Why Didn't Meade Capture Lee's Army?

[FZ11]

Not sure that is the correct way to read his instructions.

"You will not be hampered by any minute instructions from these headquarters. Your army is free to act as you may deem proper under the circumstances as they arise. You will, however, keep in view the important fact that the Army of the Potomac is the covering army of Washington, as well as the army of operation against the invading forces of the rebels. You will therefore manoeuvre and fight in such a manner as to cover the Capital and also Baltimore, as far as circumstances will admit. Should General Lee move upon either of these places, it is expected that you will either anticipate him or arrive with him, so as to give him battle."

O.K. What's the correct way?

 

[Old Soldier]

Not sure that is the correct way to read his instructions.

"You will not be hampered by any minute instructions from these headquarters. Your army is free to act as you may deem proper under the circumstances as they arise. You will, however, keep in view the important fact that the Army of the Potomac is the covering army of Washington, as well as the army of operation against the invading forces of the rebels. You will therefore manoeuvre and fight in such a manner as to cover the Capital and also Baltimore, as far as circumstances will admit. Should General Lee move upon either of these places, it is expected that you will either anticipate him or arrive with him, so as to give him battle."

To sum this up = "Get on after him, you are on your own - but make sure he can't get to Washington."

 

[wausaubob]

Meade's orders prioritize interposing the AOP between Lee and D.C., so, in a way, Meade's behavior is reactive rather than proactive by order.

Precisely. General Meade had operational control of the army, but Lincoln and Halleck were controlling US strategy.
The more telling question is why didn't the US immediately reinforce Rosecrans' Tennessee force, rather than wait for Rosecrans to be caught off balance in northern Georgia?
The US strategic planners, including the President were not very prompt and not very insightful.
With reinforcements, Rosecrans and Thomas could have put the Confederates under General Bragg in real danger of being cut off.

 

[NickSpencer]

O.K. What's the correct way?

The way Meade interpreted them.

Meade to Halleck 29th "My main point being to find and fight the enemy./My endeavor will be falling upon some portion of Lee's army in detail/ I shall have to submit to the cavalry raid around me in some measure"

Meade placed his commands in a way to be able to march towards or protect Harrisburg, Baltimore, or Washington on the 29th, he knew by then he had the inner position of Lee arc of movement, ie when he takes command he had the luxury of always being between lee and the objectives he had discretionary orders to defend places not peremptory orders to do so.

 

[Rhea Cole]

The way Meade interpreted them.

Meade to Halleck 29th "My main point being to find and fight the enemy./My endeavor will be falling upon some portion of Lee's army in detail/ I shall have to submit to the cavalry raid around me in some measure"

Meade placed his commands in a way to be able to march towards or protect Harrisburg, Baltimore, or Washington on the 29th, he knew by then he had the inner position of Lee arc of movement, ie when he takes command he had the luxury of always being between lee and the objectives he had discretionary orders to defend places not peremptory orders to do so.

Nick Spencer has summed up the situation exactly.

Meade telegraphed Lincoln declaring that he had successfully driven Lee out of Union territory. Lincoln's private response bordered on despair.

The Army of the Potomac's command had been brainwashed by McClellan, Burnside & Hooker into believing that Lee would prevail no matter what. In their mindset sending Lee back to Virginia to fight another day was victory.

In July 4th atop Monteagle Mountain & Vicksburg generals who had infused their armies with confidence that they would prevail no matter what were victorious.

Under Grant in 1864 it took the same army 52 days to pin Lee down in Virginia & by December destroy the Army of Tennessee & take Atlanta & March to March the Sea & capture Savannah.

On an 8 1/2" X 11" map of the Western Theater the entire operations of the Armies of the Potomac & Northern Virginia is literally the size of a postage stamp. That is a graphic example of the war Grant fought.

To directly answer the question posed, Meade did not destroy the Army of Northern Virginia was that he had been trained how not to. Famously at the Wilderness Grant observed Meade's HQ whittling. It was not until a panicked colonel arrived shouting that that Lee had struck again.

Grant almost never lost his temper… in a steely eyed I am wearing four stars appearance Grant said it was time that that stopped worry about what Lee was doing & start focusing on what they were going to Lee.

That is how Meade could have destroyed Lee's army.

 

[Old Soldier]

The Army of the Potomac had completed it's primary task - to defend Washington.

What gets most of us foreigners is how close to Washinton the border - and the initial battles were. Richmond was the Confederate capital. It is only 120 miles from Washington but took until April 3, 1865 to be occupied by Union troops - after a year long siege!. Bull Run and Manassas are just 45 miles from Washington. Early's attack on Fort Stevens July 11–12, 1864 was less than 4 miles from the White House!

 

[Josh The Lighthouse Guy]

"It is the business of cavalry to follow up on the victory, and to prevent the beaten army from rallying."
-Napoleon Bonaparte, quoted in Lee Is Trapped and Must Be Taken

I just came across this quote at the start of a chapter and it illustrates some of the misunderstanding.

What Napoleon is describing here makes sense in the Napoleonic Wars in which most major battles ended in one side routing. There was no rally to prevent during July 4-14; the Confederates withdrew in good order.

In terms of Napoleonic tactics, Meade should have had a cavalry reserve which he unleashed after the July 3 attack failed. This cavalry force would run down the retreating Confederates, scattering them and breaking through the now weak line from where they had launched their attack. I daresay McClellan hoped to unleash Pleasanton at Antietam Creek in this manner, had the Union attacks collapsed the Confederate line.

The reality is that the Union army had no heavy cavalry to deliver such a crushing counterattack, their light cavalry was busy on the flanks, and a cavalry charge across the open fields between Cemetery and Seminary Ridges - even on the heels of Pickett's repulse - would have been a bloody disaster due to improvements in firearms and artillery between 1815 and 1861, plus the presence of unengaged Confederate units on both flanks of the charge.

Certainly Merritt and Farnsworth found that Lee's right flanks was still steady and full of fight on the afternoon of July 3, despite the bloody fighting in which it had engaged the day before.

 

[Peace Society]

Seems like Meade had been running his cavalry ragged the whole time. He really needed fresh horses and men. Not all his infantry was worn out. I've been reading the angry letters of some of them over why they didn't set out right away and smash into Lee.

 

[David H.]

Stunningly obvious retrospective insight (STORI): Meade had limited skills for his position as army commander, and he'd only been in the position, what, six days? He won the battle, which was a lot. Asking him to also capture Lee's army might be a bit much.

In that vein, I recently watched an hour-plus interview of Gary Gallagher. (Is Gary Gallagher our best living Civil War historian? He might be. Who is better?) In that interview Gallagher makes a couple interesting assertions:

1. the Confederacy did not have a better set of generals than the US
2. over time the Union identified 4 generals who would competently command armies: Grant, Sherman, Sheridan, and Thomas. (all 4 from the western theater!).
3. the Confederacy only found one general competent to command an army: Lee.

These statements occur at about one hour 35 minutes twenty seconds in an interview by Lex Fridman on YouTube titled "Gary Gallagher: American Civil War, slavery, Lincoln, Grant & Lee". I enjoyed and profited from every minute of the interview! Recommended.

So Meade was new in his position, and maybe outmatched by Gen. Lee. Meade did well to win the battle. Take what you can get, rather than risking it all. A lot was at stake!

 

[David H.]

Stunningly obvious retrospective insight (STORI): Meade had limited skills for his position as army commander, and he'd only been in the position, what, six days? He won the battle, which was a lot. Asking him to also capture Lee's army might be a bit much.

In that vein, I recently watched an hour-plus interview of Gary Gallagher. (Is Gary Gallagher our best living Civil War historian? He might be. Who is better?) In that interview Gallagher makes a couple interesting assertions:

1. the Confederacy did not have a better set of generals than the US
2. over time the Union identified 4 generals who would competently command armies: Grant, Sherman, Sheridan, and Thomas. (all 4 from the western theater!).
3. the Confederacy only found one general competent to command an army: Lee.

These statements occur at about one hour 35 minutes twenty seconds in an interview by Lex Fridman on YouTube titled "Gary Gallagher: American Civil War, slavery, Lincoln, Grant & Lee". I enjoyed and profited from every minute of the interview! Recommended.

So Meade was new in his position, and maybe outmatched by Gen. Lee. Meade did well to win the battle. Take what you can get, rather than risking it all. A lot was at stake!

I agree - Gary Gallagher is the best - always interesting and informative. I've heard him speak in person, in YouTube talks and classroom lectures and at the CWI at Gettysburg College.

Meanwhile, from what I have read from many smarter people than me on this forum is that Meade had a lot of challenges to deal with in trying to catch up with Lee and his army.

 

[NickSpencer]

If the CS did not have better Generals, how come it took so long to win?, how come the butchers bill shows the CS cost benift of casualties inflicted and sufferer by the size of each sides combatants shows the CS was significantly better?, how come every combat m,odel points to CS having better leadership as the reasons?.

 

[LtGenHenryWagerHalleck]

On July 28 I as general-in-chief wrote Meade an unofficial letter to clarify my and the president's reactions to Lee's escape after Gettysburg.

"I take this method of writing you a few words which I could not well communicate in any other way. Your fight at Gettysburg met with universal approbation of all military men here. You handled your troops in that battle as well, if not better, than any general has handled his army during the war. You brought all your forces into action at the right time and place, which no commander of the Army of the Potomac has done before. You may well be proud of that battle. The President's order of proclamation of July 4th showed how much he appreciated your success. And now a few words in regard to subsequent events. You should not have been surprised or vexed at the President's disappointment at the escape of Lee's army. He had examined into all the details of sending you reinforcements to satisfy himself that every man who could possibly be spared from other places had been sent to your army. He thought that Lee's defeat was so certain that he felt no little impatience at his unexpected escape. I have no doubt, General, that you felt the disappointment as keenly as any one else. Such things sometimes occur to us without any fault of our own. Take it all together, your short campaign has proved your superior generalship, and you merit, as you will receive, the confidence of the Government and the gratitude of the country. I need not assure you, General, that I have lost none of the confidence which I felt in you when I recommended you for the command."



Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
H. W. Halleck

 

[Old Soldier]

"It is the business of cavalry to follow up on the victory, and to prevent the beaten army from rallying."
-Napoleon Bonaparte, quoted in Lee Is Trapped and Must Be Taken

I just came across this quote at the start of a chapter and it illustrates some of the misunderstanding.

What Napoleon is describing here makes sense in the Napoleonic Wars in which most major battles ended in one side routing. There was no rally to prevent during July 4-14; the Confederates withdrew in good order.

In terms of Napoleonic tactics, Meade should have had a cavalry reserve which he unleashed after the July 3 attack failed. This cavalry force would run down the retreating Confederates, scattering them and breaking through the now weak line from where they had launched their attack. I daresay McClellan hoped to unleash Pleasanton at Antietam Creek in this manner, had the Union attacks collapsed the Confederate line.

The reality is that the Union army had no heavy cavalry to deliver such a crushing counterattack, their light cavalry was busy on the flanks, and a cavalry charge across the open fields between Cemetery and Seminary Ridges - even on the heels of Pickett's repulse - would have been a bloody disaster due to improvements in firearms and artillery between 1815 and 1861, plus the presence of unengaged Confederate units on both flanks of the charge.

Certainly Merritt and Farnsworth found that Lee's right flanks was still steady and full of fight on the afternoon of July 3, despite the bloody fighting in which it had engaged the day before.

I am not sure the Napoleonic Wars were fought for so long 'with one side routing'. The British army organised a fighting retreat to Corruna in 1809. It was winter. There was no 'rout'. In many cases, the French overran smaller duchies and countries by basically overwhelming any resistance with a large army - the Grande Armée - often without a battle. No small Duchy would be able to defeat it on their own. Hence the various 'coalitions' of the Napoleonic Wars.

Sure, the end of a battle would cause the losers to 'leave the field' in some disorder, but this was often checked by reserve formations behind the lines, the troops reassembled and reassigned, if necessary, but his required a large ground force. Abandoned field guns were certainly lost, but the escaping troops were not, as, at some point, the various armies would have a 'line' to withdraw to - organised beforehand usually a defended city, a broad river or high ground - in exactly the same way as the civil war. Here the 'routed' units would be reorganised and reformed. The main cause of Napoleon's defeat in 1813 was not through one battle, but a series of battles to the East with Russia, Prussia and Austria, as well as to the South in Spain and Portugal. The Grande Armée was big enough to support this.

If it had been a rout, he would never have assembled the army of 1815. Waterloo, on the other hand was a rout as the Brits, Belgians and German duchies had fought them to a standstill - then the Prussians arrived to continue the pursuit. There was no 'reorganisation'.

 

[Josh The Lighthouse Guy]

If the CS did not have better Generals, how come it took so long to win?, how come the butchers bill shows the CS cost benift of casualties inflicted and sufferer by the size of each sides combatants shows the CS was significantly better?, how come every combat m,odel points to CS having better leadership as the reasons?.

Your argument, as pertains to the thread at hand, is that the Army of the Potomac failed to capture the Army of Northern Virginia because Lee and his subordinates were better generals...even though they had just lost a major battle to those supposedly inferior opponents?

 

[Old Soldier]

Your argument, as pertains to the thread at hand, is that the Army of the Potomac failed to capture the Army of Northern Virginia because Lee and his subordinates were better generals...even though they had just lost a major battle to those supposedly inferior opponents?

No. They were ... generals! Generals who knew HOW to quit the field and WHEN to quit the field. They had lost a battle, not the war. (We can argue about that NOW, but at the time that was the truth as they saw it.) There was no 'better' about it. They were making the best of a bad situation.

Meade DID send cavalry after them, but he also knew some would have to be retained to protect Washington - as the President and the other politicians were expecting him to. His field army was now concentrated to the North and had also suffered in the battle. Nevertheless, he sent two brigades South towards Frederick on open roads to ensure that they got there before Lee and to ensure he did not turn East down the Potomac.

Lee's gamble that he COULD turn and go for Washington had failed. Meade's actions ensured he could never try again from the same direction.

As for the President's repremand, Lincoln was no soldier. He was NOT there, not fighting the battle but, I suspect was 'advised' by some of the 'failure to prevent the escape of Lee's army' and seems to have been led to expect Lee's surrender. How Napoleonic!!

 

[jackt62]

Best way to destroy a retreating army is to plant yourself across its communications. Taylor tried this at Monette's Ferry and Mansura, Hood tried it at Spring Hill, and Grant successfully accomplished it at Jetersville and Appomattox. Merely contending with a rearguard does not seem to suffice.

Which is why it was almost impossible to "destroy" a retreating army in the CW.

 

[Old Soldier]

After reading up on Meade I note that there was more than an element of political knife-twisting involved. Especially so as he was only promoted to take command of the AoP THREE days before Gettysburg. Was this promotion to make it easy to find someone to blame for the result? Other more senior corps commanders had turned the job down! The president and his entourage seem to have - or thought they had - a say in what happened on the battlefield and the generals just 'did as they were told'. Why DID they expect Lee to surrender a force as large as the AoNV after just one battle? Did the Union Army surrender after Bull Run?

Meade was a regular soldier. He knew what to do in the field, besides, I also note he had regular 'councils of war' and relied on feedback from his corps commanders and that his decisions were based on their agreement with plans he put forward. Makes you wonder.

 

[wausaubob]

Nick Spencer has summed up the situation exactly.

View attachment 587578

Meade telegraphed Lincoln declaring that he had successfully driven Lee out of Union territory. Lincoln's private response bordered on despair.

The Army of the Potomac's command had been brainwashed by McClellan, Burnside & Hooker into believing that Lee would prevail no matter what. In their mindset sending Lee back to Virginia to fight another day was victory.

In July 4th atop Monteagle Mountain & Vicksburg generals who had infused their armies with confidence that they would prevail no matter what were victorious.

Under Grant in 1864 it took the same army 52 days to pin Lee down in Virginia & by December destroy the Army of Tennessee & take Atlanta & March to March the Sea & capture Savannah.

On an 8 1/2" X 11" map of the Western Theater the entire operations of the Armies of the Potomac & Northern Virginia is literally the size of a postage stamp. That is a graphic example of the war Grant fought.

To directly answer the question posed, Meade did not destroy the Army of Northern Virginia was that he had been trained how not to. Famously at the Wilderness Grant observed Meade's HQ whittling. It was not until a panicked colonel arrived shouting that that Lee had struck again.

Grant almost never lost his temper… in a steely eyed I am wearing four stars appearance Grant said it was time that that stopped worry about what Lee was doing & start focusing on what they were going to Lee.

That is how Meade could have destroyed Lee's army.

One year later, in May 1864, there was probably not much divergence between Grant and Meade with respect to once the US Army made contact with the enemy, there would be no let up. The divergence was in Grant organizing and allowing a large scale cavalry raid into the Confederate logistical area including the first disruption of the Virginia railroads. Sheridan was moved away from Meade's control for compelling reasons.