wilmington from the north and west.

If the Union looked at the closeout of southern ports like WW2 island-hopping, they'd bypass Savannah, Charleston, and Mobile, and close out Wilmington. With the former 3 closed to blockade running by late 1864, they only mattered as population centers.

If we choose to go with a timeline in which half or so of Sherman's forces get sent to New Bern, what could be added to that, and how big of a force could the Union collect? This is an idea:

1) I will leave Thomas and the 4th,14th, and 20th corps at Atlanta, along with most of the cavalry corps

2) Howard's 15, 17th , and left wing 16th corps, along with Kilpatrick's cavalry division, get shipped to New Bern NC, via rail and sea.

3) Schofield's 23rd corps, along with A.J. Smith and the right wing of 16th corps, get put together with whatever Canby can pull together. Either Schofield or Canby (whomever is senior) takes Mobile, and moves up the Alabama river, in an attempt to close out AL, MS and east LA.

Likely confederate counters to these movements:

1) Hood remains at Palmetto, with 6 infantry divisions organized into 2 corps, and a cavalry corps of 8 brigades organized into 3 divisions

2) Realizing the mortal threat that the Union buildup at New Bern represented, an infantry corps of 3 divisions is sent to NC, to be joined with Hoke's division of ANV, Conner's brigade of Kershaw's division, and whatever Hardee can send brigaded together. To this I'd add 3 cavalry brigades from the AoT, 2 from the ANV (Butler's division), and whatever cavalry Hardee can send. I think Beauregard is or Johnston is the only logical choice to command here.

3) Hood's position at Palmetto may have the advantage of interior lines, in that he can rapidly reinforce Mobile and Selma.

 

[steve59p]

After the depot at Holly Springs was destroyed Grant's army resorted to confiscating all the food in the area. His response to the farmers was simple: You don't expect men with guns in their hands to starve. I think he also told the people, we brought our own commissary supplies, but the people you support destroyed them.

If accurate Grant was saying "we intend to starve you and your families rather than our operations be interrupted". He's assuming that all the people in the area he's occupying should be classified as enemy combatants even when their civilians and some might even have been pro-union.

Note this was in response to a raid on a military camp in a union occupied area, which would be a valid military target. In other cases union forces took actions such as looting and destruction of local resources when they were themselves raiding into rebel controlled areas, i.e. they were attacking civilian as well as military targets. At other times their burnt towns simply because someone nearby has fired a shot at them.

 

[jepridgen]

If Hood had stayed at Palmetto, I tend to think that Sherman would have sent (or been directed to send) forces to Virginia, or the NC coast, in which case they would have gone back north via rail. The Union didn't really need to assault Ft. Fisher/Wilmington; they could use occupied New Bern to build an army that would take Wilmington from the north and west.

If the Union looked at the closeout of southern ports like WW2 island-hopping, they'd bypass Savannah, Charleston, and Mobile, and close out Wilmington. With the former 3 closed to blockade running by late 1864, they only mattered as population centers.

If we choose to go with a timeline in which half or so of Sherman's forces get sent to New Bern, what could be added to that, and how big of a force could the Union collect? This is an idea:

1) I will leave Thomas and the 4th,14th, and 20th corps at Atlanta, along with most of the cavalry corps

2) Howard's 15, 17th , and left wing 16th corps, along with Kilpatrick's cavalry division, get shipped to New Bern NC, via rail and sea.

3) Schofield's 23rd corps, along with A.J. Smith and the right wing of 16th corps, get put together with whatever Canby can pull together. Either Schofield or Canby (whomever is senior) takes Mobile, and moves up the Alabama river, in an attempt to close out AL, MS and east LA.

Likely confederate counters to these movements:

1) Hood remains at Palmetto, with 6 infantry divisions organized into 2 corps, and a cavalry corps of 8 brigades organized into 3 divisions

2) Realizing the mortal threat that the Union buildup at New Bern represented, an infantry corps of 3 divisions is sent to NC, to be joined with Hoke's division of ANV, Conner's brigade of Kershaw's division, and whatever Hardee can send brigaded together. To this I'd add 3 cavalry brigades from the AoT, 2 from the ANV (Butler's division), and whatever cavalry Hardee can send. I think Beauregard is or Johnston is the only logical choice to command here.

3) Hood's position at Palmetto may have the advantage of interior lines, in that he can rapidly reinforce Mobile and Selma.

Not an unreasonable scenario, but I'm not so sure Sherman wouldn't have went anyway. Sherman did essentially make Atlanta a fort capable of holding off a larger force with a fairly small sized garrison, but he quickly soured on this plan and was pushing to move south to the coast. Even if Hood stayed put, I can't see Sherman garrisoning Atlanta as once he destroyed its industry. Perhaps he'd leave a more robust force on the NW side of the Chattahoochee while he went south with the main army. Interesting to think of the scenarios in this case.

 

[33RDNCK]

I didn't intend for Thomas's force to remain in Atlanta. The intent was to have them advance and engage with Hood. I think that Sherman would have most likely commanded the NC force in person.

 

[jepridgen]

I didn't intend for Thomas's force to remain in Atlanta. The intent was to have them advance and engage with Hood. I think that Sherman would have most likely commanded the NC force in person.

Makes sense, I think Sherman sticks around in Georgia though to either finish off Hood or charge ahead with his march to Savannah. He had sufficient men to occupy Hood and do the march after Atlanta if he didn't need to guard his supply line to Chattanooga. Hood either has to follow and expose Columbus to Sherman's remaining force (probably under Thomas) or try to gain a victory in northern Georgia while Sherman heads south.