yulzari
Private
- Joined
- Jul 25, 2017
- Location
- Plymouth and Basse Marche
I put in a like but would like to mention that the control of fire was by their junior officers so they were the ones who needed the most training in range estimation. The soldiers had it so that they could still act in the absence of their officers when necessary. Also it was very vital with the arching trajectory of even the fastest rifle muskets.
Even when the Magazine Lee Enfield entered service range estimation on the open veldt in South Africa was a difficult task. My grandfather, in an engagement with Boer soldiers, was put to firing at increasing higher settings of his rifle until his fire was seen to reach the Boer positions. Then the Company was ordered to set their sights to his distance setting and effective fire commenced and the Boers withdrew. With a rifle musket an mis-estimation of only 25 feet could render the fire ineffective and certainly at an mis-estimation of 50 feet. There was a reason why British troops with rifle muskets were taught three different sight positions for a given sight setting. Fine, mid and full. This gave three intermediate effective settings for a given sight setting. One of the junior officer's jobs was to observe the fall of shot and correct the ordered range setting as necessary. He had to be well trained and practiced to do this. In the ADOO campaigns the ill trained officers at best might put out or indicate range markers as the simplest measure. Whether the other ranks understood this, could alter their sight settings or indeed receive the orders immediately either by word or via their NCOs is a matter I cannot comment upon. It was not an easy task to maintain the fire of rifle muskets against an advancing enemy by gradually reducing the sight setting as they close without a delay that causes the fire to fall behind them. The Napoleonic close formation at least gave a chance to disseminate new range settings in a timely fashion.
The French doctrine of élan recognised this and encouraged a fast approach with the bayonet. Avoiding pausing to return fire and troops were practiced in gymnastics and running to enable them to close fast. This paid off in Italy in 1859 against the Austrians who had yet to come to terms with their new Lorenz rifle muskets but less so in 1870 against the short ranged but fast firing Prussian Dreysers and totally failed in 1914 against fast firing magazine Mausers and machine guns. In the 1860s with ill directed I'll managed rifle musket fire it might well have regularly worked if one side had trained and practiced the task. But that would be for a different post I think.
Going back 40 years ago, with my L1A1 out to 300 metres a centre of mass POA was going the hit the poor naughty person somewhere or his mate next to him or behind him and make them regret their enlistment decision. Range estimation had became progressively less vital as the trajectory flattened with improved small arms performance over time. Over 300 metres leave it to the Gimpy and the rolled up 50 round belt you have carted about in your webbing pouch all week and cursed the ..**! cotton bandolier they put round your neck in lieu at the same time.
Even when the Magazine Lee Enfield entered service range estimation on the open veldt in South Africa was a difficult task. My grandfather, in an engagement with Boer soldiers, was put to firing at increasing higher settings of his rifle until his fire was seen to reach the Boer positions. Then the Company was ordered to set their sights to his distance setting and effective fire commenced and the Boers withdrew. With a rifle musket an mis-estimation of only 25 feet could render the fire ineffective and certainly at an mis-estimation of 50 feet. There was a reason why British troops with rifle muskets were taught three different sight positions for a given sight setting. Fine, mid and full. This gave three intermediate effective settings for a given sight setting. One of the junior officer's jobs was to observe the fall of shot and correct the ordered range setting as necessary. He had to be well trained and practiced to do this. In the ADOO campaigns the ill trained officers at best might put out or indicate range markers as the simplest measure. Whether the other ranks understood this, could alter their sight settings or indeed receive the orders immediately either by word or via their NCOs is a matter I cannot comment upon. It was not an easy task to maintain the fire of rifle muskets against an advancing enemy by gradually reducing the sight setting as they close without a delay that causes the fire to fall behind them. The Napoleonic close formation at least gave a chance to disseminate new range settings in a timely fashion.
The French doctrine of élan recognised this and encouraged a fast approach with the bayonet. Avoiding pausing to return fire and troops were practiced in gymnastics and running to enable them to close fast. This paid off in Italy in 1859 against the Austrians who had yet to come to terms with their new Lorenz rifle muskets but less so in 1870 against the short ranged but fast firing Prussian Dreysers and totally failed in 1914 against fast firing magazine Mausers and machine guns. In the 1860s with ill directed I'll managed rifle musket fire it might well have regularly worked if one side had trained and practiced the task. But that would be for a different post I think.
Going back 40 years ago, with my L1A1 out to 300 metres a centre of mass POA was going the hit the poor naughty person somewhere or his mate next to him or behind him and make them regret their enlistment decision. Range estimation had became progressively less vital as the trajectory flattened with improved small arms performance over time. Over 300 metres leave it to the Gimpy and the rolled up 50 round belt you have carted about in your webbing pouch all week and cursed the ..**! cotton bandolier they put round your neck in lieu at the same time.
Bringing the