Russian navy

[TFSmith121]

gary,



At the end of the American Civil War when the Union fleet was at its very largest it never equalled the size of the Royal Navy in terms of the number of hulls available. In terms of tonnage the disparity was considerably greater, some of the Union hulls being sailing schooners of just 50 tons.

Monitor was already sunk by the time the Russian ships arrived at NYC and San Francisco but the newer monitor designs were still basically slow, unseaworthy, poorly armoured rafts with negligible reserve buoyancy and a pair of hard to work large guns in a slow turning easily jamming turret. They could not fight in a significant seaway and were no threat to the Royal Navy anywhere other than under the guns of a fortress (of course the Union did not have many guns for most of the coastal forts) where they might cause a few problems for the Royal Navy littoral forces until overwhelmed.

I would be interested to know how you think the Union Navy would have interdicted British shipping as almost the only ships they had capable of employment as commerce destroyers were the same ships they need to defend the coast? Where do you think they would have interdicted British shipping? There would have been almost nothing in the north Atlantic if the Union had warred on the British and the commerce destroyers were most unlikely to be able to break through the Brazil Africa gap. Where might they coal and provision? Almost every port would be closed to them or strictly neutral if they had warred on the British. Only the purpose built Russian combat clippers would have posed a serious threat to British shipping and there were too few of them to make a difference.

The British had considerably more, larger, better ironclads in commission, reserve or build than the Union had in 1863/4 even including the Webb ships built for export. On top of that British yards had built more than half of the ironclads in commission with other nations at this time including at least one built for Russia.

An Anglo-Union naval war would have been a very very one sided affair, even if it is a Union avec Russia affair the naval war would be very one sided but heaven knows why the Russians would be stupid enough to get involved?

Considering that 90 percent of the British flag merchant marine was still under sail in the early 1860s, and that any US side wheel steamer - built as a warship or converted from an ocean-going merchantman - is going to be quite capable of running down these sorts of targets... Lloyd's is going to be paying out a lot of policies in the City.

Likewise, considering the absolute inability of the RN to manage anything decisive in littoral operations operating by itself in 1854-55 or 1859 or even in the 1860s, 1870s, 1880s, or 1890s against a Western enemy, your confidence sounds surprisingly like the RN flag officers who were defeated at Coronel, Tanga, the Dardanelles, etc. Cradock was KIA, along with most of his men (~1600 KIA between Good Hope and Monmouth) and Caulfield, Carden, and de Robeck all failed, with de Robeck losing three capital ships (Irresistible, Ocean, and Bouvet) along the way; Christian lost three large cruisers (Aboukir, Cressy, and Hogue) and most of their crews on a deployment the high command saw as questionable, but no flag officer managed to take charge effectively enough to change it. Audacious was mined and sunk in British waters during gunnery training exercises; etc. Again, not what would have been expected from the heirs of Trafalgar, but - nonetheless - exactly what happened...

It's not exactly a triumphal parade of victories for the RN in the steam era, from Odessa and Taganrog to the Peiho to Coronel etc., and given that the only enemy they faced in this period who actually tried to fight it out at sea were the Germans in 1914-18, (other than de Peirola, the Peruvian pirate, and even though the RN force on station under de Horsey outnumbered him 2-1, they still couldn't manage a decisive decision.) It doesn't make a compelling case for the RN sweeping all before it in action against a Western enemy in the second half of the Ninetenth Century.

Beyond that, given the RN's loss of four capital ships (Conqueror, Captain, Vanguard, Victoria) to marine casualty in the same period, it's not exactly a sweeping endorsement of RN seamanship and command (or naval architecture) either, at least not as demonstrated by Sotheby, Dawkins, Burgoyne (and Coles), and Tryon, et al.

Given the fates of Tiger, Jasper, Comorant, Lee, Plover, Conqueror, Orpheus, Captain, Vanguard, and Victoria, it's not like the RN in this period was invulnerable to the realities of combat and operations at sea, even against enemies (Russia and China, for example) that never ordered their ships (if they even had them; the Chinese certainly did not in 1859-60, and yet still managed to sink three of the RN's finest in a single action in 1859) to sea. Or even the sea itself, and in their own waters...

Obviously, when one considers the operational record in this era of the RN, the differences between historical reality and myth making is fairly stark. Add in the 1914-15 losses, the first time in this period the RN actually faced a significant enemy willing to fight it out at sea, and it becomes clear the RN, despite its numerical strength, was not exactly everything it was cracked up to be. ... The USN had more experience fighting it out against steel and steam at sea in 1913 than the RN had, for example.

The same held true regarding iron and steam in 1863, as well, and for most of 1862.

Best,

 

[matthew mckeon]

Gentlemen,
You are investing a great deal of heat in what is after all, a war that didn't happen. Thank goodness the historical actors were less irritable then forum members, there would have been a bloodbath! Let's proceed a little more respectfully.

 

[Dilandu]

//It is also my understanding that serfs owned by the Imperium itself were not freed until 1866.
//

Yes. The reason was, that such serfs were usually workers on government factories&mines, and transition time were needed to avoid production drop.

//was then a part of the Russian Empire some serfs were not fully freed until 1871 and in Kalmykia also a part of the Russian Empire at the time the serfs were not freed until 1892.//

The problem was enforcement. Those regions... Well, they weren't actually tightly controlled, and local population were quite prone to make a lot of ugly mess. The Middle Asia was not firmly controlled until much later.

 

[Tielhard]

//It is also my understanding that serfs owned by the Imperium itself were not freed until 1866.
//

Yes. The reason was, that such serfs were usually workers on government factories&mines, and transition time were needed to avoid production drop.

//was then a part of the Russian Empire some serfs were not fully freed until 1871 and in Kalmykia also a part of the Russian Empire at the time the serfs were not freed until 1892.//

The problem was enforcement. Those regions... Well, they weren't actually tightly controlled, and local population were quite prone to make a lot of ugly mess. The Middle Asia was not firmly controlled until much later.

So Dilandu, I would suggest that you were being a bit optimistic about the date the serfs were freed in the Russian Empire. You gave the date the process began rather than the date it was actually completed 1892.

 

[Dilandu]

but the newer monitor designs were still basically slow, unseaworthy, poorly armoured rafts with negligible reserve buoyancy and a pair of hard to work large guns in a slow turning easily jamming turret.

So basically they were lightyear more powerfull than the majority of birtish ironclads) In coastal waters, of course. But in coastal waters, monitors have the advantages of:

- Light draft
- Agility
- Low profile
- Excellent arc of fire
- Strudy armor
- Guns, that could really punch a hole through 4-inch armor, albeit from close range

Basically no british ironclad of this era have those advantages) I fully agree, that in open sea they were absolutely superior. But in coastal waters? With shallows, rocks and narrow ways? They have no chances against monitors. Not on that tech level.

 

[Dilandu]

So Dilandu, I would suggest that you were being a bit optimistic about the date the serfs were freed in the Russian Empire. You gave the date the process began rather than the date it was actually completed 1892.

You probably did not notice, that 67th Tiger tried to claim that abolition of serfdom was caused, somehow, by Biriths actions of 1863.

and the British thereafter simply noted that Russia should not attempt to alter the Treaty of Vienna (by annexing Poland into Russia proper) and should emancipate the Polish serfs (as the UK had forced Russia to emancipate the Russian serfs). T

My point was against this.

 

[Tielhard]

Simply by dispatching the two squadrons, one to New York and the other to San Francisco, while maintaining the Mediterranean squadron at the ready, means that in the event of war, the British would be facing a much more demanding conflict at sea than they had in 1854-56, which certainly makes it clear the Russians were much more realistic and discerning about a rational strategy.

Likewise, maintaining the Baltic Fleet meant, as it had in 1854-56, the British were unwilling to actually risk an offensive against any significant target like Kronstadt, much less St. Petersburg.

Couple the above with the reality the only Allied "victory" in the Baltic in 1854-56 was the invasion of the Åland Islands, which are basically within spitting distance of the Swedish mainland (and still required a French infantry division, because the British didn't have anything left after deploying 12 brigades to the Crimea), it's not like the Russians had much to worry about ...

Best,

TFSmith121,

... and yet despite all the half-truths that have been gorily splattered all over the virtual paper to demonstrate how utterly useless the Royal Navy, the Army and indeed the British government were the inescapable truth is that the British utterly defeated the Russian Empire in the Crimean war, utterly defeated the Chinese in a couple of Opium wars, intervened in the Taiping for the victory, defeated the Sepoy rebellion, even brought the Afghans to heel, defeated the Maori in every war but the first, eventually brought the Ashanti, Zulu and the Boer to their knees, won the wars in the Himal, had a splendid expedition to Abyssinia complete with elephants and made the Union yeild over Trent. What a bunch of losers. Compare them to the mighty USA which managed both the Sand Creek Massacre and defeat at the hands of Red Cloud. Oh! What a magnificent Manifest destiny they had!

Not forgetting of course that the English won the World Cup in 1966.

 

[matthew mckeon]

2nd Warning. Points, thread bans, and thread closing on the table.

 

[TFSmith121]

TFSmith121,

... and yet despite all the half-truths that have been gorily splattered all over the virtual paper to demonstrate how utterly useless the Royal Navy, the Army and indeed the British government were the inescapable truth is that the British utterly defeated the Russian Empire in the Crimean war, utterly defeated the Chinese in a couple of Opium wars, intervened in the Taiping for the victory, defeated the Sepoy rebellion, even brought the Afghans to heel, defeated the Maori in every war but the first, eventually brought the Ashanti, Zulu and the Boer to their knees, won the wars in the Himal, had a splendid expedition to Abyssinia complete with elephants and made the Union yeild over Trent. What a bunch of losers. Compare them to the mighty USA which managed both the Sand Creek Massacre and defeat at the hands of Red Cloud. Oh! What a magnificent Manifest destiny they had!

Not forgetting of course that the English won the World Cup in 1966.

Again, reported for lack of civility. However, given the question revolves around the Imperial Russian Navy and its role in the strategic calculations of all the powers in the 1860s, it's worth pointing out that:

Crimea - one may wish to check with the French, the Turks, the Sardinians, and on the de facto alliance with the Austrians when it comes to the factors that led to an Allied victory over the Russians after 24 months of warfare, as opposed to "the British utterly" defeating the Russians. Presumably, the French, Turks, and Sardinians paying the butcher's bill felt differently, and given the scale of the French, Turkish, and even the Sardinian expeditionary forces in comparison to that of the British, they had a point. Same for the threat of the Austrians in the Balkans and Central/Eastern Europe. See: https://archive.org/stream/invasionofcrimea09king#page/6/mode/2up (as in "100,000 French, 45,000 Turks, 28,000 British, and 15,000 Sardinians"; yeah, that's "utterly British" all right...) Also, the realities of the Russian Navy's involvement are that they never put to sea in 1855-56.
China - again, may wish to check with the French on that one. No Chinese navy, either, during the Opium Wars.
Taiping - Chinese Empire provided the manpower in that one; British funded some mercenary officers and supplies, and small garrisons. Also, no naval element of the Taipings.
Sepoys - The Indians provided most of the manpower themselves, and the Sepoys didn't have a navy.
Afghans - India provided the manpower; no Afghan navy, obviously.
Maori - no Maori navy.
Africa - no African navies.
Etc.

Anyway, what, specifically, are you suggesting is a "half truth"? You made the charge; please substantiate it.

 

[TFSmith121]

2nd Warning. Points, thread bans, and thread closing on the table.

Understood, and appreciated.

Best,

 

[67th Tigers]

As well as you dismissed a lot of history books, and scientific works, and rewards awarded just because it doesn't consist with your imaginary idol of Royal Navy.

Might I remind you, that even the history of much less distant past is not simple and clear? I really hope not.

Well, I see you're making no pretense of unbiased investigation here.

We have quite a good idea of what happened at Taganrog from the allied perspective, because the reports of the commanders are easily accessible, and reporters on the scene saw the same think. The landing party consisted of two men whose names we know the names of. It's well covered in the histories (such as Vol. 9 of Kinglake).

The so called "second and third phases" were an immediate mystery. The British had basically done everything they wanted at Taganrog on 3rd June; they had denied the Russian Army four months worth of supplies. Hence further investigation was needed. The second phase according to the (obviously Russian) author of the wikipedia article places the date of the second phase starting as 7th July. This turned out to be an Old Style (OS) date, and the "second phase" was a recce by Commander Osborn in HMS Jasper on 19th July (NS, = 7th July OS). The Jasper observed a new battery being built on the hill and put two shells into it and observed no reply so moved on, leaving a pair of gunboats to interdict some barges (described in Osborn's action report).

The "third phase" was more obscure, and appears to be the Ardent destroying the battery the Jasper put two shells into two three weeks earlier, whilst Osborn led the Vesuvius, Wrangler, Beagle, Fancy, Grinder and Cracker on a recce of the Don River. It turned out to be so shallow the gunboats could only get 2.5 miles from the river delta. (This is covered in Vol. 85 of the Publications of the Navy Records Society). On the way back the Grinder again made a recce under fire.

 

[TFSmith121]

Good point but the OP was about sea power projection by the Russians. This is a feat that really has never been accomplished--the last attempt really being the October 62 missile crisis. They failed to impose their will and likely would have in 1862 as well. Thus my original comment--cannon fodder

Except the Russian strategy in 1862-63 was less sea power projection and more having a score of commerce raiders deployed outside of the Baltic before any potential balloon went up; it's essentially the same strategy adopted by the Germans in 1914, which - given the results (Turkey enters the war, the Germans defeat the British at Coronel and force major redeployments of RN assets away from the North Sea) was quite successful in operational terms in 1914-15.

Best,

 

[galveston bay]

gary,



At the end of the American Civil War when the Union fleet was at its very largest it never equalled the size of the Royal Navy in terms of the number of hulls available. In terms of tonnage the disparity was considerably greater, some of the Union hulls being sailing schooners of just 50 tons.

Monitor was already sunk by the time the Russian ships arrived at NYC and San Francisco but the newer monitor designs were still basically slow, unseaworthy, poorly armoured rafts with negligible reserve buoyancy and a pair of hard to work large guns in a slow turning easily jamming turret. They could not fight in a significant seaway and were no threat to the Royal Navy anywhere other than under the guns of a fortress (of course the Union did not have many guns for most of the coastal forts) where they might cause a few problems for the Royal Navy littoral forces until overwhelmed.

I would be interested to know how you think the Union Navy would have interdicted British shipping as almost the only ships they had capable of employment as commerce destroyers were the same ships they need to defend the coast? Where do you think they would have interdicted British shipping? There would have been almost nothing in the north Atlantic if the Union had warred on the British and the commerce destroyers were most unlikely to be able to break through the Brazil Africa gap. Where might they coal and provision? Almost every port would be closed to them or strictly neutral if they had warred on the British. Only the purpose built Russian combat clippers would have posed a serious threat to British shipping and there were too few of them to make a difference.

The British had considerably more, larger, better ironclads in commission, reserve or build than the Union had in 1863/4 even including the Webb ships built for export. On top of that British yards had built more than half of the ironclads in commission with other nations at this time including at least one built for Russia.

An Anglo-Union naval war would have been a very very one sided affair, even if it is a Union avec Russia affair the naval war would be very one sided but heaven knows why the Russians would be stupid enough to get involved?

the balance of forces (even we exclude ships fit for brown water operations only) is significantly better at this point in history than it was in 1812 (for the Americans and Russians)

Which was only one sided beginning in 1814 when the RN ran out of problems in Europe to deal with. In this situation it will have problems in Europe

The Royal Navy is the standard of the 19th Century, but it isn't invincible, it isn't omnipresent (not with all 3 oceans and every major sea to patrol), and it isn't omnipotent. Obviously no one else is either, but as the RN has the burden of sea control while the Americans and the Russians only have to practice sea denial in specific areas while waging a commerce war, it will indeed be anything but one sided.

Both world wars should tell you that much

 

[TFSmith121]

the balance of forces (even we exclude ships fit for brown water operations only) is significantly better at this point in history than it was in 1812 (for the Americans and Russians)

Which was only one sided beginning in 1814 when the RN ran out of problems in Europe to deal with. In this situation it will have problems in Europe

The Royal Navy is the standard of the 19th Century, but it isn't invincible, it isn't omnipresent (not with all 3 oceans and every major sea to patrol), and it isn't omnipotent. Obviously no one else is either, but as the RN has the burden of sea control while the Americans and the Russians only have to practice sea denial in specific areas while waging a commerce war, it will indeed be anything but one sided.

Both world wars should tell you that much

Indeed. The obvious and undeniable successes of the Imperial German Navy in 1914-15, in a very similar strategic situation, or of the Kriegsmarine in 1939-41, in roughly similar circumstances, make for compelling historical evidence of Britain's strategic problems in the steam era and afterwards.

Best,

 

[matthew mckeon]

Indeed. The obvious and undeniable successes of the Imperial German Navy in 1914-15, in a very similar strategic situation, or of the Kriegsmarine in 1939-41, in roughly similar circumstances, make for compelling historical evidence of Britain's strategic problems in the steam era and afterwards.

Best,

In WWI, the surface raider threat was a nuisance. In WW2, the submarines and airpower profoundly changed naval warfare out of recognition. Not to mention the strategy situation were completely different during the world wars.

Commerce raiders would have played a part of this bitterly fought(by forum members), but hypothetical war to be sure. But I wouldn't think that 20th century wars offer much of a guide.

 

[TFSmith121]

In WWI, the surface raider threat was a nuisance. In WW2, the submarines and airpower profoundly changed naval warfare out of recognition. Not to mention the strategy situation were completely different during the world wars.

Commerce raiders would have played a part of this bitterly fought(by forum members), but hypothetical war to be sure. But I wouldn't think that 20th century wars offer much of a guide.

Less so from the weapons, but more from the strategic setting. As Galveston Bay said, the "continental" power (Russia or the US in the 1860s, Germany in 1914) simply has to practice sea denial in littoral areas and commerce raiding on the broad seas; the "maritime" (and trade dependent) power has to manage sea control.

Having said that, the various actions between the German and British navies in 1914-15 are good examples of what happens when two such opposing powers shift from peacetime to wartime operations; the realities of both sides' losses and the aftermath of the preceding years of peacetime training are clear. Considering 1914-15 was the first time in roughly a century the British faced an enemy that chose to fight it out at sea, and that the vessels involved were coal-burning steamships, the historical examples of Coronel and Tanga seem more appropriate than Trafalgar et al.

Best,

 

[matthew mckeon]

The Kaiser's fleet failed to stop the British blockade, failed in contesting British control of the seas around Europe. The surface raider threat was minor. Its hard to see what the Germans accomplished with their surface fleet in WWI.

The real threat was submarines, but since that brought the US into the World War I, and didn't prove decisive anyway, since the early U Boats weren't able to blockade Britain or prevent the transportation of the AEF.

 

[galveston bay]

It should be noted that a literal handful of Confederate raiders took over 200 Union merchant ships over the course of the war. That is a significant chunk of the prewar Union merchant fleet. In this situation we are talking about a couple of dozen US and Russian sloops and smaller raiders, not to mention a few that are powered solely by wind. Now there are more RN ships of course than USN ships that were dedicated to anti raider missions, but in the worse case, if those Russo-American ships manage to equal the Confederate achievement, at around 30 ships apiece, we are talking around 40 raiders and roughly 1200 British merchant ships. Now that seems high to me, but even in a less successful run of about 10 ships each that still is a sizeable loss (roughly 400 ships).

I suspect, based on experience from the Napoleonic era (the most recent full scale maritime war) we are looking at the higher numbers. The reason to use the First World War as a model is because it is the first global war that we have records for showing how effective steam powered ships are at raiding and it is a similar large scale (global). The Napoleonic era too is global.

So we kind of have to use the models we have, taking into account differences such as wireless, aerial spotting aircraft to improve warnings vs the invisibility of the submarine. Take away those factors and you have the difficulty of finding a raider (a literal needle in a hay stack) vs the fact that merchant shipping takes predictable voyages from known ports.

So there are a lot of similarities making the models of actual wars useful.

As to the German surface fleet.. while it never seized control or even successfully denied the North Sea to the British, it did hold the Baltic and more importantly, forced the diversion of vast resources to contain it. In this situation similarly vast resources would have to be allocated to keep American and Russian squadrons at bay

 

[Dilandu]

In WWI, the surface raider threat was a nuisance.

Must point out, that german surface raiders strategy before World War I was very limited in compairson with French & Russian analogues. The geography of the Germany lacked open access to the oceans, which made any prolonged raiding operations virtually impossible.

 

[matthew mckeon]

It should be noted that a literal handful of Confederate raiders took over 200 Union merchant ships over the course of the war. That is a significant chunk of the prewar Union merchant fleet. In this situation we are talking about a couple of dozen US and Russian sloops and smaller raiders, not to mention a few that are powered solely by wind. Now there are more RN ships of course than USN ships that were dedicated to anti raider missions, but in the worse case, if those Russo-American ships manage to equal the Confederate achievement, at around 30 ships apiece, we are talking around 40 raiders and roughly 1200 British merchant ships. Now that seems high to me, but even in a less successful run of about 10 ships each that still is a sizeable loss (roughly 400 ships).

I suspect, based on experience from the Napoleonic era (the most recent full scale maritime war) we are looking at the higher numbers. The reason to use the First World War as a model is because it is the first global war that we have records for showing how effective steam powered ships are at raiding and it is a similar large scale (global). The Napoleonic era too is global.

So we kind of have to use the models we have, taking into account differences such as wireless, aerial spotting aircraft to improve warnings vs the invisibility of the submarine. Take away those factors and you have the difficulty of finding a raider (a literal needle in a hay stack) vs the fact that merchant shipping takes predictable voyages from known ports.

So there are a lot of similarities making the models of actual wars useful.

As to the German surface fleet.. while it never seized control or even successfully denied the North Sea to the British, it did hold the Baltic and more importantly, forced the diversion of vast resources to contain it. In this situation similarly vast resources would have to be allocated to keep American and Russian squadrons at bay

Your points are well taken. The German High Seas Fleet was a "fleet in being" after Jutland. I don't see any Russian or American equivalent force in the 19th century, in terms of being a plausible threat to engage and defeat a British battle fleet in waters near Britain.