How would you rate Rosecrans?

[David Moore]

It would have subtracted thousands of irreplaceable soldiers from Bragg's ranks, making it less likely that Bragg could threaten Chattanooga again and more likely that he could be driven back through Georgia.



I've seen no reason to believe that either of them was misrepresenting what he saw. But clearly Dana saw a lot more than Meigs did. And neither of them inspire any confidence that Rosecrans was up to the task.

Dana was called by Gordon Granger - who could be considered the real savior of Chickamauga- a "loathsome pimp."
Dana knowingly lied about Grant's drinking in 1863.
Dana himself admitted he may have been misinformed and unfair to Rosecrans.

Some excerpts from Meig's telegram:
I have seen the men vigorous, hearty, cheerful, and confident.
When the troops understood to be on their way here arrive General Rosecrans expects to recover command of the river to Bridgeport. Supplies can then be accumulated by water.
I have spent the time thus far with the commander and the chief officers of this army. It is difficult for the leaders to abstain from claiming a complete victory.
As I now see this field it appears to me that the great effort of the rebels by which, concentrating in Georgia, they hoped to crush this army and recover possession of Tennessee and Kentucky, has failed. If so, the fruits of victory are with General Rosecrans, though the trophies, the battle-field, and part of the wounded have fallen into the hands of the enemy.
Things look much better here than I expected to find them when I left Nashville; still success will demand efforts from the army and from the country. Of the rugged nature of this region, I had no conception when I left Washington. I never traveled on such roads before.

 

[brass napoleon]

Ord wrote the following to his wife:
"July 17, 1864
….the politicians still control matters here [Washington]- or seek to control them so that a general who is simply governed by military interests, and discards politics would be pulled to pieces and turned away -"

It's a reality of our form of government that the military is subordinate to the civilian government and must align itself to the political goals of our elected leaders. Anything other than that would be a military dictatorship.

Horace N. Fisher -who was there in 1863- wrote the following to John D. Long who was governor of Massachusetts after the war;
"After his victory at Stone River there came a set of disgruntled politicians to Rosecrans to get him to run as opposition candidate to Prest. Lincoln I have always thought that the fact of the overture thus made became known in Washington... and that this created a determination to get rid of him and led to his removal from command."
[Horace Greeley sent James Gilmore aka Edmund Kirk to Tennessee to sound out Rosecrans about running against Lincoln. Rosecrans flatly rejected the overture.]

Fisher is engaging in the wildest of conspiracy theories here: that Lincoln MIGHT have found out about some disgruntled politicians making an offer to Rosey that he "flatly rejected", and that as a result Lincoln wanted him removed from command and concocted a scheme to make this otherwise brilliant general look bad.

Not pretty stuff. Not what we read in our textbooks.

Probably because it's irrelevant. I've seen enough though, myself. Have a nice weekend.

 

[David Moore]

Dana was called by Gordon Granger - who could be considered the real savior of Chickamauga- a "loathsome pimp."
Dana knowingly lied about Grant's drinking in 1863.
Dana himself admitted he may have been misinformed and unfair to Rosecrans.

Some excerpts from Meig's telegram:
I have seen the men vigorous, hearty, cheerful, and confident.
When the troops understood to be on their way here arrive. General Rosecrans expects to recover command fff the river to Bridgeport. Supplies can then be accumulated by water.
I have spent the time thus far with the commander and the chief officers of this army. It is difficult for the leaders to abstain from claiming a complete victory.
As I now see this field it appears to me that the great effort of therebels by which, concentrating in Georgia, they hoped to crush this army and recover possession of Tennessee and Kentucky, has failed. If so, thefruits of victory are with General Rosecrans, though the trophies, the battle-field, and part of the wounded have fallen into the hands of the enemy.
Things look much better here than I expected to find them when I left Nashville; still success will demand efforts from the army and from the country. Of the rugged nature of this region, I had no conception when I left Washington. I never traveled on such roads before.

Attached is a letter that Meigs wrote Rosecrans in 1889. Note his linking Rosecrans with Hooker and Grant.

 

[David Moore]

It's a reality of our form of government that the military is subordinate to the civilian government and must align itself to the political goals of our elected leaders. Anything other than that would be a military dictatorship.



Fisher is engaging in the wildest of conspiracy theories here: that Lincoln MIGHT have found out about some disgruntled politicians making an offer to Rosey that he "flatly rejected", and that as a result Lincoln wanted him removed from command and concocted a scheme to make this otherwise brilliant general look bad.



Probably because it's irrelevant. I've seen enough though, myself. Have a nice weekend.

Garfield felt that the "political leaders were not unwilling to see evil befall Rosecrans." The story of Greeley's emissary sounding out Rosecrans about the presidency is not disputed by historians. Because I think you are new to this discussion I will repost the letter from JK Herbert to Bejamin Butler that I have posted elsewhere on this site. I'd like to point out that almost all my statements are supported by documentation by people who were at the events. After the war Fisher became a scholar of government and an educator. I for one would be reluctant to dismiss the veracity of what he wrote. You can learn more about him from these links http://www.masshist.org/online/civilwar/index.php?entry_id=712 AND https://books.google.com/books?id=O...onepage&q=horace newton fisher obituary&f=fal

From J. K. Herbert to General Butler Sherman House, Chicago, July 27th, 1863

Dear Sir: On looking about among the politicians here I find that there is more activity here than elsewhere in reference to prospective politics. Hon. E. B. Washburne is making a business already of committing men to Grant for the Presidency. He is wealthy, shrewd, in earnest, determined that Grant shall be the man. I hear good men say he will go into a nominating convention stronger than Lincoln went. They are trying to get Grant in command of Rosecrans' army & his own too, with perhaps additional reinforcements —send him across to the Atlantic and eastward on Richmond — hoping thereby to make him irresistible in a Nominating Convention. If the administration see the joke, they will see to it that he does not get an opportunity. But if Grant & his western friends can do this thing they will — I am not misinformed — they are bending every energy for the enterprise. The P. O. keeps the Tribune almost if not altogether for Lincoln's renomination. Judge Drummond, Judge Higgins, & some other good men of former days are for Lincoln, I learn. Judge Higgins came to my room last night and stayed till midnight. I learned the Lincoln policy here by heart. I mean the notions of men who would renominate & who they are. Dr. D. Brainerd, a former strong Democratic politician, will be one of the Com. men here. He is all right. But he tells me men here are for Grant or Lincoln generally, and "cannot be tied to" as we want them. Men who work and are of much account are apt to talk some Western man. Well, I don't fear the result in any case except Grant's, nor that one much; but it spoils the good Committee timber considerably. Brainerd is a Butler man, & one of the best in the state. He thinks we can get a good Com. by looking it up. I had a talk with the Tribune folks about Mo. They wanted you there instead of Schofield. I told them to talk it up, and the east would take up the cry I'd warrant, & I see in the Tribune yesterday morning a little article on the subject. I send you a paper & one to a friend in Boston to have the Boston papers take it up. I tell you Grant is going to be in the way in the West, & especially if he takes any more Vicksburgs, — such for example as Mobile or Savannah, or Richmond, & because they are crowding him, other men ought to be at work. I am getting the run of the thing in my Diary pretty closely. The League is large in Illinois. About 800 councils & 100,000 members now. All the strong men of the state are in them. There are fears entertained that Trumbull & other leading politicians will not take a bold stand since Burnside's row with the Times. They all backed down, you know. I think I shall have an instructive diary when I get around. Your most obt. servt.,J. K. Herbert
Source:https://books.google.com/books?pg=P...&q=herbert washburne butler rosecrans&f=false

 

[dlofting]

What were the ratios of troops/enemy between the the armies Rosecrans faced in Tennessee and Grant in VA?
I refer you to the Ord quotes in post 99 on this thread

I've got to say that this is an example of why your posts in this thread frustrate me. The answer to the question you have posed will show that Grant had a larger ratio/numbers advantage at the start of the Overland Campaign than Rosecrans did during Tullahoma/Chattanooga....ipso facto Rosecrans couldn't be expected to move as quickly as Grant.

However, that only tells a piece of the story. Grant was up against the best General in the Confederate army. The ANV had been beaten once, at Gettysburg. They had the best reconnassaince/intelligence officer the war produced, in Jeb Stuart......and we can go on.

You can't just pull out one piece of information (even if that one piece is verified to be correct by a number of primary sources) and hang your hat on it. You have to look at the big picture.

The Union army lost the battle of Chickamauga and Rosecrans was in command of that army, so he gets the blame.

As Lee said after the failure of Pickett's charge "It's all my fault".

 

[David Moore]

I've got to say that this is an example of why your posts in this thread frustrate me. The answer to the question you have posed will show that Grant had a larger ratio/numbers advantage at the start of the Overland Campaign than Rosecrans did during Tullahoma/Chattanooga....ipso facto Rosecrans couldn't be expected to move as quickly as Grant.

However, that only tells a piece of the story. Grant was up against the best General in the Confederate army. The ANV had been beaten once, at Gettysburg. They had the best reconnassaince/intelligence officer the war produced, in Jeb Stuart......and we can go on.

You can't just pull out one piece of information (even if that one piece is verified to be correct by a number of primary sources) and hang your hat on it. You have to look at the big picture.

The Union army lost the battle of Chickamauga and Rosecrans was in command of that army, so he gets the blame.

As Lee said after the failure of Pickett's charge "It's all my fault".

I think I have posted more than one piece of information on this site.
In case you didn't see it elsewhere I will repost the link to what Edward Hagerman wrote about Rosecrnans' mobility.
Rosecrans interestingly did face Lee in WV in 1861. What he would have done with an army the size of Grant's in 1864-5 is not knowable but I think he would have avoided frontal assaults. Lee was hoping Rosecrans would attck him at Sewell Mountain and Rosecrans refused leaving Lee disappointed.
Did the Union army lose the Chattanoga campaign?
Page 211f https://books.google.com/books?id=h..._AbYQ6AEIHDAA#v=onepage&q=SPECTACULAR&f=false

 

[David Moore]

It would have subtracted thousands of irreplaceable soldiers from Bragg's ranks, making it less likely that Bragg could threaten Chattanooga again and more likely that he could be driven back through Georgia.



I've seen no reason to believe that either of them was misrepresenting what he saw. But clearly Dana saw a lot more than Meigs did. And neither of them inspire any confidence that Rosecrans was up to the task.

Wouldn't Rosecrans have suffered considerable casualties? What was the interval between major battles in 1883? Two to three months?
Are you saying after a battle of Tullahoma Bragg would have retreated through Chattanooga to Atlanta? Are you saying after such a battle Rosecrans would have pursued Bragg through the mountains, rivers and plateaus of east Tennessee and north Alabama without delay?
I think a battle of Tullahoma wound not have produced too much a different outcome than the campaign of Tullahoma did:
Rosecrans in Tullahoma, Bragg in Chattanooga. Many thousand of men would not have been killed however.

 

[leftyhunter]

Not to make Rosecrans look bad but to make sure he failed and others would benefit.
Garfield used the word "evil." Ord wrote the following to his wife:
"July 17, 1864
….the politicians still control matters here [Washington]- or seek to control them so that a general who is simply governed by military interests, and discards politics would be pulled to pieces and turned away -"
Horace N. Fisher -who was there in 1863- wrote the following to John D. Long who was governor of Massachusetts after the war;
"After his victory at Stone River there came a set of disgruntled politicians to Rosecrans to get him to run as opposition candidate to Prest. Lincoln I have always thought that the fact of the overture thus made became known in Washington... and that this created a determination to get rid of him and led to his removal from command."
[Horace Greeley sent James Gilmore aka Edmund Kirk to Tennessee to sound out Rosecrans about running against Lincoln. Rosecrans flatly rejected the overture.]

Not pretty stuff. Not what we read in our textbooks.

In order to prove a conspiracy their must be proof that higher up's in the case of Rosecrans knew that Longstreet would reinforce him and thus hold back needed troops and supplies.
Leftyhunter

 

[nitrofd]

I think I have posted more than one piece of information on this site.
In case you didn't see it elsewhere I will repost the link to what Edward Hagerman wrote about Rosecrnans' mobility.
Rosecrans interestingly did face Lee in WV in 1861. What he would have done with an army the size of Grant's in 1864-5 in not knowable but I think he would have avoided frontal assaults. Lee was hoping Rosecrans would attck him at Sewell Mountain and Rosecrans refused leaving Lee disappointed.
Did the Union army lose the Chattanoga campaign?
Page 211f https://books.google.com/books?id=h..._AbYQ6AEIHDAA#v=onepage&q=SPECTACULAR&f=false

Lee in West Virginia was not the same Lee with the ANV.

 

[leftyhunter]

Lee in West Virginia was not the same Lee with the ANV.

Especially keeping in mind that at first Lee was not the commander of CSA forces in Wv. Per President Davis he was a senior advisor the three other CSA generals who each commanded their own forces.
McPhearson p.300 "But Lee, functioning in Richmond as a sort of commander in chief of Virginia's armed forces had few men and less steel to spare in faraway western Virginia..Lee was only able to supply Gen.Garnett with 4,500 men"in the most miserable condition as to arms clothing and discipline ".
Eventually Lee was sent to Wv"Lee went to Huntersville where 10,00 wet, sick, hungry Confederate soldiers confronted 3,000 Union troops dug in the high ground of Cheat Mountain., a few miles south of the Rich Mountain pass from which Rosecrans had driven the rebels in July" By the way McPhearson notes that Rosecrans served very effectively in Wv. Not to say its not Rosecrans fault if he takes advantage of enemy forces after all war is not a boxing match its a street fight. On the other hand we can't compare the AnV vs the state of CSA troops in Wv . The Union troops on the whole where better led, more numerous and better supplied then the CSA troops and most of the locals where friendly and many fought on the Union side.
Leftyhunter

 

[1SGDan]

What were the ratios of troops/enemy between the the armies Rosecrans faced in Tennessee and Grant in VA?
I refer you to the Ord quotes in post 99 on this thread

I am not exactly sure what your point is but will say this odds can be figured in several ways, especially in the minds of military leaders. What we know about what Rosecrans and Grant thought of these odds is limited. We may may never know for certain. What we do know is that one acted boldly to confront them while one did not. To paraphrase an old saying in this case fortune favored the bold.

 

[David Moore]

In order to prove a conspiracy their must be proof that higher up's in the case of Rosecrans knew that Longstreet would reinforce him and thus hold back needed troops and supplies.
Leftyhunter

I'm going principally on two things:
Garfield's letter written in 1867 saying that political leaders were not unwilling to see evil befall Rosecrans.
I have only seen the quote in its entirety in my book. (Aside from the Garfield papers in the Library of Congress)
Hopefully this link will get you to page 163 https://books.google.com/books?id=YkVXAwAAQBAJ&pg=PA163&dq=the+political+leaders+not+unwilling+to+see+evil+befall+him&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwiizIe7ycPJAhVJwj4KHUbpCLMQ6AEIHjAA#v=onepage&q=the political leaders not unwilling to see evil befall him&f=false
Also the JK Herbert to Benjamin Butler stating that Washburne, Grant's political patron,was working to get Grant head of Rosecrans' army.
All the political leaders needed to do for Rosecrans to fail was to not reinforce Rosecrans which they didn't.
It is interesting that news of Lee's troops was in the NY Herald on Sept 9 but Halleck didn't alert Rosecrans until Sept 13.
I don't want to be called a conspiracy promoter but when I came upon these quotes I had an obligation to learn more about them and put them in my book.
When I recently came upon the Ord quote about politics determining the fate of generals it only reinforced my belief that politics determined Rosecrans' fate.

 

[David Moore]

Lee in West Virginia was not the same Lee with the ANV.

Nevertheless Rosecrans outgeneraled him. Rosecrans was not an advocate of charges against entrenched positions. Lee and Rosecrans had a good relationship after the war. That probably hurts Rosecrans with some historians today.

 

[David Moore]

I am not exactly sure what your point is but will say this odds can be figured in several ways, especially in the minds of military leaders. What we know about what Rosecrans and Grant thought of these odds is limited. We may may never know for certain. What we do know is that one acted boldly to confront them while one did not. To paraphrase an old saying in this case fortune favored the bold.

I'm saying if Rosecrans had been given an army the size of Sherman's or Grant's in 1864 he probably would have done at least as well they did. Probably much better. Rosecrans accomplished quite a bit: WV, NE Mississippi (Grant the commanding general didn't take part in the battles of Iuka and Corinth) Middle Tennessee.

 

[1SGDan]

I'm saying if Rosecrans had been given an army the size of Sherman's or Grant's in 1864 he probably would have done at least as well they did. Probably much better. Rosecrans accomplished quite a bit: WV, NE Mississippi (Grant the commanding general didn't take part in the battles of Iuka and Corinth) Middle Tennessee.

I am quite a fan of his Tullahoma Campaign but as far as the rest it is just conjecture. Tell me what you did not what you MIGHT have done under different circumstances.
Grant actually did have input on Iuka but did not support Rosecrans as the original plan had suggested.

 

[David Moore]

I am quite a fan of his Tullahoma Campaign but as far as the rest it is just conjecture. Tell me what you did not what you MIGHT have done under different circumstances.
Grant actually did have input on Iuka but did not support Rosecrans as the original plan had suggested.

Not quite sure of your question. Grant basically agreed to the plan which he admits was Rosecrans' but after midnight on Sept 19 he was not a factor. Iuka is my next project. Researching it now.

 

[1SGDan]

Not quite sure of your question. Grant basically agreed to the plan which he admits was Rosecrans' but after midnight on Sept 19 he was not a factor. Iuka is my next project. Researching it now.

You can see my analysis at
http://civilwartalk.com/threads/iuka-victory-as-failure.69613/#post-411022

 

[David Moore]

You can see my analysis at
http://civilwartalk.com/threads/iuka-victory-as-failure.69613/#post-411022

I appreciate your skepticism about the acoustical shadow and your noting that Grant seemed to lose interest in the battle.
My research will address those things. Part of my interest in Iuka is that it started the rift between Grant and Rosecrans and we know who won that battle. Your emphasis is the military which is essential, mine is more on the political and personal. The war was fought after all to settle political issues not to see who had the better generals or braver soldiers.

 

[1SGDan]

I appreciate your skepticism about the acoustical shadow and your noting that Grant seemed to lose interest in the battle.
My research will address those things. Part of my interest in Iuka is that it started the rift between Grant and Rosecrans and we know who won that battle. Your emphasis is the military which is essential, mine is more on the political and personal. The war was fought after all to settle political issues not to see who had the better generals or braver soldiers.

Analysis of all aspects are appreciated but I will offer that on a battlefield there are no politics. I 'll anticipate your analysis from a different perspective.

 

[leftyhunter]

I'm going principally on two things:
Garfield's letter written in 1867 saying that political leaders are not unwilling to see evil befall Rosecrans.
I have only seen the quote in its entirety in my book. (Aside from the Garfield papers in the Library of Congress
Hopefully this link will get you to page 163 https://books.google.com/books?id=YkVXAwAAQBAJ&pg=PA163&dq=the+political+leaders+not+unwilling+to+see+evil+befall+him&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwiizIe7ycPJAhVJwj4KHUbpCLMQ6AEIHjAA#v=onepage&q=the political leaders not unwilling to see evil befall him&f=false
Also the JK Herbert to Benjamin Butler stating that Washburne, Grant's political patron,was working to get Grant head of Rosecrans' army.
All the political leaders needed to do for Rosecrans to fail was to not reinforce Rosecrans which they didn't.
It is interesting that news of Lee's troops was in the NY Herald on Sept 9 but Halleck didn't alert Rosecrans until Sept 13.
I don't want to be called a conspiracy promoter but when I came upon these quotes I had an obligation to learn more about them and put them in my book.
When I recently came upon the Ord quote about politics determining the fate of generals it only reinforced my belief that politics determined Rosecrans' fate.

I appreciate the link but it does not prove that their was an active conspiracy to damage or place the AoC in danger.
Here's another take on higher ups and Rosecrans
From the book " The Grand Design Strategy and the U.S.Civil War Donald Stoker Professor at the US Naval College Oxford University Press p.321-325
" Has Rosecrans pushed beyond the city, Halleck unsure as to the truth of reports that the rebels had sent part of Bragg's army to Lee, put the brakes Rosecrans advance on September 11,planning to give orders for future movements soon. He directed Burnside to take the gaps in the mountains of North Carolina and link up with Rosecrans at least his cavalry. Rosecrans thought it more likely that reinforcements where coming to Bragg. This was confirmed on the fourteenth. Meanwhile,Rosecrans worried about an attack on his communications . Hallack responded by ordering Burnside to put as many troops as to Chattanooga to reinforce Rosecrans and ordered old Rosy to prevent Bragg from getting back into middle Tennessee. Hallack also began coordinating other forces to meet a possible counter thrust by Bragg by taking troops from various commands further west.
No evidence that any higher up wanted rosecrans to fail. It appears Hallack is trying to get the help Rosecrans need. true more troops at Chicumungua would of helped Rosecrans but troops from Gen. Sheridan and Gen. Davis did reach Thomas but Thomas thought they would get in the way and ordered them to Chattanooga.
Leftyhunter