McClellan What Would McClellan Have Done?

[DanSBHawk]

Since I gave you the opportunity for you to highlight any case of misrepresentation, and you have declined to highlight it, I therefore conclude that I have not misrepresented your position.

I'm going to give you a second chance, however, because...



...when someone like McClellan, or Magruder, or Lee, is evaluating what will happen if they make a yes/no decision, they are considering two possibilities - what happens if they choose yes, and what happens if they choose no. At least one of those possibilities is always imaginary, because only one of them - at most - can ever happen.

So I'll say it once more - and this time, unless you specifically highlight where I have gone wrong, I'll assume I have correctly represented your opinion here.

In your opinion:

IF McClellan had broken through on the 7th of April,
THEN
INSTEAD of holding Yorktown (earning up to four weeks of extra time, for a cost of no more than 3,000 men)
Lee would have
NOT held Yorktown (costing up to four weeks of extra time, instead)
And would have EVACUATED (saving the men).

Is that correct?

Get over yourself. I'm not going to play your game.

 

[Saphroneth]

Get over yourself. I'm not going to play your game.

Most of the point of this is to make sure I don't misinterpret your views. I want to be certain that I am correctly interpreting the things you have said.

 

[DanSBHawk]

Most of the point of this is to make sure I don't misinterpret your views. I want to be certain that I am correctly interpreting the things you have said.

I've made my view very clear. There is no evidence that Lee wanted to sacrifice 3000 men in a doomed effort to hold Yorktown.

 

[Saphroneth]

I've made my view very clear. There is no evidence that Lee wanted to sacrifice 3000 men in a doomed effort to hold Yorktown.

Very good.


So, as far as Lee is concerned, the loss of 3,000 men is not worth a delay of up to four weeks. That's certainly a position you can reasonably hold.

Little follow-up question - how many casualties would an acceleration in the historical timeline of up to four weeks be worth the Union?

 

[DanSBHawk]

So, as far as Lee is concerned, the loss of 3,000 men is not worth a delay of up to four weeks. That's certainly a position you can reasonably hold.

Little follow-up question - how many casualties would an acceleration in the historical timeline of up to four weeks be worth the Union?

Again, I don't care about your hypotheticals. Why is this so hard to understand? I'm not interested in treating history like it's on a game board.

 

[Saphroneth]

Again, I don't care about your hypotheticals. Why is this so hard to understand? I'm not interested in treating history like it's on a game board.

You were quite willing to discuss the possibility of hypotheticals only a few days ago?

If McClellan gets above Yorktown on the land side, and the navy gets above Yorktown on the river, then that is exactly what Lee was warning about happening. Any confederate troops still on the peninsula get cut off from retreating.

 

[DanSBHawk]

You were quite willing to discuss the possibility of hypotheticals only a few days ago?

That was Lee's hypothetical. He was warning and instructing Magruder.

 

[Saphroneth]

That was Lee's hypothetical. He was warning and instructing Magruder.

...okay? But you were willing to discuss it, nonetheless. And Lee was making decisions and giving orders based on hypotheticals...

 

[DanSBHawk]

...okay? But you were willing to discuss it, nonetheless. And Lee was making decisions and giving orders based on hypotheticals...

Yes. Because he is a historical figure. And the historical sources are something we look at and interpret.

Modern-day persons imagining alternate history scenarios is not the same thing.

 

[67th Tigers]

Not in the OR, but in the records of the Army of the Peninsula:

(Transcribed by me, no recipient given, but almost certainly Col. Winston at Wynn's Mill)

Head qrs, Dept Peninsula
Lee's Farm, Apr 5 1862

Sir,

I am instructed by the comd'g genl to say that in the event that you are forced to retreat, you will send the nearest Ala Regt to Yorktown to report to Gen Rains to form a part of the garrison if your communications are not interrupted with that place.

I am sir &c.
Henry Bryan
AAG

 

[OpnCoronet]

In the Seven Days, Lee had 2,150 companies (including artillery batteries) in his army, and McClellan had 1,750 by the same measure. You seem to think that this means that Lee is the one who's outnumbered?

Your measurements are most likely incorrect, in so far as their accuracy is concerned, i.e., other measurements yield different results and who is to say which are more accurate than another?

As indicated by your posts, the numbers seem entirely subjective. I prefer the proof of action over words or numbers. Johnston and Lee both were determined to abandon Yorktown as soon as McClellan could nerve himself up o make a solid effort to take it. With as many guns as you estimate Magruder had, he would have to plan ahead enough time to get all of those guns out of Yorktown safely assuming, of course, he had as many as you seem o imagine.

 

[Saphroneth]

Your measurements are most likely incorrect, in so far as their accuracy is concerned, i.e., other measurements yield different results and who is to say which are more accurate than another?

There's a reason I stuck with companies, which is that they're much easier to actually check and verify than raw numbers and the measurement is the same on both sides. Note that Harsh has given numbers indicating a Union inferiority in the Seven Days (both numerically and in terms of total regimental or company organizations), and of course on top of that there's that Lee's army in July has more officers in it than McClellan does and Lee is complaining of not having enough officers. So in July Lee has a bigger army than McClellan did, and that's after Jackson has left again.


If you'd like, we can actually go to the trouble of demonstrating it (i.e. that Lee had more companies than McClellan did)...

As indicated by your posts, the numbers seem entirely subjective. I prefer the proof of action over words or numbers.

...but it seems like you don't actually care about them anyway.

You said before that if the numbers around Richmond were close to equal then Johnston would have attacked. He did - at Seven Pines - and then Lee attacked in the Seven Days.

What's the "proof of action" that McClellan's army was significantly larger than that of Johnston or Lee near Richmond?

As indicated by your posts, the numbers seem entirely subjective. I prefer the proof of action over words or numbers. Johnston and Lee both were determined to abandon Yorktown as soon as McClellan could nerve himself up o make a solid effort to take it. With as many guns as you estimate Magruder had, he would have to plan ahead enough time to get all of those guns out of Yorktown safely assuming, of course, he had as many as you seem o imagine.

You seem to assume that all the guns at Yorktown were removed ahead of time historically? In fact Barnard reports that the Federals captured 56 guns in Yorktown proper and the outworks, and there were emplacements for another 31 field guns and 7 naval. That's on top of the Confederate reports about the number of field guns in the rest of the Warwick line.

Of course, what's going on here is that you are assuming that McClellan must have been able to roll over Yorktown at any time. In fact, Yorktown is a strong position that can cause an attacker large casualties, but is a viable target to properly conducted siege work because the enemy can set up superior siege batteries and blast through it.

If the Warwick line had been vulnerable to a "solid effort to take it" on the 5th April, it would have been taken, because McClellan ordered both his columns to attack. Alternatively, of course, you could argue that both McClellan's column commanders failed to prosecute his aggressive orders...

 

[OpnCoronet]

There's a reason I stuck with companies, which is that they're much easier to actually check and verify than raw numbers and the measurement is the same on both sides. Note that Harsh has given numbers indicating a Union inferiority in the Seven Days (both numerically and in terms of total regimental or company organizations), and of course on top of that there's that Lee's army in July has more officers in it than McClellan does and Lee is complaining of not having enough officers. So in July Lee has a bigger army than McClellan did, and that's after Jackson has left again.


If you'd like, we can actually go to the trouble of demonstrating it (i.e. that Lee had more companies than McClellan did)...


...but it seems like you don't actually care about them anyway.

You said before that if the numbers around Richmond were close to equal then Johnston would have attacked. He did - at Seven Pines - and then Lee attacked in the Seven Days.

What's the "proof of action" that McClellan's army was significantly larger than that of Johnston or Lee near Richmond?




You seem to assume that all the guns at Yorktown were removed ahead of time historically? In fact Barnard reports that the Federals captured 56 guns in Yorktown proper and the outworks, and there were emplacements for another 31 field guns and 7 naval. That's on top of the Confederate reports about the number of field guns in the rest of the Warwick line.

Of course, what's going on here is that you are assuming that McClellan must have been able to roll over Yorktown at any time. In fact, Yorktown is a strong position that can cause an attacker large casualties, but is a viable target to properly conducted siege work because the enemy can set up superior siege batteries and blast through it.

If the Warwick line had been vulnerable to a "solid effort to take it" on the 5th April, it would have been taken, because McClellan ordered both his columns to attack. Alternatively, of course, you could argue that both McClellan's column commanders failed to prosecute his aggressive orders...

I am commenting on the fact that McClellan failed to even attempt to ascertain if the Warwick Line was in actual fact, impregnable, as little mac seems to have assumed based upon what he saw and I believe the time lost at Yorktown was never recovered and that lost time was just enough for Davis and Lee to assemble the largest army that Lee would ever command in the field, to defeat McClellan.

I think Barnard's after action report on McClellan's mistakes during his Peninsular Campaign is a clear indication of the accuracy of Longstreet's concise estimation of McClellan's Generalship.

 

[67th Tigers]

Johnston and Lee both were determined to abandon Yorktown as soon as McClellan could nerve himself up o make a solid effort to take it.

The issue at hand is the role of the Navy and the siege artillery. Magruder, Johnston & Lee all prettymuch agreed that Yorktown could be held against a simple assault. What worried them was McClellan's siege artillery and the possibility of the Navy bringing ironclads up the York. What they hoped for was that McClellan would mount an assault without breaching, because that would give them the chance to break the attackers and counterattack. However, by late April, any failed attack would have the Federals fall back to their works, thus rendering any counterattack impossible. There was no longer any hope of a victory. With the advanced state of McClellan's works, and the naval bombardment of 1st May, the gig was up. Johnston informed Lee he was going to pull back. The actual message has not been preserved for posterity.

Everyone was agreed to hold Yorktown as long as possible. Given the siege artillery, it was no longer deemed possible. Their one hope was a Federal assault, followed by a vigorous counterattack. This was no longer a possibility.

 

[Saphroneth]

I am commenting on the fact that McClellan failed to even attempt to ascertain if the Warwick Line was in actual fact, impregnable, as little mac seems to have assumed based upon what he saw

What?

It's not like every other commander in history ever launched a massive assault on every defensive position they ran into, just to prove beyond all doubt that the position was actually impregnable.

Instead, what happened was that the commanders gathered the available information by having their engineers (the people with qualifications and training in assessing defensive positions) look at it, and then if there seemed to be a benefit from attacking the position - well, then an attack might happen.

But the first step is to look at it and see if it looks remotely possible to attack.


That's not so much "assumption" as an assessment. Yorktown proper, for example, is a bastion fort with a continuous enciente and a twenty foot climb to get into it; the twenty foot climb is also a factor of the Red and White Redoubts and the curtain wall between them. These are the kinds of positions which were historically (in terms of fortress attack and defence) impregnable to an assault that did not in some way benefit from some significant other advantage, usually that the defensive wall had been broken down by artillery, and even when assaulted they usually took a heavy toll on the attackers.


The rest of the line requires crossing a river that has been artificially deepened so that it is not a militarily practical ford.


You don't need to actually take dozens or hundreds of casualties at every single point along the line to ascertain that any assault will be very difficult, costly, and unlikely to work. You can determine this based on an engineering survey - and the engineers, indeed, did a survey.

 

[OpnCoronet]

The issue at hand is the role of the Navy and the siege artillery. Magruder, Johnston & Lee all prettymuch agreed that Yorktown could be held against a simple assault. What worried them was McClellan's siege artillery and the possibility of the Navy bringing ironclads up the York. What they hoped for was that McClellan would mount an assault without breaching, because that would give them the chance to break the attackers and counterattack. However, by late April, any failed attack would have the Federals fall back to their works, thus rendering any counterattack impossible. There was no longer any hope of a victory. With the advanced state of McClellan's works, and the naval bombardment of 1st May, the gig was up. Johnston informed Lee he was going to pull back. The actual message has not been preserved for posterity.

Everyone was agreed to hold Yorktown as long as possible. Given the siege artillery, it was no longer deemed possible. Their one hope was a Federal assault, followed by a vigorous counterattack. This was no longer a possibility.

To me it seems Magruder was the only one who thought Yorktown could, or even should, be held.

The question at hand is not knowing whether McClellan would need Naval support, at all, in taking Yorktown.

 

[Saphroneth]

To me it seems Magruder was the only one who thought Yorktown could, or even should, be held.

But Yorktown has no easy way to take it (short of naval bombardment or siege artillery, and the latter takes time) and it is what causes most of the delay. The rest of the Warwick line is kind of a bonus - the delay that is caused by the Warwick line is caused by the fact the York is closed by the guns at Yorktown.

For the Confederates to give this up if it can be held onto (even for a week or two) is giving McClellan that very time that you say it was such a great failing for him to not get. If it's a failing for McClellan to not take that time, how much worse is it for the Confederates to take an action which makes things so much easier for McClellan?

 

[67th Tigers]

I am commenting on the fact that McClellan failed to even attempt to ascertain if the Warwick Line was in actual fact, impregnable, as little mac seems to have assumed based upon what he saw and I believe the time lost at Yorktown was never recovered and that lost time was just enough for Davis and Lee to assemble the largest army that Lee would ever command in the field, to defeat McClellan.

I think Barnard's after action report on McClellan's mistakes during his Peninsular Campaign is a clear indication of the accuracy of Longstreet's concise estimation of McClellan's Generalship.

I don't think you've really read Barnard's AAR of 6th May in which he deemed an assault "too hazardous," but rather his later works in which he, as Hunt put it, "cut up his own words." Barnard, at the time, was quite forward in his belief that no assault was possible, staing that even if a "murderous assault" was actually successful, it would not have achieved much. On 11th May he wrote that the idea of "an assault was mere hare-brained folly."

Later, Barnard fell in with an anti-McClellan crowd in Washington, after McClellan got rid of him. Then he changed his tune a bit, but always talked around the issue.

Barnard didn't need thousands of corpses to see the obvious - the Yorktown position could not be assaulted with any reasonable chance of success.

 

[OpnCoronet]

What?

It's not like every other commander in history ever launched a massive assault on every defensive position they ran into, just to prove beyond all doubt that the position was actually impregnable.

Instead, what happened was that the commanders gathered the available information by having their engineers (the people with qualifications and training in assessing defensive positions) look at it, and then if there seemed to be a benefit from attacking the position - well, then an attack might happen.

But the first step is to look at it and see if it looks remotely possible to attack.


That's not so much "assumption" as an assessment. Yorktown proper, for example, is a bastion fort with a continuous enciente and a twenty foot climb to get into it; the twenty foot climb is also a factor of the Red and White Redoubts and the curtain wall between them. These are the kinds of positions which were historically (in terms of fortress attack and defence) impregnable to an assault that did not in some way benefit from some significant other advantage, usually that the defensive wall had been broken down by artillery, and even when assaulted they usually took a heavy toll on the attackers.


The rest of the line requires crossing a river that has been artificially deepened so that it is not a militarily practical ford.


You don't need to actually take dozens or hundreds of casualties at every single point along the line to ascertain that any assault will be very difficult, costly, and unlikely to work. You can determine this based on an engineering survey - and the engineers, indeed, did a survey.

I agree that a siege should generally be the last resort after all other avenues have been explored. Did little Mac really explore other options?

I myself, put more weight in McClellan's Engineers and Johnston's experienced eyes as to where a b reach in the Warwick Line might be accomplished.

 

[Saphroneth]

I agree that a siege should generally be the last resort after all other avenues have been explored. Did little Mac really explore other options?

He explored them, and in some cases rejected them as unproductive or impractical. What option do you think he failed to explore?

I myself, put more weight in McClellan's Engineers and Johnston's experienced eyes as to where a b reach in the Warwick Line might be accomplished.

Okay, so where is that?