How much did Meade know?

[johncla]

Military intelligence. Have you noticed - in the Vicksburg campaign - how well-informed Grant and his colleagues were compared to their opponents? I think there's even a story that the landing at Bruinsburg was delayed for five minutes while a US agent of some kind boarded the 1st boat, confirmed to Grant that the coast was clear, and then the 1st troops stepped ashore. And in the Gettysburg campaign on the morning of July 1 Meade knew where Lee's army was, while Lee thought Meade's army was 25 miles away at Middleburg, rather than Buford's division on the near side of Gettysburg, and an infantry corps nearby.

So, is there a pattern of US military intelligence outworking Confederate military intelligence?

My question -- how much did Meade know about the position and activities of Ewell's corps between June 28 and July 1?

I don't remember reading anything about that, anywhere. We all know about Buford's reports to Reynolds, but that was just Rodes and Early's general location on 6/30. Surely, the PA governor was raising holy heck with US Army HQ in the capitol, detailing on a daily basis for a week or so the sack of Chambersburg, Gettysburg, Carlisle, York...? How much of that information filtered out to the Army of the Potomac?

I'm guessing Meade was fully informed about Ewell's corps, but don't see that in the histories.

 

[6thMichCav]

It may not be directly relevant to your question, but I understand Kilpatrick notified Pleasanton of the cavalry clash at Hanover, and Pleasanton reported it to Meade the evening of June 30. So, not only was Stuart delayed in linking up with Lee, but Meade was aware of the whereabouts of (at least part of) the Confederate cavalry.

 

[Josh The Lighthouse Guy]

I think Meade had a better picture of where Lee was at dawn on July 1 than vice versa, but I think it was still rather incomplete. If Meade is fully aware of Lee's actual dispositions I think his instructions to Reynolds would have been more cautious and he would have sent more cavalry to Gettysburg than just Buford.

I would imagine Kent Masterson Brown's book about Lee at Gettysburg addresses this topic.

 

[gc45]

Have asked myself on many occasions just why Reynolds, being considered tops in his position as a core commander, would ride into a hornets nest of southerners getting himself killed right off. Both he and Meade may not have known much about just where the boys in gray were but lets say they knew 50% or a little more, would Reynolds then ride up and to their front only to get killed?

 

[Scott1967]

Have asked myself on many occasions just why Reynolds, being considered tops in his position as a core commander, would ride into a hornets nest of southerners getting himself killed right off. Both he and Meade may not have known much about just where the boys in gray were but lets say they knew 50% or a little more, would Reynolds then ride up and to their front only to get killed?

Meredith the Iron Brigade commander was thought by many an incompetent fool i suspect Reynolds wanted his best brigade placed properly and thought to take care of it personally in my opinion.

 

[RedRover]

So, is there a pattern of US military intelligence outworking Confederate military intelligence?

Yes. the US Army of the Potomac had a "Bureau of Military Information" attached to its Provost Marshal's department, organized by Gen. Hooker in early 1863, with agents and scouts collecting notes from locals, interrogating prisoners, etc. over a wide area around the army. They collected information from any and all sources. It's singular purpose was to collect information on enemy movements, organization, etc.

Below, the Bureau HQ, with Colonel George V. Sharpe, commanding, at left...

On June 12, some of Sharpe's men interviewed Charlie Wright, a contraband from about Culpepper, Virginia, who gave information that Ewell's Corps had passed there en route to the Potomac...

General Hooker was satisfied, all considered, that this was correct, and moved the Army of the Potomac toward the Potomac too.

In the following days the information from Charlie Wright, General Pleastonton's Cavalry scouts confirmed on that Ewell's corps was moving northward...

By the 24th Hooker was satisfied Ewell was fully over the Potomac, and advancing at the head of Lee's Army...

My question -- how much did Meade know about the position and activities of Ewell's corps between June 28 and July 1?
I'm guessing Meade was fully informed about Ewell's corps, but don't see that in the histories.

General Meade's dispatches detail the intelligence that he was satisfied was confirmed.

As of 11 AM on 29 June, General Meade was aware of Confederate movement toward the Susquehanna, but did not know exactly what Lee was up to, and planned accordingly.

He understood Lee's army generally was moving toward Chambersburg...

Twenty four hours later, on the 30th, Meade informed Gen. Couch of his intel on the Confederate movements, and presumed, correctly, that Ewell was near the Susquehanna...

By 4:30 PM that day, he understood some of Ewell's corps was at York, etc.

By 7 AM on July 1:

And by noon on July 1:

By 6 PM, he knew he was fighting Ewell and A.P. Hill, but didn't know where Longstreet's corps was...

On July 2, by 3 PM, he was concentrating the Army of the Potomac, and awaited an attack...

By 8 PM he reported that about 4 PM the Confederates attacked in strength.

By 8: 00 AM on July 3, Meade was satisfied that Lee's whole army was in his front...

 

[FZ11]

Yes. the US Army of the Potomac had a "Bureau of Military Information" attached to its Provost Marshal's department, organized by Gen. Hooker in early 1863, with agents and scouts collecting notes from locals, interrogating prisoners, etc. over a wide area around the army. They collected information from any and all sources. It's singular purpose was to collect information on enemy movements, organization, etc.

Below, the Bureau HQ, with Colonel George V. Sharpe, commanding, at left...

View attachment 561888


On June 12, some of Sharpe's men interviewed Charlie Wright, a contraband from about Culpepper, Virginia, who gave information that Ewell's Corps had passed there en route to the Potomac...

View attachment 561890

General Hooker was satisfied, all considered, that this was correct, and moved the Army of the Potomac toward the Potomac too.


View attachment 561889

In the following days the information from Charlie Wright, General Pleastonton's Cavalry scouts confirmed on that Ewell's corps was moving northward...

View attachment 561892

View attachment 561893


By the 24th Hooker was satisfied Ewell was fully over the Potomac, and advancing at the head of Lee's Army...

View attachment 561891




General Meade's dispatches detail the intelligence that he was satisfied was confirmed.

As of 11 AM on 29 June, General Meade was aware of Confederate movement toward the Susquehanna, but did not know exactly what Lee was up to, and planned accordingly.

View attachment 561875

He understood Lee's army generally was moving toward Chambersburg...

View attachment 561876

Twenty four hours later, on the 30th, Meade informed Gen. Couch of his intel on the Confederate movements, and presumed, correctly, that Ewell was near the Susquehanna...


View attachment 561877
View attachment 561878

By 4:30 PM that day, he understood some of Ewell's corps was at York, etc.

View attachment 561879

By 7 AM on July 1:

View attachment 561881

And by noon on July 1:

View attachment 561882
View attachment 561883

By 6 PM, he knew he was fighting Ewell and A.P. Hill, but didn't know where Longstreet's corps was...

View attachment 561884

On July 2, by 3 PM, he was concentrating the Army of the Potomac, and awaited an attack...

View attachment 561885

By 8 PM he reported that about 4 PM the Confederates attacked in strength.

View attachment 561886


By 8: 00 AM on July 3, Meade was satisfied that Lee's whole army was in his front...

View attachment 561887

Thank you, for this impressive research!

 

[121st PA Vols]

Have asked myself on many occasions just why Reynolds, being considered tops in his position as a core commander, would ride into a hornets nest of southerners getting himself killed right off. Both he and Meade may not have known much about just where the boys in gray were but lets say they knew 50% or a little more, would Reynolds then ride up and to their front only to get killed?

gc45, I think that is a characteristic of good/great commanders at any level, that they ride into it, wherever the action is, in many cases paying for it with their life or a wound. The list is unending of division and corps and army commanders that were killed or wounded by this kind of action.
From Lee on down, many showed up this way in battle. Meade's horse was hit and retired at Gettysburg with him having 5 bullet holes through his blouse and trousers during the second day of battle. It seems part and parcel of greatness.

 

[Miles Krisman]

Military intelligence. Have you noticed - in the Vicksburg campaign - how well-informed Grant and his colleagues were compared to their opponents? I think there's even a story that the landing at Bruinsburg was delayed for five minutes while a US agent of some kind boarded the 1st boat, confirmed to Grant that the coast was clear, and then the 1st troops stepped ashore. And in the Gettysburg campaign on the morning of July 1 Meade knew where Lee's army was, while Lee thought Meade's army was 25 miles away at Middleburg, rather than Buford's division on the near side of Gettysburg, and an infantry corps nearby.

So, is there a pattern of US military intelligence outworking Confederate military intelligence?

My question -- how much did Meade know about the position and activities of Ewell's corps between June 28 and July 1?

I don't remember reading anything about that, anywhere. We all know about Buford's reports to Reynolds, but that was just Rodes and Early's general location on 6/30. Surely, the PA governor was raising holy heck with US Army HQ in the capitol, detailing on a daily basis for a week or so the sack of Chambersburg, Gettysburg, Carlisle, York...? How much of that information filtered out to the Army of the Potomac?

I'm guessing Meade was fully informed about Ewell's corps, but don't see that in the histories.

General Meade only took over command of the Army of the Potomac on June 28, 1863, so although he may have then been privy to whatever intelligence that had been available to General Hooker, there really wasn't much he could do, other than pursue Lee as he did.

General Meade only took over command of the Army of the Potomac on June 28, 1863, so although he may have then been privy to whatever intelligence that had been available to General Hooker, there really wasn't much he could do, other than pursue Lee as he did.

(Apologies for making a mess of this post. johncla obviously didn't make this comment.)

 

[wausaubob]

The information provided by the African/American man had to be very helpful. That allowed Pleasonton's cavalry to make a preliminary report to search for corroboration. Cavalry on both sides had the ability to gain a good vantage point and experience in estimating the enemy strength.

 

[Reconstructed Rebel]

Cavalry on both sides had the ability to gain a good vantage point and experience in estimating the enemy strength.

Particularly when operating on home territory where the locals were eager to help in most cases. For much of the war this was an advantage enjoyed by the Confederates, but in Pennsylvania they experienced the intelligence gathering handicaps of the invading army.

Until this thread, I was unaware of how extensive and organized the Federal efforts at intelligence gathering were. Perhaps this was the result of the challenges Union commanders faced because most of their battles were in hostile states? Using this same line of thought, perhaps it was not as well organized by the Confederates because it was less difficult to collect the needed information?

 

[hughes]

Sharpe had an appropriate name.

 

[gc45]

gc45, I think that is a characteristic of good/great commanders at any level, that they ride into it, wherever the action is, in many cases paying for it with their life or a wound. The list is unending of division and corps and army commanders that were killed or wounded by this kind of action.
From Lee on down, many showed up this way in battle. Meade's horse was hit and retired at Gettysburg with him having 5 bullet holes through his blouse and trousers during the second day of battle. It seems part and parcel of greatness.

Agreed. perhaps i was thinking of all those who lead only from behind.

 

[BCS1973]

My question -- how much did Meade know about the position and activities of Ewell's corps between June 28 and July 1?

One would assume that Meade knew of Ewell being at Carlisle on the 28th. I don't believe enough telegraph lines would have been cut to prevent the news of a US Army barracks being taken. Similarly, I would posit that Couch would have sent word regarding Jenkins actions along the Susquehanna on the 29th and 30th, but what of Ewell? It's likely he knew of Ewell leaving Carlisle and the direction, but not clear if he knew for where. Even Jenkins didn't know Ewell headed for Cashtown on the 30th which would add to the confusion considering there would be a small force at Harrisburg while the larger force is moving in the opposite direction. I believe @RedRover 's post indicates such a gap in knowledge regarding Ewell's location for the 30th.

 

[RedRover]

One would assume that Meade knew of Ewell being at Carlisle on the 28th. I don't believe enough telegraph lines would have been cut to prevent the news of a US Army barracks being taken. Similarly, I would posit that Couch would have sent word regarding Jenkins actions along the Susquehanna on the 29th and 30th, but what of Ewell? It's likely he knew of Ewell leaving Carlisle and the direction, but not clear if he knew for where. Even Jenkins didn't know Ewell headed for Cashtown on the 30th which would add to the confusion considering there would be a small force at Harrisburg while the larger force is moving in the opposite direction. I believe @RedRover 's post indicates such a gap in knowledge regarding Ewell's location for the 30th.

The Confederate Cavalry covering Lee's army had cut all the telegraph lines they could. Stuart's cavalry force, east of Frederick and Meade's advance, cut the telegraph lines... and communication between Meades' army on the march, and Washington.

Imboden's brigade to the west of Lee, at Cumberland doing some of the same...

Jenkins' brigade the same operating with Ewell's corps in Lee's advance.
When Early entered Gettysburg on June 26 he cut the telegraph lines, etc., and then at York, he cut all the Telegraph lines there.

The consequence was, that Meade had to receive notices from Washington, etc. by couriers, with apparently most of the critical information on Ewell's corps along the Susquehanna only reaching the general in the first hours of July 1.

Again, during the day of June 30, neither Couch nor Gen. Halleck at Washington had "direct" communication with General Meade, who was on the march. But they were gathering information for him. For example about midday on the 30th:

Nor did General Couch at Harrisburg have any direct communication with Gen. Meade, Gen. Haupt noted it had been cut...

Consequently, Couch, etc. at Harrisburg had to communicate with Washington, and from there, couriers had to carry the information to Meade in the field.


On the 30th Couch sent the following to the War Department at Washington, for General Meade regarding Ewell... that it appeared he was backtracking to a concentration with Lee's army in the Cumberland Valley (say about Chambersburg)...

Also, received at Washington that evening from Couch, notice that Early's Division of Ewell's corps was heading toward Gettysburg...

So at the close of June 30, when it was clear that Ewell's Corps was leaving the Susquehanna, and backtracking toward the balance of Lee's Army, a battle was in the offing, which information was sent to Meade by a courier. The most significant of these notices were forwarded by Gen. Henry Haupt at Harrisburg.

Gen. Haupt at 10:30 P.M. from Harrisburg sent to Washington, for Gen. Meade, confirmation Lee's army concentrating about Chambersburg...

And at midnight... confirmation Lee's army was concentrating for a blow...

At 12:45 Haupt at Harrisburg sent a further notice from intelligence suggesting Lee's concentration point was not Chambersburg, but east of the mountains at Gettysburg.

So most of the above was carried to Meade by a special courier in the first hours of July 1, which Meade informed Haupt he received about 3 A.M. on the 1st of July.

 

[johncla]

In answer to my own question, I now see that Meade had pretty good information. Apparently his information was much better than Lee's. I just started reading KM Brown's book "Meade at Gettysburg" which has a bunch of information on this topic.
Im laughing...apparently Meade learned a lot just reading newspaper stories covering Lee's campaign.

 

[jackt62]

Both armies were playing a cat and mouse game after Lee commenced his campaign in late June. It is well understood that Stuart's absence hindered the ANV in tracking the daily movements of the AotP. But prior to Meade's elevation to command, Hooker was also stymied in developing the path of the ANV once it entered the Shenandoah Valley and was shielded by the Blue Ridge mountain line. By the time Meade assumed command, the ANV had fairly good intelligence of the whereabouts of certainly Ewell's Corps and the general direction in which the rest of the ANV was headed. But whether a clash would occur where it eventually happened at Gettysburg was uncertain given the wide trajectory of the ANV.

 

[BCS1973]

View attachment 562022


So at the close of June 30, when it was clear that Ewell's Corps was leaving the Susquehanna, and backtracking toward the balance of Lee's Army, a battle was in the offing, which information was sent to Meade by a courier. The most significant of these notices were forwarded by Gen. Henry Haupt at Harrisburg.

So I'm wondering at what point Couch lost direct contact as he references previous telegraphs. To correct my earlier post, Couch would have known by at least the 27th that Jenkins was heading his way.

 

[BCS1973]

By the time Meade assumed command, the ANV had fairly good intelligence of the whereabouts of certainly Ewell's Corps...

ANV or AotP?

 

[Josh The Lighthouse Guy]

Where was Jenkins on July 1? He was screening Rodes and Early as they approached Gettysburg. Was he covering Ewell's rear against Couch possibly lunging across the Susquehanna from Harrisburg?