Rebforever
Lt. Colonel
- Joined
- Oct 26, 2012
How?Lee let Longstreet down.....
How?Lee let Longstreet down.....
Actually, this quote was from the previous day. Longstreet wanted Pickett's division before he attacked on July 2. According to G. Moxley Sorrell, To Hood, Longstreet confided, 'The General is a little nervous this morning; he wishes me to attack. I do not wish to do so without [George] Pickett. I never like to go into battle with one boot off.'Longstreet understood that a direct assault would never succeed, he'd repeated it many times, what was it he said, 'I don't like to fight with one boot off', I think Longstreet would have preferred a flanking move to shift the Union line, Lee should have listened to him.
Poppycock.Longstreet let Lee down.
All good points. Lee however had shown this side of himself in the past. Every time Lee divided his army he was showing how audacious his nature truly was. Each of those occasions had the potental to end in disaster for the ANV. To the victor go the spoils. Had Lee's army have failed on any of the occasions he would have been uttering "it is all my fault" much earlier than July 3, 1863.Cold Harbor and Pickett's Charge seem to me to be opposite sides of the same coin. Grant was very much in Lee's place, with subordinates telling him not to do it, with pride saying it can be done with enough grit and my army's got it! Lee had that in play. Grant's men supposedly wrote their names inside their shirts and Lee's just about did the same, some of them straggling way, way, way out of gunshot. The men who made both these doomed charges were dedicated, hard-core, do or die soldiers - that was one of the critical losses. The best men you had went down, were lost and for no gain. The difference was Cold Harbor was not the first of a series of death knells for Grant - it was a disturbance in the force only. For Lee, the loss was irreparable and the ANV, the Confederacy's finest and best led fighting force, was headed downhill after that.
For me, Lee knew he was throwing the dice but he thought he had the loaded pair. His army was a wonder, they would do anything he asked of them and he believed they would succeed at it. So he not only asked, he demanded. People have wondered what in the world was up with Lee, he wasn't himself, he was sick, etc. Actually, this was indeed Lee! He was a very controlled person at all times but this was one time he threw any restraint out the window and went for the whole enchilada. Think what the prize would have been had he won!
To prevent the disaster and gain a lesser but more secure prize? Listen to Longstreet!
This battle/attack reeks of pride on Lee's part. Longstreet didn't even want to engage at Gettysburg, let alone do a suicidal attack on the union center. He pleaded to withdrawal from Gettysburg and to find open ground between them and Washington. After day 1 of the battle, upon seeing the Federal position, Longstreet wanted to attack the Union Left, around Big Round Top. Lee ignored him and sent his corps up Little Round Top instead. By day 3, Longstreet was again pleading to withdrawal, or if Lee was going to attack, to attack on the Union left (Big Round Top again). Lee again ignored Longstreet and carried on with his grand assault hoping for his "grande victoire". He was hoping to deliver the final blow of the war with one massive Napoleonic attack....it was stupid and prideful, born out of the belief he and his army were invincible against the boys in blue, and cost the South who knows what in morale and resources. Sure, Lee went back and blamed the attack on himself and took credit for it, but for all the writing on how Lee selected his Generals and let them do their jobs, he bungled this by not listening to Longstreet.How?
I happen to agree with this. However there are many who would not and with good reason. Ewell's attack started to soon and lost all desired effect at the time the PPT charge stepped off. The Union wisely ceased their artillary fire early giving the Confederates the perception that they were low on ammunition and the time was right to launch before they could resupply their batteries. Meade had wisely reinforced the center of his line. Lee was confident that Meade would reenforce his flanks because they they had not yet been truly tested. All and all Lee's plan was a solid one. On many occasions Lee out witted the Union generals. He was confident. On this occasion Meade made some pretty good calls which lead to the defeat.-Too far too few
-Pickett's division and the 11th Mississippi were the only fresh troops in the assault the others had been badly used during the first 2 days.
-Brockenbrough's Brigade gave way and exposed Davis' Brigade to enfilading fire all the way to the stone wall at the Bryan Barn
Pickett's Division was also exposed to enfilading fire during their assault.
-Lee was not able to forward additional men to support the assault troops
-Perhaps Lee might have paid more attention to Longstreet's advice prior to the assault:
'General, I have been a soldier all my life. I have been with soldiers engaged in fights by couples, by squads, companies, regiments, divisions, and armies, and should know, as well as anyone, what soldiers can do. It is my opinion that no fifteen thousand men ever arranged for battle can take that position."
Regards
David
That is old stuff. Longstreet disobeyed General Lee's orderThis battle/attack reeks of pride on Lee's part. Longstreet didn't even want to engage at Gettysburg, let alone do a suicidal attack on the union center. He pleaded to withdrawal from Gettysburg and to find open ground between them and Washington. After day 1 of the battle, upon seeing the Federal position, Longstreet wanted to attack the Union Left, around Big Round Top. Lee ignored him and sent his corps up Little Round Top instead. By day 3, Longstreet was again pleading to withdrawal, or if Lee was going to attack, to attack on the Union left (Big Round Top again). Lee again ignored Longstreet and carried on with his grand assault hoping for his "grande victoire". He was hoping to deliver the final blow of the war with one massive Napoleonic attack....it was stupid and prideful, born out of the belief he and his army were invincible against the boys in blue, and cost the South who knows what in morale and resources. Sure, Lee went back and blamed the attack on himself and took credit for it, but for all the writing on how Lee selected his Generals and let them do their jobs, he bungled this by not listening to Longstreet.
Edited; personal attackThat is old stuff. Longstreet disobeyed General Lee's order
Edited; personal attack Have you read Manassas to Appomattox, or are you just quoting wikipedia?

All good points. Lee however had shown this side of himself in the past. Every time Lee divided his army he was showing how audacious his nature truly was. Each of those occasions had the potental to end in disaster for the ANV. To the victor go the spoils. Had Lee's army have failed on any of the occasions he would have been uttering "it is all my fault" much earlier than July 3, 1863.
No I don't believe it was. Longstreet had a very real concern over the attack plan. The manual from which he and Lee learned told both officers that the plan was flawed. Lee counted on the past mistakes of the Union army repeating themselves and his army exploiting those mistakes. What Lee had not anticipated was a disciplined Union commander who would dig in and not make the critical mistake at the critical time.Chancellorsville comes to mind on that! Nothing is sure on a battlefield. Perhaps Longstreet butted heads with Lee at the wrong point - he did it when Lee's mind was set and he was not going to be denied. The stars may have been set in their courses but Lee was set in his as well. He was determined to bull his way through it despite warnings that he would normally have taken note of because, as he said later, he believed his army was invincible. Longstreet may have had bad timing with his suggestions, but the worst mistake was trying to override Lee right in front of everyone. Lee had to assert his authority and leave no doubt who was commanding this battle. It had bad optics but Lee's mind was already set, so Longstreet had to just suck it up. Which brings us to the point of the OP. Should Longstreet have been as fired up as Pickett was about the charge? Was that the real lynch pin on which the battle hung?

Tut tut, did you read my original post, you don't have that option.![]()
How? He carried out his orders for the assault, then -when it failed- prepared for the counterattack that didn't come.Longstreet let Lee down.
Agreed. Too often because of the result, some attempt excuses: Lee 'wasn't himself'; he "was ill". No, Lee's strength was his aggressiveness and on this occasion, it was his downfall.Lee knew he was throwing the dice but he thought he had the loaded pair. His army was a wonder, they would do anything he asked of them and he believed they would succeed at it. So he not only asked, he demanded. People have wondered what in the world was up with Lee, he wasn't himself, he was sick, etc. Actually, this was indeed Lee! He was a very controlled person at all times but this was one time he threw any restraint out the window and went for the whole enchilada. Think what the prize would have been had he won!
Stuarts orders was to guard the flank... nothing more.Pickett's charge was supposed to have been supported by a Cavalry assault from JEB Stuart, that was to hit in the rear of the Federal position, but this did not go to plan.
The fight on East Cavalry Field May have been the MOST DECISIVE action of the battle. All credit to Custer !
Simply put, there is not so much as a shred of evidence to suggest that Stuart's presence was anything but what he and Lee both explicitly said, which is that the Confederate cavalry was there to guard the flank.
Would the charge have been more successful had the Confederate artillery fire been more accurate?
Specifically, what could Longstreet have done differently?I also find myself wondering about Longstreet. Should he have taken over for the absent Hill. Maybe. But they arent his men.