Federal / Confederate Corps / Division Flexibility

[huskerblitz]

If messages are supposed to follow the chain of command up then they should follow the chain of command down. Giving instructions directly to subordinates of subordinates rather than through the intermediate levels of command is a good way to foster resentment among those whom you are circumventing, and - as with David and Johnston both talking to Pemberton - lead to conflicting orders.

For example, an army commander should not be giving orders directly to division commanders or artillery battery commanders, except in an emergency. Orders should go through the corps commander. This was the source of much of the tension between Grant and Meade during the Overland Campaign.



Micro-managing.

Again, sucks to have oversight.

 

[67th Tigers]

Charles Hamilton was promoted to date in September. James B McPherson promoted to date a month later.

Halleck asks Grant if he's situated with his commanders, and he replies that he would be happy to have Lew Wallace if he had less rank, but adding him now would upend his command structure.

Grant makes plans to add him by telling Dodge he will need to give up his post and come to the front, but Halleck diverts Wallace to keep Grant's command structure intact.

Hamilton's rank was dated to 19th September 1862, but it was signed into being on 10th March 1863, having been confirmed the day before. Hamilton is signing himself as BG up until ca. 20th January 1863, and signs himself as MG for the first time on 21st January. This would be as soon as the nomination is known.

In December 1862, Hamilton is still a BG(V). When Hamilton's seniority is settled in March, he is the ranking officer in 17th Corps. He made a claim for corps command, although the law as it stood then allowed POTUS to appoint anyone within the highest available grade to command, regardless of seniority (with regular rank being considered a different grade to volunteer rank). Grant reassigned him to 13th Corps, as McClernand ranked Hamilton, but Hamilton refused and resigned.

I don't see Halleck having any qualms about assigning Wallace to Grant's dept, but the VP really wanted Buell tried, and that needed two generals of equal or superior rank, and so Wallace and Ord were diverted to that duty.

 

[tony_gunter]

Hamilton's rank was dated to 19th September 1862, but it was signed into being on 10th March 1863, having been confirmed the day before. Hamilton is signing himself as BG up until ca. 20th January 1863, and signs himself as MG for the first time on 21st January. This would be as soon as the nomination is known.

In December 1862, Hamilton is still a BG(V). When Hamilton's seniority is settled in March, he is the ranking officer in 17th Corps. He made a claim for corps command, although the law as it stood then allowed POTUS to appoint anyone within the highest available grade to command, regardless of seniority (with regular rank being considered a different grade to volunteer rank). Grant reassigned him to 13th Corps, as McClernand ranked Hamilton, but Hamilton refused and resigned.

I don't see Halleck having any qualms about assigning Wallace to Grant's dept, but the VP really wanted Buell tried, and that needed two generals of equal or superior rank, and so Wallace and Ord were diverted to that duty.

Good point about McPherson, but Wallace was pulled off the train on his way to Grant's army the day after Grant told Halleck that it would upset the Army of the Tennessee command dispositions.

They only needed three men on the Buell commission, adding Wallace made five.

 

[67th Tigers]

Good point about McPherson, but Wallace was pulled off the train on his way to Grant's army the day after Grant told Halleck that it would upset the Army of the Tennessee command dispositions.

They only needed three men on the Buell commission, adding Wallace made five.

As a Military Commission, guidance was 13 members if possible, or as many as possible without disrupting the needs of the service, but never less than three (excluding the recorder). Five was apparently the norm, and the opinions of the JAG were to begin with a minimum of five to allow for losses to the court not to end the process. If the number of members fell below three, the entire process had to restart with newly appointed members.

 

[tony_gunter]

As a Military Commission, guidance was 13 members if possible, or as many as possible without disrupting the needs of the service, but never less than three (excluding the recorder). Five was apparently the norm, and the opinions of the JAG were to begin with a minimum of five to allow for losses to the court not to end the process. If the number of members fell below three, the entire process had to restart with newly appointed members.

It's not just the number of members, it's the timeline. He's literally on his way to Grant with orders from Lorenzo Thomas when Halleck asks if it's cool. Grant responds that he's ok with it but it would upset the command dispositions. Lorenzo Thomas immediately issues new orders that Grant sends to Cairo to be delivered to him when he arrives.

 

[67th Tigers]

It's not just the number of members, it's the timeline. He's literally on his way to Grant with orders from Lorenzo Thomas when Halleck asks if it's cool. Grant responds that he's ok with it but it would upset the command dispositions. Lorenzo Thomas immediately issues new orders that Grant sends to Cairo to be delivered to him when he arrives.

If that's the letter I have previously mentioned, then it's a month after Wallace is assigned to the Buell Commission. Are there other letters from October or early November on this topic?

 

[Rhea Cole]

By the way, total brain misfire about Featherston. He was only a brigade commander and was in the field under Loring. Maybe I was thinking of Forney, but his only major battle was bull run.

But maybe the general point still stands, why is Carter Stevenson, relatively inexperienced, in command of half the army in the field? I don't see a lot of options though. Pemberton was toast.

General Carter Littlepage Stevenson was a very able commander. He & his 8,000 (?) man division had been despatched to Vicksburg by Davis in November 1862. Rosecrans had excellent intel on Bragg's army at Murfreesboro.

It was sure knowledge that Forrest & Morgan had departed on raids & that Carter Stevenson was beyond recall that triggered Rosecrans' advance that resulted in the Battle of Stones River.

You have to pity Stevenson's troops & horses for the purgatory of train travel they endured.

General Carter Littlepage Stevenson read more here.

Link

Carter L. Stevenson

Carter L. Stevenson was born to a prominent family in Fredericksburg, Virginia, and gained an appointment at West Point, where he graduated in 1838....

www.battlefields.org

Link

Carter Littlepage Stevenson, Jr. - Vicksburg National Military Park (U.S. National Park Service)

Carter Littlepage Stevenson, Jr.

www.nps.gov

 

[tony_gunter]

If that's the letter I have previously mentioned, then it's a month after Wallace is assigned to the Buell Commission. Are there other letters from October or early November on this topic?

Yeah, you're right. I was misremembering the place that conversation with Halleck occupied in the timeline. It was Governor Morton of Indiana that raised the issue sometime after November 3rd that sending Wallace to report to Grant would risk command disruptions.

 

[tony_gunter]

General Carter Littlepage Stevenson was a very able commander. He & his 8,000 (?) man division had been despatched to Vicksburg by Davis in November 1862. Rosecrans had excellent intel on Bragg's army at Murfreesboro.

It was sure knowledge that Forrest & Morgan had departed on raids & that Carter Stevenson was beyond recall that triggered Rosecrans' advance that resulted in the Battle of Stones River.

You have to pity Stevenson's troops & horses for the purgatory of train travel they endured.

General Carter Littlepage Stevenson read more here.

Link

Carter L. Stevenson

Carter L. Stevenson was born to a prominent family in Fredericksburg, Virginia, and gained an appointment at West Point, where he graduated in 1838....

www.battlefields.org

Link

Carter Littlepage Stevenson, Jr. - Vicksburg National Military Park (U.S. National Park Service)

Carter Littlepage Stevenson, Jr.

www.nps.gov

Carter Stevenson had never commanded troops in a major battle. His 10,000 man division was nearly half of Pemberton's 22,000 man army in the field.

Loring was probably the most experienced commander with a division of about 7,000 IIRC. Bowen commanded about 4,000.

 

[tony_gunter]

[deleted duplicate]

 

[Mississippian1861]

On March 31st 1863, Pemberton had in the entire department:

Present for Duty: 3878 Officers and 44951 men
Aggregate Present: 61495 all ranks
Aggregate Present & Absent: 82318 all ranks

 

[67th Tigers]

On McClernand's crossing of the Mississippi, the major rebel dispositions of the Vicksburg region were:

• At Fort Pemberton, 106 miles NNE from Vicksburg: Loring's Division with Moore's Brigade: 7,227 PFD by the last return
• Snyder's Bluff (12 miles NNE from Vicksburg) and Vicksburg proper: Smith's Division with Hebert's Bde: 7,021 ditto
• At Port Gibson (30 miles SSW from Vicksburg, the closest forces): Forney's Division under Bowen: 4,564 ditto
• Buford's Brigade (just arrived at Jackson, 47 miles east of Vicksburg): 2,735 ditto
• Stevenson's Division as the mobile reserve (near Vicksburg): 10,476 ditto

Pemberton's force had recently received 2 brigades worth of reinforcements moved from Port Hudson (Buford's and Gregg's Bdes = 5,480 PFD) with another en route that arrived after Vicksburg was invested (Maxey = 2,747 PFD). Beauregard had been ordered to send a force of 8-10,000, but had only sent two bdes, which arrived after the movement, and so weren't at Vicksburg.

Smith wasn't for the field, and Pemberton had Loring on the northern approach, Bowen the southern, and Stevenson held to reinforce either...

About 5,000 men were the garrison of Vicksburg. The rest were a field army supposed to maneouvre around it. Getting ca. 20,000 PFD trapped in Vicksburg was pointless; 5,000 would have prevented an assault and held it just as long.

 

[Rhea Cole]

Pemberton was in command of the Department of Mississippi and East Louisiana. All of the army commanders in Mississippi (such as Van Dorn, Smith, Stevenson, Gardner, etc.) were subordinate to Pemberton and reported to him, not to Joseph Johnston. At pretty much no point during his tenure in Mississippi prior to Champion Hill was Pemberton in command of an army in the field. He attended a few reviews, he inspected the fortifications and garrisons of Vicksburg and Port Hudson. That's about it. Most of the rank and file probably never laid eyes on Pemberton more than once or twice.

Exactly, however Johnston commanded all of the Confederate forces in the West. Pemberton reported to him as did Bragg in Middle Tennessee. Davis, for his own esoteric reasons, saw fit to undermine Johnston's authority every chance he got. The muddled, uncoordinated Confederate operations in the West can be attributed directly to Davis' delusional thinking. Ordering Pemberton to hold Vicksburg is exhibit "A."

Davis was in what chess players call a "zugzwang." He could not trade territory for strategic advantage elsewhere. When the CSA abandoned an area it also abandoned the slave population to its own devices. Mass self-liberation as happened on Davis' own plantation was the result. His other option was to try & hold everywhere. Neither move was a formula for success. A chess player tips the king over & shakes the opponent's hand. Davis did not have that option, so not quite doing either was his decision… we all know how that worked out.

 

[Rhea Cole]

Carter Stevenson had never commanded troops in a major battle. His 10,000 man division was nearly half of Pemberton's 22,000 man army in the field.

Loring was probably the most experienced commander with a division of about 7,000 IIRC. Bowen commanded about 4,000.

tony_gunter, the answer to your question is a simple one.

Loring had no respect for Pemberton's ability to command the army. His analysis of the tactical & strategic situation agreed with General Johnston's. Vicksburg was a trap & preserving the army was the primary objective. Finding his command cut off from Vicksburg he wisely withdrew & joined Johnston.

• Maj. Gen. William W. Loring: He outranked Stevenson and commanded one of the primary divisions in the Confederate Army of Mississippi. During the retreat at the Battle of Champion Hill, Loring became separated from the rest of the army, took his division around the Union forces, and ended up joining Gen. Joseph E. Johnston in Jackson, Mississippi, rather than retreating into the city.

• Maj. Gen. Carter L. Stevenson: While junior to Loring, Stevenson played a much larger role during the actual Siege of Vicksburg. Stevenson successfully led his division into the city and was placed in command of the entire right wing of the Confederate defensive lines during the 47-day siege

Loring was not in Vicksburg during the siege. Carter Stephenson's command, which held the right wing of the works, was the logical right wing commander.

 

[Bradley]

His analysis of the tactical & strategic situation agreed with General Johnston's.

I don't think so. During Pemberton's council of war on May 14, Loring actually argued against following Johnston's suggestion, or order, to abandon Vicksburg and march to Clinton.

Source: OR24.

 

[Rhea Cole]

I don't think so. During Pemberton's council of war on May 14, Loring actually argued against following Johnston's suggestion, or order, to abandon Vicksburg and march to Clinton.

Source: OR24.

As my mother said many times, actions speak louder than words.