Army Life And Marksmanship

[Saphroneth]

Something I should note is that the French army's attack doctrine is not what they do in the first week of the war. Their attack doctrine is to advance by coordinated rushes, fire and movement, with their light artillery up front to support them:

"...average conscript is troubled little about such matters as these. As an infantryman, his business is to entrench himself when ordered to do so; to advance by short rushes, squad alternating with squad, during the work of getting nearer to the enemy; to charge if bidden, or to retreat as he advanced, in the way that would produce least damage to the force of which he is a member if that force was exposed to actual fire."

That's a French infantryman's description of his training, in 1912/13, at least that's my understanding! It's very far indeed from columnar attack, and importantly it works once the division commanders who were off doctrine have been sacked.


Attack a l'outrance is operational - it means committing the whole force, not leaving 75% of it standing around doing nothing while you're defeated (as the Russians did in 1905).

 

[DoctorKingSchultz]

The French had the best infantry rifle in the world in 1870, the Chassepot Needle-Rifle, and trained their men to fire at 1,000 meters.

Without sounding disingenuously provocative, as I generally agree with your posts - I was just looking at a different thread, where you seemed very adamant that it was total.. to put it one way, bull to even suggest that the British infantrymen (already on their way to becoming an army of individual marksmen solidified by 1859) were not shooting anywhere near 600-800 yards at Inkerman and that it was all hogwash. Got pretty angry about that too.

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But now, you're fully ready to believe every French infantryman was firing at 1,000 meters. Alright, sure. Perhaps you think percussion and flintlock muzzleloaders leak the same amount of gas from their breech - just trying to figure out why one is possible in your mind and not the other, not putting words in your mouth.


Have you actually read any of the manuals of any of the armies of this era? 1850s, 1860s, 1870s, any of them? Because if you did you would be aware that the British do train all of their men up to 900 yards, compulsory for all Infantrymen as of the 1859 manual (by 1861, 1,000) - with, for men beyond the Third Class/C Class, no fewer than ~400 yards to be trained with in subsequent annual practice of 90 rounds. Any man still in Class C was to go through all of the aiming, positioning drills etc. until he at least reached Class C (Keeping in mind a man at Class C was firing at 300 yards, one in Class B up to 600). There is again, zero difference as to the training of the green Rifleman and the regular Infantryman in the British Army as of 1859 (Granted not the case in 1854 yet, but the relevance, still, will be seen in a minute.)

Contrast this to the French as of 1870. Their institutions have similarly been evolutions from the 1840s-50s; as already mentioned in this very thread in some detail, the French, as with various others have schools of musketry, in their case, l'École Normale de Tir at Vincennes, predating Hythe by 8 years, was originally established for the army's marksmen and by 1852 has been established for all infantrymen. This does not mean every infantryman was training at 1,000 meters at all. In both 1859 and 1870, which you seem to have missed, the regular French infantryman is firing at a maximum of 300 (and 1870, 400) yards. In both years the French see little need to go to the lengths (that you reject the existence of outright) that the British were going to. There is indeed a difference between Tirailleurs, Chasseurs, Zouaves and regular, still-named Line infantry in the French army. The British no longer have actual doctrinal, training or weapon distinctions between "Rifleman" and Infantryman and both are ideally shooting to 1,000 yards.
Meanwhile the French train their regular line infantry up to 300-400 meters (1859/1870). Big difference. I will give the benefit of the doubt that that important clarification was just missed because whatever you looked up said 1,000 meters without distinction. Meanwhile that is the distances the regular British infantryman is least expected to fire at and goes through almost all of the same training as a fresh recruit in the following year upon having this lowest designation as an infantryman.

Sources? All in the manuals. The British Regulations for Conducting the Musketry Instruction of the army, 1859 and all its revisions in use until 1889 (and sister manual Field Exercise & Evolutions of Infantry) are out there for your reading. Same goes for the rest. This isn't buried or unknown information, and multiple publishers reprint many of these manuals. I have both original and reprints.

I've made this the main focus of my post now but nevermind the fact as well that the Chassepot still needs its needle replacing, and with time its rubber obturator; any close equivalent of that in a Martini-Henry or any metallic-cartridge conversion rifle i.e. Snider or Allin, you let me know. Between them the Chassepot still has a paper cartridge vulnerable to the elements as well. It is undoubtably the best of the needlefire development, and best sealed, a very strong design that both the Mosin-Nagant to an arguable extend and much more clearly the Mauser M71 have had influencing their designs; but still ultimately a dead-end system.

Just as a side-note in case it comes up; yards and meters are honestly close enough in conversion that the point should still stand here, i.e. 300 meters = 328.8 yards, 400 meters = 437.5 yards, 1000 meters = 1093.6 yards. While in the world of blackpowder that difference, especially with rifle-muskets can be significant, it is obvious to see how an average French infantryman firing at a maximum of ~400 meters is comparable to the worst British infantryman expected to go through the same practice until he reaches the 2nd Class going up to 600. a system that is still in place very much as of the 1867 and 1870 revisions of their manual. Much as the French retain differing distances for their traditional marksmen vs. regular infantryman. Let's not even go into the weaknesses of their conscription and training systems that put they at real disadvantages in 1870.

 

[Old Soldier]

There is a basic and fundamental tension going on which is the basis of why battles don't always go one way or the other, and that is psychological. A unit under fire that is advancing is under a lot of stress and the men in it want to go to ground and return fire; if it takes enough casualties from fire, then that urge overwhelms the drive forwards and the men take cover and the attack fails. If it has a sudden shock (such as an enemy unit appearing out of dead ground and suddenly opening fire, resulting in psychological shock, followed by being charged) then the men rout and the attack fails. This has been the case for hundreds of years as of 1914 and it doesn't really change even then - attacks often succeeded in reaching the enemy trenches. They often nearly worked, despite magazine rifles and machine guns; the ACW is not nearly as lethal, but because this is psychological attacks could fail in the ACW.

The difference in WW1 is not in being able to take the enemy trenches, but in being able to sustain the attack. The artillery necessary to suppress enemy trenches and destroy enemy defensive positions tore up the ground and meant that an attack couldn't be followed up on operationally.

No trenches in 1914 - but a lot of marching. The early battles were to stop a German advance and regain ground that way, It took weeks to accomplish but by then the Germans has established a trench line where THEY wanted it. Then the tactics have to change. The machinegun made the difference.

To put it in context with this thread. For the rifle to be an effective weapon needed marksmanship, otherwise it is only just better than the smoothbore musket. Any damage done beyond 150 yards is accidental and the tactics reflect this. HOWEVER if the enemy is at your gates, what do you do if your new army cannot shoot straight? IF the gatling gun was available in quanity and a knowledgable general could make use of them, it would be a different story. But it wasn't

 

[repman66]

Without sounding disingenuously provocative, as I generally agree with your posts - I was just looking at a different thread, where you seemed very adamant that it was total.. to put it one way, bull to even suggest that the British infantrymen (already on their way to becoming an army of individual marksmen solidified by 1859) were not shooting anywhere near 600-800 yards at Inkerman and that it was all hogwash. Got pretty angry about that too.

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But now, you're fully ready to believe every French infantryman was firing at 1,000 meters. Alright, sure. Perhaps you think percussion and flintlock muzzleloaders leak the same amount of gas from their breech - just trying to figure out why one is possible in your mind and not the other, not putting words in your mouth.


Have you actually read any of the manuals of any of the armies of this era? 1850s, 1860s, 1870s, any of them? Because if you did you would be aware that the British do train all of their men up to 900 yards, compulsory for all Infantrymen as of the 1859 manual (by 1861, 1,000) - with, for men beyond the Third Class/C Class, no fewer than ~400 yards to be trained with in subsequent annual practice of 90 rounds. Any man still in Class C was to go through all of the aiming, positioning drills etc. until he at least reached Class C (Keeping in mind a man at Class C was firing at 300 yards, one in Class B up to 600). There is again, zero difference as to the training of the green Rifleman and the regular Infantryman in the British Army as of 1859 (Granted not the case in 1854 yet, but the relevance, still, will be seen in a minute.)

Contrast this to the French as of 1870. Their institutions have similarly been evolutions from the 1840s-50s; as already mentioned in this very thread in some detail, the French, as with various others have schools of musketry, in their case, l'École Normale de Tir at Vincennes, predating Hythe by 8 years, was originally established for the army's marksmen and by 1852 has been established for all infantrymen. This does not mean every infantryman was training at 1,000 meters at all. In both 1859 and 1870, which you seem to have missed, the regular French infantryman is firing at a maximum of 300 (and 1870, 400) yards. In both years the French see little need to go to the lengths (that you reject the existence of outright) that the British were going to. There is indeed a difference between Tirailleurs, Chasseurs, Zouaves and regular, still-named Line infantry in the French army. The British no longer have actual doctrinal, training or weapon distinctions between "Rifleman" and Infantryman and both are ideally shooting to 1,000 yards.
Meanwhile the French train their regular line infantry up to 300-400 meters (1859/1870). Big difference. I will give the benefit of the doubt that that important clarification was just missed because whatever you looked up said 1,000 meters without distinction. Meanwhile that is the distances the regular British infantryman is least expected to fire at and goes through almost all of the same training as a fresh recruit in the following year upon having this lowest designation as an infantryman.

Sources? All in the manuals. The British Regulations for Conducting the Musketry Instruction of the army, 1859 and all its revisions in use until 1889 (and sister manual Field Exercise & Evolutions of Infantry) are out there for your reading. Same goes for the rest. This isn't buried or unknown information, and multiple publishers reprint many of these manuals. I have both original and reprints.

I've made this the main focus of my post now but nevermind the fact as well that the Chassepot still needs its needle replacing, and with time its rubber obturator; any close equivalent of that in a Martini-Henry or any metallic-cartridge conversion rifle, you let me know. It is undoubtably the best of the needlefire development, and best sealed, a very strong design that both the Mosin-Nagant to an arguable extend and much more clearly the Mauser M71 have had influencing their designs; but still ultimately a dead-end system.

View attachment 586866
View attachment 586867

Just as a side-note in case it comes up; yards and meters are honestly close enough in conversion that the point should still stand here, i.e. 300 meters = 328.8 yards, 400 meters = 437.5 yards, 1000 meters = 1093.6 yards. While in the world of blackpowder that difference, especially with rifle-muskets can be significant, it is obvious to see how an average French infantryman firing at a maximum of ~400 meters is comparable to the worst British infantryman expected to go through the same practice until he reaches the 2nd Class going up to 600. a system that is still in place very much as of the 1867 and 1870 revisions of their manual. Much as the French retain differing distances for their traditional marksmen vs. regular infantryman. Let's not even go into the weaknesses of their conscription and training systems that put they at real disadvantages in 1870.

1) Having both firearms, one is easy to use and shoot at distance, the other is decidedly not. Rifled musket you shoot, load, then fire. If the target is moving you've got to readjust by yards. There is so much room for error. You're taking your eyes away from downrange.

The French fired a breech-loader in volleys at 800 meters. They fired 12-16 shots a minute for the first 5 minutes or so then the rate of fire decreased (French rounds were wrapped in silk which, as a fire retardant, helped prevent excess sludge and black powder residue - to achieve the same effect now if you have a chassepot soak your paper cartridge in borax solution).

The Chassepot fires with a much straighter trajectory than a rifled musket. It's much more forgiving, and, when fired in volley with an officer properly assuming fire control it is effective at those ranges.

Look at how the American and British fired breach loading firearms in the 1870's - that was the French.

You mentioned the gas - sure - with the rubber obturator there is no gas leakage. The Dreyse had massive gas leakage (many times fired from the hip) and you have a fps muzzle velocity of 1,400-1,500 for the Chassepot and 500 for the Dreyse.

Finally I said it was the best infantry rifle in the world in 1870 because it was. The French have the misfortune to have had the best black powder rifle (Chassepot) and the best bolt-action rifle introduced where it was years, maybe only months, from being obsolete.

The Chassepot was better than the Spencer& Winchester (more range) and is a disgustingly elegant little gun. I love shooting it but it Kicks. You replace the Needle maybe every 200 shots? Its also extraordinarily simple to replace both the Obturator and the Needle (both, with the original tool, take under a minute).

2) Large Scale historical precedent - Look to St. Privat the Prussian Guards were fired upon about 1,000 meters and decimated at 800 meters and had to crawl forward to get within 600 meters of the French line losing 8,000 or 18,000 men and never getting within 400 meters.

Basically I assert that the French Chassepot was effective at 1,000 meters and **** murderous at 800 meters because it actually occurred with dozens of real life examples. It DIDN'T occur with the rifled musket, anywhere, in large degrees because it was not practicable at 800 yards.

There are sources claiming the French opened up at 1500 meters which I find incredible but most of the Prussian Guard was stopped between 1000 and 600 meters from the French lines.

 

[DoctorKingSchultz]

1) Having both firearms, one is easy to use and shoot at distance, the other is decidedly not. Rifled musket you shoot, load, then fire. If the target is moving you've got to readjust by yards. There is so much room for error. You're taking your eyes away from downrange.

The French fired a breech-loader in volleys at 800 meters. They fired 12-16 shots a minute for the first 5 minutes or so then the rate of fire decreased (French rounds were wrapped in silk which, as a fire retardant, helped prevent excess sludge and black powder residue - to achieve the same effect now if you have a chassepot soak your paper cartridge in borax solution).

The Chassepot fires with a much straighter trajectory than a rifled musket. It's much more forgiving, and, when fired in volley with an officer properly assuming fire control it is effective at those ranges.

Look at how the American and British fired breach loading firearms in the 1870's - that was the French.

You mentioned the gas - sure - with the rubber obturator there is no gas leakage. The Dreyse had massive gas leakage (many times fired from the hip) and you have a fps muzzle velocity of 1,400-1,500 for the Chassepot and 500 for the Dreyse.

Finally I said it was the best infantry rifle in the world in 1870 because it was. The French have the misfortune to have had the best black powder rifle (Chassepot) and the best bolt-action rifle introduced where it was years, maybe only months, from being obsolete.

The Chassepot was better than the Spencer& Winchester (more range) and is a disgustingly elegant little gun. I love shooting it but it Kicks. You replace the Needle maybe every 200 shots? Its also extraordinarily simple to replace both the Obturator and the Needle (both, with the original tool, take under a minute).

2) Large Scale historical precedent - Look to St. Privat the Prussian Guards were fired upon about 1,000 meters and decimated at 800 meters and had to crawl forward to get within 600 meters of the French line losing 8,000 or 18,000 men and never getting within 400 meters.

Basically I assert that the French Chassepot was effective at 1,000 meters and **** murderous at 800 meters because it actually occurred with dozens of real life examples. It DIDN'T occur with the rifled musket, anywhere, in large degrees because it was not practicable at 800 yards.

There are sources claiming the French opened up at 1500 meters which I find incredible but most of the Prussian Guard was stopped between 1000 and 600 meters from the French lines.

Let's break this done, because you really seem to have both missed the point and ultimately come to a conclusion half the past few pages have been dedicated to explaining is wrong:

You mentioned the gas - sure - with the rubber obturator there is no gas leakage. The Dreyse had massive gas leakage (many times fired from the hip) and you have a fps muzzle velocity of 1,400-1,500 for the Chassepot and 500 for the Dreyse.

Here, I don't exactly get the point; to be very clear, I do not need any remote reassurance that the Chassepot is brilliant - I know and have acknowledged that, unless you are reaffirming what I already said this seems meaningless. I already have various posts dedicated to the Dreyse and mentioned all this before, granted not on this thread. In any case, I did not even name the gas leakage at the breech as a fault of the Chassepot - it has a great seal and is the best thing that came out of the needlefire system. Literally named it as a strength of the gun. My comment is not bashing nor debating how good the gun is. All of this should be obvious if you took the time to actually read my post. Went on to even talk about the design's extended legacy and influence:

And also to be very clear, since you have shifted attention to the gun - my point is about what you have said and are saying about the systems of various armies. The Chassepot comes into the discussion but I have nothing to say about its quality - it is a great weapon. I cannot see how me mentioning the obvious shortcomings it does have seems to equate to my whole point being about the gun itself.

You're skipping a step here -

The French had the best infantry rifle in the world in 1870, the Chassepot Needle-Rifle, and trained their men to fire at 1,000 meters. In battles of the Franco-Prussian war repeatedly French infantry, well trained in the use of their firearms, pinned down German infantry formations well in excess of 400 meters. But the Prussians kept the initiative and kept advancing.

2) Large Scale historical precedent - Look to St. Privat the Prussian Guards were fired upon about 1,000 meters and decimated at 800 meters and had to crawl forward to get within 600 meters of the French line losing 8,000 or 18,000 men and never getting within 400 meters.

There are sources claiming the French opened up at 1500 meters which I find incredible but most of the Prussian Guard was stopped between 1000 and 600 meters from the French lines.

This is literally not true. You frame this as though every French infantryman is learning to fire at 1,000 meters. That is not the case. Firing at 800 yards in combat does not mean you were trained to shoot at that distance. Someone with no clue about the French Army would see this and assume the French were some kind of army of marksmen - funny to spend various pages trying to refute that on one thread for the British and now try and claim that for the French here.

The French fired a breech-loader in volleys at 800 meters. They fired 12-16 shots a minute for the first 5 minutes or so then the rate of fire decreased (French rounds were wrapped in silk which, as a fire retardant, helped prevent excess sludge and black powder residue - to achieve the same effect now if you have a chassepot soak your paper cartridge in borax solution).

The Chassepot fires with a much straighter trajectory than a rifled musket. It's much more forgiving, and, when fired in volley with an officer properly assuming fire control it is effective at those ranges.

Look at how the American and British fired breach loading firearms in the 1870's - that was the French.

So much to unpack here. The French fire in volleys at 800 yards..
You say this directly after I ask you, have you actually read any manual from the period? Seriously, what is the point of mentioning this? The British do the same, most armies that have taken rifle training more seriously than "Leave it to the officers" do. Many rifles between the 1850s and 1890s have what are called "volley sights" literally for this purpose. Nothing about this is new or revolutionary in 1870. But you present this like something special. This is the basics of rifle tactics from Minié rifles of the 1850s through to c.1905, where smokeless-powder repeating rifles have been typical for over a decade and are finally being replaced in this role by the machine gun, removing the need for

As to trajectory - thought this would come up. This is why my posts are so long; someone will always try to use anything I haven't mentioned. I am well aware the Chassepot has a much flatter trajectory than any rifle-musket. Rifle-musket trajectories in contrast of course, are much less forgiving. Which means... you need extensive rifle training to use them with great effect. Which the British did. Keeping in mind they continued their rigorous system with the P53 Enfield through to the Martini era, until they finally adopted the Lee-Metford in 1889. Congrats, you logically explained exactly why the British infantry were made into an army prizing individual marksmanship over all else..

First page for the actual course relevant to the regular infantryman - page 10, Regulations for Conducting the Musketry Instruction of the Army, 1859. Used with various revisions until 1889 - all of this very much relevant in 1870, or 1874 when the Chassepot was superceded in the French Third Republic by the Gras. Right here in front of me.

Before I go onto the next one, need to address:

1 - I do not doubt for a second, nor did I say anything doubting that the French were able to engage the Prussians at great distance. Part of Prussian tactic and success involves getting within distances where the poorly ranged Dreyse with a pretty poor projectile in comparison, can be effective. Exactly what happens in all 3 Wars of German Unification.
Cannot go past the claim that American & British copied the French in "firing breach loading firearms" after the FPW. Again - have you even looked at a letter of any manual from this period? The 1877 revisions of the British manuals are literally based from Prussian tactics. The Americans copying the French in any way does not really mean anything; I even acknowledged the German Mauser M71 taking heavy, direct influence from the Chassepot, while any Army in the 1870s-80s is copying the Prussian, British or French in some fashion - so what??? American being irrelevant when they were in the process of trying to install systems for professionality and marksmanship that did not exist before and during the War, and were as a result a main focus. Meanwhile the absolute irony in the fact the American National Rifle Association is..... wait... directly based on the British National Rifle Association. There is nothing about your statements here that suggest any knowledge of the manuals. Nobody who has read one in any of the decades 1850s-80s will see company firing at very long ranges, i.e. as still seen on the Mosin-Nagants' volley sights still floating around in Ukraine today as something born out of 1870 or the French is unique for.
Unless I am missing what you mean somehow.


2 - Extremely erroneous to respond to someone highlighting a completely false statement that ordinary French infantrymen were being trained to shoot at 1,000m with a bunch of examples of where long-ranged shooting was achieved by the French in combat. It is literally the same as saying that an example of where Union infantry opened fire at 200 yards in 1863 = US volunteer infantrymen were trained to shoot at 200 yards. Even if you find an example where that fire was effective, that proves literally nothing; unless you did not at all understand what I am saying. The French army has specialist marksmen who actually trained at those distances. Literally wrong to claim that regular French line infantry trained at 1,000m. Which I am not arguing, but telling you is that it literally was not the case.

3 - Your main source seems to always be a personal analogy. Guess what - You are not the only one with experience with these rifles. You have spent 90% of your argument on attesting to examples of long-ranged fighting and/or defending the gun mechanically, as if I have refuted either of those things:

1) Having both firearms, one is easy to use and shoot at distance, the other is decidedly not. Rifled musket you shoot, load, then fire. If the target is moving you've got to readjust by yards. There is so much room for error. You're taking your eyes away from downrange.

Had you, with no past experience, been training under any of the military systems? Doubt it. There is a few threads dedicated to, including this one as to how you do not just "learn to shoot" and voila you're a sniper with any gun. For the last time, no argument at all about FPW ranges. The FACT is that the French of 1870 are not teaching each individual infantryman to fire at that distance. They do what literally everyone else does in the decade up to that point, and many into the turn of the century. Company/"volley" fire at distances around 1,000+ yards and often in excess of 600 for many regular soldiers.

It is dizzying the amount of error, irony or blatant lie I am reading here. So to summarize, so that you actually reply to what is relevant - address this:


- What army makes the most advanced use, and makes the most of the range of rifle-muskets in its short era?
- How was the marksmanship of British soldiers, in 1859 - and relevantly in 1870 - judged in both years?
- How do the French in the late rifle-musket era, c. 1859-66 differ to British in their view of the importance of marksmanship on the smallest individual infantryman's level?
- Do they both completely replace their old manuals by 1870 or are both still using the same, with ultimately minor tweaks and changes over the years?

- Did Enfield-era British Army just pluck numbers out of the air or roll a lottery for their rifle shooting scores? What purpose does it serve to fake it just for themselves? Why have an entirely fake competition for the Rifle Volunteers at magical inachievable distances?
- What rifle organization and army contributed to the advancement of small bore rifles and directly relates to the reduction of calibers to .45 by the 1870s?
- What is the maximum elevation on a generic Enfield, and the maximum on a normal variant?
- Is the rifle-musket a pea-shooter then? How does being comparatively very difficult to make full use of its range = nobody can do it? How the heck does your experience shooting for fun on a range, or at a tree in your back yard for all I care, equate to annually practicing and being in service enlisted for years with proper military training?
- How many pages of the British manual are just dedicated to various visual data and tables to be collected for rifle practice and instruction? And which of the two British manuals is it in?
- What does the front of the manual say is the most important skill any British soldier has?
- How many hours have you dedicated to learning proper judgment and aiming drills?
- What distances does the regular British soldier get trained to fire at in both 1860 and 1870?
- What distances does the regular French soldier get trained to fire at in both 1860 and 1870?
- Does the British Army have any "specialist" forms of infantry in use in 1870? How do they train differently?
- Does the French Army have any "specialist" forms of infantry in use in 1870? How do they train differently?
- There are accounts that exist of fire being opened upon at 200 yards in the Civil War. Explain to me why this does not magically mean American and Confederate infantry are trained at 200 yards. After all, it literally is your logic.
- What is the American National Rifle Association literally named after? It was established in 1871. From what point was an NRA called for? Was there talk of one prior to the FPW in 1870 or the adoption - hell, invention - of the Chassepot? Why? From what inspiration?
- When is the British Army's first revision to their 1859 manual beyond 1870? What changed? What is the direct influence on the helmet they adopt the very next year?
- What does the American helmet happen to similarly copy to an even greater extent?
- What remote evidence do you have that firing by company/volley nearing 1,000m is remotely first introduced in 1870, by the French or due to the changes between 1866-70?
- Why is it that me, @Old Soldier & Sap always talk about rifle training and weapon systems in threads like these? Do you understand how rifle training greatly enhances the performance of any rifle?




> Can you not see the irony in telling everyone in one thread how well-known, accepted fighting distances at Inkerman in one thread is all bull, and then telling us in this thread to accept fighting distances you give for the FPW? or the further irony in that I do not even slightly dispute them, if anything both are true?

> Can you not see the irony in trying to refute British training I mentioned relating to the Enfield era, as if it is not directly still relevant to the Army of the Snider-conversion and Martini-Henry's whole eras as standard-issue? How might I be entirely unconvinced, with this and a million other examples now, that you have read any more than a ChatGPT result on ANY of the manuals of any of the armies in question between 1850 and 1880?

> Can you not see the irony in pointing out that the rifle-musket is unforgivingly hard to shoot with at long range, which we all literally know, as if that does not easily justify and explain on its own why an army in 1860 is putting rigorous emphasis on rifle training and marksmanship more than any other using the rifle-musket, while pointing out that a rifle with a much flatter trajectory, and can obviously be easier to use, is also being used at up to 1,000m? While also saying that as back-up of how French soldiers were trained, when it says far more about the rifle?

> Can you not see the irony of fully dismissing the long-ranged use of the P51 (& P53) Enfield in Crimea because you looked up at and the British lines were "broken" at certain points in Inkerman, and then proceeding to talk about examples of French long-ranged firing and "decimating" Prussian infantry on various occasions, when by your logic that doesn't mean anything when the French LOST the war and were still badly beaten at most turns in a short war? I doubt you use much logic at all but I would expect this to be obvious if the Russians at any point wavering the British positions magically makes it all irrelevant.

> Let's not even talk about the irony in admitting how difficult any rifle-musket ultimately will be for proper long-range repeatedly now, yet on one thread dismissing the idea that a lack of vigorous or even slight rifle training meant that most soldiers of the Civil War were firing at ~100 yards or less -- while yet still in both cases refuting that the army that puts a ridiculously obsessed focus, more than any in the rifle-musket era is able to!

Let's not even add hypocrisy or plain disingenuity to the list - How you have now conveniently removed the most famous examples of long-ranged firing with rifle-muskets from mind, so you can say none exist compared with long-ranged shooting of the best of the Needlefires. Seriously, I aspire to have that same ability to remove facts from existence to fit narratives I have. What were we talking about again?


You seem like the eye for an eye. Either you really hate the British Army, or you have disliked how certain people on the forum, who themselves are wrong, try and overemphasize the British Army like an army of supermen - and then gone and done the same thing, all of the sudden doing the same for the French. Just as bad as they are. This is the most disingenuous post I've read on the entire site. Have a good day, I have next to no doubt you will find an answer for every one of these. If there is one thing the internet can teach me it is that nobody likes admitting when they are wrong, as no doubt is your case. Don't expect another response, I have wasted far too much time on you and I really do have better things to get on with. Obviously annoyed me a bit.

 

[repman66]

Let's break this done, because you really seem to have both missed the point and ultimately come to a conclusion half the past few pages have been dedicated to explaining is wrong:

Here, I don't exactly get the point; to be very clear, I do not need any remote reassurance that the Chassepot is brilliant - I know and have acknowledged that, unless you are reaffirming what I already said this seems meaningless. I already have various posts dedicated to the Dreyse and mentioned all this before, granted not on this thread. In any case, I did not even name the gas leakage at the breech as a fault of the Chassepot - it has a great seal and is the best thing that came out of the needlefire system. Literally named it as a strength of the gun. My comment is not bashing nor debating how good the gun is. All of this should be obvious if you took the time to actually read my post. Went on to even talk about the design's extended legacy and influence:View attachment 586872
And also to be very clear, since you have shifted attention to the gun - my point is about what you have said and are saying about the systems of various armies. The Chassepot comes into the discussion but I have nothing to say about its quality - it is a great weapon. I cannot see how me mentioning the obvious shortcomings it does have seems to equate to my whole point being about the gun itself.






This is literally not true. You frame this as though every French infantryman is learning to fire at 1,000 meters. That is not the case. Firing at 800 yards in combat does not mean you were trained to shoot at that distance. Someone with no clue about the French Army would see this and assume the French were some kind of army of marksmen - funny to spend various pages trying to refute that on one thread for the British and now try and claim that for the French here.


So much to unpack here. The French fire in volleys at 800 yards..
You say this directly after I ask you, have you actually read any manual from the period? Seriously, what is the point of mentioning this? The British do the same, most armies that have taken rifle training more seriously than "Leave it to the officers" do. Many rifles between the 1850s and 1890s have what are called "volley sights" literally for this purpose. Nothing about this is new or revolutionary in 1870. But you present this like something special. This is the basics of rifle tactics from Minié rifles of the 1850s through to c.1905, where smokeless-powder repeating rifles have been typical for over a decade and are finally being replaced in this role by the machine gun, removing the need for

As to trajectory - thought this would come up. This is why my posts are so long; someone will always try to use anything I haven't mentioned. I am well aware the Chassepot has a much flatter trajectory than any rifle-musket. Rifle-musket trajectories in contrast of course, are much less forgiving. Which means... you need extensive rifle training to use them with great effect. Which the British did. Keeping in mind they continued their rigorous system with the P53 Enfield through to the Martini era, until they finally adopted the Lee-Metford in 1889. Congrats, you logically explained exactly why the British infantry were made into an army prizing individual marksmanship over all else.. View attachment 586873 First page for the actual course relevant to the regular infantryman - page 10, Regulations for Conducting the Musketry Instruction of the Army, 1859. Used with various revisions until 1889 - all of this very much relevant in 1870, or 1874 when the Chassepot was superceded in the French Third Republic by the Gras. Right here in front of me.

Before I go onto the next one, need to address:

1 - I do not doubt for a second, nor did I say anything doubting that the French were able to engage the Prussians at great distance. Part of Prussian tactic and success involves getting within distances where the poorly ranged Dreyse with a pretty poor projectile in comparison, can be effective. Exactly what happens in all 3 Wars of German Unification.
Cannot go past the claim that American & British copied the French in "firing breach loading firearms" after the FPW. Again - have you even looked at a letter of any manual from this period? The 1877 revisions of the British manuals are literally based from Prussian tactics. The Americans copying the French in any way does not really mean anything; I even acknowledged the German Mauser M71 taking heavy, direct influence from the Chassepot, while any Army in the 1870s-80s is copying the Prussian, British or French in some fashion - so what??? American being irrelevant when they were in the process of trying to install systems for professionality and marksmanship that did not exist before and during the War, and were as a result a main focus. Meanwhile the absolute irony in the fact the American National Rifle Association is..... wait... directly based on the British National Rifle Association. There is nothing about your statements here that suggest any knowledge of the manuals. Nobody who has read one in any of the decades 1850s-80s will see company firing at very long ranges, i.e. as still seen on the Mosin-Nagants' volley sights still floating around in Ukraine today as something born out of 1870 or the French is unique for.
Unless I am missing what you mean somehow.


2 - Extremely erroneous to respond to someone highlighting a completely false statement that ordinary French infantrymen were being trained to shoot at 1,000m with a bunch of examples of where long-ranged shooting was achieved by the French in combat. It is literally the same as saying that an example of where Union infantry opened fire at 200 yards in 1863 = US volunteer infantrymen were trained to shoot at 200 yards. Even if you find an example where that fire was effective, that proves literally nothing; unless you did not at all understand what I am saying. The French army has specialist marksmen who actually trained at those distances. Literally wrong to claim that regular French line infantry trained at 1,000m. Which I am not arguing, but telling you is that it literally was not the case.

3 - Your main source seems to always be a personal analogy. Guess what - You are not the only one with experience with these rifles. You have spent 90% of your argument on attesting to examples of long-ranged fighting and/or defending the gun mechanically, as if I have refuted either of those things:

Had you, with no past experience, been training under any of the military systems? Doubt it. There is a few threads dedicated to, including this one as to how you do not just "learn to shoot" and voila you're a sniper with any gun. For the last time, no argument at all about FPW ranges. The FACT is that the French of 1870 are not teaching each individual infantryman to fire at that distance. They do what literally everyone else does in the decade up to that point, and many into the turn of the century. Company/"volley" fire at distances around 1,000+ yards and often in excess of 600 for many regular soldiers.

It is dizzying the amount of error, irony or blatant lie I am reading here. So to summarize, so that you actually reply to what is relevant - address this:


- What army makes the most advanced use, and makes the most of the range of rifle-muskets in its short era?
- How was the marksmanship of British soldiers, in 1859 - and relevantly in 1870 - judged in both years?
- How do the French in the late rifle-musket era, c. 1859-66 differ to British in their view of the importance of marksmanship on the smallest individual infantryman's level?
- Do they both completely replace their old manuals by 1870 or are both still using the same, with ultimately minor tweaks and changes over the years?

- Did Enfield-era British Army just pluck numbers out of the air or roll a lottery for their rifle shooting scores? What purpose does it serve to fake it just for themselves? Why have an entirely fake competition for the Rifle Volunteers at magical inachievable distances?
- What rifle organization and army contributed to the advancement of small bore rifles and directly relates to the reduction of calibers to .45 by the 1870s?
- What is the maximum elevation on a generic Enfield, and the maximum on a normal variant?
- Is the rifle-musket a pea-shooter then? How does being comparatively very difficult to make full use of its range = nobody can do it? How the heck does your experience shooting for fun on a range, or at a tree in your back yard for all I care, equate to annually practicing and being in service enlisted for years with proper military training?
- How many pages of the British manual are just dedicated to various visual data and tables to be collected for rifle practice and instruction? And which of the two British manuals is it in?
- What does the front of the manual say is the most important skill any British soldier has?
- How many hours have you dedicated to learning proper judgment and aiming drills?
- What distances does the regular British soldier get trained to fire at in both 1860 and 1870?
- What distances does the regular French soldier get trained to fire at in both 1860 and 1870?
- Does the British Army have any "specialist" forms of infantry in use in 1870? How do they train differently?
- Does the French Army have any "specialist" forms of infantry in use in 1870? How do they train differently?
- There are accounts that exist of fire being opened upon at 200 yards in the Civil War. Explain to me why this does not magically mean American and Confederate infantry are trained at 200 yards. After all, it literally is your logic.
- What is the American National Rifle Association literally named after? It was established in 1871. From what point was an NRA called for? Was there talk of one prior to the FPW in 1870 or the adoption - hell, invention - of the Chassepot? Why? From what inspiration?
- When is the British Army's first revision to their 1859 manual beyond 1870? What changed? What is the direct influence on the helmet they adopt the very next year?
- What does the American helmet happen to similarly copy to an even greater extent?
- What remote evidence do you have that firing by company/volley nearing 1,000m is remotely first introduced in 1870, by the French or due to the changes between 1866-70?
- Why is it that me, @Old Soldier & Sap always talk about rifle training and weapon systems in threads like these? Do you understand how rifle training greatly enhances the performance of any rifle?




> Can you not see the irony in telling everyone in one thread how well-known, accepted fighting distances at Inkerman in one thread is all bull, and then telling us in this thread to accept fighting distances you give for the FPW? or the further irony in that I do not even slightly dispute them, if anything both are true?

> Can you not see the irony in trying to refute British training I mentioned relating to the Enfield era, as if it is not directly still relevant to the Army of the Snider-conversion and Martini-Henry's whole eras as standard-issue? How might I be entirely unconvinced, with this and a million other examples now, that you have read any more than a ChatGPT result on ANY of the manuals of any of the armies in question between 1850 and 1880?

> Can you not see the irony in pointing out that the rifle-musket is unforgivingly hard to shoot with at long range, which we all literally know, as if that does not easily justify and explain on its own why an army in 1860 is putting rigorous emphasis on rifle training and marksmanship more than any other using the rifle-musket, while pointing out that a rifle with a much flatter trajectory, and can obviously be easier to use, is also being used at up to 1,000m? While also saying that as back-up of how French soldiers were trained, when it says far more about the rifle?

> Can you not see the irony of fully dismissing the long-ranged use of the P51 (& P53) Enfield in Crimea because you looked up at and the British lines were "broken" at certain points in Inkerman, and then proceeding to talk about examples of French long-ranged firing and "decimating" Prussian infantry on various occasions, when by your logic that doesn't mean anything when the French LOST the war and were still badly beaten at most turns in a short war? I doubt you use much logic at all but I would expect this to be obvious if the Russians at any point wavering the British positions magically makes it all irrelevant.

> Let's not even talk about the irony in admitting how difficult any rifle-musket ultimately will be for proper long-range repeatedly now, yet on one thread dismissing the idea that a lack of vigorous or even slight rifle training meant that most soldiers of the Civil War were firing at ~100 yards or less -- while yet still in both cases refuting that the army that puts a ridiculously obsessed focus, more than any in the rifle-musket era is able to!

Let's not even add hypocrisy or plain disingenuity to the list - How you have now conveniently removed the most famous examples of long-ranged firing with rifle-muskets from mind, so you can say none exist compared with long-ranged shooting of the best of the Needlefires. Seriously, I aspire to have that same ability to remove facts from existence to fit narratives I have. What were we talking about again?


You seem like the eye for an eye. Either you really hate the British Army, or you have disliked how certain people on the forum, who themselves are wrong, try and overemphasize the British Army like an army of supermen - and then gone and done the same thing, all of the sudden doing the same for the French. Just as bad as they are. This is the most disingenuous post I've read on the entire site. Have a good day, I have next to no doubt you will find an answer for every one of these. If there is one thing the internet can teach me it is that nobody likes admitting when they are wrong, as no doubt is your case. Don't expect another response, I have wasted far too much time on you and I really do have better things to get on with. Obviously annoyed me a bit.

Wooo wooo wooo

Hold up.

I am not arguing that the French Infantryman in 1870 was a trained sharpshooter able to hit targets out to 800 meters etc., individually.

I was saying that the Chassepot weapons system allowed volley fire to be effective 1,000 meters from target, that so long as the French had ammunition and held their discipline, the Prussians(Germans) took massive casualties and were unable to penetrate French defenses.

I am further arguing that these massed volley tactics were used by the American and the British forces in their colonial fighting - Custer's C Company under Calhoun fires effective volleys at long range (400-500 yards) keeping native forces at bay until other friendly forces collapse, etc. British countless examples include the Zulu war, etc.

I further assert that the rifled musket, while an intermediate step up from the smoothbore musket, had several flaws, one of which being extremely hard to use, effectively, especially when targets were moving until about 200 yards.

I took offense that the American experience, you know four years of actual war, was minimized and that American troops did not know, in the least, how to use their weapons systems.

I granted and made no counter that British had the best trained, the best school for training, and individually, as an average soldier the best marksman. They spent the most money on it, they had a small enough army that they were able to concentrate this training.

However, when I provided numerous and multiple first-hand accounts of individual American forces hitting targets 300, 400, 500, 600 yards away (not marksmen, but line infantrymen), I was poo pooed. Every time I mention a primary source showing combat in the civil war at 300+ yards, and being effective I received a loud hurray of excuses.

For the Chassepot, you are taking a weapons system that is almost idiot proof, with very simple sights and a much flatter trajectory, and you can reload in one step laying down or keeping your eyes downrange, and you can spatter 12 rounds or more a minute at the target, you're going to shot the ever-living **** out of a Prussian column at 800 meters.

A rifled musket, even in the hands of the best trained, for their day, infantry, are going to have a much more difficult time stopping a charge at range. I just don't see what was claimed being reasonable and with what I discussed previously, the wind, the velocity, the bullet arc- attacks being broken up by rifle fire before 300 meters or less when the bullet arc is less. I also countered fiction of rifle fire driving artillery away at 800+ yards because that isn't going to happen from desultory skirmish fire unless you are much closer - IE 400 yards.

I'm truly not sure what you're going on about. You came in at a post about me praising the French Chassepot weapon and, frankly, if the British spent all that money, time, and training on marksmanship and the French didn't, it was WASTED because the French outshot and outperformed in 1870 the British performance in Crimea.

If the Brits with their Snider Enfield, fought the French of 1870, with their Chassepot, the French would rout the Brits from the field. Weapons systems matter and the French, at least their regular and colonial forces, knew how to use theirs.


But, for me, it boils down to when someone argues too much of this, I generally respond with a little of that.

 

[Old Soldier]

The thing is, I highly doubt the people who purport such misconceptions online have thought remotely that far. I regularly see people - and indeed have met people - who sincerely believe that infantry tactics of 1914 look exactly like 1815, with minor change at very most. Tactics as basic as fire and maneuver being beyond them.

Perhaps a spell on the range with an SMLE.
"Lying. Rifle to be loaded and 4 rounds in the magazine before the target appears. Loading to be from the pouch or bandolier by 5 rounds afterwards. One minute allowed. at a target at 300 yards"
Fifteen rounds issued. 3 points are scored for hits within the inner 24" circle, 2 points are scored for hits within the outer 36" circle and 1 point is scored for hits within the 48" square. Minimum score = 15.

SMLE sight is 'U' notch and blade foresight. No optics.

 

[Old Soldier]

Wooo wooo wooo

Hold up.

If the Brits with their Snider Enfield, fought the French of 1870, with their Chassepot, the French would rout the Brits from the field. Weapons systems matter and the French, at least their regular and colonial forces, knew how to use theirs.

The Snider conversion actually made the Enfields more accurate. They fired a centerfire carrtridge at around 10 AIMED rounds per minute but up to 20 on rapid. There was very little to go wrong with them. French training did not emphasise marksmanship for line units, just the tireurs and chasseurs. The line infantry were trained in volley fire but they generally opened up, firing as quickly as they could. There was little fire control. In any case, the French tactical doctrine favored aggressive offensive movements (élan) over dispersed, cover-utilizing fire tactics, IOW a long bayonet charge which would have been dealt with in the same way as any native charge.

The Chassepot was a 'needle rifle', far better than the Dreyse, but would it would not keep up a high rate of fire, for any length of time - 8 to 15 rounds per minute - and they only carried 80 rounds. Besides, it was the German ARTILLERY that hammered the French in 1870.

All rather academic, as the chances of a French army in battle against the British in 1870 was ZERO.

 

[67th Tigers]

However, when I provided numerous and multiple first-hand accounts of individual American forces hitting targets 300, 400, 500, 600 yards away (not marksmen, but line infantrymen), I was poo pooed. Every time I mention a primary source showing combat in the civil war at 300+ yards, and being effective I received a loud hurray of excuses.

Yeah... no, you didn't. There's a reason why Griffith, Hess and others keep finding firefights were at "smoothbore range" - it's because they were.

I'm truly not sure what you're going on about. You came in at a post about me praising the French Chassepot weapon and, frankly, if the British spent all that money, time, and training on marksmanship and the French didn't, it was WASTED because the French outshot and outperformed in 1870 the British performance in Crimea.

If the Brits with their Snider Enfield, fought the French of 1870, with their Chassepot, the French would rout the Brits from the field. Weapons systems matter and the French, at least their regular and colonial forces, knew how to use theirs.

Not really. Bullet drop is a function of velocity. Whilst the Chassepot has a slightly higher velocity at the muzzle, the lighter bullet decelerates quicker (despite a higher sectional density) and the velocity curves cross about 150 yards downrange. This means the drop is less, at long range, with the Snider.

When it comes to dispersion, the Chassepot bullet disperses a lot more than a Snider. This is due to a bad form of rifling. The Chassepot has four very wide grooves, and the bullet is slightly oversized to force engagement. This lead to the bullet's sides being straightened and the cross-section being almost square. Unbalanced forces thus cause it to deviate more, and be blown more by the wind.

The Snider achieved obturation by having a metallic cartridge case. The Chassepot used a rubber ring obturator. This meant that every shot the Chassepot's obturator was degrading, and it would soon start leaking gas.

The bulk of the French in 1870 had no particular training in individual musketry. They'd adopted the "feu de bataillon" as their primary means of giving fire. A whole battalion would essentially be treated like an artillery piece, and it was relatively effective, when the enemy was good enough to stand still or slowly march in close-order in the open. When the Prussians broke down into zuge, advanced by rushes etc., the French fire was pretty ineffective. It's how the Prussians assaulted French positions. The British were also fighting in open order at this time.

Now, as to whether the French in 1870 outshot the British in 1854, the latter with an early muzzleloading Minie, that's an interesting question, and it doesn't really appear they did, remembering that the British won and the French lost. However, in 1870, the British infantry didn't have a mix of P1851 Minies and P1839 smoothbores, they had Sniders...

 

[Old Soldier]

Yeah... no, you didn't. There's a reason why Griffith, Hess and others keep finding firefights were at "smoothbore range" - it's because they were.



Not really. Bullet drop is a function of velocity. Whilst the Chassepot has a slightly higher velocity at the muzzle, the lighter bullet decelerates quicker (despite a higher sectional density) and the velocity curves cross about 150 yards downrange. This means the drop is less, at long range, with the Snider.

When it comes to dispersion, the Chassepot bullet disperses a lot more than a Snider. This is due to a bad form of rifling. The Chassepot has four very wide grooves, and the bullet is slightly oversized to force engagement. This lead to the bullet's sides being straightened and the cross-section being almost square. Unbalanced forces thus cause it to deviate more, and be blown more by the wind.

The Snider achieved obturation by having a metallic cartridge case. The Chassepot used a rubber ring obturator. This meant that every shot the Chassepot's obturator was degrading, and it would soon start leaking gas.

The bulk of the French in 1870 had no particular training in individual musketry. They'd adopted the "feu de bataillon" as their primary means of giving fire. A whole battalion would essentially be treated like an artillery piece, and it was relatively effective, when the enemy was good enough to stand still or slowly march in close-order in the open. When the Prussians broke down into zuge, advanced by rushes etc., the French fire was pretty ineffective. It's how the Prussians assaulted French positions. The British were also fighting in open order at this time.

Now, as to whether the French in 1870 outshot the British in 1854, the latter with an early muzzleloading Minie, that's an interesting question, and it doesn't really appear they did, remembering that the British won and the French lost. However, in 1870, the British infantry didn't have a mix of P1851 Minies and P1839 smoothbores, they had Sniders...

The reason why the Pattern 1851 Minie was replaced by the Enfield P1853 was that the larger caliber of the P1851 made it kick like a mule. It was not well-liked and was (just) one of the reasons for the replacement.

 

[repman66]

The Snider conversion actually made the Enfields more accurate. They fired a centerfire carrtridge at around 10 AIMED rounds per minute but up to 20 on rapid. There was very little to go wrong with them. French training did not emphasise marksmanship for line units, just the tireurs and chasseurs. The line infantry were trained in volley fire but they generally opened up, firing as quickly as they could. There was little fire control. In any case, the French tactical doctrine favored aggressive offensive movements (élan) over dispersed, cover-utilizing fire tactics, IOW a long bayonet charge which would have been dealt with in the same way as any native charge.

The Chassepot was a 'needle rifle', far better than the Dreyse, but would it would not keep up a high rate of fire, for any length of time - 8 to 15 rounds per minute - and they only carried 80 rounds. Besides, it was the German ARTILLERY that hammered the French in 1870.

All rather academic, as the chances of a French army in battle against the British in 1870 was ZERO.

Agreed -- the biggest problem with French Line infantry in 1870 is that they would quickly use their ammunition and, if the Prussians were not routed - would and did leave their place in line, etc.

You have nailed the point exactly here:

Besides, it was the German ARTILLERY that hammered the French in 1870.

This is the takeaway from the Franco - Prussian War. Artillery was going to be king and win or lose wars. The individual marksmanship of a rifleman in World War 1 or Ukraine today is secondary to his support artillery (classical, drone, airsupport whatever).

The French won almost all the tactical infantry fights and inflicted 90+% of the Prussian casualties with the Chassepot (French official stats). The Prussians swept the field with their artillery. The tight, mass formations, were extremely effective for the French versus the Prussian and German infantry and got them killed in mass by the Krupp gun, which was the first truly modern artillery piece (so modern the Germans really didn't know how to use it effectively).

My further points was the assertion, for example, that a couple of companies of skirmishers could individually fire, at 800 yards, a line of guns and be effective enough to drive them off. When the testimony actually stated the skirmishers were driven back a couple of times by grape (400-600 yards range).

This is totally different than a battalion of French line infantry unloading a feu de bataillon at effective range and slaughtering their opponents (or, alternatively, running out of ammunition). Additionally, as having owned an original Chassepot with original and reproduced obturators and needles, they do not wear out in 80 or 100 shots. If you're firing extreme, say combat style for a couple days you'll have to change both in a couple hundred rounds of shooting. Me, I've shot about 1000 rounds in 8 years with my current needle and replace the obturator about 500 shots just because I feel like I have to, not because I notice blowback or suffer inaccuracy (always wear my marine gatorz with that beaut though).

 

[DoctorKingSchultz]

Wooo wooo wooo

Hold up.

I am not arguing that the French Infantryman in 1870 was a trained sharpshooter able to hit targets out to 800 meters etc., individually.

I was saying that the Chassepot weapons system allowed volley fire to be effective 1,000 meters from target, that so long as the French had ammunition and held their discipline, the Prussians(Germans) took massive casualties and were unable to penetrate French defenses.

I am further arguing that these massed volley tactics were used by the American and the British forces in their colonial fighting - Custer's C Company under Calhoun fires effective volleys at long range (400-500 yards) keeping native forces at bay until other friendly forces collapse, etc. British countless examples include the Zulu war, etc.

I further assert that the rifled musket, while an intermediate step up from the smoothbore musket, had several flaws, one of which being extremely hard to use, effectively, especially when targets were moving until about 200 yards.

I took offense that the American experience, you know four years of actual war, was minimized and that American troops did not know, in the least, how to use their weapons systems.

I granted and made no counter that British had the best trained, the best school for training, and individually, as an average soldier the best marksman. They spent the most money on it, they had a small enough army that they were able to concentrate this training.

However, when I provided numerous and multiple first-hand accounts of individual American forces hitting targets 300, 400, 500, 600 yards away (not marksmen, but line infantrymen), I was poo pooed. Every time I mention a primary source showing combat in the civil war at 300+ yards, and being effective I received a loud hurray of excuses.

For the Chassepot, you are taking a weapons system that is almost idiot proof, with very simple sights and a much flatter trajectory, and you can reload in one step laying down or keeping your eyes downrange, and you can spatter 12 rounds or more a minute at the target, you're going to shot the ever-living **** out of a Prussian column at 800 meters.

A rifled musket, even in the hands of the best trained, for their day, infantry, are going to have a much more difficult time stopping a charge at range. I just don't see what was claimed being reasonable and with what I discussed previously, the wind, the velocity, the bullet arc- attacks being broken up by rifle fire before 300 meters or less when the bullet arc is less. I also countered fiction of rifle fire driving artillery away at 800+ yards because that isn't going to happen from desultory skirmish fire unless you are much closer - IE 400 yards.

I'm truly not sure what you're going on about. You came in at a post about me praising the French Chassepot weapon and, frankly, if the British spent all that money, time, and training on marksmanship and the French didn't, it was WASTED because the French outshot and outperformed in 1870 the British performance in Crimea.

If the Brits with their Snider Enfield, fought the French of 1870, with their Chassepot, the French would rout the Brits from the field. Weapons systems matter and the French, at least their regular and colonial forces, knew how to use theirs.


But, for me, it boils down to when someone argues too much of this, I generally respond with a little of that.

Fine then, I'll break my promise and reply to this and ask again - have you ever read ANY manuals of any of the 3 armies we are talking about within a 3 or 4-decade timespan??

Obviously you ignored the majority of what I said because you have no answer to it. The premise here is the idea that regular French infantry in 1870 is training to "fire at 1,000m". They are not, you cannot back that up and all and quite frankly, sound like you have no idea what you are talking about when you mention company/file volleying nearing 1,000m as something unique - this whole era is known for that. This is not: and you are the only one, who purports this to be something revolutionary or new in 1870.

British infantry are all taught the same way, there are no specialist sharpshooters. They fire at 1,000 yards in company/"volley" fire in 1859. MOST armies at large ranges in the age of the rifle, as I said if you had actually read, still use "company fire" until the 1900s-10s. You're even proving yourself wrong the more you talk about it - company, volley firing in a more traditional sense than the British is happening with mass volunteer armies of the French in 1870; this attests nothing to individual marksmanship ability with the Chassepot, if we really need to mention anything more on it mechanically, but says everything about how massed fire is still effective - just, when at much greater ranges - until replaced by the machine gun for that role. It is effective for the exact same reasons as the smoothbores were at much lower; with individual firing, at 1,000m or near it most French infantrymen cannot be guaranteed to be precise. Much as how armies armed with smoothbores in 1830 cannot be either at 300m. We're not talking about aimed individual fire, but volley firing with the intent of suppression and hitting with walls of lead...

Wooo wooo wooo

Hold up.

I am not arguing that the French Infantryman in 1870 was a trained sharpshooter able to hit targets out to 800 meters etc., individually.

..

As to your other comments - it seems very clear there is some miscommunication. Nobody in this room disagrees that a Chassepot - or anything comparably, a breechloader with a self-contained cartridge, or even a capping breechloader - is more "idiot proof" than any rifle-musket. Part of the whole change to breechloaders is because of that - so much more room for error with any form of muzzleloader. You understand that practically and personally, and I do too. I know all of this, you continue to miss the point. My point is that you seem to flatly bash the army that, with little room for too much exaggeration, puts the rifle-musket through its largest advancement and its infantry through the most intensive rifle-training in the world; so it seems ironic to be in one thread, entirely dismissing them (You claim you had no counter that they were the best, but much like the above were clearly denying all of it) and in another, making a claim NOBODY makes about the French being some kind of sharpshooter army. Then saying you're not saying that. Then going on to say that actually, because the French had the Chassepot they were god-tier marksmen that would have routed the British solely for that - irony yet again, where you entirely dismiss the weapons system and just talk about the weapon! I am talking about the armies and how they actually fight. Which you clearly show at every turn to know nothing of.

As a side-note, the British army under this system being "small" is a little overexaggerated. Do you know the figures from any given year? In 1862 the British army is over 220,000 strong with 134,000 Rifle Volunteers. Total strength if it got caught in a real war at its doorstep being about 350,000 total men to expend before they need to recruit or conscript. None of these figures are hard to find.
And for the last time, as I said before - stop talking about the rifle-musket, anyhow! The British system they had under the Enfield is STILL in use with the Snider and Martini-Henry. Your entire argument is resting on some perceived disagreement about the quality of the Chassepot I do not have at all, and moreover telling me what I have literally said to you about rifle-muskets - as if... the same manuals they used in 1859 are not still largely the same and used at this time. Try not jumping the topic again. You like to invent things, but pay attention to what I am actually talking about.

As easily the hundredth example you have given that you have never read on the doctrine of any of these armies, the way American and British armies fight under colonial circumstances is not unique at all. The British do not go "back" to volley firing or close-order formations in the Zulu War - if you ever read so much as a letter of any of their manuals, they had just, as mentioned, adopted a manual in 1877 going even further with open-order formations, which are already emphasized in 1859, but the thing is that close-order never left. It is situational, and they used it situationally; There is no retardation or reversion of tactics in the colonial wars. They simply use close-order when needed, not that they don't also use skirmish order situationally in the same conflict. It is the best way to make use of any single-shot rifle in a comparable situation. Surely you don't think the French would have used dispersed formations if it was them in the Zulu campaigns? The irony in all you say while repeatedly talking about one of the most archaic tactics of 1870, volley fire applied to greater distances...

 

[repman66]

Fine then, I'll break my promise and reply to this and ask again - have you ever read ANY manuals of any of the 3 armies we are talking about within a 3 or 4-decade timespan??

Obviously you ignored the majority of what I said because you have no answer to it. The premise here is the idea that regular French infantry in 1870 is training to "fire at 1,000m". They are not, you cannot back that up and all and quite frankly, sound like you have no idea what you are talking about when you mention company/file volleying nearing 1,000m as something unique - this whole era is known for that. This is not: and you are the only one, who purports this to be something revolutionary or new in 1870.

British infantry are all taught the same way, there are no specialist sharpshooters. They fire at 1,000 yards in company/"volley" fire in 1859. MOST armies at large ranges in the age of the rifle, as I said if you had actually read, still use "company fire" until the 1900s-10s. You're even proving yourself wrong the more you talk about it - company, volley firing in a more traditional sense than the British is happening with mass volunteer armies of the French in 1870; this attests nothing to individual marksmanship ability with the Chassepot, if we really need to mention anything more on it mechanically, but says everything about how massed fire is still effective - just, when at much greater ranges - until replaced by the machine gun for that role. It is effective for the exact same reasons as the smoothbores were at much lower; with individual firing, at 1,000m or near it most French infantrymen cannot be guaranteed to be precise. Much as how armies armed with smoothbores in 1830 cannot be either at 300m. We're not talking about aimed individual fire, but volley firing with the intent of suppression and hitting with walls of lead...

View attachment 586941


..

As to your other comments - it seems very clear there is some miscommunication. Nobody in this room disagrees that a Chassepot - or anything comparably, a breechloader with a self-contained cartridge, or even a capping breechloader - is more "idiot proof" than any rifle-musket. Part of the whole change to breechloaders is because of that - so much more room for error with any form of muzzleloader. You understand that practically and personally, and I do too. I know all of this, you continue to miss the point. My point is that you seem to flatly bash the army that, with little room for too much exaggeration, puts the rifle-musket through its largest advancement and its infantry through the most intensive rifle-training in the world; so it seems ironic to be in one thread, entirely dismissing them (You claim you had no counter that they were the best, but much like the above were clearly denying all of it) and in another, making a claim NOBODY makes about the French being some kind of sharpshooter army. Then saying you're not saying that. Then going on to say that actually, because the French had the Chassepot they were god-tier marksmen that would have routed the British solely for that - irony yet again, where you entirely dismiss the weapons system and just talk about the weapon! I am talking about the armies and how they actually fight. Which you clearly show at every turn to know nothing of.

As a side-note, the British army under this system being "small" is a little overexaggerated. Do you know the figures from any given year? In 1862 the British army is over 220,000 strong with 134,000 Rifle Volunteers. Total strength if it got caught in a real war at its doorstep being about 350,000 total men to expend before they need to recruit or conscript. None of these figures are hard to find.
And for the last time, as I said before - stop talking about the rifle-musket, anyhow! The British system they had under the Enfield is STILL in use with the Snider and Martini-Henry. Your entire argument is resting on some perceived disagreement about the quality of the Chassepot I do not have at all, and moreover telling me what I have literally said to you about rifle-muskets - as if... the same manuals they used in 1859 are not still largely the same and used at this time. Try not jumping the topic again. You like to invent things, but pay attention to what I am actually talking about.

As easily the hundredth example you have given that you have never read on the doctrine of any of these armies, the way American and British armies fight under colonial circumstances is not unique at all. The British do not go "back" to volley firing or close-order formations in the Zulu War - if you ever read so much as a letter of any of their manuals, they had just, as mentioned, adopted a manual in 1877 going even further with open-order formations, which are already emphasized in 1859, but the thing is that close-order never left. It is situational, and they used it situationally; There is no retardation or reversion of tactics in the colonial wars. They simply use close-order when needed, not that they don't also use skirmish order situationally in the same conflict. It is the best way to make use of any single-shot rifle in a comparable situation. Surely you don't think the French would have used dispersed formations if it was them in the Zulu campaigns? The irony in all you say while repeatedly talking about one of the most archaic tactics of 1870, volley fire applied to greater distances...

Both the British and American's fought in open order in the 1870's and the British were vastly better trained in it (considering much of the American army went into the Spanish-American War fighting like it was going up against Frederick the Great). Both manuals trained and advised open order. Both lost their infamous colonial fights due to overconfidence in these tactics - the Americans never really held steady at Little Bighorn (Reno's Skirmish line routs, Calhoun holds but when I company is gone that's the ball game).

The Brits (contrary to the old narrative of blame the blacks) overextended in open order (arguably would have been more effective in a battalion square with ammunition wagons in the center) and were eventually overwhelmed when the Zulu's worked around the flank. You see the British disregarding their OWN tactical doctrine and returning to close formations when they next invaded Zulu land.

I am not saying that with the French. I am saying that a battalion of 500 men was able to lay 6000 rounds on target every minute for 3-5 minutes with such density and with enough rounds falling on target that it destroyed the Prussian battalion columns and open order lines. In contrast, Prussian artillery had a field-day with these bunched up targets (at Mars-la-Tour I vividly recall French infantry being shelled and bombed hundreds of yards from the front and suffering huge casualties doing.... nothing.)

I am further saying, the British supermen of Crimea were not, in open order, with a Rifled Musket, with 4-6 companies of infantry, driving off a 50+ Russian gunline at 800 yards. They don't have the accuracy, density of firepower, nor the consistency to do that.

Say, 500 men, firing at 2.5 shots a minute, in three minutes you have 3,750 shots.

The French are firing 18,000 + shots.

At 1% hit you have 180 French hits, and 38 British hits.

However, this is all nonsense. What I commented on that apparently drew your ire is that I believe several Russian artillery at Inkerman was hit but that the ranges appear to have been close enough for the Russian guns to use grape and drive back the British skirmishers. I am sure the Russians were very surprised as their infantry was mostly armed with smoothbore rifles and to take losses in men and horseflesh at 400 - 500 yards from rifle fire would have been extremely effective against morale.

 

[67th Tigers]

Upton's manual still has the close-order two-rank line, as I posted here. It was 1891 before the U.S. adopted extended order as the norm, and even that was controversial.

At Isandlwana, the 24th were in standard extended-order for the time. About 600 riflemen (6 coys) shot down about 5,000 Zulus, and completely destroyed the "chest." The problem is there were 20,000 Zulus, and the left and right "horns" crashed down onto the the 24th and just overwhelmed them by sheer mass. Of the four divisions of the Zulu army, only one (the "loins") was still combat effective, and marched off to attack a single coy at Rorke's Drift, and was destroyed.

At Inkerman, the rifle armed British infantry did shatter the Russian artillery line at 6-800 yds, as previously discussed.

 

[repman66]

Upton's manual still has the close-order two-rank line, as I posted here. It was 1891 before the U.S. adopted extended order as the norm, and even that was controversial.

At Isandlwana, the 24th were in standard extended-order for the time. About 600 riflemen (6 coys) shot down about 5,000 Zulus, and completely destroyed the "chest." The problem is there were 20,000 Zulus, and the left and right "horns" crashed down onto the the 24th and just overwhelmed them by sheer mass. Of the four divisions of the Zulu army, only one (the "loins") was still combat effective, and marched off to attack a single coy at Rorke's Drift, and was destroyed.

At Inkerman, the rifle armed British infantry did shatter the Russian artillery line at 6-800 yds, as previously discussed.

I suggest you read Ian Knight's book on the battle and the war. The British extended in open order and were too spread out to react to the change in combat circumstances.

I agree in part and disagree in part, Upton, does talk and give instruction for using the entire battalion as skirmishers in open order (rough paragraphs 350? I think - luckily my collection includes an 1874 reprint) which is what Custer and company did when facing natives. Routinely leaving their sabers and using open, extended, order and volley fire. If you read some of the officer correspondance they mention reading articles from such men as Vernois etc. but it wasn't till 1882 that the debate ripped fully into the officer corps (namely, the infantry).

The US army fought in open order in the Native wars.

 

[DoctorKingSchultz]

Both the British and American's fought in open order in the 1870's and the British were vastly better trained in it (considering much of the American army went into the Spanish-American War fighting like it was going up against Frederick the Great). Both manuals trained and advised open order. Both lost their infamous colonial fights due to overconfidence in these tactics - the Americans never really held steady at Little Bighorn (Reno's Skirmish line routs, Calhoun holds but when I company is gone that's the ball game).

The Brits (contrary to the old narrative of blame the blacks) overextended in open order (arguably would have been more effective in a battalion square with ammunition wagons in the center) and were eventually overwhelmed when the Zulu's worked around the flank. You see the British disregarding their OWN tactical doctrine and returning to close formations when they next invaded Zulu land.

I am not saying that with the French. I am saying that a battalion of 500 men was able to lay 6000 rounds on target every minute for 3-5 minutes with such density and with enough rounds falling on target that it destroyed the Prussian battalion columns and open order lines. In contrast, Prussian artillery had a field-day with these bunched up targets (at Mars-la-Tour I vividly recall French infantry being shelled and bombed hundreds of yards from the front and suffering huge casualties doing.... nothing.)

I am further saying, the British supermen of Crimea were not, in open order, with a Rifled Musket, with 4-6 companies of infantry, driving off a 50+ Russian gunline at 800 yards. They don't have the accuracy, density of firepower, nor the consistency to do that.

Say, 500 men, firing at 2.5 shots a minute, in three minutes you have 3,750 shots.

The French are firing 18,000 + shots.

At 1% hit you have 180 French hits, and 38 British hits.

However, this is all nonsense. What I commented on that apparently drew your ire is that I believe several Russian artillery at Inkerman was hit but that the ranges appear to have been close enough for the Russian guns to use grape and drive back the British skirmishers. I am sure the Russians were very surprised as their infantry was mostly armed with smoothbore rifles and to take losses in men and horseflesh at 400 - 500 yards from rifle fire would have been extremely effective against morale.

I have little to dispute here. I think much of our earlier conversation has come from a misunderstanding of exactly what it is you are saying; I have exampled multiple seemingly contradictions already.


On the main topic, to clarify I think we can agree:

- The Chassepot was and is a brilliant rifle, at least the best the needlefire system produced and the best that saw large use in any conflict
- The French definitely still use close-order formations in the Franco-Prussian War, and many armies in general are using close-order fire en masse throughout the entire "rifle era" 1850s-1900s
- The French are not an army of marksmen in the 1850s or the 1870s, and the full potential of the Chassepot could have been put to better use in the FPW.


And I have seen from your other post, accurately describing the strength of Prussian Krupp guns during the conflict, which did much of the work. Prussian infantry tactic also making up for the objectively much worse Dreyse designs. They did well to incorporate the Chassepot influences in the Mauser M71, and the French in their next two service rifle designs.

Both the British and American's fought in open order in the 1870's and the British were vastly better trained in it (considering much of the American army went into the Spanish-American War fighting like it was going up against Frederick the Great). Both manuals trained and advised open order. Both lost their infamous colonial fights due to overconfidence in these tactics - the Americans never really held steady at Little Bighorn (Reno's Skirmish line routs, Calhoun holds but when I company is gone that's the ball game).

The Brits (contrary to the old narrative of blame the blacks) overextended in open order (arguably would have been more effective in a battalion square with ammunition wagons in the center) and were eventually overwhelmed when the Zulu's worked around the flank. You see the British disregarding their OWN tactical doctrine and returning to close formations when they next invaded Zulu land.

Now we are getting someplace. As is often erroneously said of the Zulu War, and indeed even already on this thread I thought you were purporting the British to in some way be going "backwards" during the Zulu conflict. Many appear to think the formations in that war to be unique - as I said, close order was situationally used in that conflict, as per the manuals. Still in existence, never left. As you have added to it, early defeats, i.e. most significant and first at Isandlwana were from over-extended order. Close-order formations becoming preferential in colonial situations, as I have said, thereafter (and indeed before, really) make sense - it is the best way to use any single-shot rifles against a massive, overwhelming force. And by extension it is not unique to use rifles in close-order "volleys" long before this. It is though, undoubtably more likely to be effective if done the right way with a Chassepot.

Linking it to this:

I am not saying that with the French. I am saying that a battalion of 500 men was able to lay 6000 rounds on target every minute for 3-5 minutes with such density and with enough rounds falling on target that it destroyed the Prussian battalion columns and open order lines. In contrast, Prussian artillery had a field-day with these bunched up targets (at Mars-la-Tour I vividly recall French infantry being shelled and bombed hundreds of yards from the front and suffering huge casualties doing.... nothing.)

I am further saying, the British supermen of Crimea were not, in open order, with a Rifled Musket, with 4-6 companies of infantry, driving off a 50+ Russian gunline at 800 yards. They don't have the accuracy, density of firepower, nor the consistency to do that.

Say, 500 men, firing at 2.5 shots a minute, in three minutes you have 3,750 shots.

The French are firing 18,000 + shots.

At 1% hit you have 180 French hits, and 38 British hits.

We seem to have an issue with actually understanding what is being done in extended and close order. First - This seems to assume the maximum possible speed of 500 men, assumptively firing in actual volley, that is, synchronized firing, as fast as possible are shooting 18,000 rounds in 3 minutes, 6,000 per minute, 12 shots per man in a minute in close order. Do you think 12 men firing Chassepots with more than 85 grains of blackpowder behind each shot is seeing what they are shooting at? The idea here is that they are told to start firing at a certain range, i.e. 800 yards, set their sights to that position and, with the assumptions made here, fire as fast as possible. This is completely obscuring vision. I get the point about rate of fire - it is unneeded when I very much understand the Chassepot mechanically. You do too but don't seem to take this to consideration. The majority of the fire - and indeed the purpose of this tactic - is to, as I said, provide blankets of lead. Moreover typical firing in close order say, in the British Army in 1859 as well as 1870 prefers file firing, in the sense that a range is called, sights are set and a range, a certain number of volleys (or none, equating to no limit) are called and from whichever direction named, a unit is expected to fire from that to the other direction in their own time and continue by themselves autonomously until they have completed the task. Half of the idea is that you are not obscuring your vision.
Moreover in extended order most of the point is that someone is firing at any one moment such that fire is continuous, you are not shooting as fast as possible in synchrony. A failure to control fire properly, or to simply blaze away all ammunition as you mention shows a lack of proper rifle handling and if anything implies a lack of aimed fire, and thus a lack of full capabilities of the Chassepot actually put to use - and therefore is a far cry from "they trained their men to fire at 1,000m" - they didn't anyway, and this is not properly aimed fire at 1,000m. It is literally blankets of lead in that direction that should be about 1,000m. Unlike with rifle-muskets the drop-off being more forgiving and thus making it more effective - which is what I imagine your point is.

I will hand you credit where due and the P53 and its post-war developments up to 1859 are definitely improvements - i.e. the new Boxer cartridge, and the 1859 manual's reloading drill is designed to make loading as fast as possible - desired features when your infantrymen reload on their own time and are being given significant autonomy.

So in relation, many of the P53's advancements, unless anyone can really butt in against it, are postwar. Having said that the P51 still had a good cartridge, as was the wartime P53 - you can definitely manage more than 2.5 rounds per minute (Though I get we are comparing Inkerman vs. Gravelotte & other examples - but why? Apples to oranges. What could the point be here, other than that at Gravelotte the French fired faster and put more rounds downrange than the British at Inkerman? Like... okay? Arguing against a non-existent issue. Nobody here remotely disputes that a breechloading, bolt-action rifle with a self-contained cartridge can fire faster than any muzzleloader... which is why such rifles were adopted and has ZERO bearing on whether)

In the same conditions for fair comparison, fighting in close order we are looking more like 3 rounds a minute; realistically it is demonstrable to fire at maximum 4. I will not use that though - let's go 3.5. Firing at your absolute fastest, that is 1,750 rounds per minute per 500 men. That is 5,250 in 3, and that is 52.5 hits with 1% hitrate.
If we humor ourselves and go for 5RPM per man (Brett from Paper Cartridges demonstrating that with a P53, which would be 5 if loaded at the start of the test) in close order volley fire, assuming everyone is just blazing away as fast as possible with a cloud ahead of them, we are looking at 500 men shooting 2,5000RPM total, 7,500 in 3 and 75 hits.
What does this tell us? That even at absolute, sweaty, insane rate of fire with a P53 (or P51) Enfield in the same tactics, you hardly get over halfway the firerate, and total rounds downrange of the Chassepot with 12 RPM. Great? You keep saying stuff like this that ultimately make no sense. The only thing this tells us is that you obviously can fire much faster and put many more rounds at the enemy with the same number of men in 1 minute, 3 minutes and get hits with 1% hitrate than you can with the Enfield - or ANY muzzleloader. What is your point???
This has zero bearing whatsoever on the ability of a British infantryman in 1854 to hit a Russian at 800 yards. It is easier to do it with a Chassepot - of course? Surely we can see here how this again attests to the mechanical ability of the Chassepot and says nothing about British ability to hit at a range with a different rifle. I encourage you to cite the time that anyone argued the Enfield has a greater firerate. If anything, this makes the wider point even worse because we're comparing aimed fire, which, even if we were looking at the same rifle in both cases, will come with lower rate of fire, with getting as many rounds downrange with literal volleying blankets intended to, en masse, hit something. Again, still talking about the mechanical ability of the Chassepot to both fire quickly and hit something at 1,000 meters when I do not remotely dispute that, and it says nothing good about French tactics nor anything bad about British tactics or ability at Inkerman... Are you aware the Prussians won at Gravelotte? Since again, you seem to admit the whole thing is just because you dislike how certain people here glaze the British Army as some kind of supermen and seemed to want to get back at them. Yet to see anything that actually says something here. Still here actually comparing Enfield rifle-muskets to Chassepots. Come back and let us know where and when anyone disagreed or said that you can shoot faster and put more rounds downrange with a P53 than a Chassepot. I am talking about tactics and training.

 

[Old Soldier]

And I have seen from your other post, accurately describing the strength of Prussian Krupp guns during the conflict, which did much of the work. Prussian infantry tactic also making up for the objectively much worse Dreyse designs. They did well to incorporate the Chassepot influences in the Mauser M71, and the French in their next two service rifle designs.

Where shall I start?

There were NO 'Chassepot influences' in Mausers M1871 - it fired a 11.15×60R black powder centerfire cartidge, a single rear locking lug bolt action (Like practically all bolt action rifles of the era) and even a safety catch. It was still single round fed. In fact the French Mle 1874 Gras was very similar in its action which was achieved by converting the Chassepot bolt. The Gras was derived from the Chassepot action but for centerfire black powder11×59mmR Gras and manufactured from new. The old Chassepot was converted using the new parts for the old bolt (Modelle 66/74) unlike the Snider conversion of the Enfield P53. Those were the next two service rifles for the French army - a converted Chassepot and a new-made Gras.

The Gewehr 71 was further enhanced in 1884 with the addition of an 8-round tubular magazine (Gewehr 71/84) under the barrel. The Gras M1871 was never so modified The NEXT French issue rifle was the M1886 Lebel, a totally different design front locking lugs for its bolt action, with a tubular magazine, but, even more groundbreaking, 8mm smokeless catridges. In the French fashion, the old Gras were rebarreled for this new 8mm round.

 

[DoctorKingSchultz]

Where shall I start?

There were NO 'Chassepot influences' in Mausers M1871 - it fired a 11.15×60R black powder centerfire cartidge, a single rear locking lug bolt action (Like practically all bolt action rifles of the era) and even a safety catch. It was still single round fed. In fact the French Mle 1874 Gras was very similar in its action which was achieved by converting the Chassepot bolt. The Gras was derived from the Chassepot action but for centerfire black powder11×59mmR Gras and manufactured from new. The old Chassepot was converted using the new parts for the old bolt (Modelle 66/74) unlike the Snider conversion of the Enfield P53. Those were the next two service rifles for the French army - a converted Chassepot and a new-made Gras.

The Gewehr 71 was further enhanced in 1884 with the addition of an 8-round tubular magazine (Gewehr 71/84) under the barrel. The Gras M1871 was never so modified The NEXT French issue rifle was the M1886 Lebel, a totally different design front locking lugs for its bolt action, with a tubular magazine, but, even more groundbreaking, 8mm smokeless catridges. In the French fashion, the old Gras were rebarreled for this new 8mm round.

I had to have been mistaken then. What is the origin of the Mauser 71 designs? I am curious to know, because I had been told they were related and indeed both very superficially have similarities in their actions. I know much less of the Mauser 71 so I should not have said that, and the main evidence I was told about influences between the Chassepot, M71 and Gras. I guess it goes to show the importance of not spreading rumors then, if that is untrue. I'm sure you can see how, without diving into the mechanics of the Mauser 71 (which is a blank area really, for me) how I took it at face value:

Not my image - Mauser '71 breech. Rock Island Auction Company. Same as below.

Gras M1874 M80 breech.

Paper Cartridges - Chassepot M1866.

I am curious then as to what the influences are on the latter two rifles are, then. I guess it is far besides the original point of the thread though. My understanding was that the Chassepot's designs was widely influential - much as the Mauser designs in the 1890s were to from the Arisaka to the Springfield 1903.

 

[Old Soldier]

The Mauser was designed from scratch around a metallic-cased cartridge It was born with a firing pin - AND a safety catch demanded by the military. Paul Mauser teamed up with Samuel Norris (Remington's European agent) in 1867 to design a modern metallic cartridge and rifle system. The locking lug was a bar extension on the bolt which also housed the bolt handle. The 'one lug' system was well established and safe enough for black powder.

Both the Chassepot and the Dreyse were dead-end single-shot designs both based on paper cartidges. They were adopted long before a reliable rifle-caliber metallic-cased cartridge was available. These paper cartridges provided no breech seal hence the need for an obturator. The Chassepot was the better of the two, but that was the end of their development. The positioning of the cap was also important as the needle had to perform the same job as a hammer on a percussion cap. The paper cartridge, although termed 'combustible' left paper and other residue in the breech. Other bolt-action rifles were available at the time like the Vetterli which fired a rimfire cased round. They were an advance on the paper cartridge capping breechloaders of the Civil War, but still a dead end.

The Gras cartridge was developed AFTER the 1870 war, quite possibly initiated by the German round. The Chassepot bolt was modified with a new bolt head to feed and extract the round, to seal the breech and the needle changed to a firing pin.

 

[Saphroneth]

Something I want to clarify about why Inkerman is a useful data point is that it's early in the adoption of widespread rifles, and early in the adoption of marksmanship training to ordinary line troops, and for that very reason the old tactics are still being used by the attackers. This makes it useful to demonstrate that a step change has taken place in effectiveness (which is why there is only one Inkerman, in fact; once it happens the Russians seem to no longer attempt breakouts, because they concentrated multiple corps and over a hundred guns against about half of one British division in the early stages and one full division in the second stage, and they took terrible casualties and failed in the attack. So we only have one Inkerman.)

While this doesn't indicate that the British are supermen, it does indicate that their weapons system is very effective against what it faced (which was smoothbore-armed infantry); the ways in which it is effective mean that ordinary line troops can put out effective area fire at hundreds of yards, outside the range at which the Russian troops with their smoothbores can effectively respond. The cause of this is the specific kind of training given to the British troops.

What this means is that the weapons system the British have been equipped with (rifle-armed soldiers with rifle training) gives them an effective capability that did not exist with smoothbore muskets. This capability is certainly refined over the following years as the physical properties of the weapon improve (better lubricant, more windage etc.) and as the men gain a greater degree of experience (the assessment scores of British units continue to climb, and in 1859 they change the parameters of the assessment to make it harder) but as Britain fights few wars in the rifle-musket dominated period Inkerman and the Alma are the two major engagements where the rifle-musket really matters, and of those Inkerman is the more telling. There are also some engagements during the "Indian Mutiny" which are also somewhat telling.


Now, something I should note here is that the cause of this ability is nothing magic. It's because of training - institutionalized training in a way which the British happened to largely guess correctly, enabled by the British spending a lot of money on that training (the ammunition fired in training alone was quite expensive). Training American or French or Austrian soldiers the same way would have produced the same results; training Prussian soldiers much the same way did produce the same sort of results (influenced by their different weapon). Training Confederate soldiers in a similar sort of way, as Cleburne did, resulted in a perceptible improvement in their performance (AIUI this is best shown at Liberty Gap).


Soldiers improve because of training, and they improve in what they are trained at. If you train soldiers to shoot at targets at 100 yards, they will get good at shooting targets at 100 yards; if you train soldiers to shoot at targets at 400 yards, they will get good at shooting targets at 400 yards. The commonality of the British Hythe system and the Prussian system is that they train soldiers to shoot at unknown ranges, where the soldiers themselves have to estimate the range, and this means they are learning to shoot at any range.

Notably, this is quite a social departure! The 17th, 18th and early 19th century ideal had been the "mechanical" soldier who followed orders without any initiative whatsoever, so this devolution of a lot of initiative down to the individual soldiers in terms of range estimation etc. is notable. I would guess it enters the British army through the example of the elite "Rifle" units of the Napoleonic Wars.