Army Life And Marksmanship

[yulzari]

Regarding the general conversation here. It is dangerous to apply the practices of European armies at the time to the American Difference of Opinion. They were either conscript troops or long term volunteers. In both cases there was time and the administration to teach and practice rifle skills.

The American armies were, perforce, amateurs under amateur officers thrust into a negligible system of administration that did well to feed, clothe and arm them at all. The use of Napoleonic and earlier mass close range infantry was a correct response to manage them tactically at all. With exceptions, the rifle musket was wasted upon most of them and a smooth bore musket would have served then nearly as well. In time lessons were learned and efforts made to educate both officers and men. The greatest advance was in logistics and communications with the railways allowing both supplies and men to move great distances at threat speeds even if it was a foot slog for most. And allied to the railways was the telegraph which could communicate in real time.

Eventually the comparative industries made the result certain.

Within reason, the quality of the small arms made little difference. The best could take advantage of the rifle musket but they were few and diluted to minimal effect at the campaign level amongst the general mass in major engagements.

 

[DoctorKingSchultz]

The simple fact is that few of the city and town volunteers had ever held a rifle, never mind fired it. Yes, there were some natural marksmen, but most hadn't a clue what to do. Neither had their instructors. There were simply not enough instructors to go around, so they used the old guys. Most would have been familiar with the percussion musket - there were plenty available - but they were not trained in the military use of the rifle for line regiments. Yes, rifles had been issued before, but how many who had used them in the Mexican Wars were still around?

BTW, I don't think we were a nation of riflemen in 1775. We were a nation of shooters. Rifles were a rare thing in New England and most New Englanders used buck 'n ball. Where the Swiss/Germans settled there were a lot of rifes: Pennsyvlania & Virginia and going south from there they spread to the Carolinas. Privately owned rifles were more common post-Revolution.

I'm well aware of this; I am stating the fact of easily the most widely-believed misconception of the war, not implying or claiming say, that the 13 colonies were indeed crack shots but it wasn't up to them alone; they weren't at all.

Misconceptions are often wrong at their core. Take any war; the Great War, or World War One - How easily is it to find a post anywhere online about that war and find a top reply or comment doing something along the lines of talking about how "Napoleonic tactics" were used in 1914 and how magical it is that it all changed by 1918. Or blaming some infantry lieutenant for their perceptibly "stupid tactics" as if, even if they were stupid, that a little officer was the one who decided fundamental infantry doctrine?

Could just be interpreting this wrong but 2 is quite a few. I will presume we are all just contributing to solidifying the main point here; it isn't like most (or anyone really) was shooting Minié rifles in America, and in general, despite what people would want to believe about the Old West, or of the 19th century, of the US through history in general, it was not a gun-slinging nation.
I think the vastly made more important, on the individual level, focus on the 2nd Amendment is a whole other conversation, made much greater of a deal today than just about ever, but yeah - not a nation of sharpshooters, or shooters in general. (I mention it because the modern state of the US around gun culture, and living memory probably contributes greatly to the whole misconception, it would make sense.)

There are things like men's recreational shooting clubs set up by German immigrants @gary alludes to, and I know I have seen threads at least mention before, more common around the 1850s onwards but that is nothing like the institutionalized Corps of the British Army dedicated to training rifle marksmanship to an army that is 220,000 strong in regulars in 1861; nor is it like having a nationalized rifle-shooting association, nor a culture already familiar with rifles like the Norwegian, Swiss or Germanic states all benefit from that affects their own focuses on marksmanship (though none quite like the British Army in these waning years of Minié rifle supremacy).

Oh, and:

Yes, rifles had been issued before, but how many who had used them in the Mexican Wars were still around?

Obviously rhetorical, and there is the fact that their rifle knowledge would be useless anyway - but giving it a thought - with the scales the US and Confederate Armies work with to begin with in the war, it would be a complete disservice to say they dwarf Mexican war numbers. Without any disrespect to the men of that conflict - if every Mexican war veteran (who shouldered something with rifled grooves) stepped up, it still wouldn't be enough.
What the US needed was at very least was a few years of a particularly popular earlier NRA, and more importantly institutional training of any kind. Austrians spent a lot less time than British on distance position, aim drill etc. training; their soldiers didn't learn to judge distance - which perhaps makes the 1859 British manuals a little prophetic; they were officially adopted in March 1859, just a month before the 2nd Italian War of Independence, & my Field Exercise printed in June, the very month of Solferino.
Both manuals complement each other in many ways, and among the main themes it repeats, as I showed in an earlier post, i.e. 1st page for training, page 10 of the Musketry Instruction - distance judging drill is claimed as the singular most important skill of the soldier. Keeping in mind the Austrian infantrymen are all taught to fire at known distances; just not judge distance themselves. Their officers' main role is to do it for them. Austrians are still, with this, lightyears beyond US practice are considered woefully inept in practice. (This doesn't come down to how difficult rifle training is, but just as comparison. The lack of judging drill for the individual made a huge difference.)

Was distance judgment institutionalized among all infantrymen in any sort of way, how to simply aim properly at different elevations? No. Nevermind the fact that guns of the Civil War may range from a Springfield M1861 with a maximum of 500-yard sights to an Enfield P56 short rifle with the 1100-yard sight, a Spencer's 800-yard sight or hell, a Maynard carbine and whatever its rear sight is graduated for (think about 200 yards at most generous); Nevermind how a unit might be issued various weapons that defeat having knowledge of exactly how to aim and hit necessarily with one of them; a Lorenz M1854 and Springfield M1861 do not shoot the same.

There is plenty to point out. You don't just "learn to shoot" with these. As @Old Soldier put, marksmen take time. They also need the resources; what they got was the old fashioned "Leave it to your officers" that is recognizable to any older armies.

Let's make it clear. There were NOT regular - full-time professional - soldiers. Many instructors will have come from the State Militias - still using smoothbore muskets. They were teaching the DRILLS, to ensure the recruits could match their fire with regular soldiers - but they were not teaching them how to shoot. The percussion musket could fire three rounds, perhaps four, a minute and had an effective range of no more than 150 yards. The new Minie rifles had the same rate of fire, but an effective range of 400 yards, 600 in trained hands, and up to 1,000 for unit area fire, but these guys were not being trained how to make use of that technical advance. It takes time to produce a marksman (or even a decent shot) and they were not given that time. The generals wanted troops in the field, ready to go, so the instructors made it so. What they didn't get was marksmen.

The generals too, did not appreciate what a trained rifleman could do, should do, and deployed their troops as they always used to - as musket armed infantry. They expected nothing more. Even the trained Sharpshooter battalions, with accurate Sharps rifles, were deployed as line infantry! The concept of unit (company) fire and the 'beaten zone' at long range seems to have been totally ignored - and left to artillery.

A company firing at a battery in the field at 600-1000 yards was perfectly feasible and would have effectively caused the battery to cease fire and move away. Was that ever done?

The generals too, did not appreciate what a trained rifleman could do, should do, and deployed their troops as they always used to - as musket armed infantry. They expected nothing more.

This statement actually brings up quite an interesting thought; it is almost as though they did think the way so many others think about this. As before stated, the US Army's dress and fatigue uniform are collectively based upon French and Austrian influence; namely inspired by their light infantry; Chasseurs and Jägers. This is even more apparent at the time Hardee's was initially adopted, itself named Rifle & Light Infantry tactics for a reason. Copied from the 1846 French drill as we all know, for light infantry and the Tige system. The hunter's horn for light infantry now denotes all infantrymen, who all ideally carry rifle-muskets. Point being; the US Army models its uniform and official manuals off of light infantry dress; they follow the trend of copying the main basic idea in the 1850s of the change brought by the rifle-musket - the universal infantryman. The ideal US infantryman would have been perfectly flexible between skirmish and line formation, even if Hardee's is barebones compared to say, the 400~ total pages, possibly more (I'd have to count_ for the British manuals.
They go out of their way to ensure acceptably modern arms, especially that of the Enfield, Lorenz etc. are armed in number; the US Government has 1,200,000 Springfield M1861 and derivatives ordered, goes as far as purchasing 106,667 total Spencer rifles and carbines from 1862-63, delivered until 1866; while that is bit out there for the topic - nobody is doing that; the US is going out of their way to both get acceptably modern weapons and perceptibly advanced arms to equip their armies - the point, they armies feel that simply equipping themselves with rifle-muskets and the general best the day has to offer will make them... better, perhaps. Maybe, they think... they will "learn to shoot" practically in the field? Flawed idea but it seems to be what they are doing.

Italy for comparison; perhaps a poor example for being much shorter, but in the era surrounding the Expedition of the Thousand, 1860, it appears that the Garibaldi's forces - mass volunteer army - goes out of its way to predominantly use percussion smoothbores in that war. Not simply out of availability. They order for single-shot cavalry pistol-carbines to be made, some of their last real major use, and virtually as soon as the war ends and the Kingdom of Italy, for the most part, secured the new Army sets about getting itself proper uniforms and instantly in year 1 sets about getting a brand-new Fucello Model 1860/61 rifle-musket for the army, makes purchases from the likes of Lefaucheux, etc. all within a year of unification. Certain Italian political movements are known for their shirtsleeve uniforms - sure, but putting all of this into perspective it seems to all make sense, right? The Army that fought in 1860 seems to be led by men who consciously knew that between untrained mass volunteer armies, smoothbore percussion muskets were still relevant, and made little to no effort in procuring Minié rifles, got itself a good bunch of percussion smoothbores knowing it had no time nor point in attempting to train with the little time they gave themselves. Everything changes mere months after achieving their goals.

The US train of thought during the Civil War is, we need rifle-muskets. With time they start at least procuring quantities of things that nobody else has really done before. They are obsessed with quality and modernization yet simultaneously don't seem to want to - don't actively really have the means at all - to do it. It would be a different story if they really "wanted" troops of the smoothbore era, there was effort made to procure advanced arms. The basis being that, seemingly, "If we have advanced guns, our troops with eventually learn to shoot, and maybe our oldschool volleys will be deadlier and we will be more successful than the enemy."

 

[DoctorKingSchultz]

Regarding the general conversation here. It is dangerous to apply the practices of European armies at the time to the American Difference of Opinion. They were either conscript troops or long term volunteers. In both cases there was time and the administration to teach and practice rifle skills.

The American armies were, perforce, amateurs under amateur officers thrust into a negligible system of administration that did well to feed, clothe and arm them at all. The use of Napoleonic and earlier mass close range infantry was a correct response to manage them tactically at all. With exceptions, the rifle musket was wasted upon most of them and a smooth bore musket would have served then nearly as well. In time lessons were learned and efforts made to educate both officers and men. The greatest advance was in logistics and communications with the railways allowing both supplies and men to move great distances at threat speeds even if it was a foot slog for most. And allied to the railways was the telegraph which could communicate in real time.

Eventually the comparative industries made the result certain.

Within reason, the quality of the small arms made little difference. The best could take advantage of the rifle musket but they were few and diluted to minimal effect at the campaign level amongst the general mass in major engagements.

I think all of that most of us here understand, the revived discussion came from discussing some severe misconceptions and understanding from the start of the thread, and now active comparison and discussion of the armies of the Civil War relative to their counterparts.
It is essential in understanding the war, i.e. in the correct, basic analysis you have just given, to look at other armies.
There may be a person or two on the forum as a whole who may not get it, the discussion I see is talking about and contrasting armies, and moreover explaining why the American Civil War was fought in the way it was as oppose to an ideal. This stems from trying to rectify the idea that American tactics in the war were born from being the only that existed, or perhaps the best, part of a general misunderstanding that the war had anything really to do with "proving" rifle technology in any way or pioneering how to use it - which believe it or not, is a highly pervasive myth, I know many in real life and see online regularly who are wholly ignorant of external doctrine and believe it to be the only [that exists].
This implies an understanding, and the thread has gotten for the most part, various times now to the conclusions that the war was fought the way it was out of necessity; As I like to keep repeating, it is the best way to fight with mass untrained volunteer/conscript armies. The Civil War could have been fought with breechloaders being as prevalent as rifle-muskets instead, and still looking much the same in infantry tactics. Direct mention early in the conversation was about dislikes in how the 1870s-80s are discussed as regards the US Army; changing tactics responding to changing weaponry, which was not the case; because the Civil War was fought the way it was from lack of professionality in resource, institution or administration. It's not like they were on top of the game in the '60s and the trapdoor was changing warfare for them, they were both becoming more professional and implementing rifle training and that is why things were changing in the 1870s-80s. As I referred to myself just now, could've been fought with breechloaders and looked the same way.
The War of the Pacific is tactically, South America's direct example of that in 1879-84. Giant armies with weeks to prepare, armed with still ultimately single-shot arms - the best way to use them is the tried ways that work, ways designed to be learned very quickly and simply. That is the way we keep seeing throughout the whole era with again, largely untrained, mass volunteer armies. Nobody here is making any dangerous assumptions I can see.

Perhaps you aren't referring to me but I've directly said much of the same stuff, in a nutshell. TLR and all that, everyone talking recently all has. Explaining why the US Army did not have British, Prussian, French tactics =/= dangerous, it literally involves understanding both, comparing both and now we are actively talking about why the US Army was the way it was. Nevermind that we have already been doing that.

 

[Old Soldier]

OK. Some defense of US production and technology. Breech-loaders were 'new kit' Most are NOT suitable for line infantry- and they cost a fortune! The cased ammo did not have the power or range required and were not always reliable (Capping breechloaders were much more effective). They had not been used in line warfare before and were mostly issued to cavalry.

Many of the breechloaders used in the Civil War were trialled by the Brits from 1859 as they searched for a reliable breechloader very aware of the 'needle rifles' in Europe. Most were carbines but many were also trialled as infantry rifles alongside British and European weapons including Sharps and Westley Richards Monkey Tails. As most are aware they settled on the case breechloader, not the capping breechloader. The economic - and cheap - way was to convert new P53 using the Snider breech mechanism from 1866 onwards as well as it's associated centerfire ammunition. It equalled or bettered P53 accuracy.

The state arsenals and their sub-contractors were slow in producing any weapons initially and were well behind in production, particularly with rifles for the infantry. Production of the M1861 did not hit the required numbers until 1863. In the meanwhile Ordnance was in Europe buying anything available. - just as the Rebs were. The Rebs ordered 500,000 Enfield P53s from the private sector (no surviving records of how many were received) but the Union also ordered - and got - 400,000, not to mention the Lorenz from Austria.

The rifle's effectiveness was proved in the Crimean War (1854-55) and justified the rather comprehensive instruction in the British and French Armies. Was the USA interested? Were they learning those lessons too? No. They did things THEIR way*(still do). They saw no need to do it. It wasn't their sort of war. They relied on the experiences of the Mexican War. They only had a small regular army anyway, mostly in garrison troops and manning forts. They did not need a large army. Sure they conducted short patrols against native Americans, but that was about it. As for tactical awareness, the US Army was not alone as the Austro-Hungarian armies suffered the same disasters against the Prussians armed with Dreyse Rifles - breech-loaders effective only out to 400 yards, but with a higher rate of fire - especially the Battle of Königgrätz in 1866 (45,000 Aust. cas v 10,000 Prus.) so the US generals were not the only ones blind to the rifles of the opposition.

* This is an historical fact as we see the same problems in the re-equipping aftermath of the Spanish-American War. They seem to take no one's advice learned from experience that the US forces have not encountered. Pershing's tactics and re-equipping of the AEF in 1918, Kasserine Pass, Omaha Beach and early daylight bombing missions are further examples.