Pickett's Charge, failed because?

[thomas aagaard]

I doubt it. Solid shot and black powder explosives from field guns lacked the destructive power to do much damage to protected or prone infantry at the range involved.

The csa artillery had plenty of shells, that in the perfect world would detonate in the air above the federal line and cause massive casualties... but faulty fuses resulted in a large % of the shells not detonating and simply flying over the line and hitting in the rear of the federal army.

 

[Hussar Yeomanry]

Specifically, what could Longstreet have done differently?

That is what I wonder. Other than refuse to attack... which would be out of character... I think perhaps and I stress perhaps... he could have stepped up to the plate when A.P.Hill goes walkabout. Certainly he is seen in the vicinity of Pettigrew and Trimble's Divisions in the company of Lee. However would it have put people's backs up? In the end as I stated in my post I just don't know about Longstreet that day. Could he have done more? Definitely. But perhaps that is with the benefit of hindsight. Could he reasonably have expected A.P.Hill to be so... absent?

[Also, I agree utterly about Stuart. He was out there to potentially exploit any success. Not as a diversion. The (failed) diversion was Ewell.]

 

[Hussar Yeomanry]

The csa artillery had plenty of shells, that in the perfect world would detonate in the air above the federal line and cause massive casualties... but faulty fuses resulted in a large % of the shells not detonating and simply flying over the line and hitting in the rear of the federal army.

The shells weren't so much faulty as unfamiliar and the fuse needed to be set at a different length than they are used to/ are expecting. There are also those who argue that too much has been made of this and that actually they were hitting where they thought the Union infantry was (because the Confederate infanty was drawn up behind the guns they assumed - incorrectly - that the Union infantry was too.) How accurate this theory is I cannot say.

 

[diane]

I've wondered, too, what Longstreet could have done differently...and I suspect he wondered that many times as well! He was a far better soldier than Pickett was, and it was his assault, but he just could not get his heart into something he perceived was folly. In that respect he reminds me of Forrest. Whenever Forrest believed a battle was folly and not going to be successful...it wasn't! He'd fight it, but his heart wasn't in it. Think that was the bottom line for Longstreet as well.

 

[major bill]

What if the fences along Emmetsburg Road had been torn down over night?

 

[Hussar Yeomanry]

What if the fences along Emmetsburg Road had been torn down over night?

In a perfect world definitely this would help.

However, Lee hasn't yet informed his commanders where they would attack so there is no reason for people to do this. Further in Angie Atkinson's Ranger Tour on Youtube she gives various quotes about how the day before Wright's Brigade had found the fence surprisingly sturdy and while it could be dismantled it took time. Lastly in places the fence is within the firing distance of the Union skirmish line. So, could it have been done silently in the dark? That I think is a relevant question and am not sure of the answer.

 

[War Horse]

I've wondered, too, what Longstreet could have done differently...and I suspect he wondered that many times as well! He was a far better soldier than Pickett was, and it was his assault, but he just could not get his heart into something he perceived was folly. In that respect he reminds me of Forrest. Whenever Forrest believed a battle was folly and not going to be successful...it wasn't! He'd fight it, but his heart wasn't in it. Think that was the bottom line for Longstreet as well.

Not that long before his artillery was assembled on Mary's Heights. When Longstreet made a suggestion to Porter Alexander about the placement of his guns, Alexander replied "General not even a chicken could survive when I open fire on that field". As it turns out Alexander was correct. Failed assault after failed assault. The Union soldiers were being decimated. As Longstreet watched as the carnage played out he turned to Lee and said. "If they continue to come, I will kill them all". The advantage of holding the high ground with well placed artilery.

Now the shoe is on the other foot. Is it any wonder Longstreet was down hearted. He inflected and witnessed the carnage his troops inflected on the Union at Fredericksburg. Now all he could do is play the tape over and over again in his mind. The only difference is the carnage is being inflicted on his men this time.

I'd say Longstreet had good reason to disagree with the order and then be less than enthusiastic when his appeals fell on deaf ears. I'd also be willing to bet he would have been the happiest man on the battlefield had his prediction of the events to come been wrong. Unfortunately for his men and he they were spot on.

 

[Greywolf]

Wonder if the charge would have had any chance if the distance was only 1/4 to 1/2 mile. I suspect it would have done a good bit better.

I dont think it had much chance as it was done. Although with artillery support moving forward and protecting the flanks there is little doubt more men would have made it to the wall, but even if 2500 men made it to the wall there was no support coming, which makes it check mate after all. If it had been an attack in depth the union artillery would have been giddy, and the destruction even more massive

 

[diane]

There is one question I've never heard adequately answered. When Lee came in late after the fight, Imboden heard him talking and one of the things he said was the charge was not supported as he thought it would be. What did he mean by that? Apparently others thought there was to be support but it didn't show, but it seemed Lee was talking about something else.

 

[Waterloo50]

Wonder if the charge would have had any chance if the distance was only 1/4 to 1/2 mile. I suspect it would have done a good bit better.

I dont think it had much chance as it was done. Although with artillery support moving forward and protecting the flanks there is little doubt more men would have made it to the wall, but even if 2500 men made it to the wall there was no support coming, which makes it check mate after all. If it had been an attack in depth the union artillery would have been giddy, and the destruction even more massive

1/4 to 1/2 mile may have been better but regardless of the distance it was hot and humid, I imagine that covering a distance of a mile in those conditions whilst suffering heavy casualties and taking constant fire would have sapped many of their strength. It must have taken some serious psychological strength to even consider pushing beyond further than the road, the effects of canister shot must have been terrifying, I suspect that the motivation to push on would have been similar to the experience of the men at Omaha beach, you either move foward and take your chances or you stay put and die, at least if you push forward, you're in with a chance of neutralising the threat.

 

[Hussar Yeomanry]

There is one question I've never heard adequately answered. When Lee came in late after the fight, Imboden heard him talking and one of the things he said was the charge was not supported as he thought it would be. What did he mean by that? Apparently others thought there was to be support but it didn't show, but it seemed Lee was talking about something else.

I think that at least partly he was talking about the missing close range artillery support (and Pendleton gets much of the blame for that). Possibly also the wariness of some of the brigades tasked to support the attack. However here Lee has Lee to blame for as was his way he wrote very general orders. Effectively they were 'support the attack if practicable' and everyone could see as the PPT Charge developed that it wasn't.

 

[Greywolf]

There is one question I've never heard adequately answered. When Lee came in late after the fight, Imboden heard him talking and one of the things he said was the charge was not supported as he thought it would be. What did he mean by that? Apparently others thought there was to be support but it didn't show, but it seemed Lee was talking about something else.

I believe Anderson's division for one was support

 

[diane]

I think that at least partly he was talking about the missing close range artillery support (and Pendleton gets much of the blame for that). Possibly also the wariness of some of the brigades tasked to support the attack. However here Lee has Lee to blame for as was his way he wrote very general orders. Effectively they were 'support the attack if practicable' and everyone could see as the PPT Charge developed that it wasn't.

Thanks! That's more clearly explained than I've seen. Quite often it's thought to refer to Longstreet, but I didn't take that from it. Don't think Lee blamed him for anything. Unclear orders are a thing that quite often appears as a serious flaw in Lee's command style - partly to keep from offending notoriously touchy subordinates and partly to encourage initiative. But he didn't seem to learn except in the case of Jackson. However, the charge was a straight-forward affair and should have been ordered that way as well.

 

[Greywolf]

To add, it was part of Anderson's division, 3 brigades I believe. They were preparing to move forward and Longstreet called it off. Probably a wise idea

 

[Hussar Yeomanry]

To add, it was part of Anderson's division, 3 brigades I believe. They were preparing to move forward and Longstreet called it off. Probably a wise idea

I am intrigued now. Are you sure about this for Longstreet has no authority over (the also mostly absent) Anderson. These are Hill's men and so any such order would need to come from the absent Hill.

 

[diane]

Didn't Hill want his whole corps committed but Lee held one division back as reserves?

 

[Hussar Yeomanry]

Didn't Hill want his whole corps committed but Lee held one division back as reserves?

I've never heard that before (though it could be true). The problem we have with Hill at Gettysburg is not that he is new to Corps Command but that he is the missing man and this creates a command vacuum.

 

[Andy Cardinal]

To quote Pickett himself, I think the Union army had something to do with it.

A frontal assault against a prepared position was rarely successful in the Civil War. Chances for the assault to succeed were slim to begin with. Union artillery fire played a role as well, especially I think with Brockenbrough's brigade.

The fences were factors as well, and reduced whatever slim chance there was to about zero.

For sake of argument, though, let's say the assault is extremely successful and breaks Webb's and Hays's line. Could whatever remnant of Pickett's/Pettigrew's/Trimble's divisions have stayed on Cemetery Ridge? I doubt it.

 

[War Horse]

There is one question I've never heard adequately answered. When Lee came in late after the fight, Imboden heard him talking and one of the things he said was the charge was not supported as he thought it would be. What did he mean by that? Apparently others thought there was to be support but it didn't show, but it seemed Lee was talking about something else.

"General Lee did not return to his headquarters until 1 o'clock on the morning of July 4. Brigadier General John Imboden, commanding an irregular band of cavalry that had been liberally foraging the countryside to the west, was waiting there for him. Lee dismounted and, Imboden wrote, "threw his arm across the saddle to rest, and fixing his eyes upon the ground leaned in silence and almost motionless upon his equally weary horse." Imboden commiserated: "General, this has been a hard day for you."

"Yes, it has been a sad, sad day for us, " Lee replied, and then (Imboden recalled) "relapsed into his thoughtful mood and attitude." But suddenly he roused himself to speak vigorously of the battle just fought. "I never saw troops behave more magnificently than Pickett's division of Virginians did today in that charge," he said. But he went on, they were not supported as they were to have been - "for some reason not yet fully explained to me"-else "we would have held the position and the day would have been ours."

Thus if Generals Imboden's account can be accepted, some nine hours after the event Robert E. Lee had convinced himself that his plan for Pickett's Charge was perfectly sound. Only it's execution had been flawed.

Gettysburg pg 471
Stephen W. Sears

It would appear only General John Imboden was present to hear Lee make that statement.

I'll have a look at E.P Alexander's memoirs. I believe he speaks of the intended support that never materialized.

 

[diane]

I've never heard that before (though it could be true). The problem we have with Hill at Gettysburg is not that he is new to Corps Command but that he is the missing man and this creates a command vacuum.

That's the critical problem. Hill's illness was very problematic during the Gettysburg campaign. He probably shouldn't have been in command at all but Lee just didn't have a wealth of replacements!