Biggest Yankee Error

[Package4]

You missed this James Ripley quote:

A great evil now specially prevalent in regard to arms for military service is the vast variety of new inventions. . . . This evil can only be stopped by positively refusing to answer any requisitions for or proportions to sell new and untried arms. . .
​

And your point? Also would need source and date of quote

 

[Package4]

Monday morning quarterbacking aside, no one knew how long the war might last, how many troops would be required and who might be able to supply the government, a government that previously furnished itself through the armories.

Due to the promises and get rich quick schemes and over ambitious concerns, the Ordnance Department decided that a Commission on Ordnance and Ordnance Stores to be established to view the various contracts.

Just to illustrate the abject confusion, the below correspondence are from the OR, Ripley could not furnish arms that were required to field an army let alone deal with all of the new inventions knocking at his door. Not only inventors, but each state was looking to acquire arms from the Federal Government to furnish their troops.

I believe that Ripley is an unsung hero who armed the US forces efficiently and quickly. Unlike the South, I have heard of no Northern troops armed with pikes heading off to war unless by choice (Rush's Lancers)

ORDNANCE OFFICE,
May 18, 1861.

Respectfully returned. Arms can be issued only to troops actually mustered into the U. S. service. Our supplies will not admit of furnishing any other than smooth-bored arms.

JAS. W. RIPLEY,
Lieutenant-Colonel of Ordnance.




ORDNANCE OFFICE,
May 27, 1861.

Respectfully returned. There is nothing due to the State of New York on account of quota under the law for arming the militia, and issues in advance on such accounts are forbidden. Loans of Government supplies or their issue, except to troops actually mustered into the U. S. service, are also forbidden. Sales of ordinance stores are restricted to such as are condemned on regular inspection as damaged or otherwise unserviceable. Work at U. S. arsenals except for Government purposes is forbidden at all times, and now the full capacity of those arsenals is not more than sufficient to supply urgent demands for the U. S. service. There is thus want of authority to comply with the written requests and lack of means to furnish at this time supplies for State or home troops unless to the delay of those needed for Government purposes.

JAS. W. RIPLEY,
Lieutenant-Colonel of Ordnance



SIMON CAMERON,
Secretary of War:

SIR: This office not having received any official information as to the entire military force which will be in service, and such information being essential for making its preparations to supply the stores which it is its province to furnish, proposes to assume as a basis an aggregate force of 250,000 men of all arms, cavalry, artillery, and infantry, and to give orders for providing the requisite supplies, and to make its estimates accordingly. Your instructions on this subject, either on the specified basis or such other as you may designate, are requested. In connection with this matter of providing supplies for arms, &c., I deem it proper to report that I suggested, some five weeks since, when my views on this subject were requested, the propriety of obtaining from abroad from 50,000 to 100,000 small-arms and eight batteries of rifled cannon, a note of which was taken at the time, but I have not been advised whether any measures have been taken to carry out that suggestion.

Respectfully, &c.,

JAS. W. RIPLEY,
Lieutenant-Colonel of Ordnance.

ORDNANCE OFFICE,
Washington, June 8, 1861.

Hon. SIMON CAMERON,
Secretary of War:

SIR: Since the receipt of your letter of the 6th ultimo every attention possible on the part of this office has been given toward obtaining the necessary data for responding to the various questions therein. In ordinary times, and without the confusion as to the condition of ordnance supplies which was occasioned by irregular and, it is believed, unwarranted orders for taking them from the arsenals, it would not have been difficult to have made a prompt answer to your letter. As it was, immediate measures were taken to answer, which involved the necessity of a correspondence with the respective arsenals. Most of them have responded, and a tabular statement is in preparation, exhibiting in a concise form, convenient for easy reference, the facts called for by the first and fifth questions of your letter. There are still some blanks necessarily left in this statement, from the non-receipt of replies from some of the arsenals, which will be filled as fast as they come in, and the complete statement submitted to you. I ought not probably to have delayed an immediate answer to your letter, as far as was possible, but my desire to answer it in full has caused me to do so. I now reply to the second, third, and fourth questions, and will not defer answers to the others longer than is absolutely necessary to enable me to do so. The cost of manufacturing rifle muskets is $13.93 per arm, including appendages, such as screw-drivers, wipers, spring vices, and bullet-molds. The Government has no foundry and purchases its cannon. The prices heretofore paid have been 6 cents per pound for iron cannon unchambered, and 6 1/2 cents for chambered; for bronze cannon, 46 cents per pound, except the mountain howitzer, for which 75 cents per pound is paid. No muskets have been purchased. For cavalry carbines, which are patented arms, the price is $30 each; and for cavalry pistols, Colt revolvers of the latest pattern, $25. The only work for supplying arms owned by the Government is the armory at Springfield. The present capacity of that armory can give a product of about 2,500 arms a month. Measures are now in as rapid progress as possible to provide additional machinery, tools, and fixtures to double at least that capacity. The orders from this office to the superintendent give him full powers of increasing the product without limit. The service is now deficient in rifle muskets; in siege and field artillery, with carriages and harness; in some calibers of heavy artillery, and carriages for the same; in accouterments and horse equipments; in artillery horses, and in powder and lead. When I say deficient, I mean that the quantities of these articles on hand are not an adequate stock for the present contemplated military force in service. We have supplies of all to meet immediate exigencies, except of rifle muskets, and our supply of this arm, smooth-bored, of good and serviceable quality, will for the present meet this deficiency. All these deficiencies must be supplied by manufacture at the U. S. Armory and arsenals and by purchases from private establishments. These two sources will keep up our supply to meet immediate wants, and in one year, it is estimated, will afford a good stock in store. The estimates of this Bureau, which will be submitted in a few days, will exhibit this subject in full detail. These estimates will not be for less than $500,000 for the remainder of the present fiscal year, and $6,000,000 for the next year, to meet liabilities contracted for and probable future expenditures.

Respectfully, &c.,

JAMES W. RIPLEY,
Lieutenant-Colonel of Ordnance.

 

[Package4]

Really *Edited*? From you? FWIW we've had this discussion before. You are the one making the charge that the US should have been able to completely arm the US Army w/ breechloaders in less than a year while fighting a war. You are not alone in such. As has been said before: amateurs study battles & professionals study logistics. Others have also said that wars are won by the least incompetent army. Even with all the incompetence in the US Army the US still managed to win the Civil War; largely without repeaters...

It would be an interesting study to determine how many inventors sought an audience with Ripley. I imagine those records no longer exist, but a patent search might shed some light.

The Ordnance Department at the time, not only had to contend with arming the troops, but all accouterments for the various branches of service as well. A very daunting task in the midst of a war.

 

[johan_steele]

It would be an interesting study to determine how many inventors sought an audience with Ripley. I imagine those records no longer exist, but a patent search might shed some light.

The Ordnance Department at the time, not only had to contend with arming the troops, but all accouterments for the various branches of service as well. A very daunting task in the midst of a war.

The actual study of logistics and industry is fascinating and more than a little revealing of reality. Changing a production line to manufacture something more complex is neither easy or quickly done. But that is a study of reality vs that of fantasy.

A lot can be learned from the study of tool manufacturers and what they were doing at the time.

Established arms companies like Colt, Remington, Savage, Sharps etc all had difficulty gearing up to wartime production levels. Imagine the troubles of Spencer with his newly established company.

Changing a production line in mid stream... It has never been as easy as flipping s switch.

 

[Package4]

The actual study of logistics and industry is fascinating and more than a little revealing of reality. Changing a production line to manufacture something more complex is neither easy or quickly done. But that is a study of reality vs that of fantasy.

A lot can be learned from the study of tool manufacturers and what they were doing at the time.

Established arms companies like Colt, Remington, Savage, Sharps etc all had difficulty gearing up to wartime production levels. Imagine the troubles of Spencer with his newly established company.

Changing a production line in mid stream... It has never been as easy as flipping s switch.

True, I was lucky enough to meet and briefly study under Shigeo Shingo (Toyota Production System) as a young Industrial Engineer. US Production, even in the 1980s was slow and laborious, he showed us how to change a die in minutes where it took 1-2 hours prior to his instruction. Simple things like eliminating threads to lock down the die, to just what was needed, a quarter turn. I worked in a factory that produced 50% of the gasoline pumps in the US, we did some casting, all machining, shearing, bending and forming, in addition to painting. Changing a process with new machinery was extremely tedious and took months. I can't imagine the process without electricity (1860), I doubt there was light enough to run three shifts, let alone two.

My engineering thesis was a project I later helped implement, changing an electrostatic wet paint system over to a powder coat system, that took almost a year, to get it right. What they did in the 1860s was astounding...…..

 

[Philip Leigh]

Really *Edited*? From you? FWIW we've had this discussion before. You are the one making the charge that the US should have been able to completely arm the US Army w/ breechloaders in less than a year while fighting a war.

Where did I write that?

 

[Philip Leigh]

I believe that using Ripley's own words might help clarify . . . [our discussion, blah blah, blah]

You missed this James Ripley quote:

A great evil now specially prevalent in regard to arms for military service is the vast variety of new inventions. . . . This evil can only be stopped by positively refusing to answer any requisitions for or proportions to sell new and untried arms. . .
​

And your point?

I'll let Ripley's words above speak for themselves.

Also would need source . . .

You know how to click on a hyperlink, right?

. . . and date of quote.

Trackable through the source.

 

[O' Be Joyful]

Trackable through the source.

Indeed it is. The full quote is far more instructive as to the problems to be faced than your cherry picked link.

Notes on subject of contracting for small-arms.

A great evil now specially prevalent in regard to arms for the military service is the vast variety of the new inventions, each having, of course, its advocates, insisting upon the superiority of his favorite arm over all others and urging its adoption by the Government.

The influence thus exercised has already introduced into the service many kinds and calibers of arms, some, in my opinion, unfit for use as military weapons, and none as good as the U. S. musket, producing confusion in the manufacture, the issue, and the use of ammunition, and very injurious to the efficiency of troops. This evil can only be stopped by positively refusing to answer any requisitions for or propositions to sell new and untried arms, and steadily adhering to the rule of uniformity of arms for all troops of the same kind, such as cavalry, artillery, infantry. The U. S. muskets as now made have no superior arms in the world. I say this with confidence, from my entire familiarity with the manufacture of these arms, and from the fact that the celebrated Enfield rifle of England is the result of a long visit and minute examination and close study of the arms made at Springfield Armory and of the machinery and tools and mode of conducting operations there, by three British officers, who were selected by their Government for the special service. They had the machinery for the Enfield Armory made in the vicinity of Springfield from U. S. patterns, and they engaged the services of several of the armory mechanics, one to take the general charge of the Enfield works as master-armorer, and others to take charge of the stocking, forging, and other principal departments of manufacture. It is, in my opinion, decidedly objectionable to enter into contracts for any other arms than those of the regular U. S. patterns. Although there are many persons urgent and clamorous for contracts, and ready to promise the delivery of any kind of arms, of any patterns, and in a short time, I know of none, and I do not believe there are any, who have the requisite machinery, tools, and fixtures for making such arms, and but few who can prepare them in less than one year's time. Even Mr. Colt, who has the most complete private armory in the United States or probably elsewhere, and greater means and facilities for commencing the fabrication of the Government pattern arms than any one else, states that it will require six months for him to make the first delivery. All who seek these contracts want orders for large quantities of arms, which I consider it certain they will not be able to deliver under many years' time, not probably until the present demand for them is over. The Government, however, will be bound to take and pay for all these arms. The best and only proper course to pursue in this matter is, in my opinion, to make no contract now for more than 25,000 arms, with a stringent condition in regard to the time of delivery-I should say {p.265} an entire forfeiture of the contract. In this way the ability of each contractor to meet his engagements, both as regards time and the quality of his work, will be ascertained, when additional contracts may be given to those who prove themselves worthy, and the Government will thus obtain arms without disappointment and without involving itself in unnecessary liabilities. The present capacity of Springfield Armory is the product of about 2,500 arms per month, and measures are in rapid progress to double at least that product, with orders to put no limit to the extent of work. The cost of the rifled muskets made there is $13.93 each, including the bullet-molds, screw-drivers, wipers, and spring vices. I have little doubt they will be made for less than $13.

JAS. W. RIPLEY, Lieutenant-Colonel, Ordnance.–––

WAR DEPARTMENT, Washington, June 11, 1861.
​

Later communications by Ripley may be found at the link.

http://www.simmonsgames.com/research/authors/USWarDept/ORA/OR-S3-V1.html

 

[Philip Leigh]

Indeed it is. The full quote is far more instructive as to the problems to be faced than your cherry picked link.

Notes on subject of contracting for small-arms.

A great evil now specially prevalent in regard to arms for the military service is the vast variety of the new inventions, each having, of course, its advocates, insisting upon the superiority of his favorite arm over all others and urging its adoption by the Government.

The influence thus exercised has already introduced into the service many kinds and calibers of arms, some, in my opinion, unfit for use as military weapons, and none as good as the U. S. musket, producing confusion in the manufacture, the issue, and the use of ammunition, and very injurious to the efficiency of troops. This evil can only be stopped by positively refusing to answer any requisitions for or propositions to sell new and untried arms, and steadily adhering to the rule of uniformity of arms for all troops of the same kind, such as cavalry, artillery, infantry. The U. S. muskets as now made have no superior arms in the world. I say this with confidence, from my entire familiarity with the manufacture of these arms, and from the fact that the celebrated Enfield rifle of England is the result of a long visit and minute examination and close study of the arms made at Springfield Armory and of the machinery and tools and mode of conducting operations there, by three British officers, who were selected by their Government for the special service. They had the machinery for the Enfield Armory made in the vicinity of Springfield from U. S. patterns, and they engaged the services of several of the armory mechanics, one to take the general charge of the Enfield works as master-armorer, and others to take charge of the stocking, forging, and other principal departments of manufacture. It is, in my opinion, decidedly objectionable to enter into contracts for any other arms than those of the regular U. S. patterns. Although there are many persons urgent and clamorous for contracts, and ready to promise the delivery of any kind of arms, of any patterns, and in a short time, I know of none, and I do not believe there are any, who have the requisite machinery, tools, and fixtures for making such arms, and but few who can prepare them in less than one year's time. Even Mr. Colt, who has the most complete private armory in the United States or probably elsewhere, and greater means and facilities for commencing the fabrication of the Government pattern arms than any one else, states that it will require six months for him to make the first delivery. All who seek these contracts want orders for large quantities of arms, which I consider it certain they will not be able to deliver under many years' time, not probably until the present demand for them is over. The Government, however, will be bound to take and pay for all these arms. The best and only proper course to pursue in this matter is, in my opinion, to make no contract now for more than 25,000 arms, with a stringent condition in regard to the time of delivery-I should say {p.265} an entire forfeiture of the contract. In this way the ability of each contractor to meet his engagements, both as regards time and the quality of his work, will be ascertained, when additional contracts may be given to those who prove themselves worthy, and the Government will thus obtain arms without disappointment and without involving itself in unnecessary liabilities. The present capacity of Springfield Armory is the product of about 2,500 arms per month, and measures are in rapid progress to double at least that product, with orders to put no limit to the extent of work. The cost of the rifled muskets made there is $13.93 each, including the bullet-molds, screw-drivers, wipers, and spring vices. I have little doubt they will be made for less than $13.

JAS. W. RIPLEY, Lieutenant-Colonel, Ordnance.–––

WAR DEPARTMENT, Washington, June 11, 1861.
​

Later communications by Ripley may be found at the link.

http://www.simmonsgames.com/research/authors/USWarDept/ORA/OR-S3-V1.html

You are targeting the wrong person for "cherry picking" because you are merely reposting the source that Package4, quoted below, which happens to be ultimately be the same source that I used. The difference is that Package4 omitted the following Ripley remarks:

A great evil now specially prevalent in regard to arms for military service is the vast variety of new inventions. . . . This evil can only be stopped by positively refusing to answer any requisitions for or proportions to sell new and untried arms. . .
​

I believe that using Ripley's own words might help clarify the issue facing the Ordnance Department in 1861:

"Although there are many persons urgent and clamorous for contracts, and ready to promise the delivery of any kind of arms, of any pattern, and in short time, I know of none, and I do not believe there are any, who have the requisite machinery, tools, and fixtures for making such arms, and but few who can prepare them in less than one year's time. Even Mr. Colt, who has the most complete private armory in the United States or probably elsewhere, and greater means and facilities for commencing the fabrication of the Government pattern arms than anyone else, states that it will require six months for him to make the first delivery. All who seek these contracts want orders for large quantities of arms, which I consider it certain they will not be able to deliver under many years time, not probably until the present demand for those is over."

The Colt plant had over 1,400 machines and Colt did not deliver in the 6 month period predicted by Ripley, it took him almost a year to tool up and produce the '61 Springfield type musket.

The Amoskeag Gun factory took 14 months to tool up and make the same arm; there were over 500 different operations just to make the '61 Springfield. General James Wolf Ripley Chief of Ordnance, Tate; pages 17-18

 

[unionblue]

@Harvey Johnson ,

You brought a paperback book to a library fight.

And lost.

 

[thomas aagaard]

What everyone really should remember is that a gun don't shoot on its own. You need cartridges.

Where a springfield is not actually loaded with one and a bad cartridges is not necessarily critical, a sharps need a well made "soft" cartridge to fire and a Spencer or Henry need brass cartridges.

Even IF bigger numbers of repeaters could have been made, the Union did not have the ability to make the needed brass cartridges.
Even getting sufficient numbers of cartridges for the sharps was an issue at times for the USSS.

 

[thomas aagaard]

As often as the Dreyse is mentioned it should be remembered that several nations tested it and rejected it because it had accuracy issues and leaked gas badly.

The danish army tested it in both 1835 (yes 6 before the prussian army accepted it) and again in 1851 and rejected it for the following reasons.

• It need mechanical skills not common with danish recruits.
  (to take the lock apart and put it back together)
  And there was not the sufficient time to teach it. Prussian infantry served 3 years at full time. The danes did 16 month but that included a 4 month winter break. So effectively only 12 month in actual service.
• It need a standard of maintenance that is to high compared to what can be expected of soldiers under war conditions.
• Needs to be cleaned to often and to hard to keep clean.
  (A danish "tap riffel M/1848 could fire of many hundreds of round with no cleaning needed. In one test one was fired for 8 hours. Then the next day they shot another 60 rounds at 2 shots a minute. With the last round being as easy to load as the first. No cleaning done.)
• Recoil to heavy
• The needle need to be replaced too often.

(The bolded part are from the book, the next text is my commend and/or explanation.)

And as one danish military book from 1851 say:
"Man er næsten over alt kommet til den erkendelse at bagladegeværet ikke egner sig til militært brug."
[almost everywhere it have been recognized that the breech loaded rifle is not suited for military use]

The issue that it leaked gas is actually not given as an important reason. The fact that it too easy for a soldier to do something/not do something that result in it not working at all was the core problem.
["It is simply not sufficient reliable in its current form."] as the same book note.

The fear that the soldiers would spend their ammo too quickly was also mentioned (something the prussians feared also)
And there was the issue of cost. Up rifling the existing stock of french M/1822 smoothbore percussion muskets was much much cheaper than buying new guns. (and the army correctly judged that getting rifled artillery was more important)


[text] is my translation.

 

[Package4]

You are targeting the wrong person for "cherry picking" because you are merely reposting the source that Package4, quoted below, which happens to be ultimately be the same source that I used. The difference is that Package4 omitted the following Ripley remarks:

A great evil now specially prevalent in regard to arms for military service is the vast variety of new inventions. . . . This evil can only be stopped by positively refusing to answer any requisitions for or proportions to sell new and untried arms. . .
​

Not true, my quotes came directly from the O.R., so if you would like to look it up please do so, it was tedious going through the OR so I stopped at June 8th, feeling that the point was made.

Any idea that machinery would have been made available and product produced in time to change the course of the war, is , as Johan has pointed out, ludicrous. I copied and pasted full quotes, not cherry picked parts of quotes...…….

You have not answered the question of how the machinery would be made to produce the numbers required to supply the over 2 million pieces to arm the US Army, with repeaters or even breechloaders. Ripley himself indicates that it would take at least a year to finally be able to produce rifled musket stock, for inventory and this through current production of US Arsenals/Armories & contractors. OR June 8 1861

Your source was from Christopher D. Van Aller's book "The Culture of Defense", where he also states that the US should go back to diesel powered submarines, since they are as effective as nuclear and much more cost effective. No doubt Putin and XI are rooting for this wacko to be listened to..... He also says there are better and more cost effective methods than the aircraft carrier, though he doesn't spell them out...…..Granted his book is dated, but think where we would be if anyone had listened to his counsel.

 

[wausaubob]

The best and only proper course to pursue in this matter is, in my opinion, to make no contract now for more than 25,000 arms, with a stringent condition in regard to the time of delivery-I should say {p.265} an entire forfeiture of the contract.

What Ripley is writing about is a method of accountability. Before granting a contract for 150,000 rifles, lets see who can perform a smaller contract. If this method had been used on the TCRR, the builders would have less risk and the government could have supervised the cost.
With respect to the Civil War, the administration had overwhelming concerns respecting the navy and river flotillas.
The prospect of a long war with ten of thousands of casualties was accepted in 1863.

 

[Philip Leigh]

Not true, my quotes came directly from the O.R., so if you would like to look it up please do so, it was tedious going through the OR so I stopped at June 8th . . .

As documented below you did not originally cite your source as a June 8, 1861 note by Ripley. You simply provided a quote by Ripley without a citation for the quote. Your exact words are:

I believe that using Ripley's own words might help clarify the issue facing the Ordnance Department in 1861:
"Although there are many persons urgent and clamorous for contracts, and ready to promise the delivery of any kind of arms, of any pattern, and in short time, I know of none, and I do not believe there are any, who have the requisite machinery, tools, and fixtures for making such arms, and but few who can prepare them in less than one year's time. Even Mr. Colt, who has the most complete private armory in the United States or probably elsewhere, and greater means and facilities for commencing the fabrication of the Government pattern arms than anyone else, states that it will require six months for him to make the first delivery. All who seek these contracts want orders for large quantities of arms, which I consider it certain they will not be able to deliver under many years time, not probably until the present demand for those is over." . . .

You may now note that those are the same words used by Ripley in a June 11, 1861 note from which you excluded (among other remarks) the following:

A great evil now specially prevalent in regard to arms for military service is the vast variety of new inventions. . . . This evil can only be stopped by positively refusing to answer any requisitions for or proportions to sell new and untried arms. . .
​

 

[Philip Leigh]

Really *Edited*? From you? FWIW we've had this discussion before. You are the one making the charge that the US should have been able to completely arm the US Army w/ breechloaders in less than a year while fighting a war. . . .

For the second time I ask you to show: Where did I write this?

Specifically, please show where I claimed that the US Army should have been able to completely arm with breechloaders in less than a year.

You are causing others to believe that I made such a claim but I don't recall ever writing it.

 

[CSA Today]

@Harvey Johnson ,

You brought a paperback book to a library fight.

And lost.

Possibly the most profound thing written by someone of the Northern persuasion on this forum today.

 

[Package4]

As documented below you did not originally cite your source as a June 8, 1861 note by Ripley. You simply provided a quote by Ripley without a citation. Your exact words are as follows:

You may now note that those are the same words used by Ripley in a June 11, 1861 note from which you excluded (among other remarks) the following:

A great evil now specially prevalent in regard to arms for military service is the vast variety of new inventions. . . . This evil can only be stopped by positively refusing to answer any requisitions for or proportions to sell new and untried arms. . .
​

The attribution was at the end of the entirety; "General James Wolf Ripley Chief of Ordnance, Tate; pages 17-18" This is a book written about Ripley with many of his correspondence and why he decided to stay with the arms that he did. Ripley was superintendent of the Springfield Armory for over 12 years, thus he had probably one the best understanding of rifle making machinery than anyone in North America, other than Colt.

Even with the experience and a tried process, it took Springfield an additional year to double their production, in fact of the 23 contracts for M1861 rifled muskets from contractors only 8 were filled. Springfield Shoulder Arms 1795-1865 page 116. The ramp up time even with established concerns was too lengthy and this was for a musket all were familiar. Production of a Spencer would have even longer, in fact Spencer could not fill his own contracts and the Burnside Rifle Company filled the void with licensed carbines in 1865. Burnside produced 34,000 and the US government purchased 30,502, these were inferior pieces as Burnside did not have the machinery to rifle the barrels with the 6 groove rifling, they produced the Spencer in three groove. Flayderman's Guide to Antique American Firearms 9th Edition page 521.

 

[Package4]

"There is reason to believe that had the Federal infantry been armed from the first with even the breechloaders available in 1861 [the war's first year] the war would have been terminated in a year."

For the second time I ask you to show: Where did I write this?

Specifically, please show where I claimed that the US Army should have been able to completely arm with breechloaders in less than a year.

You are causing others to believe that I made such a claim but I don't recall ever writing it.

Not your quote, but you copied and pasted, in defense of Phil Leigh's argument.

 

[Philip Leigh]

Not true, my [James W. Ripley] quotes came directly from the O.R., so if you would like to look it up please do so, it was tedious going through the OR so I stopped at June 8th, feeling that the point was made. . .

As documented below you did not originally cite your source as a June 8, 1861 note by Ripley. . .

You may now note that those are the same words used by Ripley in a June 11, 1861 note from which you excluded (among other remarks) the following:

A great evil now specially prevalent in regard to arms for military service is the vast variety of new inventions. . . . This evil can only be stopped by positively refusing to answer any requisitions for or proportions to sell new and untried arms. . .​

The attribution was at the end of the entirety; "General James Wolf Ripley Chief of Ordnance, Tate; pages 17-18." . . .

Okay. Now you clarify that you did not tediously go through the OR to settle on Ripley's June 8, 1861 notes as your source but used pages 17-18 of Tate's book instead. As you may observe, however, Tate's source on those pages was the June 11, 1861 Ripley notes, which I cited above, and not his June 8, 1861 notes.

Nonetheless, on page 15 of his book even Tate includes Ripley's (6-11-1861) words below that you omitted:

A great evil now specially prevalent in regard to arms for military service is the vast variety of new inventions. . . . This evil can only be stopped by positively refusing to answer any requisitions for or proportions to sell new and untried arms. . .​