Winter maneuvers

atlantis

2nd Lieutenant
Joined
Nov 12, 2016
The ANV had failures on the battlefield was any consideration given to large scale winter maneuvers to polish up Corp and Division command ability to handle their commands in the field.
 
The ANV had failures on the battlefield was any consideration given to large scale winter maneuvers to polish up Corp and Division command ability to handle their commands in the field.
I wouldn't think so. Firstly, the same conditions that inhibit mobile warfare during the winter would impede maneuvers. Second, conducting training maneuvers in a theater of operations is liable to be mistaken by the enemy for the real deal with who knows what consequences. Thirdly, the field armies may not be able to spare the formations from operational duties so they could conduct maneuvers. Fourthly, the field armies may not be able to support such training exercises without compromising operational logistics. And fifthly, there is simply no tradition or understanding (let alone capability) in the US Army of the necessity to exercise formations so I highly doubt the Confederates would either

In fact, even the British with their much larger army, only began training exercises at brigade level in the Home Isles on the very eve of the Crimean War (at least one field maneuver involving about 10,00 troops took place in about 1852 in India). The United States Army wouldn't conduct its first field maneuver (about 5,000 troops) until 1902, and the first peacetime training exercise with a provisional division didn't happen until 1911. Prussia, by contrast, had been doing field maneuvers at a division and corps level since the Napoleonic Wars.

I think field maneuvers and a proper training program would have benefited both armies but it simply wasn't possible for the Confederacy.
 
I wouldn't think so. Firstly, the same conditions that inhibit mobile warfare during the winter would impede maneuvers. Second, conducting training maneuvers in a theater of operations is liable to be mistaken by the enemy for the real deal with who knows what consequences. Thirdly, the field armies may not be able to spare the formations from operational duties so they could conduct maneuvers. Fourthly, the field armies may not be able to support such training exercises without compromising operational logistics. And fifthly, there is simply no tradition or understanding (let alone capability) in the US Army of the necessity to exercise formations so I highly doubt the Confederates would either

In fact, even the British with their much larger army, only began training exercises at brigade level in the Home Isles on the very eve of the Crimean War (at least one field maneuver involving about 10,00 troops took place in about 1852 in India). The United States Army wouldn't conduct its first field maneuver (about 5,000 troops) until 1902, and the first peacetime training exercise with a provisional division didn't happen until 1911. Prussia, by contrast, had been doing field maneuvers at a division and corps level since the Napoleonic Wars.

I think field maneuvers and a proper training program would have benefited both armies but it simply wasn't possible for the Confederacy.
What could be done to improve combat readiness during the downtime of winter.
 
What could be done to improve combat readiness during the downtime of winter.
Drill I would think. A well drilled unit would be more combat effective though a 'green' unit would likely be poor in its first engagement either way. It really depends on the unit, the winter, and the location. A regiment in the ANV in December of 1864 needs very different things than an AotP regiment in January of 1862.
 
Have you ever walked on ice with leather soled shoes? Driven a wagon on an icy road? Or, even worse a cannon and limber? Cleared a path or road without a modern snowshovel? What do you do when a January thaw sinks your wheeled vehicles in the mud? (Looking at you Mr Burnside.) Armies had no choice but to go into winter quarters because you couldn't maneuver in the weather. Jackson nearly destroyed his own army marching on Romney. Sherman could march all over the deep south from November to March but the weather is mild there. Still his soldiers complained about the cold. In Virginia you simply can't maneuver an army in winter conditions. War was pretty much a seasonal thing.
 
In terms of things that are within the mental framework of the armies involved, lots of drill in camp is the big one over the winter - very Valley Forge. Time under the drum greatly improves the battlefield effectiveness of an army - that's why militia units are supposed to have a minimum number of days of drill, it means they have the basics needed to fight.

In terms of things that are NOT within that mental framework, I think the biggest possible improvement would be comprehensive musketry practice. You probably couldn't run the whole army through the Hythe musketry method, but you could give them all the theoretical bits (that is, a course in range estimation etc.) and probably afford a few rounds per man to do actual practice.
 
I'm certainly no expert on any of this but if I remember correctly the Great Frederick conducted what is considered by some a classic battle of maneuver at Lethem on December 5th. 1757 that lead to a victory against the Austrians.

Similarly, Napoleon faced off in a very bloody battle against the Russians on February 7th. and 8 th., 1807 at Eylau.

Believe me no criticism of our gallant lads, North or South, is intended, however if the Europeans could fight battles in it...................

John
 
It is my impression that in 1803 or 1804 a very large military camp was established by the French Army under Napoleon at Boulogne. If I'm not mistaken maneuvering by very large formations, Divisions and even Corps was practised there.

John
 
I'm certainly no expert on any of this but if I remember correctly the Great Frederick conducted what is considered by some a classic battle of maneuver at Lethem on December 5th. 1757 that lead to a victory against the Austrians.

Similarly, Napoleon faced off in a very bloody battle against the Russians on February 7th. and 8 th., 1807 at Eylau.

Believe me no criticism of our gallant lads, North or South, is intended, however if the Europeans could fight battles in it...................

John
As I recall, Napoleon didn't do so well against the Russians in November and December of 1812. The Russians didn't do so well either, but they retained control of Russia. Would winter maneuvers have helped to prepare either side for what actually took place? If Napoleon had started in May would he still have had a difficult winter? Would winter maneuvers help prepare an army in the northern latitudes for winter or summer conflicts or was the climate just too much for large scale military conflicts using 19th century technology?
 
Sorry, I didn't make myself very clear. I was only referring to the fact that they did, on occasion, campaign in the winter in the 18th. and early 19th. century. If they were able to do that it would seem that they would have been able to conduct winter maneuvers. Just a thought.

Although I believe Eylau in 1807, between the French and the Russians, was considered strategically inconclusive, but it is my impression the Leuthen, in 1757, between the Prussians and the Austrians, was a decisive Prussian victory. Once again, if these armies were able to fight these battles in the winter it would seem that they would have been able to conduct maneuvers in the winter.

John
 
It's possible to campaign in winter but it's much harder. One of the key issues here is simply grass, because without the ability to graze (or forage up the equivalent from the area you're moving over) your wagons need to carry all of the food for your horses instead of half or less. This causes your operational distance to collapse and is probably going to lead to overstraining the horses, killing some of them.

Moving by forage becomes harder in less dense environments because you need enough food to be available in the area to feed the army, ideally without taking everything the locals have because if you do take everything they have it leads to suicidal resistance.
 
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It is my impression that in 1803 or 1804 a very large military camp was established by the French Army under Napoleon at Boulogne. If I'm not mistaken maneuvering by very large formations, Divisions and even Corps was practised there.

John

It's where the Napoleonic Army Corps, and hence all later Corps, was invented. Until this point, Corps simply meant the main body of an army.

The Armée des Côtes de l'Ocean (Marshal Berthier) was originally organised thus (English names):
  • Amphibious Forces - 5 independent brigades (under Marchand, Merle, Morand, Dupas and Eppler) each attached to a landing flotilla, and hence one of the other formations - were dispersed although several became an extra brigade in the wing they were attached to
  • Advance Guard (Marshal Lannes) of 2 divisions and a light cavalry brigade - became 5th Army Corps
  • Right Wing (Marshal Davout) of 2 divisions and a light cavalry brigade - became 3rd Army Corps
  • Main Body or "Army Corps" (Marshal Soult) of 4 divisions and a light cavalry brigade - became 4th Corps
  • Left Wing (Marshal Ney) of 3 divisions and a light cavalry brigade - became 6th Corps
  • Reserve (Prince Louis Bonaparte) of 1 heavy cavalry division, 2 dragoon divisions, 1 light cavalry division, 1 dismounted dragoon division and a light infantry brigade - became the Cavalry Reserve
Independent Armies
  • Army of Ireland (Marshal Augereau) of 2 divisions and a light cavalry division - became 7th Corps
  • Army of Holland (Marshal Marmont) of 2 divisions and a light cavalry division - became 2nd Corps
  • Army of Hanover (Marshal Bernadotte) of 2 divisions and a light cavalry division - became 1st Corps
  • Army of Italy (Marshal Massena) of 6 divisions and 3 cavalry divisions (1 ea. heavy, dragoon and light) - divided into a right and left wing
The Imperial Guard was only a single small cavalry division, and two infantry regiments (each of which was also a brigade).

As conceived, the main army was conventional in having an advance guard, right, centre and left, and a cavalry reserve. The real innovation was giving each a balanced force with cavalry etc., and expecting the commander to act on their own. This was largely because of the expected circumstance of each formation landing separated from the others, and hence each wing needing to be an army in their own right. As it transformed into the Grande Armee (with the addition of three previously independent armies), these all became numbered Army Corps.

The Berthier-Napoleon relationship is interesting, because Berthier did the real commanding of the Grande Armee. Napoleon usually gave broad brush-stroke ideas, and Berthier transformed them into actual orders etc.
 
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I'm certainly no expert on any of this but if I remember correctly the Great Frederick conducted what is considered by some a classic battle of maneuver at Lethem on December 5th. 1757 that lead to a victory against the Austrians.

Similarly, Napoleon faced off in a very bloody battle against the Russians on February 7th. and 8 th., 1807 at Eylau.

Believe me no criticism of our gallant lads, North or South, is intended, however if the Europeans could fight battles in it...................

John
Eylau is perhaps the ultimate example of why you don't campaign in the winter.

European military history has some dazzling examples of winter warfare; there is Leuthen as you say, and Gustavus Adolphus was the great master of winter warfare in his campaigns against Russia, Poland, and his crowning achievement at Breitenfeld - since his army often relied on local mercenaries, a Swedish 'winter advantage' can't be called into effect either. But also, winter conditions were quite literally the death of him at Lutzen.

Burnside had a pair of great plans for late autumn and winter campaigning, and the rain washed them both away.

There are three fundamental, critical differences between the American Civil War and the heyday of European winter warfare; the size of armies, the professionalism of armies, and America's imposing geography, criss-crossing major rivers, and the poor infrastructure of the American South.

Even small, professional armies struggled with the communication and movement crises created by winter. That problem is exponentially harsher for essentially immature mass armies without the cadres forming the backbone of Napoleonic or Prussian conscripts, and quadratically so campaigning in the major theaters of the ACW rather than in Europe. The critical rivers of the war are too fast and deep relative to their cold to freeze over, and frozen rivers are a theme of many winter brilliancies.

It is not cold that cripples an army as much as rain and mud. Freezing temperatures at least harden the ground for man and wagon and open new paths for maneuver. The milder winters of the wartime American South are the most unhappy medium, being fought across by the most unsuited armies, in some of the most unpleasant terrain.
 
So this may or may not be useful, it's what I would consider a conceptual framework.


Everything up to at least regimental-level drill is something that the troops would practice as part of their regiments (tactical battalions - that is, an organization that moves and fights as a single close order unit and follows the drill book). Making sure that the regiments operate the way they should, in effect - and making sure that if the officer asks for the soldiers to perform a marching right wheel, they actually do that marching right wheel. Since the regiment mostly already camps together, you don't need to make any real special arrangements to do these - it's just what an army that isn't actively on campaign should be doing anyway. During most pauses this is what armies actually were doing, unless they were instead engaged in labour to do things like sieges.

There is also what we might call "grand drill". By this I refer to a force larger than one tactical battalion which is nonetheless expected to do things in a specific, preplanned way.
An example of this would be French divisional attack columns (as seen at Waterloo) or the "Mixed Order" where some battalions are in line and others are in column. This is a complex bit of operation which needs to be trained in advance, but it's still drill - it just requires more coordination to get the troops in one place to do it.

A third thing is conditioning. This happens naturally if you're doing drill, but it can also be focused on - this is keeping the men active and used to marching long distances in any one day. Ideally you want it to be that the army's limiting factor is their animals and logistics, and that the men can march further than that in any given day. But, as I say, this happens naturally if the men are being drilled intensively enough, though you do need to have the spine to actually get them to do that because it's tiring and they don't want to do it.

Doing manoeuvres is something which is I think different to all of the above. I would consider a training manoeuvre to be the execution of a "mock campaign" in which the units of the army are expected to function as they would during an actual campaign, marching significant distances and camping in new locations, and to do so as large combined forces. It's a lot more realistic than peacetime pure drill, but in wartime of course you can manoeuvre realistically quite easily - against the enemy.


The thing is, I think manoeuvres specifically are most useful for a peacetime army or an army that is expected to go to war somewhere else and not for a long period of time. They become more important as war becomes more technical, as well, because there's so many more moving parts involved - but for an 1860s army, the only thing that manoeuvres really provide that the experience of being in a camp and doing drill don't provide is that it tests the ability of the officers to actually follow best practices and get the army on the move.


The reason why I've laid out all of this is that I think the armies of the Civil War mostly don't actually have the opportunity to get any particular benefit from training manoeuvres, beyond what they could get from spending the same amount of time drilling. The thing that would make this distinct is to move around and see what breaks, and there's not nothing to that, but generally speaking I think most of the time the armies either already have men with experience doing this, or they're so green that they really do need to drill the men - and remember, if you're doing the kind of manoeuvres which teach you things drill doesn't, you're eating into the time you could be drilling.
 
There are three fundamental, critical differences between the American Civil War and the heyday of European winter warfare; the size of armies, the professionalism of armies, and America's imposing geography, criss-crossing major rivers, and the poor infrastructure of the American South.
I'm not so sure the imposing geography is quite as critical a difference, because it's not like European winter warfare took place entirely in plains with good infrastructure. That said, I would agree with you if what you meant specifically was low population density, because that really is a pretty major difference - Switzerland in 1800 (hardly an especially flat and fertile region of Europe!) had about 100 people per square mile across the whole area, while Virginia (with about the same population in 1860 as Switzerland had in 1800) had four times the land area of Switzerland and thus a quarter the population density.


This matters because armies on campaign do so by taking food from the locals. If there are a quarter as many locals, there is a quarter as much food.
 
I'm not so sure the imposing geography is quite as critical a difference, because it's not like European winter warfare took place entirely in plains with good infrastructure. That said, I would agree with you if what you meant specifically was low population density, because that really is a pretty major difference - Switzerland in 1800 (hardly an especially flat and fertile region of Europe!) had about 100 people per square mile across the whole area, while Virginia (with about the same population in 1860 as Switzerland had in 1800) had four times the land area of Switzerland and thus a quarter the population density.


This matters because armies on campaign do so by taking food from the locals. If there are a quarter as many locals, there is a quarter as much food.
'Geography' is indeed vague, and Europe isn't a monolith - the campaigns of Gustavus alone ranged from Livonia to Germany. But there are a lot of factors tied up in the land itself that sometimes apply and sometimes don't, with population density being the one that is basically always consistently applicable that make winter campaigning in the ACW a lot more difficult than in most examples of successful winter campaigning that come to mind for me.

Low population density is also generally going to correspond to sparser, more primitive road infrastructure.

"America has a lot of forests and rivers" tends to be somewhat exaggerated as a factor making the Civil War unique, considering that Napoleon campaigned across imposing rivers, mountains, forests, etc., and indeed coordinated vastly disparate actions in both 1809 and in the simultaneous wars in Spain and Russia, something that is occasionally attributed as a new innovation to Grant. But I do feel that the sense that American geography being more hostile than that typical of Europe is an overly general exaggeration of something that has a kernel of merit, though that is for now more vibes than something I have dug deeply into to substantiate in a more concrete way.
 
"America has a lot of forests and rivers" tends to be somewhat exaggerated as a factor making the Civil War unique, considering that Napoleon campaigned across imposing rivers, mountains, forests, etc., and indeed coordinated vastly disparate actions in both 1809 and in the simultaneous wars in Spain and Russia, something that is occasionally attributed as a new innovation to Grant. But I do feel that the sense that American geography being more hostile than that typical of Europe is an overly general exaggeration of something that has a kernel of merit, though that is for now more vibes than something I have dug deeply into to substantiate in a more concrete way.
There are some places where it can be considered to apply, but for the most part I think the main campaigns take place in farmland areas - the AoP and AoNV spend their entire existence campaigning over good farmland except for more or less just The Wilderness and a few fights over mountain passes. Rosecrans going over the mountains to get to Chattanooga is a bit more high-elevation and dealing with Big Geography, though I suspect we could find comparable instances of dealing with tough mountains in Europe - the question being if the Alps or Pyrenees are more correct.

Generally armies stick to the lowland farm areas because that's where the objectives are, a lot of the time (i.e. the big cities and large populations that sustain enemy armies and enemy political will)
 
I think you underestimate the ruggedness of even the eastern US in this time frame. Northern Virginia was indeed small farms and towns, but the road network connecting them was still pretty poor. The Valley was good for transportation, which is why it was such a high speed avenue of approach. West and North of the Shenandoah, the mountains get impassable quickly. (See Jackson's Romney Campaign.) Central Virginia is pretty hilly too. Also, the Chickahominy Swamp southeast of Richmond was a dreadful hell for the Army of the Potomac. There was plenty of army arresting terrain in the East too. Also the constant marching and countermarching by these armies deluded them of crops, fences, houses, people and small timber. Northern Virginia was like a desert by the 3rd year of war.
 

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