Pickett's Charge, failed because?

[Andy Cardinal]

Interesting how views change. It wasn't that long ago on this board that the majority consensus was that Lee did not have that option due to poor road structure not suitable to handle an army.

I thought the poor roads ruled out Longstreet's plan to maneveur to the right. But Lee could have fallen back to the mountains. Some people argue this is where Lee wanted to concentrate his army in the first place, although I do not buy that argument.

 

[dlavin]

Retreat to the high ground at South Mountain just W of Cashtown and wait for the Union to attack.

Lee, retreat after day 2? Given the events of day one and two, was that in anyone in the Confederate command's mindset, other than maybe Longstreet? Wouldn't that be logistically difficult given the length to which his army was spread out?

 

[Andy Cardinal]

Lee, retreat after day 2? Given the events of day one and two, was that in anyone in the Confederate command's mindset, other than maybe Longstreet? Wouldn't that be logistically difficult given the length to which his army was spread out?

While I agree with what you say, if Lee knew his July 3rd attack was doomed this was probably his best option. Obviously he didn't think it was doomed.

 

[War Horse]

I thought the poor roads ruled out Longstreet's plan to maneveur to the right. But Lee could have fallen back to the mountains. Some people argue this is where Lee wanted to concentrate his army in the first place, although I do not buy that argument.

It was definitely used to argue Longstreet's move. It's also been argued for a confederate retreat. Regardless it would have been interesting. A Confederate retreat with a very healthy Union army in persuit.

 

[dlavin]

While I agree with what you say, if Lee knew his July 3rd attack was doomed this was probably his best option. Obviously he didn't think it was doomed.

I agree with you that if Lee knew in advance his attack would fail, then retreat would be in the cards. But after days one and two results, not sure a retreat would even be considered a realistic thought among the Confederate high command. Who here would have suggested a "change of base" after the two days of fighting at Gettysburg?

Maybe had Lee compared the results of how many troops he had to send day two and the results they gained against the fact that he only had one fresh division and pieces of two others would not be enough to gain the big win he was looking for.

 

[dlofting]

His supply train was up the road in Chambersburg. Perfect location.

Yes, just thinking about a long supply line through the Shenandoah Valley. With Stuart back he had the cavalry to protect it, but it was longer and less secure than he was used to.

 

[Andy Cardinal]

Who here would have suggested a "change of base" after the two days of fighting at Gettysburg?

.

McClellan, lol

 

[Andy Cardinal]

I agree with you that if Lee knew in advance his attack would fail, then retreat would be in the cards. But after days one and two results, not sure a retreat would even be considered a realistic thought among the Confederate high command. Who here would have suggested a "change of base" after the two days of fighting at Gettysburg?

Maybe had Lee compared the results of how many troops he had to send day two and the results they gained against the fact that he only had one fresh division and pieces of two others would not be enough to gain the big win he was looking for.

I agree with your reasoning.... But Lee was too good to have made that attack without believing it had a good chance to succeed. I believe he thought it would succeed. That being said, I've never been satisfied with anything I've read about Lee's plan for July 3. I'm with Longstreet's statement that no 15,000 men ever took that position. So there had to be more to the plan. What was it?

 

[dlavin]

I agree lee had to think it would succeed.

Maybe I'm wrong here, but didn't Lee want Ewell to attack at the same time or just before Longstreet? But what happened was Ewell attacked early in the morning and had failed leaving "Pickett's" charge on its own. I guess the logic there would have been to keep the Union troops on the flanks.

Even with success reserves were so far away to exploit and sustain any success Lee may have had. The Union simply wasn't going to flee the field.

 

[Andy Cardinal]

I think Lee did originally intend Ewell to attack in conjunction with Pickett. However, the fighting on Culp's Hill ended well before the cannonade began, so Lee would have known there was no help coming from Ewell's direction. Since he expected Pickett & Pettigrew to proceed, I assume he expected the attack to succeed without any help from Ewell.

 

[Andy Cardinal]

I just downloaded & read the article @Waterloo50 suggested earlier. Very interrsting reading. I am no good at math (and I know Waterloo already indicated some of this), but they conclude Pickett's Charge would have succeeded if these three factors had been met:

1. The artillery bombardment had been more successful.
2. Meade had not massed reserves in the area. Most interesting, they conclude that if the Vermont brigade had not been present, the charge would likely have been successful.
3. If 2 more brigades had been added to the initial assault wave.

I would add my own opinion that the artillery fire from Union batteries on Cemetery Hill (combined with the 8th Ohio's flanking of Pettigrew's division) played an important role. Are there any good studies of the impact of Osborn's artillery on the assault?

 

[major bill]

I was wondering what percentage of the Confederate casualties were caused by Union artillery. I know I have read this some place. When I read it it did not seem overly high. Do we not give the Union Infantry enough credit?

 

[Andy Cardinal]

I was wondering what percentage of the Confederate casualties were caused by Union artillery. I know I have read this some place. When I read it it did not seem overly high. Do we not give the Union Infantry enough credit?

I have read estimates ranging from 25% to 50%.

 

[major bill]

Is it possible that Meade out thought Lee on day 3? In that Meade had enough streangth to stop an attack in the center and possibly enough streangth to stop an attack on either flack and could still keep enough reserves to use his interior lines to reinforce any threatened area?

 

[W. Richardson]

Retreat to the high ground at South Mountain just W of Cashtown and wait for the Union to attack.

I have always felt that was Lee's best option. On the high ground in a perfect defensive poster, supply line protected, forge/plunder all one wishes west of that line, and then wait for the Union attack that WILL come. Old Abe would be choking to get the words out...Attack....Attack....Attack........Destroy Lee's Army........Attack....Attack..............

But.........

That isn't what happened...............

Respectfully,

William.

One Nation
Two countries

 

[Jamieva]

I think Lee did originally intend Ewell to attack in conjunction with Pickett. However, the fighting on Culp's Hill ended well before the cannonade began, so Lee would have known there was no help coming from Ewell's direction. Since he expected Pickett & Pettigrew to proceed, I assume he expected the attack to succeed without any help from Ewell.

Lee wanted a simultaneous attack on all fronts such that Meade could not shift troops from other locations ot meet the major push, which was to be from Pickett

 

[rbasin]

Too many blue guys. Not enough grey guys. Just needed more guys

 

[E_just_E]

Yes, just thinking about a long supply line through the Shenandoah Valley. With Stuart back he had the cavalry to protect it, but it was longer and less secure than he was used to.

Imboden was protecting it. Not all Cavalry was with Stuart. In addition to Imboden's brigade, Albert Jenkins's was with Ewell on the Confederate van.

 

[Deleted User CS]

From a strategic and tactical standpoint, Lee should have withdrawn his forces on July 2, 1863, and relocated his entire army along terrain that would have better suited his aggressive style of fighting. According to Napoleon, Frederick the Great as well as Sun Tzu it is almost impossible to defeat a standing army reinforced with heavy artillery which are strategically located on elevated terrain, such as Cemetery Hill, which was the keystone or key position of the Gettysburg Battlefield. I believe if Ewell had tried to attack Cemetery Hill on July 1, 1863, the same result would had occurred as that of Pickett's Charge. Once again General Longstreet was correct in telling Lee that the tactical position of the Army of Northern Virginia was at a great disadvantage to attack an entrenched enemy complimented and reinforced with plenty of artillery and with the added advantage of using interior lines to reinforce any weak position along the fish hook rather quickly. To quote Longstreet, "there are no seventeen thousand men in this world that can take that position." David.

 

[diane]

Is it possible that Meade out thought Lee on day 3? In that Meade had enough streangth to stop an attack in the center and possibly enough streangth to stop an attack on either flack and could still keep enough reserves to use his interior lines to reinforce any threatened area?

Bill, that's something I've often thought - it's just possible Lee was out-generalled by Meade and that's actually it in a nutshell. When we focus on what Lee did or didn't do, very often we forget there was another general in the field, too!