Pickett's Charge, failed because?

[War Horse]

And, when Alexander was ready to use the nine howitzers they were nowhere to be found. After the battle, he found Pendleton "had sent & taken four or five of the guns & disposed of them somewhere else without any notice to me. The remainder Maj. R.[Richardson] admitted having moved "a short distance" because he said he found himself in the range of shell from the enemy...."
<Gary W. Gallagher, Editor, Fighting for the Confederacy: The Personal Recollections of General Edward Porter Alexander. (Chapel Hill, NC The University of North Carolina Press, 1989), p. 249.>

By that time it was to late was it not?

 

[WJC]

By that time it was to late was it not?

Thanks for your response.
I've always understood the timing to be not long after Pickett, Pettigrew, et al. stepped off. I've read it to mean Alexander expected to follow along behind the infantry and support from various points on the move.
Alexander was able to advance some guns: he talks of firing on what he understood was probably Stannard's Vermont brigade on Pickett's right. He fired up until he saw the attack failed. He then realized he'd better save ammunition and prepare for a counterattack.
<Gary W. Gallagher, Editor, Fighting for the Confederacy: The Personal Recollections of General Edward Porter Alexander. (Chapel Hill, NC The University of North Carolina Press, 1989), pp. 262-265>

 

[War Horse]

Thanks for your response.
I've always understood the timing to be not long after Pickett, Pettigrew, et al. stepped off. I've read it to mean Alexander expected to follow along behind the infantry and support from various points on the move.
Alexander was able to advance some guns: he talks of firing on what he understood was probably Stannard's Vermont brigade on Pickett's right. He fired up until he saw the attack failed. He then realized he'd better save ammunition and prepare for a counterattack.
<Gary W. Gallagher, Editor, Fighting for the Confederacy: The Personal Recollections of General Edward Porter Alexander. (Chapel Hill, NC The University of North Carolina Press, 1989), pp. 262-265>

It sounds very much like this could be the lack of coordination Lee was talking about to Imboden.

 

[Armistead]

View attachment 293367

Mention the name George E Pickett and the first thing that springs to mind is the failed attack at Gettysburg.

Like many of us here I've examined that famous/infamous charge and I'm left wondering what could have been done differently to make it a success, was it even possible for the outcome to have been different. I'd like to know what others think, if I could send you back in time and assuming that Lee would act on your advice, what would you have told him was required to break through the Union defences...oh, by the way, telling Lee not to go ahead with an attack isn't an option.

For those who want a quick overview of how things originally played out here's a quick timeline, it's not exhaustive by any means but it gives a rough idea on how things unfolded.

1:00pm 152 Confederate cannons are pushed out of the tree line and fire on the Union centre, 122 Union cannons respond, the firing last for 2 hours.
3:00pm the cannon fire falls silent.
3:10pm 14000 Confederate troops step out of the tree line, the confederate line is almost a mile in length, the confederate line steps out in perfect order, it was 87 degrees and humid so the line moved slowly.
122 Union cannon open up on the confederate line.
The Confederate line has to cross open ground for about a mile to make it to the Union line, however, they have to cross the Emmitsburg road which is lined either side by two 5 foot tall fences.
At the Union line, approximately 6000 men are told to hold fire until the confederate line reaches the road, meanwhile, 25 Union cannon are being loaded with canister shot.
When the confederate line or what's left it reaches the road, all hell breaks lose and the confederate line starts to falter, so much so that they go to ground, the bodies are falling and the road becomes a scene of complete carnage, those that have managed to push on meet the first line of union defences at the West wall, the confederate line clashes with 1600 union soldiers, in this clash the Union suffers 500 casualties and approximately 1100 union men withdraw to the main union line, the confederate line loses momentum and on seeing this the union swing around and box in those that had made it to the west wall.
On seeing the line falter, brigadier general Armistead pushes through the line and try's to encourage the men to keep moving, again the confederate line is hammered by the union main line.
In total the confederate line took about 50 minutes to cross and withdraw across the field, they suffered a loss of 6,800 men.

I fail to see what could have been done differently, does anyone have any theories about what was needed to break the Union line?

 

[Waterloo50]

View attachment 293544

Excellent picture, I haven't seen that one before.

 

[Waterloo50]

These are the findings from,
Pickett's Charge: What modern mathematics teaches us about Civil War battle


.The first factor we examined was the Confederate retreat. About half the charging infantry had become casualties before the rest pulled back. Should they have kept fighting instead? If they had, our model calculated that they all would have become casualties too. By contrast, the defending Union soldiers would have suffered only slightly higher losses. The charge simply didn't include enough Confederate soldiers to win. They were wise to retreat when they did.

.We next evaluated how many soldiers the Confederate charge would have needed to succeed. Lee put nine infantry brigades, more than 10,000 men, in the charge. He kept five more brigades back in reserve. If he had put most of those reserves into the charge, our model estimated it would have captured the Union position. But then Lee would have had insufficient fresh troops left to take advantage of that success.

.We also looked at the Confederate artillery barrage. Contrary to plans, their cannons ran short of ammunition due to a mix-up with their supply wagons. If their generals had better coordinated those supplies, the cannons could have fired twice as much. Our model calculated that this improved barrage would have been like adding one more infantry brigade to the charge. That is, the supply mix-up hurt the Confederate attack, but was not decisive by itself.

.Finally, we considered the Union Army. After the battle, critics complained that Meade had focused too much on preparing his defences. This made it harder to launch a counter-attack later. However, our model estimated that if he had put even one less infantry brigade in his defensive line, the Confederate charge probably would have succeeded. This suggests Meade was correct to emphasize his defense.


Source:https://theconversation.com/pickett...atics-teaches-us-about-civil-war-battle-78982


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[Waterloo50]

Would the charge have been more successful had the Confederate artillery fire been more accurate?

Possibly but some suggest they needed to continue firing for a longer period of time for it to have been truly effective. As suggested in my previous post, an improved barrage would have been like adding one extra infantry brigade.

 

[WJC]

It sounds very much like this could be the lack of coordination Lee was talking about to Imboden.

Thanks for your response.
I never considered that Lee was specifically talking about this, but it could very well be.

 

[dlofting]

I've tried to consider this from Lee's position at the time. He thought that Meade had weakened his centre to reinforce his flanks. He didn't know that Meade was still strong enough to repulse a charge of 15000 men. Was he lacking information/intelligence that Stuart might have provided had he been available before July 3...... we can only speculate.

What were his alternatives? Longstreet was proposing a move to the right, either for a flank attack or to a defensive position. The roads to the southeast of Gettysburg didn't really support this and it made logistics worse, not better. So in my opinion Lee could attack or retreat, but not maneuver......being Lee he chose to attack, a decision that most of us disagree with. But we weren't there and we know a lot of things that Lee didn't.

 

[E_just_E]

What were his alternatives?

Retreat to the high ground at South Mountain just W of Cashtown and wait for the Union to attack.

 

[W. Richardson]

Poorly planned

Bravely led

Poorly supported

Respectfully,

William

One Nation
Two countries

 

[Andy Cardinal]

I've tried to consider this from Lee's position at the time. He thought that Meade had weakened his centre to reinforce his flanks. He didn't know that Meade was still strong enough to repulse a charge of 15000 men. Was he lacking information/intelligence that Stuart might have provided had he been available before July 3...... we can only speculate.

What were his alternatives? Longstreet was proposing a move to the right, either for a flank attack or to a defensive position. The roads to the southeast of Gettysburg didn't really support this and it made logistics worse, not better. So in my opinion Lee could attack or retreat, but not maneuver......being Lee he chose to attack, a decision that most of us disagree with. But we weren't there and we know a lot of things that Lee didn't.

I agree with @E_just_E , that's what I've always thought his best alternative, and as a completely different subject, that is what Meade thought Lee was doing on July 5 & 6.

Lee obviously thought the attack could succeed though, because he was too good a commander to order an assault he knew was doomed to be a bloody failure.

 

[War Horse]

Interesting how views change. It wasn't that long ago on this board that the majority consensus was that Lee did not have that option due to poor road structure not suitable to handle an army.

 

[E_just_E]

Interesting how views change. It wasn't that long ago on this board that the majority consensus was that Lee did not have that option due to poor road structure not suitable to handle an army.

Really? That's the same road his troops used to go from Chambersburg to Cashtown and then on to Gettysburg. South Mountain PA not MD. There are some really easy to defend passes there

 

[War Horse]

Really? That's the same road his troops used to go from Chambersburg to Cashtown and then on to Gettysburg. South Mountain PA not MD. There are some really easy to defend passes there

I've always thought Lee had options.

 

[dlofting]

Retreat to the high ground at South Mountain just W of Cashtown and wait for the Union to attack.

Yes this was an alternative as long as Lee could keep his supply line intact.

 

[E_just_E]

Yes this was an alternative as long as Lee could keep his supply line intact.

His supply train was up the road in Chambersburg. Perfect location.

 

[Greywolf]

His supply train was up the road in Chambersburg. Perfect location.

Do you know if this option was ever discussed? Have to think Longstreet would be all over that. Reading Porters book but haven't gotten to Gettysburg yet.

 

[Rio Bravo]

Fact or Lost Cause myth?

FACT- I thought it was fairly well known that Lee was suffering from a bad bout of Diarrhoea which must have impacted on his performance. Also he had problems with his heart, Which eventually would cause his death !

 

[Andy Cardinal]

These are the findings from,
Pickett's Charge:
.We next evaluated how many soldiers the Confederate charge would have needed to succeed. Lee put nine infantry brigades, more than 10,000 men, in the charge. He kept five more brigades back in reserve. If he had put most of those reserves into the charge, our model estimated it would have captured the Union position. But then Lee would have had insufficient fresh troops left to take advantage of that success.


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Thanks for posting. Many of the conclusions correspond to my own opinions about the charge based on my own study of it.

I'm a little unclear about the reserves. While I agree with the premise to a certain extent, where would they have gone in?