Biggest Yankee Error

[Philip Leigh]

Both the army and the navy seemed to have concentrated on other problems early in the war. They were both interested in developing the ironclads, tin clads, monitors and steam sloops that would prove decisive. Mortar scows helped also.
It was almost as if they intended to capture some southern ocean ports, blockade the others, and proceed to reduce and bypass the Confederate forts on the inland rivers. But that does not generate a good search engine response.
Rifles were good enough for what was expected of the land forces.

The firing-rate superiority of breechloading rifles and carbines was known early in the war. The first order for repeating Spencers, for example, was only two months after Fort Sumter.

https://civilwarchat.wordpress.com/2018/08/07/the-biggest-union-error/

 

[unionblue]

Ah! If only the future could be predicted with the accuracy of 21st century critics!

 

[Philip Leigh]

Ah! If only the future could be predicted with the accuracy of 21st century critics!

To the contrary. War Secretaries Jefferson Davis and John Floyd who served during the 1850s provided favorable assessments of breechloaders.

In 1860 Floyd discarded all reservations and wrote:

The long habit of using muzzle-loading arms will resist what
seems to be so great an innovation, and ignorance may condemn;
but as certainly as the percussion cap has superseded the flint and
steel, so surely will the breech-loading gun drive out of use those
that load at the muzzle.
​

 

[unionblue]

To the contrary. War Secretaries Jefferson Davis and John Floyd who served during the 1850s provided favorable assessments of breechloaders.

In 1860 Floyd discarded all reservations and wrote:

The long habit of using muzzle-loading arms will resist what
seems to be so great an innovation, and ignorance may condemn;
but as certainly as the percussion cap has superseded the flint and
steel, so surely will the breech-loading gun drive out of use those
that load at the muzzle.
​

Yet these two gentlemen did what to procure such weapons for the Confederacy?

 

[Don Dixon]

Which, as noted in the OP, might have been accelerated if the federal government advanced capital and production advice instead of maintaining an adversarial relationship with the weapons supply industry. Yankees had long been proponents of federal investment in "internal improvements" and business subsidies in the form of bounties. Thus, the federal government should have been willing to make such investments in obviously superior weapons production.

The OP does not suggest that the federal government could wave a magic wand to eliminate production problems as some here falsely imply. Instead it states: It is difficult to estimate how much more quickly single-shot breechloaders and repeaters might have been deployed in the Union army. But if top military and government leaders acknowledged their superiority earlier, it is difficult to avoid concluding that the arms could have been adopted more rapidly.

You can throw all the money in the world at a problem - in this case the manufacture of breech loading/repeating rifles - but if you do not have the required facilities, machine tools, skilled labor, and raw materials, you will fail. Even with a magic wand, significant production was not going to begin until at least late 1862.

Effective with the adoption of the Model 1842 percussion smoothbore musket, all U.S. military firearms produced by the Ordnance Office were designed to be manufactured using interchangeable parts technology. Despite the design for interchangeability, there were technical problem in implementation. Although national government produced interchangeable Hall's rifles and carbines had been manufactured at Harper's Ferry Armory, that armory was incapable of providing interchangeable parts Model 1842 muskets until 1847. Model 1842 muskets manufactured at Springfield Armory were not interchangeable until 1849. Ripley had been commandant at Springfield from 1841 to 1854, and was intimately familiar with the problems of bringing an arm that would meet the Army's standards for interchangeability into production. Consequently, he had reasonable concerns regarding the ability of the Northern contractors to do it, particularly for more complex breech loading and repeating arms.

On 5 July 1861 Samuel Colt signed a contract with the Ordnance Office to manufacture 25,000 Springfield rifle muskets to be delivered beginning in 1862 at a rate of 1,000 per month. Unlike many other contractors, Colt was a legitimate firearms manufacturer with a functioning firearms factory in Hartford, Connecticut. But, the factory was fully occupied in producing Colt's revolvers for the Army and Navy. Consequently, Colt would have to build a new factory for rifle musket production. He told the Ordnance Office that it would take six months for the new factory to come on-line. To speed production, Colt contracted with Pierre-Joseph Lemille of Liege to manufacture 10,000 rifle musket barrels to be mounted on the contract weapons in the United States, as well as for locks and other parts. When the Ordnance Office then objected to the use of the parts because of concerns over interchangeability, Colt had to put them back on the market. One could fault Ripley for this decision, but the Springfield rifle musket contracts required interchangeable parts production, and production in Liege was still artisanal, largely in home workshops.

Compounding the problem for all manufacturers in late 1861 was the fact that almost all the "gun iron" used in the manufacture of gun barrels in the United States was imported from Great Britain, including the iron used by Springfield Armory. During the Trent Affair, Queen Victoria embargoed the export of arms and strategic materials, including gun iron, until the threat of war with the Federals was finally resolved.

By the spring of 1862, given the inability of Springfield Armory and the Federal arms contractors to manufacture enough of the much simpler Springfield rifle muskets to replace combat losses and keep up with the demand for equipment for the mobilizing Federal volunteer army, the government's reserve stock of small arms was essentially running on empty; even with the European procurements.

Regards,
Don Dixon

​

 

[wbull1]

In defense of the delay and fuddy-duddies everywhere, the concern about wasted ammunition was not as ridiculous as it may seem. Supplying troops by train, wagons, and mules over the distances required was not a simple matter. Soldiers could quickly use up all the ammunition they could carry on their backs. As noted, manufacturing rifles and the reight bullets in sufficient quantities was an issue. Should the weapons have been adopted sooner? Yes. But was it a simple matter to do so? I don't think so.

 

[Philip Leigh]

To the contrary. War Secretaries Jefferson Davis and John Floyd who served during the 1850s provided favorable assessments of breechloaders.

In 1860 Floyd discarded all reservations and wrote:

The long habit of using muzzle-loading arms will resist what
seems to be so great an innovation, and ignorance may condemn;
but as certainly as the percussion cap has superseded the flint and
steel, so surely will the breech-loading gun drive out of use those
that load at the muzzle.​

Yet these two gentlemen did what to procure such weapons for the Confederacy?

Anyone arguing that limitations on Northern breechloading production capacity excuses their tardy adoption must surely recognizes that the Confederacy's comparative production capacity was basically non-existent. Nonetheless, the Rebels did try to make breechloaders at factories in Richmond and Greensboro. Few imports, such as the Dreyse and Kammerlader, were available. The British tested the Dreyse before the Civil War and famously found it wanting.

Be that as it may, Jefferson Davis undeniably appreciated the value of breechloaders since he had his bodyguard armed with Henrys.

 

[gary]

If all Yankees in the field in 1861 were armed with breechloaders, there would be a lot of Halls rifles, cavalry carbines and a handful of Sharps. Given the scarcity of arms, it would be a very small army whose battle cry would not be the offensive, "On to Richmond!" but rather the defensive, "Here comes the Rebs!"

 

[unionblue]

Be that as it may, Jefferson Davis undeniably appreciated the value of breechloaders since he had his bodyguard armed with Henrys.

As a MSG in the US Army I remember complaining loud and long about M16A1 and as a member of that organization how little attention my complaints received from the Commander-in-Chief on down my military chain-of-command.

I found, due to much bitter experience, the hardest attitude to overcome in the US Army was the tired, old, phrase, "But we've never done it that way before!"

But before ol' Jefferson Davis lost his as President of the Rebellion, he did adopt a modern idea that benefitted the US Army while his was the US Secretary of War. He introduced the 'Jefferson' bootee, shoes that were the first to be manufactured for the left and right foot, instead as all previous shoes that were simply made straight. Davis correctly surmised that such new shoes would allow soldiers to march further, in greater comfort, than the old 'straight-laced' shoes.

I'm sure the soldiers on both sides would have blessed ol' Davis had they known he had made it possible for them to march long into the day and night, marching to distant fields of battle.

Unionblue

 

[Philip Leigh]

You can throw all the money in the world at a problem - in this case the manufacture of breech loading/repeating rifles - but if you do not have the required facilities, machine tools, skilled labor, and raw materials, you will fail. Even with a magic wand, significant production was not going to begin until at least late 1862.

Effective with the adoption of the Model 1842 percussion smoothbore musket, all U.S. military firearms produced by the Ordnance Office were designed to be manufactured using interchangeable parts technology. Despite the design for interchangeability, there were technical problem in implementation. Although national government produced interchangeable Hall's rifles and carbines had been manufactured at Harper's Ferry Armory, that armory was incapable of providing interchangeable parts Model 1842 muskets until 1847. Model 1842 muskets manufactured at Springfield Armory were not interchangeable until 1849. Ripley had been commandant at Springfield from 1841 to 1854, and was intimately familiar with the problems of bringing an arm that would meet the Army's standards for interchangeability into production. Consequently, he had reasonable concerns regarding the ability of the Northern contractors to do it, particularly for more complex breech loading and repeating arms.

On 5 July 1861 Samuel Colt signed a contract with the Ordnance Office to manufacture 25,000 Springfield rifle muskets to be delivered beginning in 1862 at a rate of 1,000 per month. Unlike many other contractors, Colt was a legitimate firearms manufacturer with a functioning firearms factory in Hartford, Connecticut. But, the factory was fully occupied in producing Colt's revolvers for the Army and Navy. Consequently, Colt would have to build a new factory for rifle musket production. He told the Ordnance Office that it would take six months for the new factory to come on-line. To speed production, Colt contracted with Pierre-Joseph Lemille of Liege to manufacture 10,000 rifle musket barrels to be mounted on the contract weapons in the United States, as well as for locks and other parts. When the Ordnance Office then objected to the use of the parts because of concerns over interchangeability, Colt had to put them back on the market. One could fault Ripley for this decision, but the Springfield rifle musket contracts required interchangeable parts production, and production in Liege was still artisanal, largely in home workshops.

Compounding the problem for all manufacturers in late 1861 was the fact that almost all the "gun iron" used in the manufacture of gun barrels in the United States was imported from Great Britain, including the iron used by Springfield Armory. During the Trent Affair, Queen Victoria embargoed the export of arms and strategic materials, including gun iron, until the threat of war with the Federals was finally resolved.

By the spring of 1862, given the inability of Springfield Armory and the Federal arms contractors to manufacture enough of the much simpler Springfield rifle muskets to replace combat losses and keep up with the demand for equipment for the mobilizing Federal volunteer army, the government's reserve stock of small arms was essentially running on empty; even with the European procurements.

Regards,
Don Dixon

This does not explain why Ripley refused to order Spencer repeaters until Lincoln basically forced him to do so in late December 1861. He could, and did, provide the Ordnance Department an escape clause if Spencer failed to make timely deliveries. Thus, it was not a matter of production capacity that concerned him. He simply failed to appreciate the value of the Spencer. Even after Alexander Dyer, who would soon manage the Springfield Armory, gave the Spencer a thumbs-up, Ripley dragged his feet.

 

[JOHN42768]

It is tough to teach an old dog new tricks. Even if the repeaters were forthcoming he was not about to accept a new way of doing things

 

[Package4]

The firing-rate superiority of breechloading rifles and carbines was known early in the war. The first order for repeating Spencers, for example, was only two months after Fort Sumter.

https://civilwarchat.wordpress.com/2018/08/07/the-biggest-union-error/

The issue with the Spencer was manufacturing capability, yes the first order was for 700 rifles, in July '61, but they were not delivered until December 1862. Ripley was not that opposed to the Spencer, he ordered 10,000 rifles in December 1861, but again Spencer was unable to deliver and the order was reduced to 7,500 by commissioners Holt and Owens. They were delivered over the course of the next 2 years.

The first Spencer to actually see action was not until October 16, 1862 by Sgt. Francis Lombard of the 1st MA Cav; he was the only one so armed that day at Cumberland Maryland. He received his weapon from his good friend Christopher Spencer.

I have had issues with the OP and his articles over the years and know to fact check him...…...

 

[Philip Leigh]

. . . Ripley was not that opposed to the Spencer . . .

Untrue. He had a number of objections to the Spencer including its cost, weight when fully loaded and his conclusion that its rapid fire capabilities would encourage soldiers to waste ammunition. He had similar objections to the Henry.

. . . he ordered 10,000 rifles in December 1861 . . .

Apparently you did not read upthread where I noted that he was forced to place that order at the insistence of President Lincoln. He tried to avoid placing it.

Ripley was undeniably hostile to the Spencer and Henry because of their intrinsic features. That is why he was tardy in placing orders for them. Without such orders the applicable manufacturers would have been foolish to build high volume production plants.

 

[Package4]

Untrue. He had a number of objections to the Spencer including its cost, weight when fully loaded and his conclusion that its rapid fire capabilities would encourage soldiers to waste ammunition. He had similar objections to the Henry.

Apparently you did not read upthread where I noted that he was forced to place that order at the insistence of President Lincoln. He tried to avoid placing it.

Ripley was undeniably hostile to the Spencer and Henry because of their intrinsic features. That is why he was tardy in placing orders for them. Without such orders the applicable manufacturers would have been foolish to build high volume production plants.

Lincoln did not test fire the Spencer until August of 1863; you might want to read the upthread yourself, he did nothing to encourage the purchase. I would suggest reading the authority on these weapons John D McAulay and his various tomes on their use.

I would also recommend the following myth buster, by Joe Bilby

https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2006/sep/29/20060929-083624-2018r/

 

[Package4]

According to the memoirs of Confederate Brigadier General Porter Alexander, who famously directed the Rebel bombardment prior to Pickett's Charge at Gettysburg, "There is reason to believe that had the Federal infantry been armed from the first with even the breechloaders available in 1861 [the war's first year] the war would have been terminated in a year."
Edited.
It is difficult to estimate how much more quickly single-shot breechloaders and repeaters might have been deployed in the Union army. But if top military and government leaders acknowledged their superiority earlier, it is difficult to avoid concluding that the arms could have been adopted more rapidly. As noted, War Secretary Stanton did not recommend uniform adoption until one and a half months before Appomattox, even though the earliest test results were favorable beginning two months after the war started. The failure to mobilize government and private industry into cooperative efforts and focused technological development was a mistake that would be corrected in later wars.
<https://civilwarchat.wordpress.com/2018/08/07/the-biggest-union-error/>

As has been stated before, (UCVrelics) the issue was production, not an aversion to breechloaders, if you were to look at Ripley's correspondence, you would see that that he was desperately attempting to get every Sharps, Burnside and Maynard possible, this was supplemented by the Smith, Gallager, Starr, Remington and even Merrill. Granted these were largely for the cavalry, but it was all they could do to supply that branch.

Ripley was so desperate that they were buying every Sharps possible on the open market, from gun dealers such as CC Bean of NYC, Orlson Blunt NYC, Herman Boker and EP Howland 1,000 Sharps. They even received 431 from the Union Defense Committee of New York.

I suggest reading Civil War Arms Makers and their contracts, edited by Mowbray & Heroux

 

[Philip Leigh]

Lincoln did not test fire the Spencer until August of 1863;

Even though it is ultimately immaterial, as shall be explained, your source and Robert Bruce flatly disagree.

Bruce claims that Lincoln first test fired a Spencer at the Navy Yard shortly after the Navy placed an order for 700 units in June 1861. But even if he did not shoot one at that time he was familiar with the weapon due to his cordial relations with Naval Yard commander John Dahlgren and his repeated visits to the Yard. Thus, Bruce writes: "On December 26, 1861 [not 1863], by Lincoln's direction, General Ripley ordered ten thousand Spencer repeating rifles."*

Be that as it may, even your own sources admit Ripley was forced to place the December 1861 order against his will. While they speculate that the pressure against Ripley came from men other than Lincoln, they undeniably agree that Ripley did not want to order Spencers. Moreover, those men—Simon Cameron, Thomas Scott, and Gideon Welles—were within Lincoln's center of influence.**

you might want to read the upthread yourself

Please provide a link to your point as I did in post #33.

* Robert Bruce, Lincoln and the Tools of War, (Chicago: Univ. of Ill. Press, 1989), 116
** Joe Bilby, (Yardley, Pa. Westholme Publishing, 2006), 77-79

 

[Philip Leigh]

As has been stated before, (UCVrelics) the issue was production, not an aversion to breechloaders, if you were to look at Ripley's correspondence, you would see that that he was desperately attempting to get every Sharps, Burnside and Maynard possible, this was supplemented by the Smith, Gallager, Starr, Remington and even Merrill. Granted these were largely for the cavalry, but it was all they could do to supply that branch.

Ripley was so desperate that they were buying every Sharps possible on the open market, from gun dealers such as CC Bean of NYC, Orlson Blunt NYC, Herman Boker and EP Howland 1,000 Sharps. They even received 431 from the Union Defense Committee of New York.

I suggest reading Civil War Arms Makers and their contracts, edited by Mowbray & Heroux

A simple change in thinking that was eventually partly recognized by Ripley's second successor, Alexander Dyer, in November 1864 might have made a significant difference:

Since breechloading firearms were undeniably superior, Dyer decided that the Ordnance Department should settle on a single model and purchase that model in quantity. Ripley could have done this much earlier.
​

After selecting an optimal model, the federal government could have additionally required the manufacturer to license its design—including machining—to competitors. This is precisely what America did with aviation and radio patents upon entering World War I. The federals could have also at least partially advanced payment on orders, as opposed to deliveries, as a way to most quickly expand industry capacity.

 

[Package4]

Even though it is ultimately immaterial, as shall be explained, your source and Robert Bruce flatly disagree.

Bruce claims that Lincoln first test fired a Spencer at the Navy Yard shortly after the Navy placed an order for 700 units on June 22, 1861. But even if he did not shoot one at that time he was familiar with the weapon due to his cordial relations with Naval Yard commander John Dahlgren and his repeated visits to the Yard. Thus, Bruce writes: "On December 26, 1861 [not 1863], by Lincoln's direction, General Ripley ordered ten thousand Spencer repeating rifles."*

Be that as it may, even your own sources admit Ripley was forced to place the December 1861 order against his will. While they speculate that the pressure against Ripley came from men other than Lincoln, they undeniably agree that Ripley did not want to order Spencers. Moreover, those men—Simon Cameron, Thomas Scott, and Gideon Welles—were within Lincoln's center of influence.**

Please provide a link to your point as I did in post #33.

* Robert Bruce, Lincoln and the Tools of War, (Chicago: Univ. of Ill. Press, 1989), 116
** Joe Bilby, (Yardley, Pa. Westholme Publishing, 2006), 77-79

There is absolutely no evidence that Lincoln test fired the Spencer until August of 1863, there is plenty of evidence that he did in 1863. Why would he need to test fire in '63 if he did so in '61?

Ripley had nothing against breechloaders, he astutely realized that initially, they were an arm for the cavalry, as loading a longarm on horse back, was next to impossible through the muzzle. He completed that task by mid 1863, around the time when the US Cav turned the corner and was equal to the Southern horsemen; I don't believe this to be a coincidence. He also realized that there was not the manufacturing capacity to build both carbines and rifles, thus settling on carbines.

He also knew that his first and most important duty was acquiring as many arms as quickly as possible to equip an ever growing army. Early in the war close to 50% of the arms were imported, he was trying to acquire almost anything that fired a round.

 

[Package4]

I also recall that it was the Ordinance Branch that studied the arms recovered at Gettysburg and found that of the 28K recovered, more than 22K had more than one round down the barrel. IIRC this was the study that brokered the move to breechloading rifles. I may have my numbers off, going strictly from memory, but there has been quite a bit written about this study and subsequent findings. Little help!

 

[Package4]

I also recall that it was the Ordinance Branch that studied the arms recovered at Gettysburg and found that of the 28K recovered, more than 22K had more than one round down the barrel. IIRC this was the study that brokered the move to breechloading rifles. I may have my numbers off, going strictly from memory, but there has been quite a bit written about this study and subsequent findings. Little help!

Found it:

The numbers we have today state that at least 27,574 rifles were recovered, although some sources claim the number to be as high as 37,000. Of the weapons that were salvaged, an incredible 24,000 rifles were still loaded (that's either 87% or 63%, depending on which estimate you accept.) Of the total number, half had been loaded more than once, and a quarter had been reloaded multiple times. Apparently, one poor soldier had reloaded his weapon twenty-three times.