Biggest Yankee Error

[Philip Leigh]

Really *Edited*? From you? FWIW we've had this discussion before. You are the one making the charge that the US should have been able to completely arm the US Army w/ breechloaders in less than a year while fighting a war. . . .

For the second time I ask you to show: Where did I write this?

Specifically, please show where I claimed that the US Army should have been able to completely arm with breechloaders in less than a year.

You are causing others to believe that I made such a claimed but I don't recall ever writing it.

"There is reason to believe that had the Federal infantry been armed from the first with even the breechloaders available in 1861 [the war's first year] the war would have been terminated in a year."

Not your quote, but you copied and pasted, in defense of Phil Leigh's argument.

That is a statement by Confederate General Porter Alexander opining that if the Federal infantry had been armed with breechloaders of the type available at the start to the war, the Union would have won the war in a year. Neither I (IIRC), nor Porter Alexander, claim that "the US should have been able to completely arm the US Army w/ breechloaders in less than a year while fighting a war," as johan_steel charges me as saying even though he persistently refuses to show where I wrote the statement. Until he shows proof, his charge must be dismissed as fantasy.

It is impossible to believe that any reader could mistake that as a quote by anyone other than Porter Alexander as it is clearly identified as such within the source linked in the OP.

 

[Schwallanscher]

That is a statement by Confederate General Porter Alexander opining that if the Federal infantry had been armed with breechloaders of the type available at the start to the war, the Union would have won the war in a year. It say's nothing about how many Union soldiers could have been armed in less than a year from the start of the war.

It is hard to believe that any reader could mistake that as a quote by anyone other than Porter Alexander as it is clearly identified as such within the source linked in the OP.

just imagine what they could have done with a batallion or two of bradley afvs. as long as it's not explained how to acchieve that (id est put those actually at the union's disposal) any such statement is nonsensical, don't you think?

 

[Package4]

Okay. Now you clarify that you did not tediously go through the OR to settle on Ripley's June 8, 1861 notes as your source but used pages 17-18 of Tate's book instead. As you may observe, however, Tate's source on those pages was the June 11, 1861 Ripley notes, which I cited above, and not his June 8, 1861 notes.

Nonetheless, on page 15 of his book even Tate includes Ripley's (6-11-1861) words below that you omitted:

A great evil now specially prevalent in regard to arms for military service is the vast variety of new inventions. . . . This evil can only be stopped by positively refusing to answer any requisitions for or proportions to sell new and untried arms. . .​

No, I tediously went through the OR and pasted from there after that previous attribution of Tate. Regardless, your quote means nothing, if you read it in its entirety you realize that Ripley knows manufacturing and did not want to disrupt current production, when arms of any kind are needed.

@Don Dixon has already pointed out that in order to produce the Berdan Sharpshooter rifles, Sharp in setting up that production of 2,000 rifles lost production of 6,000 badly needed Sharps carbines. Again, the point being, all concerns were already at 100% capacity, a fact you continue to ignore and the machinery required to expand, had to be built, implemented and workers trained, which takes considerable time. The Sharp example illustrates this well, in order to build a different model, the factory is reconfigured to produce that model and other production ceases as there is no spare capacity.

 

[johan_steele]

That is a statement by Confederate General Porter Alexander opining that if the Federal infantry had been armed with breechloaders of the type available at the start to the war, the Union would have won the war in a year. Neither I (IIRC), nor Porter Alexander, claim that "the US should have been able to completely arm the US Army w/ breechloaders in less than a year while fighting a war," as johan_steel charges me as saying.

It is impossible to believe that any reader could mistake that as a quote by anyone other than Porter Alexander as it is clearly identified as such within the source linked in the OP.

"But if top military and government leaders acknowledged their superiority earlier, it is difficult to avoid concluding that the arms could have been adopted more rapidly."

A source which you clearly agree with and which you are arguing in support of. It is the whole point of Mr Leigh's argument. Mr Leigh would never plagiarize Porter Alexander instead he quotes him in support of his argument in a poor effort to support his what if theory. You claim the biggest Yankee error was to fail to arm the US soldier with breech loaders. As Mr Leigh is wont to do, a general lack of research comes through in the article. A complete lack of understanding or familiarity of industrial capabilities of the day are more than evident in his writing and yours as has been pointed out by others. As I've said before; What if's as reality are... fantasy.

So if you don't believe Porter Alexander was correct then denounce him. Otherwise step up and prove him right. Show the courage of your convictions because until now... you're coming up very short.

 

[unionblue]

@Harvey Johnson ,

You brought a paperback book to a library fight.

And lost.

Possibly the most profound thing written by someone of the Northern persuasion on this forum today.

The truth has no persuasion, North or South.

 

[CSA Today]

The truth has no persuasion, North or South.

I spoke of claimants

 

[Package4]

That is a statement by Confederate General Porter Alexander opining that if the Federal infantry had been armed with breechloaders of the type available at the start to the war, the Union would have won the war in a year. Neither I (IIRC), nor Porter Alexander, claim that "the US should have been able to completely arm the US Army w/ breechloaders in less than a year while fighting a war," as johan_steel charges me as saying even though he persistently refuses to show where I wrote the statement. Until he shows proof, his charge must be dismissed as fantasy.

It is impossible to believe that any reader could mistake that as a quote by anyone other than Porter Alexander as it is clearly identified as such within the source linked in the OP.

So, two can play the "what if" game; in order for there to be enough breechloaders to supply the Union army in the first year of the war, a decision would have needed to be made in 1859/60 to go in that direction. Let's say that that decision had been made and both Springfield and Harper's Ferry were expanded, machinery produced, implemented and operational by mid 1860. Do you see where this is going?

Harper's Ferry was captured by Stonewall Jackson in April of 1861 and the machinery was shipped to Richmond, would that have negated the advantage rendering moot Bruce's claim via Alexander?

 

[Philip Leigh]

Really *Edited*? From you? FWIW we've had this discussion before. You are the one making the charge that the US should have been able to completely arm the US Army w/ breechloaders in less than a year while fighting a war. . . .

Where did I write that?

"But if top military and government leaders acknowledged their superiority earlier, it is difficult to avoid concluding that the arms could have been adopted more rapidly. . . ."

As documented above, the quote you cite is significantly different than the false charge you made when you pretended that I argued "the US should have been able to completely arm the US Army w/ breechloaders in less than a year while fighting a war." (emphasis added)

 

[unionblue]

I spoke of claimants

You threw mud in the water.

 

[CSA Today]

You threw mud in the water.

?

 

[johan_steele]

As documented above, the quote you cite is significantly different than the false charge you made when you pretended that I argued "the US should have been able to completely arm the US Army w/ breechloaders in less than a year while fighting a war." (emphasis added)

So you don't believe the US could have been effectively armed with breech loaders by 1862. Odd, we apparently agree which seems at odds with the OP. Which is it? Because right now you appear to be arguing with yourself... which is highly amusing.

 

[matthew mckeon]

The issue here is breech loaders, not the origin of the war. Further off topic posts will be deleted.

 

[Cannonman1]

Had the Union waved the magic wand and produced enough Sharps (tried and true in 1861) for example, the war would have undoubtedly been shorter insofar as the war measured by organized armies in the field but you would have had ushered in a long lasting (maybe to this day) guerrilla war that would have cost more lives than the historical war did. Both sided had to be absolutely hungry for peace and worn out. It happened as it happened and we put it behind us. I'm not so sure a war ending in 1862 or early 63 would have done the same. Makes one ponder. Kind of like the the Gatling Gun being developed to make war unthinkable.. Yeah Right!!!!.. Develop a way to kill more efficiently and you just dig more graves in the end.

 

[Package4]

One of the issues that Ripley's critics completely miss, is that they know the end result and the duration while making their criticism. Ripley, as the OR shows, did not know what size the army was going to be and how long the war would last. Since the majority of the period prognosticators seemed to think it would be a very short war (both sides), he erred on the side of arming as many and as quickly as he could.

Researching this topic, it is amazing how many complete crackpots were at his door and at the insistence of highly placed individuals in government. Keep in mind that the Ordnance Department was responsible for procuring, testing, inspecting not only small arms, but cannon and all associated accouterments, with a severely understaffed department. Couple that with a good portion of his staff electing to go South and one can imagine the immense pressure put upon that department.

His decision to continue with tried and proven weapons, in my opinion was the right one, given what was known at the time. Ripley had decided that the infantry would be fine with rifled muskets and that the mounted branch needed the breechloaders through necessity. There was not capacity to do both as has been shown.

Researching a little more, it appears that machinery for producing the different manufacturing and machining tasks required for small arms production was largely procured by that firm, at 100% capacity, who would make that machinery? Expanding to produce more arms meant additional buildings, which took time to build. Ripley not knowing how long the war would last figured that expansion of any enterprise would take so long that the focus would be taken off the emergency at hand.

 

[thomas aagaard]

When the war first broke out Lincoln enlarged the regular army.
It was expected that the regular army supported by a volunteer force that was just 2x times the size of the regular army would be sufficient to deal with the rebellion.

The cavalry was not enlarged... because anyone who knew what they where talking about knew that it would take 2-3 years to raise new cavalry regiments and train them properly. And the war would be over by then.

 

[Irishtom29]

What a terrible invention. What the point of having a repeater and then converting it in to a one shot weapon. I get the fact that there is more air then meat so aimed shots count but to deliberately force ones soldiers to fight with a disadvantage is criminal. Hopefully the boys just threw them away when it was show time.
Leftyhunter

In the early 20th Century the British army, which had considerable experience of desperate fighting while outnumbered, used a Lee Enfield rifle with a 10 round box magazine and a magazine cutoff. During the Great War the cutoff was done away with to make the rifles simpler to produce.

 

[Philip Leigh]

So you don't believe the US could have been effectively armed with breech loaders by 1862.

Your continued use of proven misrepresentations about what I have written in your efforts to defend US Ordnance Chief James Ripley's resistance to breechloading shoulder arms reminds me of an incident described by Robert Bruce in Lincoln and the Tools of War. It concerns and exchange of telegrams between General John C. Fremont and Ripley regarding Fremont's request during the spring of 1862 for "Union guns," — a predecessor to the gatling gun.

"Fremont to Ripley:​

​

Our experiments here with the Union repeating gun are satisfac-​

tory. Can you spare and will you send immediately sixteen (16)​

with equipments & full supply of ammunition for this Dep't by​

way of Pittsburg . . .​

​

Ripley to Fremont:​

​

Telegram received — Have no Union repeating guns on hand,​

and am not aware that any have been ordered.​

Fremont to Ripley:​

​

Upon the nineteenth of December on recommendation of Genl​

McClellan the President ordered fifty of the Coffee Mill or Union​

guns. Was there not some error of name in my dispatch.​

There was, of course, no error in the dispatch received at the
Ordnance Office; Ripley had simply lied and been caught at it."

 

[Philip Leigh]

You can throw all the money in the world at a problem - in this case the manufacture of breech loading/repeating rifles - but if you do not have the required facilities, machine tools, skilled labor, and raw materials, you will fail. Even with a magic wand, significant production was not going to begin until at least late 1862.

Effective with the adoption of the Model 1842 percussion smoothbore musket, all U.S. military firearms produced by the Ordnance Office were designed to be manufactured using interchangeable parts technology. Despite the design for interchangeability, there were technical problem in implementation. Although national government produced interchangeable Hall's rifles and carbines had been manufactured at Harper's Ferry Armory, that armory was incapable of providing interchangeable parts Model 1842 muskets until 1847. Model 1842 muskets manufactured at Springfield Armory were not interchangeable until 1849. Ripley had been commandant at Springfield from 1841 to 1854, and was intimately familiar with the problems of bringing an arm that would meet the Army's standards for interchangeability into production. Consequently, he had reasonable concerns regarding the ability of the Northern contractors to do it, particularly for more complex breech loading and repeating arms.

On 5 July 1861 Samuel Colt signed a contract with the Ordnance Office to manufacture 25,000 Springfield rifle muskets to be delivered beginning in 1862 at a rate of 1,000 per month. Unlike many other contractors, Colt was a legitimate firearms manufacturer with a functioning firearms factory in Hartford, Connecticut. But, the factory was fully occupied in producing Colt's revolvers for the Army and Navy. Consequently, Colt would have to build a new factory for rifle musket production. He told the Ordnance Office that it would take six months for the new factory to come on-line. To speed production, Colt contracted with Pierre-Joseph Lemille of Liege to manufacture 10,000 rifle musket barrels to be mounted on the contract weapons in the United States, as well as for locks and other parts. When the Ordnance Office then objected to the use of the parts because of concerns over interchangeability, Colt had to put them back on the market. One could fault Ripley for this decision, but the Springfield rifle musket contracts required interchangeable parts production, and production in Liege was still artisanal, largely in home workshops.

Compounding the problem for all manufacturers in late 1861 was the fact that almost all the "gun iron" used in the manufacture of gun barrels in the United States was imported from Great Britain, including the iron used by Springfield Armory. During the Trent Affair, Queen Victoria embargoed the export of arms and strategic materials, including gun iron, until the threat of war with the Federals was finally resolved.

By the spring of 1862, given the inability of Springfield Armory and the Federal arms contractors to manufacture enough of the much simpler Springfield rifle muskets to replace combat losses and keep up with the demand for equipment for the mobilizing Federal volunteer army, the government's reserve stock of small arms was essentially running on empty; even with the European procurements.

Regards,
Don Dixon

Among other factors you overlook the possibility of having the arms manufactured overseas to specifications drawn-up in the United States. This is not Monday morning quarterbacking. Only a month after the war started Navy Ordnance Chief Andrew Harwood wrote Navy Secretary Gideon Welles:

The [Navy Ordnance] Bureau has reason to believe that facilities can be found abroad — especially in the great manufacturing towns of Belgium — where, should a competent agent be sent with the pattern of a [breech-loading] fire arm which has been proved to combine essential elements of success, the arms could be fabricated more speedily and economically than in the United States.​

 

[Package4]

The guns were never ordered since no one would unreservedly give the Ordnance Department the go ahead, the OR confirm this. Bruce has a bias against Ripley and does not tell the complete story.

Correspondence between Lincoln and McClellan show that the $1,200 per piece was entirely too high and if that were to be the case he would not approve the order:

"MAJ. GEN. GEORGE B. MCCLELLAN,
Commander In Chief, United States Army."

"I would recommend that fifty of the 'coffee-mill' guns be purchased, at twenty per cent advance on cost price, which cost may be ascertained by competent Ordnance Officers. I think $1,200 entirely too high.

"GEORGE B. MCCLELLAN
Major General, Commanding."​

"December 19, 1861

"December 19, 1861​

"Let the fifty guns be ordered on the terms above recommended by General McClellan, and not otherwise.

"A. LINCOLN."

They would not come to terms on price and the project was dropped.​

What sealed the fate of the Agar gun was most likely a test for a British Ordnance officer:

Major Fosbery, an inventor in his own right, felt he had expressed adequately the consensus of all military reasoning when he appended the following to his report: "The only thing forgotten seems to be that, when firing at the rate of 100 discharges a minute, the flame of 7,500 grains of exploded powder and nearly 7 pounds of lead would pass through a single barrel in that time. The effect during the trial proved that the barrel first grew red and nearly white hot, and large drops of fused metal poured from the muzzle, and the firing had to be discontinued from fear of worse consequences."

 

[Philip Leigh]

The guns were never ordered . . .

Even the Wikipedia reports that the guns were actually used as early as the winter of 1862 and thereafter throughout the remainder of the war.

. . . since no one would unreservedly give the Ordnance Department the go ahead, the OR confirm this. Bruce has a bias against Ripley and does not tell the complete story.

Correspondence between Lincoln and McClellan show that the $1,200 per piece was entirely too high and if that were to be the case he would not approve the order:

"MAJ. GEN. GEORGE B. MCCLELLAN,
Commander In Chief, United States Army."

"I would recommend that fifty of the 'coffee-mill' guns be purchased, at twenty per cent advance on cost price, which cost may be ascertained by competent Ordnance Officers. I think $1,200 entirely too high.

"GEORGE B. MCCLELLAN
Major General, Commanding."​

"December 19, 1861

"December 19, 1861​

"Let the fifty guns be ordered on the terms above recommended by General McClellan, and not otherwise.

"A. LINCOLN."

They would not come to terms on price and the project was dropped.​

According to Lincoln and the Tools of War (p. 123) McClellan agreed to a price of $735, which was 20% above cost.

What sealed the fate of the Agar [coffee-mill] gun was most likely a test for a British Ordnance officer:

Contrary to your implication, I never wrote that the coffee-mill gun was effective.