Pickett's Charge, failed because?

"General Lee did not return to his headquarters until 1 o'clock on the morning of July 4. Brigadier General John Imboden, commanding an irregular band of cavalry that had been liberally foraging the countryside to the west, was waiting there for him. Lee dismounted and, Imboden wrote, "threw his arm across the saddle to rest, and fixing his eyes upon the ground leaned in silence and almost motionless upon his equally weary horse." Imboden commiserated: "General, this has been a hard day for you."

"Yes, it has been a sad, sad day for us, " Lee replied, and then (Imboden recalled) "relapsed into his thoughtful mood and attitude." But suddenly he roused himself to speak vigorously of the battle just fought. "I never saw troops behave more magnificently than Pickett's division of Virginians did today in that charge," he said. But he went on, they were not supported as they were to have been - "for some reason not yet fully explained to me"-else "we would have held the position and the day would have been ours."

Thus if Generals Imboden's account can be accepted, some nine hours after the event Robert E. Lee had convinced himself that his plan for Pickett's Charge was perfectly sound. Only it's execution had been flawed.

Gettysburg pg 471
Stephen W. Sears

It would appear only General John Imboden was present to hear Lee make that statement.

I'll have a look at E.P Alexander's memoirs. I believe he speaks of the intended support that never materialized.

That's it! Thanks for looking it up. I'm pretty sure Imboden related this accurately. As you say, Lee was convinced it should have worked. I think he had good reason to believe that but was looking to see what had gone so wrong.
 
That's it! Thanks for looking it up. I'm pretty sure Imboden related this accurately. As you say, Lee was convinced it should have worked. I think he had good reason to believe that but was looking to see what had gone so wrong.
Any time. I'm gonna have a look at Alexander now. Maybe we can shed more light on the matter.
 
Not that long before his artillery was assembled on Mary's Heights. When Longstreet made a suggestion to Porter Alexander about the placement of his guns, Alexander replied "General not even a chicken could survive when I open fire on that field". As it turns out Alexander was correct. Failed assault after failed assault. The Union soldiers were being decimated. As Longstreet watched as the carnage played out he turned to Lee and said. "If they continue to come, I will kill them all". The advantage of holding the high ground with well placed artilery.

Now the shoe is on the other foot. Is it any wonder Longstreet was down hearted. He inflected and witnessed the carnage his troops inflected on the Union at Fredericksburg. Now all he could do is play the tape over and over again in his mind. The only difference is the carnage is being inflicted on his men this time.

I'd say Longstreet had good reason to disagree with the order and then be less than enthusiastic when his appeals fell on deaf ears. I'd also be willing to bet he would have been the happiest man on the battlefield had his prediction of the events to come been wrong. Unfortunately for his men and he they were spot on.
It is called panic attack .
 
Agreed, those fences were always going to be a choke point

Unless one reads the plenty of contemporary references regarding their removal on July 1st by Union troops so they can proceed faster through the fields towards McPherson Ridge and what was left by the Confederate troops who attacked the Union troops in the area the next day ;)
 
"Not very long after sunrise Gen. Pendleton came up & paid me a visit and commended all of my arrangements. In his official report of the battle he says, "On Longstreet's line by Alexander's activity [I found] much already accomplished.

I mention this because among the very unjust, &, indeed, absurd criticisms which poor Gen. Longstreet's detractors have brought against him, in connection with this battle, is one to the effect that Gen. Lee's orders were disobeyed & neglected the handling of our artillary in Pickett's Charge. Now the orders which I received, both from Longstreet and Pendleton, were quite specific, & were carried out to the letter, as I will show, & even more effectively, I think, than could have been reasonably expected beforehand. Moreover they were identical with the usual practice, both of our army and the Federals, in attacking each other in position, from the beginning of the war to the end of it. And, as things turned out, the result of any other method would probably been the loss of our artillery, &, possibly, a rout of the whole army. I will go a little more into detail in this matter for there has been a great deal of most "egregious folly" written in some of the books & papers published on the subject. My orders were as follows, First, to give the enemy the most effective cannonade possible. It was not meant simply to make noise, but to try & cripple him-to tear him limbless, as it were, if possible. Note Gen. Longstreet's expression in a note to be quoted in full presently, "drive off the enemy or greatly demoralize him." When the artillery had accomplished that, the infantry column of attack was to charge. And then, further, I was to "advance such artillery as you can use in aiding the attack." Now, I could not hope to bombard effectively with anything less than the whole force of artillery at my disposal, for my range was to be generally over 1,200 yards & I had not the ammunition to make it a long business. It must be done inside of an hour if ever.

And now I may return to the visit paid me by Gen. Pendleton in the early morning, when he looked over & approved my dispositions. As I rode with him & talked over matters he told me that COL. R. L. Walker A.P. Hill's chief of arty., had 12 pr. howitzers for which he had no Special use as their range was to short. Gen. Pendleton asked me if I could make use of them." I jumped at the idea, & thanked him and & said, "yes, I had the very place for them." And I rode on with him immediately, and had them turned over to me, under the command of Maj. Richardson. I did not tell Gen. Pendleton what I wanted with them & he probably supposed that I was going to stick them somewhere around my firing line, like all the rest of my guns. But I had another purpose in view. I intended not to let them fire a shot in the preliminary cannonaide, & to keep them under cover & out of view, so that with fresh men, & full chests of ammunition, these 9 light howitzers might follow Pickett's infantry in the charge, more promptly, & also, perhaps more safely than guns from out of the firing line could do."

E. Porter Alexander
Fighting for the Confederacy
Pg's 245, 245 and 247

I paraphrased.

There was a follow up plan. The problem was the infantry never made it far enough for Alexander to follow up with his howitzers. He had to focus on protecting the retreating infantry instead.
 
Enjoy :smile:

No light to be shed by him other than on himself. His stuff written in the 20th century really contradicts many contemporary sources
I don't know E. I think it safe to say one would remember their orders and where they placed the guns. Alexander was good and I find it totally believable that he would recall placing 12 howitzers with full caissons in front of his line to be used to follow up Pickett's advance.
 
I don't know E. I think it safe to say one would remember their orders and where they placed the guns. Alexander was good and I find it totally believable that he would recall placing 12 howitzers with full caissons in front of his line to be used to follow up Pickett's advance.

So you really think that Lee gave direct orders to Alexander to place his guns where he did as he claims? Or those orders would have come about 3-4 steps down the ranks where they should? ;)
 
So you really think that Lee gave direct orders to Alexander to place his guns where he did as he claims? Or those orders would have come about 3-4 steps down the ranks where they should? :wink:
I believe what Alexander said. He placed the guns there himself. Lee expected artillery follow up. I don't believe Lee cared how or where it came from.
 
-
Perhaps Lee might have paid more attention to Longstreet's advice prior to the assault:
'General, I have been a soldier all my life. I have been with soldiers engaged in fights by couples, by squads, companies, regiments, divisions, and armies, and should know, as well as anyone, what soldiers can do. It is my opinion that no fifteen thousand men ever arranged for battle can take that position."
Regards
David
This ^^^^^.
 
The problem was the infantry never made it far enough for Alexander to follow up with his howitzers. He had to focus on protecting the retreating infantry instead.
And, when Alexander was ready to use the nine howitzers they were nowhere to be found. After the battle, he found Pendleton "had sent & taken four or five of the guns & disposed of them somewhere else without any notice to me. The remainder Maj. R.[Richardson] admitted having moved "a short distance" because he said he found himself in the range of shell from the enemy...."
<Gary W. Gallagher, Editor, Fighting for the Confederacy: The Personal Recollections of General Edward Porter Alexander. (Chapel Hill, NC The University of North Carolina Press, 1989), p. 249.>
 
To answer the OP, I think that Pickett's charge failed because the Clump of Trees was not big enough to accommodate all the Confederate attackers or tall enough to be seen by most of Pickett's Division and serve as a "beacon" to Stuart to attack :devil::whistling:

That said, Pickett's charge is the least documented "major" event in Civil War (in not American) History. A whole bunch of contradicting contemporary primary sources on it (have fun looking at some of the Union reports arguing that the Confederates came over in column formation, for example.) Lee tore Pickett's official report and the latter did not bother to re-write it in a way that Lee would had accepted. Wish I knew what that report said.

Based on the very little that we know, I think that the Pickett's charge failed because of:

a. Hard-headiness by Lee (or whoever the decision maker was) to think that something that failed the day before will succeed the next day and against potentially superior forces
b. Lack of coordination and planning
c. Lack of motivation by the confederates to die vs. surrender in groves or go half way and turn back.

That thing was doomed before it started for sure.
 
And, when Alexander was ready to use the nine howitzers they were nowhere to be found. After the battle, he found Pendleton "had sent & taken four or five of the guns & disposed of them somewhere else without any notice to me. The remainder Maj. R.[Richardson] admitted having moved "a short distance" because he said he found himself in the range of shell from the enemy...."
<Gary W. Gallagher, Editor, Fighting for the Confederacy: The Personal Recollections of General Edward Porter Alexander. (Chapel Hill, NC The University of North Carolina Press, 1989), p. 249.>
Yep, if they ain't there he can't use them. Even if they were available Union artillery had a habit of making Confederate artillery suffer
 

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