A prolonged Civil War?

[wausaubob]

Actually the western states, which became the Midwest, were able to supply Sherman's three armies with everything they needed. The US railroad industry was fully capable of double tracking the entire route from Nashville to Atlanta. Hood's force had only partial success in disrupting the US logistical lines. Some advance bases held out despite Confederate attacks. The events of December 1864 demonstrate that if Hood's force remained close to Sherman's army, eventually the Confederates would get too close and a battle would result. With the firepower possessed by Sherman's army by late 1864 I don't see how such a battle could have lasted very long.
And the Cumberland and Tennessee armies definitely would not have needed any help from USCT to fight a black flag war.
The US soldiers were aware that the war had been needlessly prolonged in real history. Note the burning of Columbia and the fire bombing of Charleston.

 

[wausaubob]

I think past April 1865 General Lee's prediction would come true. Confederate soldiers that continued to fight would have to steal to eat and steal to remain mounted. They would have been bandits, and declaration making the designation official was inevitable. By April 1865 most of General Lee's army had neither ammunition nor the bodily strength to carry a rifle.

 

[33RDNCK]

This should fill in the blanks for you.

Link;

Vance's Proclamation Against Deserters, Weekly Raleigh

As the second year of the Civil War drew to a close, the Confederate army was hamstrung by desertion from its ranks. While North Carolina had supplied

www.ncpedia.org

Link;

Response to Desertion · Desertion in the Tar Heel State · Civil War Era NC

Link:

Primary Source: The Home Guard

The Home Guard was comprised of men over the age of 45 and under 18. Unlike the army, which was formally organized and commanded from the top down

www.ncpedia.org

Link;

Was the Home Guard really that bad?

For the past three or four years, when I open the floor at one of my talks for questions, frequently I get the question, "Was the home guar...

michaelchardy.blogspot.com

Link:

https://academic.oup.com/north-carolina-scholarship-online/book/37144/chapter-abstract/323586815?redirectedFrom=

Link:

Cloaked Vengeance: George Pickett and the Hanging of Union Prisoners

What was a bitter George Pickett thinking when he ordered the hanging of Union prisoners at Kinston, N.C., in 1864?

www.historynet.com

Link:

North Carolina in the American Civil War - Col. Peter Mallett's Battalion (aka Camp Holmes Guard)

Link:

https://www.ourstate.com/kinston-hangings-part-1/[/URI was aware of all

http://

 

[33RDNCK]

This should fill in the blanks for you.

Link;

Vance's Proclamation Against Deserters, Weekly Raleigh

As the second year of the Civil War drew to a close, the Confederate army was hamstrung by desertion from its ranks. While North Carolina had supplied

www.ncpedia.org

Link;

Response to Desertion · Desertion in the Tar Heel State · Civil War Era NC

Link:

Primary Source: The Home Guard

The Home Guard was comprised of men over the age of 45 and under 18. Unlike the army, which was formally organized and commanded from the top down

www.ncpedia.org

Link;

Was the Home Guard really that bad?

For the past three or four years, when I open the floor at one of my talks for questions, frequently I get the question, "Was the home guar...

michaelchardy.blogspot.com

Link:

https://academic.oup.com/north-carolina-scholarship-online/book/37144/chapter-abstract/323586815?redirectedFrom=

Link:

Cloaked Vengeance: George Pickett and the Hanging of Union Prisoners

What was a bitter George Pickett thinking when he ordered the hanging of Union prisoners at Kinston, N.C., in 1864?

www.historynet.com

Link:

North Carolina in the American Civil War - Col. Peter Mallett's Battalion (aka Camp Holmes Guard)

Link:

The Kinston Hangings (Part 1): Caught Between Blue and Gray | Our State

Commanders on both sides fight for their loyalty, putting the men in a situation where they have no good option. (Volume 2, Part 6)

www.ourstate.com

This has nothing to do with the subject of CSA deserters returning if threatened with death.

 

[Rhea Cole]

This has nothing to do with the subject of CSA deserters returning if threatened with death.

You must be a very fast reader. As someone who has studied the subject of desertion by NC troops for many years, I must say that yours is an eccentric conclusion.

 

[13 IL Cav & 64 GA Inf]

I got that part of it. I just don't see the survivors of Franklin and Nashville putting up a spirited fight after what they'd suffered both from battle casualties and weather conditions at the army level. Walthall was able to pull together an ad hoc command, but most of the army was very much in bad shape while Thomas would've put a large number of troops against him in much better condition. Keep mind Hood lost a huge percentage of his artillery and large amounts of ordnance and other supplies. His officer corps was also devastated in some of his best divisions. Walthall surviving Franklin was a big reason his troops performed so well with Forrest.

If Hood had managed to pull together his forces, which I find highly unlikely, it would have been a repeat of Nashville. The condition of his army as a whole was just too bad. If he'd thought it possible, I have no doubt Hood would have tried to make a stand to salvage something. Just the fact that he didn't says a lot.

You are right, I believe. General Hood was in way over his head as an army commander instead of his appropriate ability level of brigade commander (perhaps division commander at top).

 

[13 IL Cav & 64 GA Inf]

You are right, I believe. General Hood was in way over his head as an army commander instead of his appropriate ability level of brigade commander (perhaps division commander at top).

In other words, the Peter Principle was in full effect.

 

[Rhea Cole]

You are right, I believe. General Hood was in way over his head as an army commander instead of his appropriate ability level of brigade commander (perhaps division commander at top).

It never hurts to agree with Marse Robert.

 

[wausaubob]

Its hard to believe that any 21st century person wishes a speedier and more violent death for the few Confederates still under arms past January 1865.

 

[33RDNCK]

I think past April 1865 General Lee's prediction would come true. Confederate soldiers that continued to fight would have to steal to eat and steal to remain mounted. They would have been bandits, and declaration making the designation official was inevitable. By April 1865 most of General Lee's army had neither ammunition nor the bodily strength to carry a rifle.

This should fill in the blanks for you.

Link;

Vance's Proclamation Against Deserters, Weekly Raleigh

As the second year of the Civil War drew to a close, the Confederate army was hamstrung by desertion from its ranks. While North Carolina had supplied

www.ncpedia.org

Link;

Response to Desertion · Desertion in the Tar Heel State · Civil War Era NC

Link:

Primary Source: The Home Guard

The Home Guard was comprised of men over the age of 45 and under 18. Unlike the army, which was formally organized and commanded from the top down

www.ncpedia.org

Link;

Was the Home Guard really that bad?

For the past three or four years, when I open the floor at one of my talks for questions, frequently I get the question, "Was the home guar...

michaelchardy.blogspot.com

Link:

https://academic.oup.com/north-carolina-scholarship-online/book/37144/chapter-abstract/323586815?redirectedFrom=

Link:

Cloaked Vengeance: George Pickett and the Hanging of Union Prisoners

What was a bitter George Pickett thinking when he ordered the hanging of Union prisoners at Kinston, N.C., in 1864?

www.historynet.com

Link:

North Carolina in the American Civil War - Col. Peter Mallett's Battalion (aka Camp Holmes Guard)

Link:

The Kinston Hangings (Part 1): Caught Between Blue and Gray | Our State

Commanders on both sides fight for their loyalty, putting the men in a situation where they have no good option. (Volume 2, Part 6)

www.ourstate.com

I was aware of most of these sources, but I fail to see how they prove your point. The Confederacy had a desertion problem, which they struggled to address, and they alternated between leniency and more draconian measures. I get it, but I don't see how that translates to Union soldiers offering no quarter, as a method to subdue the populace. It would not have subdued anything. I experienced this firsthand in Afghanistan and in Iraq. You can't kill your way out of a war.

 

[33RDNCK]

Actually the western states, which became the Midwest, were able to supply Sherman's three armies with everything they needed. The US railroad industry was fully capable of double tracking the entire route from Nashville to Atlanta. Hood's force had only partial success in disrupting the US logistical lines. Some advance bases held out despite Confederate attacks. The events of December 1864 demonstrate that if Hood's force remained close to Sherman's army, eventually the Confederates would get too close and a battle would result. With the firepower possessed by Sherman's army by late 1864 I don't see how such a battle could have lasted very long.
And the Cumberland and Tennessee armies definitely would not have needed any help from USCT to fight a black flag war.
The US soldiers were aware that the war had been needlessly prolonged in real history. Note the burning of Columbia and the fire bombing of Charleston.

What firepower did Sherman's army possess? Only the firepower that came from sheer numbers, I'd argue. From what I can gather, very few of his infantry had repeating rifles by late 1864. The Union struggled with equipping cavalry with Spencers, and although Sheridan's cavalry in VA, and Wilson's in Alabama were armed with Spencers, Stoneman was not able to arm half of his command with repeaters before his 1865 raid. The myth of the average 1865 Union soldier being armed with a Spencer rifle is an enduring one, but the numbers of rifles manufactured invalidate that myth. Shermie was very vulnerable on the March to the Sea, and would not have attempted that with an army in his front. A. J. Smith's Tupelo expedition is an example of a Union force invading CS territory, with bold ambitions, but forced to retire due to lack of forage.

 

[wausaubob]

By 1865 the US had such overwhelming power that highly placed Republicans and the financial powers in the east coast cities could have easily over ruled Lincoln's attempt to "let 'em up easy". They could have easily concluded that having spent the billions to win the war, they could spend a little more to permanently solve the problem. Armed with a 100,000 more Spencers, a few hundred more 3" ordnance rifles, and a few Gatling devices, the fictional events of the beginning of the Josey Wales movie could have been enacted in real life. Don't under estimate the radicalizing effect of the war expenditures and losses experienced by families in the northern states.
And an army can kill its way out of a war. It was the ancient way of ending a war. And Hiroshima and Nagasaki might stand as examples of how it can be done.

 

[wausaubob]

The silliness here is the inference that Nathan Forrest and Dick Taylor surrendered their commands when they didn't have to. And the fact that units in Texas for the most part simply dissolved without surrendering makes the speculation about extending the war a fantasy. On the other hand, it probably historically accurate for those men who were invisible in war and invincible in peace. Cue General Johnston's post war summation.

 

[steve59p]

By 1865 the US had such overwhelming power that highly placed Republicans and the financial powers in the east coast cities could have easily over ruled Lincoln's attempt to "let 'em up easy". They could have easily concluded that having spent the billions to win the war, they could spend a little more to permanently solve the problem. Armed with a 100,000 more Spencers, a few hundred more 3" ordnance rifles, and a few Gatling devices, the fictional events of the beginning of the Josey Wales movie could have been enacted in real life. Don't under estimate the radicalizing effect of the war expenditures and losses experienced by families in the northern states.
And an army can kill its way out of a war. It was the ancient way of ending a war. And Hiroshima and Nagasaki might stand as examples of how it can be done.

Very true. From early in the union advance, or raids into rebel territory there was often a policy of taking any mobile assets and burning what couldn't be easily moved as well as burning out settlements near any guerrilla resistance so likely they could have doubled up on such measures if significant numbers of rebels refused to give up when their political leaders did.

 

[wausaubob]

Very true. From early in the union advance, or raids into rebel territory there was often a policy of taking any mobile assets and burning what couldn't be easily moved as well as burning out settlements near any guerrilla resistance so likely they could have doubled up on such measures if significant numbers of rebels refused to give up when their political leaders did.

I think William Sherman stated that much of the property destroyed in Georgia was just wasted. They destroyed more than they confiscated.

 

[Rhea Cole]

I was aware of most of these sources, but I fail to see how they prove your point. The Confederacy had a desertion problem, which they struggled to address, and they alternated between leniency and more draconian measures. I get it, but I don't see how that translates to Union soldiers offering no quarter, as a method to subdue the populace. It would not have subdued anything. I experienced this firsthand in Afghanistan and in Iraq. You can't kill your way out of a war.

Indeed… given your impeccable credentials, why associate with the unworthy likes of me ?

I think William Sherman stated that much of the property destroyed in Georgia was just wasted. They destroyed more than they confiscated.

Of course they did. Using his unprecedented map that showed what the agricultural & industrial production of every county, Sherman was able to issue orders that maximized the destruction of those assets.

 

[wausaubob]

Indeed… given your impeccable credentials, why associate with the unworthy likes of me ?


Of course they did. Using his unprecedented map that showed what the agricultural & industrial production of every county, Sherman was able to issue orders that maximized the destruction of those assets.

There is a lot wrong with his suggestion. No quarter warfare would only apply to those Confederates who might have remained in the army after March 1865. As others have stated, such a force was likely to have severe commissary shortages and was likely to wear out any remaining uniforms quickly. The civilian population would not be subdued by violence. But as Phil Sheridan stated, poverty and hunger would be adequate tools. I am reminded of Grant's post surrender remarks about the utter devastation he saw when the toured the south some months after Appomattox. Once again, cue Joseph Johnston's post war remarks.

 

[33RDNCK]

The silliness here is the inference that Nathan Forrest and Dick Taylor surrendered their commands when they didn't have to. And the fact that units in Texas for the most part simply dissolved without surrendering makes the speculation about extending the war a fantasy. On the other hand, it probably historically accurate for those men who were invisible in war and invincible in peace. Cue General Johnston's post war summation.

Where in this thread has anyone implied that? I do think that Forrest could have successfully defended Selma against Wilson, if he'd assembled his command earlier. But Mobile was doomed, and Selma was sure to follow, given Canby's numerical superiority. In fact, I think the CS Mobile force may have been bagged entirely, if Wilson had been forced to turn south after a defeat at Selma.

 

[33RDNCK]

Indeed… given your impeccable credentials, why associate with the unworthy likes of me ?


Of course they did. Using his unprecedented map that showed what the agricultural & industrial production of every county, Sherman was able to issue orders that maximized the destruction of those assets.

Shermie had no map. If he had one, let's produce it for this forum. He was an average general, who profited from his association with Grant and others, and only succeeded due to weight of sheer numbers and Hood's incompetence. Hood opened the door for an almost completely unopposed Union Army to march through Georgia.

 

[33RDNCK]

Sherman's Maps

How the general used a surprisingly sophisticated set of data to plan his famous march across Georgia.

archive.nytimes.com

I stand partially corrected, on the map. But it is just essentially data from the 1860 census. One can assume that the livestock is still there in 1864, and the crops are still being produced at the same rate. Unlikely on both counts. I'm not saying that this doesn't have value, but in simple terms, I believe that Sherman simply took the most direct route to Savannah, accounting for the spread of the 4 infantry corps.

https://cdn.britannica.com/44/197944-050-AEC084AC/William-Tecumseh-Sherman-troops-campaign-Union-Georgia-1864.jpg