Why Didn't Meade Capture Lee's Army?

[johncla]

Stunningly obvious retrospective insight (STORI): Meade had limited skills for his position as army commander, and he'd only been in the position, what, six days? He won the battle, which was a lot. Asking him to also capture Lee's army might be a bit much.

In that vein, I recently watched an hour-plus interview of Gary Gallagher. (Is Gary Gallagher our best living Civil War historian? He might be. Who is better?) In that interview Gallagher makes a couple interesting assertions:

1. the Confederacy did not have a better set of generals than the US
2. over time the Union identified 4 generals who would competently command armies: Grant, Sherman, Sheridan, and Thomas. (all 4 from the western theater!).
3. the Confederacy only found one general competent to command an army: Lee.

These statements occur at about one hour 35 minutes twenty seconds in an interview by Lex Fridman on YouTube titled "Gary Gallagher: American Civil War, slavery, Lincoln, Grant & Lee". I enjoyed and profited from every minute of the interview! Recommended.

So Meade was new in his position, and maybe outmatched by Gen. Lee. Meade did well to win the battle. Take what you can get, rather than risking it all. A lot was at stake!

 

[Josh The Lighthouse Guy]

There are past threads on this subject.

Meade's army had won the battle, but was in rough shape. There were logistical issues, many changes among the corps and division commanders (mostly due to casualties), and 3 of 7 corps had been wrecked.

On top of all that Lee took up a strong defensive position. That the ANV conducted a very orderly withdrawal, which underscores that it was a retreat, not a rout.

 

[LtGenHenryWagerHalleck]

Rain and fortifications an army is usually wrecked after battle even if they win especially something as big as Gettysburg

 

[Tom Elmore]

My take is that Lee's Confederates at Gettysburg were a stubborn bunch, powerful on offense but particularly strong on defense, or to paraphrase Stonewall Jackson, "We sometimes fail to move them, but they always fail to move us." Meade was new to command. If he had been seasoned and a genius like Napoleon, one might argue that he could have retained most of the Sixth Corps to countercharge and split Lee's center after the repulse of the Pickett-Pettigrew-Trimble charge on July 3. Even then, I would not expect Lee's veterans to fold and collapse, but rather fight to contain the breach long enough to reunite the two wings and conduct a fighting withdrawal to the passes in the rear. I think Meade was fortunate to have achieved victory at Gettysburg. Had he tried to breach Lee's defensive line near the Potomac between Hagerstown and Williamsport, I believe he would have been soundly repulsed, although Lincoln certainly thought he missed a golden opportunity.

 

[FZ11]

Stunningly obvious retrospective insight (STORI): Meade had limited skills for his position as army commander, and he'd only been in the position, what, six days? He won the battle, which was a lot. Asking him to also capture Lee's army might be a bit much.

In that vein, I recently watched an hour-plus interview of Gary Gallagher. (Is Gary Gallagher our best living Civil War historian? He might be. Who is better?) In that interview Gallagher makes a couple interesting assertions:

1. the Confederacy did not have a better set of generals than the US
2. over time the Union identified 4 generals who would competently command armies: Grant, Sherman, Sheridan, and Thomas. (all 4 from the western theater!).
3. the Confederacy only found one general competent to command an army: Lee.

These statements occur at about one hour 35 minutes twenty seconds in an interview by Lex Fridman on YouTube titled "Gary Gallagher: American Civil War, slavery, Lincoln, Grant & Lee". I enjoyed and profited from every minute of the interview! Recommended.

So Meade was new in his position, and maybe outmatched by Gen. Lee. Meade did well to win the battle. Take what you can get, rather than risking it all. A lot was at stake!

Well, I would say Gallagher is a well known Civil War historian and leave it at that. Meade's limited skills? Meade was stunning at Gettysburg!

 

[7thWisconsin]

"Why should we censure a man who has done so much for his country because he did not do a little more?"
The AoP was shot to pieces at Gettysburg. 3 Corps wrecked. 1 Corps commander dead. 2 wounded and out of action. Thousands of wounded to care for. That army was in no shape to go over to the offensive. Meade was the first commander of the AoP to defeat Lee and held the post to the end of the war. At every level of command Meade was considered a solid commander. The army was too fought out at Gettysburg and Lee took advantage of the rainstorm on the 5th to get away.

 

[Josh The Lighthouse Guy]

It's worth noting that Pope escaped Second Manassas and Hood escaped Nashville despite both armies being routed off the battlefield.

The two army-level captures of the war involved Grant. Once he conducting a siege lasting over a month (Vicksburg). Before that he had a 5:3 advantage in manpower against a novice Confederate army that had inadequate defenses and supplies to withstand a siege, commanded by two utterly incompetent generals (Donelson).

Beauregard successfully withdrew from Shiloh back to Corinth, despite the condition of the Confederate army and presence of Buell's relatively fresh army.

McClellan had Lee pinned against the Potomac around Sharpsburg, in a position nowhere near as strong as Williamsport, and drove him back while failing to defeat him.

The ANV survived the defeat of a corps, including the practical destruction of one of its three divisions, and a mental breakdown of the corps commander at Spotsylvania.

 

[JeffBrooks]

1. the Confederacy did not have a better set of generals than the US
2. over time the Union identified 4 generals who would competently command armies: Grant, Sherman, Sheridan, and Thomas. (all 4 from the western theater!).
3. the Confederacy only found one general competent to command an army: Lee.

So, in point #1, when we say "generals", we mean "army commanders"? Not corps and division-level commanders?

 

[JeffBrooks]

The two army-level captures of the war involved Grant. Once he conducting a siege lasting over a month (Vicksburg). Before that he had a 5:3 advantage in manpower against a novice Confederate army that had inadequate defenses and supplies to withstand a siege, commanded by two utterly incompetent generals (Donelson).

If Fort Donelson counts, why doesn't Jackson's capture of Harper's Ferry? About the same number of men were taken prisoner, if I am not mistaken.

 

[jackt62]

Given the information and analyses available to him at the time, Meade made the most appropriate decisions following the ANV's repulse on Day 3 at Gettysburg. Counterattacking would have been risky; the ANV was not a disheveled mass but a still well organized fighting force that would be fighting on the defensive. Pursuing Lee's defeated army to the Potomac crossings was also not a slam dunk; difficult terrain, uncertain knowledge of Lee's movements and whereabouts, and the exhausted condition of the AotP were factors that influenced Meade's decisions in the days following Lee's retreat from Gettysburg. Additionally, Meade has been unfairly criticized for allowing the ANV to cross the river to Virginia, despite the fact that Lee had constructed a formidable defense line covering the crossing points at Falling Waters and Williamsport.

 

[Josh The Lighthouse Guy]

If Fort Donelson counts, why doesn't Jackson's capture of Harper's Ferry? About the same number of men were taken prisoner, if I am not mistaken.

A few thousand less, but yes a fair point.

Much like Donelson, the attackers had significant numerical superiority and the defending commander was incompetent.

 

[gary]

Well, I would say Gallagher is a well known Civil War historian and leave it at that. Meade's limited skills? Meade was stunning at Gettysburg!

Eisenhower felt that Meade at Gettysburg faced a much more daunting task than he (Ike) did with Overlord.

 

[NickSpencer]

Because R E Lee would not let him.

 

[Old Soldier]

Why? Because it couldn't. The battle at Gettysburg had lasted three days. Meade was left with an army much weakened from the battle - 30% casualties as well as 1,500 artillery horses and nearly 400 mules. The reserve he had was sent in 'pursuit', but, except for the cavalry, this did not follow Lee's route but headed down the Monocasy River towards Frederick and an attempted interdiction at Hagerstown. The weather after Gettyburg was heavy downpour, which did not help.

The pursuit of Gen. Lee's rebel army by Edwin Forbes

This led to a series of engagements - the 10-day Battle of Williamsport 6-16th July 1863. The Potomac was flooding which destroyed the Confederate's pontoon bridge across the river at Hagerstown, seriously delaying Lee's withdrawal and on the 11th Lee's infantry had entrenched on the left bank (the Union side) to cover the available, but difficult crossing points - fords - at Williiamsport after a series of cavalry battles to secure the area. By 12th July the flooding had eased and a new pontoon bridge was being built . The infantry of the Army of the Potomac had caught up and began probing the positions but on the night of 13th, the Confederate army had withdrawn across the river. A rearguard of two brigades defended the fords across the Potomac and after several engagements with cavalry, withdrew to the South West.

This is not the actions of a routed enemy. It was a planned withdrawal by troops still in good order after a serious defeat. Meade has carried the blame for the failure to follow up, but he did follow up with what he had available. Many seem to think that Gettysburg was a serious defeat that routed, destroyed, Lee's army. It did not, obviously. Meade was NOT dealing with a defeated enemy but one that had lost a battle and was now withdrawing in good order. How many know about these battles?

I, being a foreigner, didn't have a clue about it until I researched it - but how many Americans know about it?

 

[SWS]

Best way to destroy a retreating army is to plant yourself across its communications. Taylor tried this at Monette's Ferry and Mansura, Hood tried it at Spring Hill, and Grant successfully accomplished it at Jetersville and Appomattox. Merely contending with a rearguard does not seem to suffice.

 

[NickSpencer]

Army of 100k inf requires around 17 miles of road space to be marching on roads, otherwise its cross country, the US typicaly had 4k wagons per 100k, and they require around 40 miles of road space.

Moving in sub division along multiple lines of advance mitigates the problem, as long as the road net goes where you want it to go.

Example AoP 80k strong took up 30 miles of road net on its maneuver towards G/Burg, from Hagerstone, its empty wagons coming back over the same roads to be filled from depots at Hagerstown 15 miles of road space. so AoP requires the road space of 45 miles per day to accommodate its maneuvering elements, the point is all 45 miles is full of maneuvering formations, the head being 45 miles from the rear and 100% of the road net is occupied. So the rear element take a good days force marching just to get to the front units start position, and forces someone, the wagons heading back, off the road in doing so.

On the 3rd lee chooses to retreat and send away his logistical tail, including wounded, guarded by Cav (Imboden/Hampton and 5 Bttys of art) over cashtown road, other cav went ahead to make sure the retreat was open, Chanbliss/Jenkins to Hagerstone. This was the start of the ANV retreat, not what you mistaking think, its 17 mile long column was to clear Cashtown no later than 5:30 in the afternoon of the 4th,and move all night to reach Greencastly by dawn, and move then to Williamsport. the only way to use the troad net by so many men and wagons meant having to march elements of it through the night. The Inf elements cover the retreat till its well ahead of them.

The principle reason Meade could not catch Lee was that the AoP to follow lee required more road net than existed, so could not both catch lee and be supplied if he caught him, he said so to Lincoln when he just sayed hey capture the whole lot for me your letting us all down.

ay, next limiting factors are the road net, the sheer number of wagons ( 9 per 1000 men) filled the roads leaving no road net for other users, even if there were enough wagons, which there was not, each wagon takes men from a fighting formation so the more wagons an army has the less men to fight it has.

Lee spent a lot of time cut of from a base of supply in PA, yet he came back with so much food the ANV was still eating it by next winter, in game you get the opposite, because its not modelling how armies lived of the land. Sherman arrived at the sea having lived of the land, he arrived with more supplies than he started ( as he had nearly twice the wagons he started out with and they were mostly full) out and fed the resupply fleet with fresh beef as it only had salted beef, the only things the fleet gave were coffee and medicine which he had not been able to take from land.


Example of supply from base

http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc...c=GetTRDoc.pdf

1500 tons a day arriving via RR at Westminster..
2.5 mph rate of Wagon movement.
4000 wagons at 2800lbs each.
1100 ambulances.
Westminster 25 miles to G-Burg.

4000*2800lbs=11200000lbs per day forward lift, 5000 tons.

2.5mph for 10 hours=25 miles, one day per trip from source to consumption point.
25 miles is 44000 yards, 132000 feet, at 30 feet a wagon/team is room for 4400 wagons each way, road net is 8800 with throughputs per day of 5100 wagons. Road net is 60% in use.


Westminster to Supply AoP at G-Burg
1500, 3,360,000 lbs tons in by rail.
Out by 2000 wagon, 4,560,000. 2000 empty arrive from army for next day. 2035 tons forward lift achieved.

Lee makes a stand on the 11th at Hagerstown, c35/40 miles by road via Waynsbor/Fairfield.

Base of supply Westminster, AoP Hagerstown, 40 miles away, Waynsboro is mid way.
G-Burg to Waynsboro 1000*2280=2,280,000, 1000 empty arrive from Waynsboro.
Waynsboro to Hagerstown 1000*2280=2,280,000, 1000 empty arrive from Hagerston.

Supplies reaching AoP each day, 1017 tons a day, at 3 lbs a man 76,000 can be supplied. AoP July 10th on hand strength 80,000.

4000 wagons used, Road net c75 miles, 132000 yards/10 yards a wagon, road net is under 5% used.

Frederick becomes the next base of supply at that point.

 

[FZ11]

Stunningly obvious retrospective insight (STORI): Meade had limited skills for his position as army commander, and he'd only been in the position, what, six days? He won the battle, which was a lot. Asking him to also capture Lee's army might be a bit much.

In that vein, I recently watched an hour-plus interview of Gary Gallagher. (Is Gary Gallagher our best living Civil War historian? He might be. Who is better?) In that interview Gallagher makes a couple interesting assertions:

1. the Confederacy did not have a better set of generals than the US
2. over time the Union identified 4 generals who would competently command armies: Grant, Sherman, Sheridan, and Thomas. (all 4 from the western theater!).
3. the Confederacy only found one general competent to command an army: Lee.

These statements occur at about one hour 35 minutes twenty seconds in an interview by Lex Fridman on YouTube titled "Gary Gallagher: American Civil War, slavery, Lincoln, Grant & Lee". I enjoyed and profited from every minute of the interview! Recommended.

So Meade was new in his position, and maybe outmatched by Gen. Lee. Meade did well to win the battle. Take what you can get, rather than risking it all. A lot was at stake!

Meade's orders prioritize interposing the AOP between Lee and D.C., so, in a way, Meade's behavior is reactive rather than proactive by order.

 

[NickSpencer]

Meade's orders prioritize interposing the AOP between Lee and D.C., so, in a way, Meade's behavior is reactive rather than proactive by order.

Not sure that is the correct way to read his instructions.

"You will not be hampered by any minute instructions from these headquarters. Your army is free to act as you may deem proper under the circumstances as they arise. You will, however, keep in view the important fact that the Army of the Potomac is the covering army of Washington, as well as the army of operation against the invading forces of the rebels. You will therefore manoeuvre and fight in such a manner as to cover the Capital and also Baltimore, as far as circumstances will admit. Should General Lee move upon either of these places, it is expected that you will either anticipate him or arrive with him, so as to give him battle."

 

[Rhea Cole]

There is no need to theorize about how the Army of the Potomac's pursuit of the Army of Northern Virginia could have come out.

A significant factor in both the retreat & advance to the Potomac crossing was the end of the Little Ice Age (+/-) 1300 - 1850.

Link

https://www.science.smith.edu/climatelit/the-effects-of-the-little-ice-age/

Nothing of that magnitude just ended. Like a bolder dropped into a pond, the echo waves of that massive climate change went on for decades as the atmosphere warmed back up to pre 1300 temperatures.

Encyclopedia Brittanica

The extremes of drought & rain events profoundly affected the Civil War. Bragg's 1862 Kentucky incursion occurred during a severe drought. His foragers found pastures nothing but brown stubble, corn that died knee high & all but major rivers reduced to dry washes. Instead of advancing toward Louisville, Kirby Smith was forced to disperse his regiments in Eastern Kentucky over hundreds of square miles seeking food & fodder.

In June - July 1863 began with drought conditions. In Tennessee it did not rain for 30 days. On June 23, Rosecrans ordered an advance over what soon became a 70 mile wide front. Robert E. Lee's army had crossed over into Pennsylvania on June 15th.

In Middle Tennessee as the cavalry mounted up & soldiers formed up on the 23rd it began to rain. The TVA rates the deluge that continued for a Biblical 40 days & 40 nights a 500 year rain event. The raging streams & axil deep mud slowed the
Army of the Cumberland's advance to a slogging crawl that allowed the Army of Tennessee to escape to safety across the Tennessee River.

As the Cumberlanders reached the summit of Monteagle Mountain on July 4th, a 15 mile long convoy consisting of every wagon & motive animal that Lee's army could lay hands on was filled with wounded men.

I am sure that most of you all have either read Killer Angles or seen the movie. After the defeat of Pickett's Charge Lee has an emotionally charged meeting with Pete Longstreet… that is fiction. In fact the account is from the account recited by General Imoden who commanded rag-tag partisan cavalry. Not considered an offensive unit, amongst other things Imboden had been tasked with guarding the dark skinned people who had been kidnapped & were being sent south into slavery.

Lee ordered Imboden to escort the 14 mile long convoy filled with men shrieking in agony into a pounding rain soaked night.

Link

A Sharpshooter’s Postscript to Gettysburg, Part 5: Imboden’s Train of Misery Transports the Confederate Wounded South - Emerging Civil War

Part five in a series. We welcome back guest author Robert M. Wilson. Of the varied and often extreme challenges faced by the Army of Northern Virginia in its retreat from Gettysburg, the ordeals suffered on the wagon caravan carrying wounded soldiers to Virginia stand alone. In the early...

emergingcivilwar.com

The same extreme storm front that was pounding the advancing Cumberlanders & retreating Army of Tennessee swept across the mountains into Potomac Valley. Not only did roads turn into rushing streams & bridges washed away, the Potomac River became a mini Colorado River impossible to cross. 40 miles from Gettysburg, the Army of Northern Virginia was trapped.

Anybody who has driven I-24 north or south over Monteagel Mountian in a thunderstorm will admit to being alarmed & if honest, terrified. The Army of the Cumberland was not physically capable of maintaining contact & prevent Bragg from crossing the Tennessee River. The 2,000 foot pontoon bridges that the Pioneer Brigade bridged the Tennessee would have to wait.

A map study makes it obvious that Lee's army was backed up onto an uncrossable river. No ammunition or supplies could be transferred to the northern bank of the river. Much of the ammunition in the army's ammunition pouches was little more than a stinking black sludge. As few as 4 out of 10 Confederate muskets could fire in Tennessee as well.

Army of the Potomac cavalry was armed with breechloading carbines & Spencer Repeating Rifles loaded with internally fuzed cartridges not affected by the soaking rain. Mitney's Brigade routed Wheeler's cavalry at Shelbyville inflicting one of the most lopsided defeats of the war. Waterlogged troopers' weapons could not fire & faced with Mitney's brigade earning their "Saber Brigade" title, Wheeler's troopers… "…fled in every direction."

The question we are asked to answer is why didn't the Army of the Potomac cavalry armed with breechloading carbines & Spencers scatter Stuart's troopers running for their lives in Pennsylvania?

I know plenty of people who have ridden bicycles from the Potomac crossing to Gettysburg in a day. No massive mountain & rugged hill country stood between Meade & Lee.

Facing the same Biblical floods, the Army of the Cumberland drove the Army of Tennessee out of the state in an existential strategic victory that open the Deep South to invasion. In Pennsylvania, the army of the Potomac was the same distance as Murfreesboro to Tullahoma on this map, 35 miles. Murfreesboro to Swanee atop Monteagle mountain is 65 modern miles. Given the state of the roads & washed out bridges (+/-) 80 miles is a fair estimate.

The question needs to be reformulated:

Beset by the same extreme rain event, without the challenging terrain, why couldn't the Army of the Potomac advance as the Army of the Cumberland did? Without mountainous impediments why wasn't there an overwhelming attack known as the Battle of Falling Waters celebrated down to this day?
Not long ago I would have answered this question by deferring to Erick Wittenberg. I was privileged to be educated by him on Gettysburg matters a number of occasions. His Tullahoma Campaign book coauthored with David Powell would have given him a unique body of knowledge to draw on.

Wittenberg can't answer the question, however, our Virginia-centric friends who are not aware of the Tullahoma Campaign will want to read Tullahoma, The Forgotten Campaign that Changed the Civil War, June 23 - July 4, 1863.

Link

Tullahoma: The Forgotten Campaign that Changed the Civil War, June 23 - July 4, 1863(pb)

A leader in military and general history book publishing.

www.savasbeatie.com

 

[Josh The Lighthouse Guy]

Best way to destroy a retreating army is to plant yourself across its communications. Taylor tried this at Monette's Ferry and Mansura, Hood tried it at Spring Hill, and Grant successfully accomplished it at Jetersville and Appomattox. Merely contending with a rearguard does not seem to suffice.

Other than cavalry, there were no forces capable of intercepting Lee's line of retreat. Buford was driven off by Imboden and armed teamsters.

French's division (under Meade's control) and some of the Washington garrison (not under Meade's control) might have been sent via the B&O Railroad as far as possible, then marched the rest of the way, with the intention of delaying Lee.

However, such an operation required foresight and risk-taking that Halleck lacked. The rail traffic was probably needed for shifting Meade's logistics anyway.

The presence of Lee's unguarded pontoon bridge was, I think, only known to Union generals on July 3. After it's destruction there was also no guarantee Lee would still attempt to cross the Potomac at the same location, though it was probable.

I also don't think it was apparent on July 1-3 that the Potomac would flood so severely. IIRC, the rain fell primarily on the evening of July 3 and continued through July 4, at least in the area of operations. The Potomac River is certainly prone to floods, but I think it mostly happens from snowmelt and the remnants of tropical system, not in the midst of otherwise hot, dry summers. There was nothing like the national weather service at the time to forecast such things.

Not sure that is the correct way to read his instructions.

I agree Meade had more leeway in his orders than he probably thought he did. But he was a conservative engineer unexpectedly thrust into command and interpreted them cautiously.