@contestedground , in response to evaluating the video, I prepared this commentary, but I was a bit, umm, delayed in my ability to post it. I have listed some of the finer points gleaned from the interview:
1. "Bloody Slugfest" something that is often forgotten to do the efficiency of modern warfare is that during the Civil War, the victor suffered as much as the defeated regarding casualties. I found this fact to be well supported in the time I spent reading first hand letters viewing period photographs of the post battle scenes -- one of despair and destruction, as the fruits of victory were often hard to recognize.
2. Logistics. In the arena of war, it is often underwhelming to underscore the importance of remembering that an army runs on its stomach, and so does its stock. Not much has changed in 153yrs, except that rather than feeding the stock forage, one must feed the vehicles petrol. I agree with Professor Simpson that logistics should be viewed as important or more important than tactics.
3. Getting along with superiors. It is interesting that one of the most common criticisms of Grant arrives in the form of "He was terrible at politics". I beg to differ. Many a great general has been brought down by his inability to get along with his superiors. Grant excelled in this arena, as he made sure to reassure Lincoln through shared letters his military intentions, and importantly his disinterest in entering the political area to challenge Lincoln.
4. 'Turning point of the war". I was pleased that the interviewer brought to point the perceptions that the
Gettysburg/Vicksburg campaign victories were the "turning point of the war". Prof. Simpson re-visited that shortly after the Gettysburg victory, there was a period of time that both the confidence of the US citizenry was badly shaken, and the president himself was no longer confident in the outcome of the war, nor the security of a second presidential term. It was not until the PR coo of Sheridan's Ride & the Atlanta campaign that confidence began to rise
5. Cold Harbour. It is fortunate that recent scholarship has shed more light on the events that took place at the battle of Cold Harbour. As Prof. Simpson says, it is clearly state in the Meade letters that he was in charge, thus, a large part of the burden of failure rests on his shoulders. I have read the correspondence, and it is quite clear. I do find it interesting, as Simpson points out: Lee lost almost twice as many men in Pickett's Charge as Grant did in Cold Harbour, but yet, Grant is labeled "The Butcher".
Bringing the