Alternatives: McClellan

[Saphroneth]

If I remember correctly he was part of the cavalry charging Churubusco which did lead to the Mexicans' retreat (eventually).

Yeah, that was explicitly against orders... Kearny is a problematic commander at best, and the French at least certainly thought so! (They gave him a lower level Legion d'Honneur than he'd have earned just by showing up.)

 

[67th Tigers]

Thanks for the explanation. It's certainly a bad idea to charge headlong into fortified positions. But it seemed to have worked for Kearny in the Mexican-American War. If I remember correctly he was part of the cavalry charging Churubusco which did lead to the Mexicans' retreat (eventually).

Yes. I wrote a short account of his career here.

And if I may copy-paste from an old board:

If you read the AARs of the colonels (all in OR1, 11):

2nd Michigan - deployed mainly as skirmishers. Kearny led one of the companies in a charge! (pg 506-7)
5th Michigan - made two charges against a line of rifle pits covered by an abatis (pgs 507-8)
37th NY - on left flank, refused the flank and stood its ground (509-10)
38th NY - charged 3 times and was repulsed 3 times (pg 501)
40th NY - right wing advanced into the Slashing and was caught in a firefight. Kearny led the left wing in a charge on the left (pg 503)

So Kearny is indeed launching a whole bunch of charges, leading many of them himself. Why is he leading a company instead of commanding his division?

 

[luinrina]

Yes. I wrote a short account of his career here.

And if I may copy-paste from an old board:

If you read the AARs of the colonels (all in OR1, 11):

2nd Michigan - deployed mainly as skirmishers. Kearny led one of the companies in a charge! (pg 506-7)
5th Michigan - made two charges against a line of rifle pits covered by an abatis (pgs 507-8)
37th NY - on left flank, refused the flank and stood its ground (509-10)
38th NY - charged 3 times and was repulsed 3 times (pg 501)
40th NY - right wing advanced into the Slashing and was caught in a firefight. Kearny led the left wing in a charge on the left (pg 503)

So Kearny is indeed launching a whole bunch of charges, leading many of them himself. Why is he leading a company instead of commanding his division?

Thanks for the link, that was a very informative post about Kearny. Didn't know he was that incompetent as a leader. It certainly explains a lot though of why Hooker's men had so much casualties at Williamsburg.

I suppose AARs = After Action Reports? Still learning abbreviations.

 

[67th Tigers]

Thanks for the link, that was a very informative post about Kearny. Didn't know he was that incompetent as a leader. It certainly explains a lot though of why Hooker's men had so much casualties at Williamsburg.

Kearny's and his family were insanely rich. His father was one of the founders of the New York Stock Exchange and he inherited vast sums of money. After his death his family put out a bunch of hagiographies of their fallen family hero, and his grandson even tried to sue the reviewers in the academic press who pointed this out.

I suppose AARs = After Action Reports? Still learning abbreviations.

Yes.

 

[Yankeedave]

Kearney had to lead from the front. It's what makes him him. As far as leading companies personally, that is what it took.
At Williamsburg the regiments were as large as they would ever be. We see large, inexperienced, nine months men get butchered at Antietam and wonder why Kearney personally led companies.
At Fair Oaks when he launches charges he is counter attacking and covering for troops that have retreated. He is buying time.
He is buying time at Chantilly. He was what was successful in battles other were losing or had lost.

 

[Saphroneth]

Kearney had to lead from the front. It's what makes him him. As far as leading companies personally, that is what it took.

...to do what? Attacking dug in divisions with individual companies is not a good plan.

At Fair Oaks when he launches charges he is counter attacking and covering for troops that have retreated. He is buying time.

He's not doing his job, which is a divisional commander. Once you have a position commanding more than a unitary tactical unit (that is, a regiment, or a brigade at most) then your job is to coordinate, not send troops forwards in reckless charges because you want to be a company commander again.

He is buying time at Chantilly. He was what was successful in battles other were losing or had lost.

At Chantilly he ordered a regiment not under his command to charge even though there was a dug in enemy formation in the area and they didn't have working muskets. He refused to believe this even when they produced prisoners to demonstrate this, threatened to turn a battery on them, and forced them to advance essentially unarmed.
When he discovered the regiment was telling the truth, he turned away and got shot up the backside.

That's not buying time by any sane definition.

 

[Saphroneth]

I've seen a suggestion that McClellan's attack at Antietam should have been weighted more on his left and less on his right. The question this produces is simply how this could be done.

Historically speaking, Burnside didn't actually manage to begin crossing the bridge that now bears his name until about 1PM, and didn't advance from it until 3:30 PM. Taking the bridge was accomplished using only the troops of 9th Corps, and the area around the lower bridge is congested - there's no way for an additional corps to add to the pressure except in a "political" sense.

By the time 6th Corps arrives on the field the situation is dire enough on the right that they're marched pretty much straight over there (and 2/3 of Morell is sent over there as well, only to be recalled) so any extra weight on the Confederate right would have to be at the expense of the effort on the Union right - probably this would mean 2nd or 12th Corps being sent down to the right.

Problem is, with Burnside not getting moving until so late, that would mean 2nd or 12th Corps was effectively out of the fighting entirely. This reduces the number of brigades attacking in the north in the morning down to 15-19 instead of 24, cutting the attack by 25%-33% - with the consequence of less damage to the Confederate positions and consequently less need for Lee to feed in reinforcements in the north.

It seems feasible to me that Lee could have needed two or three fewer brigades in the north (as of 1PM Lee has several brigades not currently forming line of battle), which he could send south instead along with the never-used Armistead's Brigade. This might further delay Burnside's ability to actually fight over the bridge, or if not mean that when the advance of the left flanking movement actually began it would be with AP Hill being able to commit as many as eight or nine brigades to the attack. Since he only used three (of his five) historically to smack back Burnside's advance, a stronger force like this would have been able to repulse this southern attack quite handily if it had the same level of ability.


What McClellan actually committed to the southern attack was the largest force that would be usable (a corps), and his plan was to use three corps in the north (as part of a manoeuvre sur les derrieres, fixing Lee along a wide front) and 5th and 6th in the centre to parallel Burnside's advance in the south. What caused this plan to come unstuck was two things, firstly the heavy casualties in the north which meant that McClellan had to send 6th up there and second Burnside's slowness in actually pushing across the ford (which meant that having started the day with his forward division less than a mile from the bridge Burnside wasn't taking it until 1PM and not advancing for another two and a half hours (after defiling over the bridge).


Thus McClellan's split of effort between the north and the south was broadly sound, or at any rate if he'd moved forces south without any other change it would have impeded the battle overall.

Whether he should have sacked Burnside, on the other hand...

 

[Yankeedave]

Sack Burnsides and spare the AoP Fredericksburg.

 

[Saphroneth]

Sack Burnsides and spare the AoP Fredericksburg.

I'd say more don't sack McClellan, if you want to avoid Fredericksburg - the delay while Burnside got himself sorted out was integral to the Fredericksburg bloodbath.

 

[Yankeedave]

I'd say more don't sack McClellan, if you want to avoid Fredericksburg - the delay while Burnside got himself sorted out was integral to the Fredericksburg bloodbath.

I get the delay contributing to the defeat, but Burnside's personally made it worse. He didn't have to cross the river and attack. Sumner "found" a crossing Burnside's did not have to use.
Sac the Mac but don't get Burned. cough so to speak

 

[Saphroneth]

I get the delay contributing to the defeat, but Burnside's personally made it worse. He didn't have to cross the river and attack. Sumner "found" a crossing Burnside's did not have to use.
Sac the Mac but don't get Burned. cough so to speak

The operational plan Burnside used was, I understand, something McClellan was considering, but there were two things which went awry with it... firstly that he didn't knock Longstreet back from Culpeper first, and secondly that the delay meant Jackson was available. If you knock Longstreet back then you've either seriously done him some damage or at minimum forced him further from Fredericksburg, and if only Longstreet is available then the crossing is much more feasible to force.

Also, of course, there's that you should take the heights over Fredericksburg before Longstreet arrived. I think that kind of thing is a mistake McClellan was unlikely to make - he was a real advocate of the doctrine of taking vital ground and then entrenching on it.

 

[Saphroneth]

Something I actually think is interesting is the question of whether McClellan did anything sub-optimally after he crossed the Potomac for the Loudoun Valley Campaign. This was the campaign which led to his firing, but it's not really very clear why unless it was for political reasons - certainly as of his firing Lee was totally screwed.

 

[Jamieva]

Well the timing was clearly political. After the governor elections.

 

[Saphroneth]

Well the timing was clearly political. After the governor elections.

That sadly seems to be the case. And it's a real problem because this is actually the first time since at least April 1862 when McClellan had the combination of an army notably larger than his opponent, which was well supplied, and was the size he was expecting when making his plan (that is, the situation which the Lost Cause claims was always the case). And when he had it, McClellan mounted a very good if brief campaign aimed at striking south as fast as possible.
The force he left defending Washington was larger than an entire wing of Lee's depleted army, and he mounted the first true flying column movement of the Army of the Potomac south to Warrenton. Lee's counter movement to this was to send Longstreet across the Blue Ridge mountains to Culpeper... and at this point Lee is completely misreading McClellan's intentions - he thinks Longstreet is facing a flank guard and that the true attack was against Jackson. In fact McClellan's primary attack is against Longstreet, who is (in effectives terms) outnumbered more than 3:1.

We know what happened at Antietam when McClellan thought he had caught half of Lee's force away from the other half, it was McClellan making a massive one-day force commitment. Here McClellan's cavalry has actually siezed the mountain passes, and Jackson's a full week of marching away (historical figure when Jackson actually did move to reunite with Longstreet).

Thus Longstreet can either stand at Culpeper or retreat down the rail line to Gordonsville. If Longstreet stands he's going to get hammered, while if he retreats McClellan can shift east to Fredericksburg - and Longstreet simply can't face McClellan in the field, he's not got nearly enough troops to do it. The Confederate army needs to reunite, badly, but it'll take them more than a week to do so... and by that point McClellan's going to be over the Rappahanock. In fact, it's not beyond the realm of possibility that McClellan reaches Hanover Junction before Longstreet does, and if McClellan gets there first then Richmond just falls - there's nothing the CSA can do about it any more.

At this point there is basically no safe move for Longstreet. Any option he takes to interfere with McClellan before he reunites with Jackson runs the risk of his force getting smashed aside, but if he reunites with Jackson first then it's quite possible McClellan will reach Richmond before either half of the Army of Northern Virginia can anyway. The only way to guarantee significant Confederate troops reaching Richmond first is for Longstreet to entrain for Richmond and occupy the forts there, but at that point McClellan just marches down to the Chickahominy, reoccupies the Savage's Station position and starts battering his way in - this time with a large enough force to guard his flank against a rerun of the Seven Days.

 

[Saphroneth]

So I put this together, and I thought it'd be useful. Map as of McClellan's relief.

I assume here that most of 3rd and all of 11th Corps are still at Washington. The cavalry is omitted, but at this point the Federal cavalry is in the ascendant - most of Stuart's horses have the same epidemic outbreak that paralyzed McClellan's cav in late October - and is holding most of the Blue Ridge gaps including all the ones on the map.

Confederate strengths are their officers and men PFD. Union strengths are their officers plus 75% of their enlisted PFD, to approximate Confederate PFD (i.e. effectives).

South of the map is half of one Confederate division (IIRC Hood?) which is at Gordonsville in quarantine. Jackson's currently very slow moving as his transport's all got the same problem Early's horse has.

Position of Walker is unconfimed, he may be with Longstreet.

Either way, Longstreet is in a position in which he's going to get reamed within a day or two if he stands his ground. McClellan has no reason not to go on the attack, Washington's garrison at this point is huge so that's safe while McClellan has 83,000 troops with a valid supply line and Longstreet doesn't know he's there.

 

[NedBaldwin]

...
I assume here that most of 3rd and all of 11th Corps are still at Washington.

Why would you do that?
The 11th Corps was with the group you have labelled as Franklin.

 

[CanadianCanuck]

Nothing in that analysis makes sense. If you don't know where Walker is then either Jackson is bottled up, or he isn't (and the idea of him being bottled up is dubious in the first place, with the force ration you ascribe to him he could bull his way onto McClellan's flank) and Longstreet either has near or over 30,000 men while McClellan can put at best 60,000 against him, since committing Franklin leaves a wide open flank.

The assumption that Lee must retreat all the way to Richmond without fighting or getting creamed doesn't make much sense either. The farther McClellan goes, the further exposed he is to cavalry raids and the longer his supply lines get and it gives more time for Lee to join his army together and fight a decisive battle.

Suggesting that this is a surefire way to a decisive victory or capture of Richmond makes precious little sense.

 

[Jamieva]

Nothing in that analysis makes sense. If you don't know where Walker is then either Jackson is bottled up, or he isn't (and the idea of him being bottled up is dubious in the first place, with the force ration you ascribe to him he could bull his way onto McClellan's flank) and Longstreet either has near or over 30,000 men while McClellan can put at best 60,000 against him, since committing Franklin leaves a wide open flank.

The assumption that Lee must retreat all the way to Richmond without fighting or getting creamed doesn't make much sense either. The farther McClellan goes, the further exposed he is to cavalry raids and the longer his supply lines get and it gives more time for Lee to join his army together and fight a decisive battle.

Suggesting that this is a surefire way to a decisive victory or capture of Richmond makes precious little sense.

The entire point of this thread was not as a what if discussion, but a thinly veiled way for him to defend Little Mac's actions/legacy from the Peninsula through his removal in November 1862, The lengthy setup of the what if made it nearly impossible to even discuss other options because all of the scenarios were setup to show that Little Mac was awesome and ran circles around Lee.

 

[Saphroneth]

Why would you do that?
The 11th Corps was with the group you have labelled as Franklin.

Because the November 10 strength report did not list 11th outside the Washington defences; the listed strength with McClellan is the minimal value. (If I can get any sort of confirmation that 11th Corps was with McClellan I'll gladly adjust, and ditto for any of 3rd Corps not consisting of the division of Stoneman, though in that case I'll have to use a December 10 strength for those units.)

Nothing in that analysis makes sense. If you don't know where Walker is then either Jackson is bottled up, or he isn't (and the idea of him being bottled up is dubious in the first place, with the force ration you ascribe to him he could bull his way onto McClellan's flank) and Longstreet either has near or over 30,000 men while McClellan can put at best 60,000 against him, since committing Franklin leaves a wide open flank.

Jackson's pretty much paralyzed by his lack of transport, because all the horses are sick. He also had no idea where McClellan even was at this point, as the Federal cavalry was doing such a good screening job. (He had tried to break through the Gap into Loudoun Valley a few days previously, but balked - and as far as Jackson knows McClellan is actually positioning to go after him, that's what Lee believed at this time.)

If Walker is where I've marked him as, then Franklin may be required as a flank guard (but a flank guard which makes any operation by Jackson essentially impossible) but McClellan still has 2.5:1 odds on Longstreet without him; if Walker is with the rest of Longstreet's force, most of Franklin isn't required as a flank guard (Ashby's Gap is easily held by the Federal cavalry in force) and McClellan can concentrate nearly 3:1 odds on Jackson.

The assumption that Lee must retreat all the way to Richmond without fighting or getting creamed doesn't make much sense either. The farther McClellan goes, the further exposed he is to cavalry raids and the longer his supply lines get and it gives more time for Lee to join his army together and fight a decisive battle.

That's the thing, though, we know from when Lee actually tried to rejoin his army that Jackson's marching speed is very low at this time (because, again, his transport's screwed) while so is Stuart's cavalry - which is all pinned in the Shenandoah and mostly dismounted at this time, historically it took thousands of remounts to fix that. Meanwhile McClellan has finally got flying column supply going, so he can shift supply lines much more fluidly than he did previously.

Would you be willing to outline what you think Lee's best option is? Longstreet here can either stand at Culpeper or retreat to Gordonsville, and doing the latter leaves Fredericksburg completely open...

 

[Saphroneth]

The entire point of this thread was not as a what if discussion, but a thinly veiled way for him to defend Little Mac's actions/legacy from the Peninsula through his removal in November 1862, The lengthy setup of the what if made it nearly impossible to even discuss other options because all of the scenarios were setup to show that Little Mac was awesome and ran circles around Lee.

If you have an example of a viable alternative for McClellan during one of his campaigns, do go ahead and suggest one! The whole reason why I've been explaining things at length is so as to avoid oversimplification...