Hill at Antietam

[Okie]

Would Hill have been able to support Lee in a much better capacity had he bypassed Harper's Ferry altogether?

 

[rbasin]

And not capture Harper's Ferry? He likely would have been in the field faster. Might have stopped Burnside from crossing at all if he was assigned there for example.

 

[Kathy the history sleuth]

It's too bad Lee didn't have other resources to leave at Harper's Ferry. Perhaps he underestimated the resources that were needed at Antietam.

 

[Okie]

And not capture Harper's Ferry? He likely would have been in the field faster. Might have stopped Burnside from crossing at all if he was assigned there for example.

Thank you for your reply.

 

[Okie]

It's too bad Lee didn't have other resources to leave at Harper's Ferry. Perhaps he underestimated the resources that were needed at Antietam.

Thank you for your reply.

 

[rbasin]

One point is how the Harper's Ferry garrison could interrupt Lee's supplies

 

[Saphroneth]

Would Hill have been able to support Lee in a much better capacity had he bypassed Harper's Ferry altogether?

I don't think this is feasible or makes sense. This is because of the positions of the armies before Harpers Ferry fell.

In the first place, AP Hill was only part of Jackson's corps, but the positions were:

This is roughly how it looked when Harpers Ferry surrendered. If Harpers doesn't surrender then McLaws and Anderson probably lose most of their manpower and certainly all of their guns (as they'd need any escapees to evade over the Maryland Heights).




Now, there is no reason in principle why AP Hill could not have arrived sooner - he could have been part of Jackson's column (marched 15th), or marched with McLaws and Anderson (leaving on the 16th), and either way reached Sharpsburg before the fighting on the 17th. But there is a real risk involved because as of the night of the 16th AP Hill and Franklin are facing off over the Harpers Ferry fords.
If AP Hill marches for Sharpsburg earlier, it leaves the ford with at most one single brigade (Thomas's, historically) to protect it. There is nothing that would stop Franklin from attacking over the ford with his corps and then putting a division or two south of the Potomac blocking off the Shepherdstown Fords. This would trap Lee far more effectively than the planned movement by Burnside's 9th on the battlefield itself.

 

[jackt62]

Wasn't the reason for Hill's delay in marching from Harpers Ferry to Sharpsburg because Jackson ordered him to parole the Union garrison and collect captured stores? Could this have been expedited somehow had the dire situation facing the army at Sharpsburg been been better understood and communicated earlier?

 

[ErnieMac]

Wasn't the reason for Hill's delay in marching from Harpers Ferry to Sharpsburg because Jackson ordered him to parole the Union garrison and collect captured stores? Could this have been expedited somehow had the dire situation facing the army at Sharpsburg been been better understood and communicated earlier?

You are correct about Hill's delay. Jackson noted in his campaign report "Leaving General Hill to receive the surrender of the Federal troops and take the requisite steps for securing the captured stores, I moved, in obedience to orders from the commanding general, to rejoin him in Maryland with the remaining divisions of my command. By a severe night's march we reached the vicinity of Sharpsburg on the morning of the 16th."

A. P. Hill wrote "By direction of General Jackson, I remained at Harper's Ferry until the morning of the 17th, when, at 6.30 a.m., I received an order from General Lee to move to Sharpsburg. Leaving Thomas, with his brigade, to complete the removal of the captured property, my division was put in motion at 7.30 a.m." So far as I know Hill had not received any updates concerning events at Sharpsburg. Hill had no reason known to him and no discretion to leave Harper's Ferry before the morning of Sept. 17.

 

[Lt R. Blackwell 4th Texas]

Wasn't the reason for Hill's delay in marching from Harpers Ferry to Sharpsburg because Jackson ordered him to parole the Union garrison and collect captured stores? Could this have been expedited somehow had the dire situation facing the army at Sharpsburg been been better understood and communicated earlier?

I don't think this is feasible or makes sense. This is because of the positions of the armies before Harpers Ferry fell.

In the first place, AP Hill was only part of Jackson's corps, but the positions were:

View attachment 421871


This is roughly how it looked when Harpers Ferry surrendered. If Harpers doesn't surrender then McLaws and Anderson probably lose most of their manpower and certainly all of their guns (as they'd need any escapees to evade over the Maryland Heights).




Now, there is no reason in principle why AP Hill could not have arrived sooner - he could have been part of Jackson's column (marched 15th), or marched with McLaws and Anderson (leaving on the 16th), and either way reached Sharpsburg before the fighting on the 17th. But there is a real risk involved because as of the night of the 16th AP Hill and Franklin are facing off over the Harpers Ferry fords.
If AP Hill marches for Sharpsburg earlier, it leaves the ford with at most one single brigade (Thomas's, historically) to protect it. There is nothing that would stop Franklin from attacking over the ford with his corps and then putting a division or two south of the Potomac blocking off the Shepherdstown Fords. This would trap Lee far more effectively than the planned movement by Burnside's 9th on the battlefield itself.

Great analysis, as always.

 

[MHB1862]

I don't think this is feasible or makes sense. This is because of the positions of the armies before Harpers Ferry fell.

In the first place, AP Hill was only part of Jackson's corps, but the positions were:

View attachment 421871


This is roughly how it looked when Harpers Ferry surrendered. If Harpers doesn't surrender then McLaws and Anderson probably lose most of their manpower and certainly all of their guns (as they'd need any escapees to evade over the Maryland Heights).




Now, there is no reason in principle why AP Hill could not have arrived sooner - he could have been part of Jackson's column (marched 15th), or marched with McLaws and Anderson (leaving on the 16th), and either way reached Sharpsburg before the fighting on the 17th. But there is a real risk involved because as of the night of the 16th AP Hill and Franklin are facing off over the Harpers Ferry fords.
If AP Hill marches for Sharpsburg earlier, it leaves the ford with at most one single brigade (Thomas's, historically) to protect it. There is nothing that would stop Franklin from attacking over the ford with his corps and then putting a division or two south of the Potomac blocking off the Shepherdstown Fords. This would trap Lee far more effectively than the planned movement by Burnside's 9th on the battlefield itself.

It is likely that Franklin would have stopped Franklin from attacking over the Ford.

 

[Saphroneth]

It is likely that Franklin would have stopped Franklin from attacking over the Ford.

Really? Franklin attacked McLaws at Cramptons Gap, and McLaws had up to a quarter of Lee's entire army available in potentia to defend the gap (which Franklin couldn't see because it was on the far side of the hill); we're discussing the willingness of Franklin (with the same strength he had at Cramptons once closed up, at which point he did indeed attack) to attack a single brigade that he can see.

 

[Intrafinesse]

I don't think this is feasible or makes sense. This is because of the positions of the armies before Harpers Ferry fell.

In the first place, AP Hill was only part of Jackson's corps, but the positions were:

View attachment 421871


This is roughly how it looked when Harpers Ferry surrendered. If Harpers doesn't surrender then McLaws and Anderson probably lose most of their manpower and certainly all of their guns (as they'd need any escapees to evade over the Maryland Heights).




Now, there is no reason in principle why AP Hill could not have arrived sooner - he could have been part of Jackson's column (marched 15th), or marched with McLaws and Anderson (leaving on the 16th), and either way reached Sharpsburg before the fighting on the 17th. But there is a real risk involved because as of the night of the 16th AP Hill and Franklin are facing off over the Harpers Ferry fords.
If AP Hill marches for Sharpsburg earlier, it leaves the ford with at most one single brigade (Thomas's, historically) to protect it. There is nothing that would stop Franklin from attacking over the ford with his corps and then putting a division or two south of the Potomac blocking off the Shepherdstown Fords. This would trap Lee far more effectively than the planned movement by Burnside's 9th on the battlefield itself.

Reopening a 5 year old post.

If the Harpers Ferry garrison was better lead and had fortified Maryland Heights, would McLaws and Anderson really have been at risk of being trapped by Franklin? I had never realized that.
Was Franklin really THAT close?

That would have been a major turn of events.
I assume Lee withdraws across the Potomac, if not caught at Sharpsburg.

Your map illustrates this nicely!



I wonder how many battles had these tipping points that could have had outsized influence.


I'm new here, gradually reading through all the folders, finding all kinds of buried treasure!

 

[Saphroneth]

If the Harpers Ferry garrison was better lead and had fortified Maryland Heights, would McLaws and Anderson really have been at risk of being trapped by Franklin? I had never realized that.
Was Franklin really THAT close?

They would be, yes - indeed, if they'd held out as long as the commander told McClellan "I can't necessarily hold out past midday of the 15th", then McLaws and Anderson would have been at risk! Franklin was advancing down Pleasant Valley on the morning of the 15th when Harpers Ferry surrendered.

It's not far from Cramptons Gap to Harpers Ferry - about 8-9 miles (about 7 to Sandy Hook), which is a day's movement for wagons (typically 10 miles per day) but only a morning's movement for marching infantry, which typically moves at ~2 miles per hour. Franklin started pretty early AIUI and so would have been reaching Sandy Hook well before noon.

 

[Saphroneth]

I assume Lee withdraws across the Potomac, if not caught at Sharpsburg.

I point I should make - Lee seems to have stood at Sharpsburg not because he was caught but because he intended to fight or continue north. At most he was covering the escape of his wagons (and in that case he might have stood at Sharpsburg even if McLaws and Anderson had been got) but he might also have withdrawn across the river on the night of the 16th and sacrificed whatever wagons remained.

But yes, if McLaws and Anderson get got in Pleasant Valley then Lee probably has to cut his losses, that's a quarter of his army and probably represents 15,000-20,000 men lost - it very much makes the campaign a Confederate disaster. Of course if the Union controls the Harpers Ferry crossing then McClellan might well follow Lee straight into the Shenandoah!

I wonder how many battles had these tipping points that could have had outsized influence.

Campaigns are not just battles, the operational dimension really needs to be focused on heavily. The sequence prior to Chickamauga for example sees plenty of lost operational opportunities for the Confederates, but really some manoeuvre campaigns have lots of them; others like the Overland are a bit more elementally simple.

 

[Saphroneth]

There's a framing discussed in Too Useful to Sacrifice which is that Antietam is in a sense the sequel to South Mountain, rather than South Mountain being the prequel to Antietam. South Mountain is the battle which is key to the outcome of the campaign; Antietam for the Union is win-more and for the Confederates is what puts paid to any idea they could march north into Pennsylvania.

 

[BuckPvt]

Reopening a 5 year old post.

If the Harpers Ferry garrison was better lead and had fortified Maryland Heights, would McLaws and Anderson really have been at risk of being trapped by Franklin? I had never realized that.
Was Franklin really THAT close?

That would have been a major turn of events.
I assume Lee withdraws across the Potomac, if not caught at Sharpsburg.

Your map illustrates this nicely!



I wonder how many battles had these tipping points that could have had outsized influence.


I'm new here, gradually reading through all the folders, finding all kinds of buried treasure!

Fortifying Maryland Heights in 1862 wouldn't have been as straight forward as some have suggested. One of the biggest issues was that there wasn't an adequate water source. The few Union soldiers who were up on the heights had to send men all the way down the mountain with canteens. Putting 10,000 men up there would have created a whole new mess of challenges.

Conversely, it also wouldn't have been easy for Franklin to cause serious harm to McLaws. The Confederate troops had a surprising amount of trouble driving the sparse and relatively inexperienced Union troops off, and the Union collapse may have been the result of an incorrect order to fall back being given, rather than actually being pushed out. Franklin would have had to make that same attack against a tougher more experienced opponent who had much greater numbers than the confederates had faced.

 

[gary]

I wouldn't complain about his timing. He cleared his rear by capturing Harper's Ferry and arrived just in time to slam into Burnside's flank and roll it up. Not bad at all.

 

[Saphroneth]

Fortifying Maryland Heights in 1862 wouldn't have been as straight forward as some have suggested. One of the biggest issues was that there wasn't an adequate water source. The few Union soldiers who were up on the heights had to send men all the way down the mountain with canteens. Putting 10,000 men up there would have created a whole new mess of challenges.

Conversely, it also wouldn't have been easy for Franklin to cause serious harm to McLaws. The Confederate troops had a surprising amount of trouble driving the sparse and relatively inexperienced Union troops off, and the Union collapse may have been the result of an incorrect order to fall back being given, rather than actually being pushed out. Franklin would have had to make that same attack against a tougher more experienced opponent who had much greater numbers than the confederates had faced.

In all honesty, the water source issue sounds like one of those things that would be a solvable problem with a bit of preparation; it's not much different in basic dynamics from having a fortified position a couple of miles from the nearest stream (or, for that matter, being besieged sufficient to shut your forces inside the walls without a well actually within the enceinte).

Then surely if the Union troops are on Maryland Heights, McLaws isn't...

I wouldn't complain about his timing. He cleared his rear by capturing Harper's Ferry and arrived just in time to slam into Burnside's flank and roll it up. Not bad at all.

My understanding is that his forces hit Burnside's advancing force in front, not in flank.

 

[Intrafinesse]

In all honesty, the water source issue sounds like one of those things that would be a solvable problem with a bit of preparation; it's not much different in basic dynamics from having a fortified position a couple of miles from the nearest stream (or, for that matter, being besieged sufficient to shut your forces inside the walls without a well actually within the enceinte).

Then surely if the Union troops are on Maryland Heights, McLaws isn't...



My understanding is that his forces hit Burnside's advancing force in front, not in flank.

I'm not an expert, but I thought AP Hill hit Burnsides flank

Or is it that they are hitting the front of his left most division?

Tour Stop 9 - The Final Attack - Antietam National Battlefield (U.S. National Park Service)

Tour Stop 9 - The Final Attack

www.nps.gov

Antietam: AotW Battle Map 13

antietam.aotw.org

Antietam National Battlefield | FINAL ATTACK

The ninth stop on the Antietam National Battlefield Tour is called the Final Attack. This is where the final fighting of the Battle of Antietam took place.

npplan.com